1
FAMIL
Y SUPPORT
IssueBRIEF
Rebekah Selekman and Pamela Holcomb
Child Support Cooperation Requirements
in Child Care Subsidy Programs and
SNAP: Key Policy Considerations
The EMPOWERED
study, conducted on
behalf of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning
and Evaluation (ASPE)
at the U.S. Department
of Health and Human
Services, examines the
use of performance
measures, work
requirements, and
child support coop-
eration requirements
across human services
programs. This issue
brief examines the use
of child support coop-
eration requirements
in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP)
program and child
care subsidy programs
funded under the Child
Care Development
Fund (CCDF).
HIGHLIGHTS
States have the option to require recipients of child care subsidies and Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to cooperate with child support agencies seeking
to establish paternity and support orders; and to enforce child support obligations as a
condition of eligibility.
Child support cooperation is more frequently required by child care subsidy recipients
(required by 23 states) than SNAP recipients (required by 7 states).
Within federal parameters, states have considerable exibility to design cooperation
requirement policies. Policy variation across states aects who is subject to the coopera-
tion requirement, the criteria used to determine good cause exemptions, and penalties
for noncooperation. A better understanding of how these policies are implemented at
the local level is needed to identify best practices for the eld.
Minimal data on cooperation requirements for child care subsidy and SNAP recipients
are collected by states. While there is heightened interest among state and federal policy-
makers to expand the mandate for child support cooperation requirements, the impact of
cooperation requirements on program operations and sta workload, program participa-
tion, child support receipt, and familys economic well-being remains largely unknown.
Some public programs—Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, and
Foster Care maintenance payments under
Title IV-E of the Social Security Act—have
a mandatory requirement for applicants and
participants to cooperate with the child support
program (also known as the IV-D program)
to establish paternity and support orders, and
to enforce child support obligations. However,
for other means-tested public programs, states
have the option to exercise a child support
cooperation requirement (Figure 1). is brief
focuses on the child care subsidy program
funded under the Child Care and Development
Fund (CCDF) and the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP).
BACKGROUND
Since the enactment of the landmark 1996 federal
welfare reform law (the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or
PRWORA), states have had the option to require
SNAP applicants and recipients—custodial
parents, noncustodial parents, or both—to
cooperate with child support.
1
Additionally,
under SNAP rules, states also have the option to
disqualify noncustodial parents who are in arrears
with their court-ordered child support payments.
Some states have also enacted laws or policies
that require applicants for and recipients of child
care subsidies funded under the Child Care
Development Fund (CCDF) to cooperate with the
child support program as a condition of eligibility.
OCTOBER 2018
MATHEMATICAMPR.COM
PRINCETON, NJ  ANN ARBOR, MI  CAMBRIDGE, MA  CHICAGO, IL  OAKLAND, CA  SEATTLE, WA
TUCSON, AZ  WASHINGTON, DC  WOODLAWN, MD
2
Requiring child sup-
port cooperation for
public program partici-
pants is a strategy for
reducing poverty and
promoting economic
mobility.
The IV-D child support program collects money from noncustodial parents and
distributes that financial support to their children. For some public programs, states
must require cooperation with child support as a condition of eligibility. For other
public programs, states have the option to require cooperation with child support.
2
REQUIRED FOR ALL STATES
TANF providesfinancial
assistancefor eligible low-
income familieswith children
to help pay for food, shelter,
utilities, and other basic needs
Medicaid provides health
coverage to eligible low-
income adults, children,
pregnant women, elderly
adults and people with
disabilities
MAY BE REQUIRED BY STATE
SNAP provides nutrition
assistance to eligible,
low-income individuals
and families through a
monthly benefit
CCDF provides financial
subsidies to low-income
families to access child
care so that parents can
work or attend job training
or educational programs
Figure 1. Public programs and child support cooperation requirements
Low-income families
that participate in
multiple public
programs can face
a complex array of
cooperation require-
ments with dierent
policies and rules.
As part of a broader policy conversation about
ways to reduce poverty and promote economic
mobility, there is increased interest at both
the federal and state levels how other public
programs can use child support cooperation
requirements to (1) increase self-suciency
and reduce the need for public assistance by
increasing family income and (2) increase
participation in the child support system and
noncustodial parents’ nancial support of
their children (Doar 2016; Executive Order
no.13828, 2018).
2
is conversation is, in part,
prompted by concern over a steady reduction in
the IV-D child support caseload, driven largely
by a decline in cases that are current or former
TANF participants.
is brief provides context for discussions on
this important and still evolving policy issue
by summarizing ndings from an exploratory
examination of the current landscape of optional
cooperation requirements. We draw on several
sources, including a scan of publicly available
data, discussions with federal stakeholders, and
in-depth discussions with child support, child
care, and SNAP administrators in eight states:
Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia.
We begin with a national snapshot of the
current status of states’ adoption of coopera-
tion requirements for child care subsidy and
SNAP recipients and an overview of the process
used to implement the requirement. Next we
describe key points in the cooperation process
at which states have exibility to shape policy,
and illustrate some policy variations between the
eight study states. en we oer considerations
for policy and practice and highlight areas ripe
for future research. More details about the study
methods can be found at the end of this brief.
USE OF COOPERATION
REQUIREMENTS: A NATIONAL
SNAPSHOT
As of May 2018, 24 states had exercised the
option to require recipients of child care subsi-
dies and/or SNAP to cooperate with the child
support program. Cooperation requirements
are much more common in child care programs
than in SNAP. Seventeen states require child
support cooperation only for recipients of child
care subsidies; one state requires cooperation
only for SNAP recipients; and six states require
cooperation for both child care subsidy and
SNAP recipients
(Figure 2).
3
Some states have many years of experience
applying these kinds of cooperation require-
ments. Among the study states, Michigan and
Mississippi have had cooperation requirements
in place since the 1990s, with Florida following
suit in the early 2000s. Since 2005, Colorado,
which has a county-administered child support
program, has given counties the option to require
cooperation of child care subsidy recipients.
3
Child support coop-
eration may include
participation in activi-
ties such as genetic
testing; attending
court hearings; and
sharing financial docu-
ments and information
to locate the noncus-
todial parent.
States with no child
support cooperation
requirements
States with child care
cooperation requirements
States with SNAP
cooperation requirements
States with SNAP and child
care cooperation
requirements
Figure 2. Use of child support cooperation requirements in child care subsidy
programs and SNAP, by state
Sources: The National Conference of State Legislatures Child Support and Family Law Legislation Database; the
Child Care Development Fund Policies Database; U.S. Department of Agriculture Annual State Option Reports; and
the National Council of Child Support Directors' May 2018 survey of state child support directors.
Note: One U.S. territory, Guam, exercises the option to disqualify custodial parents from SNAP eligibility for
noncooperation with child support.
Since 2015, 17 states
have introduced at
least one legislative
proposal to establish
child support coopera-
tion in SNAP.
About half of its counties requir
e cooperation at
this time. Since 2015, ve states have established
cooperation requirements for the rst time
4
:
Kansas (2015) requires cooperation for
recipients of child care subsidies and
for SNAP recipients.
Virginia (2016) requires cooperation
for child care subsidy recipients.
North Carolina (2017) requires
cooperation for child care subsidy
recipients in three pilot counties where
a cooperation requirement is being
implemented.
5
South Dakota (2017) requires
cooperation for SNAP recipients.
Maine (2017) requires cooperation for
SNAP recipients.
e option to establish child support coop-
eration requirements for child care subsidy or
SNAP recipients also allows states to rescind
the requirement. Currently, no single data source
contains information that could be used to com-
pile a complete record of the use of cooperation
requirements across states over time. Based on
our scan, however, it appears that take-up of the
option is dynamic, with some states adding and
others dropping the cooperation requirement in
these programs. For example, Wisconsin began
requiring SNAP recipients to cooperate in 2002
but eliminated the requirement in 2009. Idaho
required SNAP recipients to cooperate from
2004 through 2009,
eliminated the requirement
in 2011, and reinstated it in 2015.
Overall, a comparison of our scan of states
that required cooperation in child care subsidy
programs or SNAP as of 2018 and a similar
review conducted around 2005 suggests a slight
upward trend in the overall number of states
with these kinds of cooperation requirements
(Roberts 2005). e total number of states with
cooperation requirements for child care subsidy
recipients increased from 14 in 2005 to 17 in
2018, with 6 states adding the requirement and
2 dropping it. Also, comparing changes between
2005 and 2018, three states (Kansas, Maine,
and South Dakota) chose to start exercising the
option to have a SNAP child support coopera-
tion requirement, and Wisconsin dropped it.
Since 2005, relatively few states have chosen to
establish cooperation requirements for recipi-
ents of child care subsidies or SNAP recipients,
although, many proposals involving these
requirements were introduced during recent state
legislative sessions. ese have either failed or were
left pending at the close of the session. Since 2015,
for example, according to the National Conference
of State Legislatures’ Child Support and Family
Law Legislation Database, 17 states introduced at
least once bill establishing child support coopera-
tion in SNAP and 7 states introduced at least one
bill establishing cooperation requirements in child
care subsidy programs.
4
OVERVIEW OF THE COOPERATION
REQUIREMENT PROCESS
Apply for
assistance
Child
support
programs
Referral to child
support for
program for
cooperation
Initial and
ongoing
assessment of
cooperation
Child care
subsidy
program
and SNAP
Administering cooperation requirements relies
on close coordination between the referring assis-
tance program (the child care subsidy program or
SNAP) and the child support program. In turn,
both systems need to inform and interact with
the individuals seeking or receiving assistance
and communicate the outcome of those interac-
tions to each other within established time-
frames. is section summarizes the general steps
in the process and describes how an automated
electronic interface can facilitate it.
Key steps in the cooperation process. e
cooperation process begins when a person applies
for assistance. e assistance program informs
the applicant of the cooperation requirement
and determines whether the applicant should be
referred to the child support program for services.
After receiving the referral, the child support
agency contacts the individual to obtain informa-
tion required to establish paternity or a support
order (if needed) and enforce the order. e child
support agency is typically responsible for tracking
cooperation and updating the assistance agency on
cooperation status. e assistance agency is gener-
ally responsible for making the initial referral to
the child support agency, but there are exceptions.
For example, in Mississippi and South Dakota,
it is the responsibility of the child care subsidy
applicant to initiate contact with the child support
oce to open a case if one has not been opened
and to obtain verication of cooperation.
Applicants can be excused from cooperation
requirements for good cause if they demonstrate
that cooperating with child support would
not be in the best interest of the child; for
example, if it might increase the risk of physi-
cal or emotional harm to the child or custodial
parents. States set their own standards of proof
for demonstrating good cause, ranging from
personal testimony to court documents proving
the risk of harm to the child or custodial parent.
Good cause is frequently determined during
the initial application period or soon thereafter,
but can be assessed at any point during program
participation. An exemption from the coopera-
tion requirement can be determined at any point
by the assistance agency or the child support
agency. If applicants or recipients do not cooper-
ate, they are notied of their noncooperation
status, and they have an opportunity to cooper-
ate or be determined exempt for good cause.
Sanctions for noncooperation with child support
depend on the type of assistance program and the
state’s policy choices. For example, the sanction
for SNAP recipients is typically a reduction in
the overall household SNAP benet, whereas
the sanction for child care subsidy recipients is
typically the loss of the entire benet. In addi-
tion, the duration of the sanction may vary from
a minimum of one month to as long as 10 years.
If the recipient begins to cooperate with child
support, the child support agency modies the
cooperation status. Recipients may have their
benets automatically reinstated or they may have
to reapply. Once recipients no longer receive assis-
tance, they are no longer required to cooperate
with child support. However, the child support
program will continue to collect child support on
behalf of the children unless the custodial parent
asks the program to close the child support case.
is overview of the cooperation process is
based on a single program, but low-income
families often participate in more than one
public benet program and therefore may face
multiple cooperation requirements. is adds
layers of complexity for the administering agen-
cies and for families subject to these require-
ments, especially when the cooperation policies,
processes, and data systems vary by program.
For example, a state’s TANF sanction for child
support noncooperation could result in a full-
family sanction (that is, termination of benets
and case closure), whereas SNAP applies a
partial-family sanction for noncooperation (that
is, the non-cooperating individual is removed
from the household, which typically reduces the
households overall benet allotment, and the
5
Automated electronic
interfaces greatly
facilitate the
implementation of
cooperation policies.
remaining household members ma
y continue to
receive SNAP assistance). us, if members of a
household receive benets from more than one
program, they need to understand that the pen-
alty for noncooperation can vary by program and
know how it aects their eligibility and benets
Facilitating the cooperation process
through an automated electronic
interface. Putting cooperation requirements
into practice is a complex endeavor. To facili-
tate referrals and sharing of information, some
states rely on an automated electronic interface
between the child support data system and the
child care program and/or SNAP data systems,
similar to the automated electronic interfaces
that have been developed between state TANF
and child support systems. Some study states
use manual processes to coordinate transmission
of information, some use automated electronic
interfaces, and some use a mix of the two:
Florida, Kansas, and Michigan have an
automated electronic interface between their
assistance program(s) and the child support
program.
Mississippi and South Dakota have an auto-
mated electronic interface between the child
support program and SNAP, but not between
the child support and child care subsidy
programs.
Colorado, North Carolina, and Virginia rely
on a manual process to exchange information.
Although the particular data elements and system
structures vary, automated electronic interfaces
typically enable the assistance programs eligibility
data system to send nightly batch referrals to the
child support oce, which then alert the child sup-
port oce to open a case and begin engaging with
the parent subject to the cooperation requirement.
When a child support worker makes a change in
cooperation status in the system, the assistance
worker receives an electronic notication of the
change. In some states, such as Kansas, a change in
cooperation status automatically triggers notica-
tions and other case closure actions in the eligibility
system. In other states, child care or SNAP workers
still have to manually change the cooperation status
in the assistance programs eligibility data system to
trigger notications and case closures. While auto-
mated electronic interfaces are complicated and can
be expensive to design and implement, respondents
from the study states generally agreed that having
an electronic interface provided critical support for
implementing these types of cooperation policies
and is far pref
erable to more time-consuming,
labor-intensive manual processes.
In states and programs without an automated
electronic interface, referrals between programs
required manual processes to communicate
information. One county in Colorado developed
a Microsoft Access database for the child sup-
port and child care programs to share, so that
sta could record interactions with recipients
and track cooperation status. In North Caro-
lina, child care subsidy program sta and child
support program sta use mail, fax, or email
to share information about clients required to
cooperate with child support. In Virginia, child
care subsidy program sta also use mail, fax, or
email to send information to the child support
program; however, for updates on cooperation
status, child care subsidy sta manually access a
web-based computer system that stores informa-
tion across public programs to check the child
support cooperation status of their clients.
KEY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In general, states have considerable exibility to
design cooperation requirements. For example,
they can determine who should be subject to the
cooperation requirement, dene the criteria and
standards of proof for good cause exemptions
within parameters set by the federal government,
and determine the penalty for noncompliance
without good cause.
POLICY CONSIDERATION 1: WHO
SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE
COOPERATION REQUIREMENT IN
STATE OPTION PROGRAMS AND
WHEN SHOULD COOPERATION BE
ASSESSED?
Eligibility criteria for child care subsidies and
SNAP can inuence how states determine who
should be subject to the cooperation requirement.
Cooperation requirements primarily apply to the
custodial parent (or the person who has physical
custody of the child), but states may also require
the noncustodial parent to cooperate.
In our study sample, child care subsidy programs
do not require noncustodial parents to cooperate
with child support, because child care subsidies
are provided specically to custodial parents.
erefore, noncustodial parents are not referred
6
States may require
noncustodial parents
to cooperate with child
support but typically
only require coop-
eration of custodial
parents.
to child support unless they are applying for assis-
tance as the custodial parent for another child.
Among the ve study states with a cooperation
requirement for SNAP recipients, three states
include specic policy language that appears to
extend cooperation requirements to noncustodial
parents. In these states, respondents reported
that dening cooperation is challenging but can
include making good faith eorts to provide
child support payments. However, in practice,
it appears these states are focused primarily, if
not exclusively, on successfully implementing
cooperation requirements for custodial parents
in the SNAP household.
e initial assessment of child support coopera-
tion may take place before or after the determina-
tion of an applicants eligibility to receive benets.
For example, Mississippi
6
and North Carolina
require applicants for child care subsidies to verify
cooperation with child support before deter-
mining their eligibility for assistance, whereas
the remaining study states determine whether
the applicants are eligible for assistance before
initiating steps to establish cooperation with child
support. Similarly, South Dakota and Kansas
check child support cooperation status for SNAP
recipients before making a nal determination on
eligibility for assistance, whereas Florida, Michi-
gan, and Mississippi determine SNAP eligibility
before verifying child support cooperation.
Among states that do not determine eligibil-
ity before requiring child support cooperation,
respondents described working with applicants
to encourage them to cooperate with child
support and having application processing
times delayed because they were waiting for the
child support program to verify cooperation.
Child care and SNAP respondents believed the
ability to determine assistance eligibility before
establishing child support cooperation enabled
them to meet program-specic time frames for
processing applications and to connect recipients
to services in a timely manner.
Child support caseworkers assess and note the
recipients’ cooperation status on an ongoing basis.
If an individual stops cooperating with child
support at any point, the child support worker
will notify the child care and/or SNAP worker
directly or through the automated electronic
interface. Programs use this information to apply
a penalty for noncooperation in various ways:
Sta in child care subsidy programs who
are notied of any changes in a recipient’s
cooperation status may only take steps to
initiate the sanction process at the point of
subsidy recertication, which takes place every
12 or more months.
7
If the recipient does not
cooperate at that time, and has not demon-
strated good cause for refusal to cooperate, the
child care case is closed for noncooperation.
For SNAP, a change in cooperation status
prompts the SNAP worker to notify the recipient
that the sanction will be applied if he or she fails
to cooperate with child support, pending a deter-
mination of good cause for refusal to cooperate.
Most states provide a 10-day window from the
time recipients are notied of their noncoopera-
tion status to the time that they must reestablish
cooperation before the sanction is imposed.
POLICY CONSIDERATION 2: UNDER
WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD
A PERSON BE EXEMPT FROM
COOPERATION REQUIREMENTS?
Federal law requires states to provide good cause
exemptions from child support cooperation
requirements for all public programs. However,
within federal parameters that take into account
the best interests of the child, states may dene
the specic criteria used to dene what consti-
tutes good cause. Best practices for good cause
determination for TANF recipients have been
identied by federal agencies and domestic
violence advocacy groups (Davies 2000). Such
practices include providing a thorough explana-
tion of child support cooperation requirements,
describing the availability of exemptions and
other safeguards, providing enough time for
recipients to make a decision about proceeding
with child support services, and identifying ways
for recipients to cooperate with child support
without sacricing their safety.
Among the study states, good cause criteria
includes cases in which (1) there is a threat of
harm (including physical, sexual, and mental
harm) to the parent or children, (2) the child
was born because of rape or incest, or (3) there is
a pending adoption proceeding for the child.
States may also decide which agency is respon-
sible for determining whether a good cause claim
is valid. Among the eight study states, agencies
typically shared this responsibility, with eligibil-
7
Reasons for granting
good cause exemp-
tions typically include
the threat of harm to
the parent or child,
a child born of rape
or incent, or pending
adoption proceedings
for the child.
ity workers determining good cause if a claim
was made before the child support referral and
the child support workers determining good
cause after receiving a referral. Two study states
specically noted that a determination of good
cause exemption granted by any one public
program carries over to all public programs. One
state reported that it uses an Intimate Partner
Violence (IPV) indicator tool to identify if good
cause exists. In another state, state-level sta
meetings were being held to address concerns
that eligibility workers were not communicating
the good cause exemption clearly to recipients.
For the most part, study states aligned their good
cause criteria for child care subsidy and/or SNAP
recipients with those for TANF recipients.
A few study states have gone beyond the good
cause exemption criteria used by their TANF pro-
grams and another state was considering doing so:
In 2016, Colorado expanded good cause to
include teen parents in response to reports
that the child support cooperation require-
ments created barriers for teen parents in
accessing child care subsidies that could
otherwise help them stay in school.
North Carolina, which is currently piloting
a new cooperation requirement in its child
care program, created additional good cause
exemption categories designed to reduce
referrals of child care subsidy recipients who
do not need to be connected to child support
services, such as those who already have child
support orders in place or those in house-
holds where the absent parent was deceased
or incarcerated.
Virginia, like North Carolina, was still in the
early stages of implementing a child support
cooperation requirement for its child care
subsidy program. Respondents expressed
interest in examining how the exibility
to design good cause exemptions could be
leveraged to reduce inappropriate referrals to
child support and thereby reduce unnecessary
burden on the child support program.
POLICY CONSIDERATION 3: WHAT
SHOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCES
FOR NONCOOPERATION?
Study states typically dene cooperation with
child support as (1) completing a child support
intake form that is used to gather information
about the non-custodial parent, and (2) fol-
lowing thr
ough with any activities necessary
for opening and maintaining a child support
case. is includes providing information or
documentation relative to establishing paternity,
identifying and locating the noncustodial parent,
and providing any other information deemed
necessary to establish and enforce the child sup-
port order. For example, the child support agency
could determine that noncooperation exists if the
custodial parent missed scheduled appointments,
did not appear for scheduled court dates, or
otherwise failed to provide requested information
within required time frames.
8
Penalties for noncooperation are commonly
referred to as sanctions. Sanctions are intended
to encourage cooperation with program require-
ments when recipients might not have cooperated
otherwise. State policy choices related to the treat-
ment of noncooperation include two important
features: type of sanction and sanction duration.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of sanctions:
(1) “full-family sanctions, which lead to loss of
the entire benet during periods of noncoopera-
tion; and (2) partial-family sanctions, which
only disqualify or remove the non-cooperating
individual from the household benet. Sanction
duration refers to the amount of time a sanction
lasts. As highlighted below, states’ approaches to
these critical dimensions of sanction policy often
vary depending on whether the sanctions apply to
the child care subsidy program or to SNAP.
Sanction policy for child support
noncooperation for child care subsidy
recipients
Type of sanction. For child care subsidy
recipients, noncooperation typically leads to a
full-family sanction that results in the loss of the
child care subsidy. However, the sanction varies
in cases in which the custodial parents receive
child care subsidies for children with dierent
noncustodial parents. For example, in Michigan,
if the custodial parent does not cooperate with
child support, the entire child care subsidy is
terminated. In contrast, Mississippi only termi-
nates the child care subsidy for the children of
the noncustodial parent for whom the custodial
parent is determined to be in noncooperation.
Sanction duration. In most study states,
child care subsidy recipients remain ineligible
for assistance until they resume cooperating
with child support. Because of the full-family
8
State SNAP and child
care subsidy sanction
policies for noncoop-
eration with child sup-
port vary by program.
sanction, families that have been sanctioned
for noncooperation must reapply for services
and verify cooperation with child support
when they do so. Kansas implements a
graduated sanction approach for child care
subsidy recipients, starting with a minimum
ineligibility period of three months that
increases with each repeated incidence of
noncooperation up to 10 years.
Sanction policy for child support
noncooperation for SNAP recipients
Type of sanction. For SNAP households,
noncooperation with child support typically
results in a partial-family sanction. Non-
cooperating SNAP recipients are removed
from the household benet while the other
members of the household remain eligible
and continue to receive a SNAP benet.
Sanction duration. Across study states,
sanctions are closely tied to the period of
noncooperation. Sanctioned SNAP recipients
who re-establish cooperation (“cure” the sanc-
tion) have their SNAP benets reinstated to
the full benet in the next available month
after they begin cooperating. However, states
have the exibility to make sanctions more
stringent. Michigan, for example, requires
that the non-cooperating family member be
removed from the SNAP case for a minimum
of one full month.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY
AND PRACTICE
Although this study is largely exploratory and
limited to a small subset of states with “at
state-option cooperation requirements, several
interrelated considerations relevant for policy
and practice emerged from our discussions with
state administrators.
Enhanced automated data systems and
electronic interfaces
. According to state
respondents, having automated data systems sup-
ported the referral of recipients between programs
and the ability to report key program outcomes.
ough such data are critical for understanding
and reporting on the actual or potential impact of
cooperation requirements, most study states did not
have them readily available.
Need for data to inform policy and improve
program management.
Most study states had
limited ability to access data in a format that
allo
wed sta at child support or assistance agen-
cies to estimate the actual or potential impacts
of cooperation requirements. For example,
they could not easily assess the impacts on the
number of referrals, cooperation status, and child
support collections for cases that were referred to
child support by the child care subsidy program
and/or SNAP and were not also participating
in TANF. e lack of federal reporting require-
ments related to cooperation requirements also
reduces the need to have automated data systems
that can run reports on this specic population.
However, this information is important for esti-
mating the extent to which extending coopera-
tion requirements to the state child care subsidy
program and/or SNAP might impact program
outcomes, sta workload, and programs’ ability
to meet federal performance benchmarks.
Limited funding for automated data
systems and electronic interface.
State
respondents emphasized that automated data sys-
tems and electronic interfaces are important for
transmitting information between the assistance
programs and the child support program. ey
noted the signicant system and cost implica-
tions associated with developing, maintaining,
and upgrading existing interfaces. Respondents’
estimates of the cost of updating their data
systems to facilitate an automated electronic
interface ranged from $250,000 to over $1 mil-
lion. To reduce system implementation costs, one
study state coupled system updates with a broader
initiative to align data systems involving dierent
departments and programs. For example, the state
was able to add child care subsidy program and
SNAP interfaces to the data system used by the
TANF program, which already interfaced with
the child support program.
Planning for the implementation of a
cooperation requirement
. Study states with
recent experience (since 2015) implementing
a cooperation requirement in the child care
subsidy program or SNAP emphasized the need
for plenty of lead time and described engaging
in an extensive planning process that focused on
several key areas.
Modifying program-specific and auto-
mated electronic interface data systems.
States emphasized the need for signicant plan-
ning, involving both policy and technical sta,
to identify and make necessary changes to their
data systems to support communication between
9
Tips for facilitating implementation of cooperation requirements
Use available data and create new reporting capabilities that cross public programs and
estimate the potential impact of cooperation requirements on program participation and
outcomes, sta workload, and the programs’ ability to meet performance benchmarks.
When possible, reduce costs of coordinated system development and interfaces by
coupling system updates that support implementation of child support cooperation
requirements with broader updates to data systems.
To the extent possible, streamline policies and processes with other public programs for
which a cooperation requirement already exists, including good cause.
Provide a long design period for planning, developing, and testing system modifications and
electronic interfaces.
Slowly roll out cooperation requirements across the state to avoid system overload with
new cases, and allow for adjustments in stang to absorb increase in sta workload.
progr
ams. Coordinating data systems required
study states to devote time and resources to
updating their data systems, if possible, or to cre-
ate manual processes for sharing data. Even with
substantial planning time for this part of the
process, states still updated and adjusted their
systems to account for real-time feedback during
the initial rollout of cooperation requirements.
Aligning policies and processes. In planning
for implementing new cooperation requirements,
states sought to identify and align policies and
procedures for referral, intake, and ongoing case
monitoring across assistance programs to better
coordinate and streamline the assistance applica-
tion process and the cooperation determination
process. For example, states aligned procedures
by using consistent good cause exemption
categories across programs.
Minimizing burden. States recognized that
implementing a new cooperation requirement
could result in increasing sta workload for all the
involved programs. Child care and/or SNAP sta
need to explain the cooperation requirement to
applicants and recipients, complete the necessary
referral steps, and process sanctions (or good cause
exemptions) as necessary for non-cooperating
recipients. is increases their workload, and for
child support sta, those increases are associated
with having more cases to work as a result of the
cooperation requirement, and with spending more
time communicating with the child care and/or
SNAP program about the cooperation status.
Most states faced the challenge of handling
workload increases with existing sta because
they had little or no funding to hire more sta.
Only o
ne study state—Kansas—provided
additional support to oset the anticipated
increase in workload when it rolled out its
new child care subsidy and SNAP cooperation
requirements. Other states did not have
additional stang resources and had to absorb
the increase in workload, which some states
viewed as a challenge for their already strained
systems. All of these study sites sought to
reduce the initial burden on sta by rolling
out cooperation requirements slowly, either by
focusing on specic regions or by rst requiring
new applicants to cooperate and later expanding
the requirement to current recipients.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
is work is an exploratory examination of
child support cooperation requirements in light
of increased interest in broadening their reach
and impact in public programs. At a basic level,
there is no single source of data to track states’
use of cooperation requirements across public
programs. To obtain a more complete picture
of key policy features and continue systematic
tracking of states’ use of these requirements,
future research eorts could compile informa-
tion on the use of child support cooperation
requirements across public programs over time
in a single data source. A database of this type
could also be used to track key policy features
such as cooperation requirements for noncusto-
dial parents, timing of cooperation assessment,
good cause exemption categories and standards
of proof, and sanction policies.
10
State and f
ederal stakeholders want to know more
about the impacts of cooperation requirements
on each programs application rates, caseload
size, performance benchmarks, and family and
economic well-being. Both state- and federal-
level stakeholders report that this information
is critical for assessing the costs and benets of
expanding mandatory cooperation requirements.
Across the study states, respondents reported that
they would like to use the data they have available
to try to estimate some of these key outcomes.
However, across the study states, there is a lack of
systematically collected data on child care subsidy
and/or SNAP recipients who are required to
cooperate with child support.
Due to data system limitations and compet-
ing priorities, assessment of outcomes related
to cooperation requirements has been very
minimal. Research using existing integrated
state administrative data or matched data from
child support, child care, and SNAP, could help
answer these pressing policy questions.
Although this study provides a formative
examination of cooperation policies at the state
level, local-level practitioners could provide a
deeper, more nuanced understanding of how
cooperation requirements are implemented in
the eld. Collecting qualitative data at the local-
level could capture variation in implementation
practice across localities (such as urban versus
rural areas) and from caseworker to caseworker.
Moreover, such data could further clarify and
compare cooperation requirement policy and
implementation practice within and across
the SNAP and child care programs. Issues of
interest that could be explored with local-level
practitioners include the use of and challenges
associated with relying on automated electronic
interfaces to support communication between
programs, variation in and best practices for
good cause exemptions, and how sanctions for
noncooperation are applied.
To further inform policy, future research could also
examine the impact of cooperation requirements
by collecting qualitative data from applicants,
current recipients, and former recipients on their
perspectives and experiences with these require-
ments. Such research could examine how appli-
cants learn about cooperation requirements and
how this information inuenced their decision to
participate in child care and/or SNAP. In addition,
speaking with individuals about their decision
to cooperate would shed light on how recipients
from dierent programs weigh the advantages and
drawbacks of cooperation with child support and
the extent to which they feel child support services
increase their familys economic well-being.
Child support cooperation
requirements: building the
knowledge base
To better inform policy discussion and
development on the use of child support
cooperation requirements, additional
data collection and research is needed to:
create and maintain a single data
tracking source to compile informa-
tion on the use of child support coop-
eration requirements across public
programs over time;
draw from existing integrated state
administrative data or match state
administrative data from child sup-
port, child care, and SNAP to learn
more about the impact of coopera-
tion requirements across multiple
programs on child support outcomes,
SNAP or child care subsidy participa-
tion, and family well-being;
examine how cooperation require-
ments across multiple programs are
implemented at the state and local
level, including variation in case-
worker practice, use of and challenges
associated with automated electronic
interfaces, enforcement of sanctions
for noncooperation and best practices
for good cause exemptions;
explore how applicants and recipients
of public programs learn about coop-
eration requirements, the trade-os
these requirements present for families,
and whether the cooperation require-
ment influenced participation in SNAP,
child care and other public programs.
11
REFERENCES
Davies, Jill. “Recommendations for Training
TANF and Child Support Enforcement Sta
About Domestic Violence.” Welfare and Domestic
Violence Technical Assistance Initiative.
Developed by the National Resource Center on
Domestic Violence, Building Comprehensive
Solutions to Domestic Violence Initiative, 2000.
Available at https://vawnet.org/sites/default/les/
materials/les/2016-09/WELprac3.pdf. Accessed
October 3, 2018.
Doar, Robert. “Reinvigorating Child Support
Enforcement as an Anti-Poverty Program.”
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute,
April 2016. Available at http://www.aei.org/
publication/reinvigorating-child-support-
enforcement-as-an-anti-poverty-program/.
Accessed October 2, 2018.
Executive Order no.13828. “Reducing Poverty in
America by Promoting Economic Mobility and
Upward Mobility.” 83 FR 15941, April 10, 2018.
Available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2018/04/13/2018-07874/reducing-
poverty-in-america-by-promoting-opportunity-
and-economic-mobility. Accessed October 3, 2018.
Roberts, Paula. “Child Support Cooperation
Requirements and Public Benets Programs: An
Overview of Issues and Recommendations for
Change.” Washington, DC: Center for Law and
Social Policy, November 2005. Available at https://
www.clasp.org/sites/default/les/public/resources-
and-publications/les/0252.pdf. Accessed
October 2, 2018.
e White House. “Executive Order Reducing
Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity and
Economic Mobility.” April 10, 2018. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/
executive-order-reducing-poverty-america-
promoting-opportunity-economic-mobility/.
Accessed October 2, 2018.
U.S. Congress.Agriculture and Nutrition Act
of 2018.” H.R. 2. 115th Congress. April 12,
2018. Available at https://agriculture.house.gov/
uploadedles/agriculture_and_nutrition_act_
of_2018.pdf. Accessed October 2, 2018.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). “Case Worker Desk Card: Safely Pursuing
Child Support.” HHS, Administration for
Children and Families, Oce of Child Support
Enforcement. April 17, 2012. Available at https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/safely-pursuing-
child-support-desk-card. Accessed October 3,
2018.
ENDNOTES
1
Before PRWORA provided states the option to
apply a child support cooperation requirement on
SNAP recipients, states could (and still may) elect
to remove individuals from their household SNAP
benet if they fail to perform actions required by
certain federal, state, or local means-tested public
assistance programs. is is known as a compa-
rable disqualication”. Our study focuses on states
that impose a specic cooperation requirement
for SNAP recipients, and not on those that use
comparable disqualications.
2
Recent eorts to reauthorize the Agricultural
Act of 2014 (also known as “e Farm Bill”)
included a provision approved by the U.S. House
of Representatives (H.R. 2) to remove the state
option to require cooperation of SNAP recipients
and make cooperation with child support manda-
tory for both custodial and noncustodial parents. In
contrast, the Senate-passed version of the Farm Bill
(S.3042) did not include a mandatory child support
cooperation requirement for SNAP recipients.
As of this writing, the Farm Bill lapsed because
Congress was unable to reach a consensus before
the reauthorization deadline.
3
Maine is included in the count of states that
require child support cooperation for SNAP
recipients because it requires noncustodial parents
who have child support orders to cooperate with
child support as a condition of receiving SNAP,
even though they do not require custodial parent
SNAP recipients to cooperate with child sup-
port. Although Virginia law requires the referral
of SNAP applicants to child support, it is not
included in the count of states that have child sup-
port cooperation requirements for SNAP recipients
because the law does not require cooperation with
child support as a condition of SNAP eligibility.
4
South Dakota and Maine established coopera-
tion requirements for SNAP participants for the
rst time since 2015. However, both states have
cooperation requirements for child care subsidy
recipients that predate their SNAP cooperation
requirements.
5
In 2017, North Carolina passed a bill to pilot
cooperation requirements for child care subsidy
recipients in three to six counties. Beginning in
February 2018, North Carolina implemented
cooperation requirements in three counties. e
pilot lasts through December 2018. In March 2019,
the Division of Child Development and Early
Education and the Division of Social Services will
report to the Joint Legislative Oversight Commit-
tee on Health and Human Services and the Fiscal
Research Division on the outcomes of the pilot,
including costs and recommendations or challenges
sustaining cooperation requirements long term.
12
Follow us on:
Mathematica
®
is a registered trademark of Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Scan this QR code
to visit our website.
12
6
Mississippi has an electronic interface between
the child support system and the SNAP program,
allowing a determination of SNAP eligibility
without verication of child support cooperation.
However, there is no interface between the child
care system and the child support system, which
is why applicants must contact the child support
oce to obtain verication of cooperation.
7
e Child Care and Development Block Grant
Act of 2014 established requirements designed to
provide more stability for families receiving child
care subsidies, including a federal-level policy
requiring eligibility redetermination periods of a
minimum of 12 months—essentially providing
continuous eligibility for families for a minimum of
12 months so long as their income does not exceed
the federal income threshold and they do not expe-
rience a non-temporary change in work, education,
or training that aects eligibility. In contrast, states
previously had the authority to set redetermination
periods and almost half used a six-month period.
8
Across study sites, caseworkers were trained to not
consider custodial parents to be non-cooperative if
they truly lacked information on the noncustodial
parent that was needed by the child support agency.
For noncustodial parents, criteria used to determine
noncompliance did not include an inability to pay
child support or owing back child support.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to express
their appreciation to all those
who contributed to this project,
including administrators and
other sta from the child sup-
port, child care, and SNAP agen-
cies in the eight study states
and representatives from the
Administration for Children and
Families’ Oce of Child Support
Enforcement, the Administration
for Children and Families’ Oce
of Child Care, and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture’s Food and
Nutrition Service. We would
also like to thank Robert Doar
from the American Enterprise
Institute, Rodney Hopkins from
the University of Utah, Meghan
McCann from the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures,
and Diane Potts, President of the
National Child Support Enforce-
ment Association 2017-2018,
for their valuable assistance and
insights. Finally, we thank the
Oce of the Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation at
the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services for its sup-
port of the EMPOWERED project
and we are especially grateful
for the thoughtful guidance
provided by Lauren Antelo, our
Federal Project Ocer.
This report was prepared under
contract #HHSP233201500035I
/ HHSP23337027T. The opinions
and views expressed in this
report are those of the authors.
They do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Department of
Health and Human Services, the
contractor or any other funding
organization.
Overview of child support cooperation data sources
Data collection for this exploratory study of child support cooperation requirements was
conducted between December 2017 and June 2018 and included semi-structured discus-
sions with federal and state-level stakeholders and a scan of publicly available databases on
state-level child support cooperation legislation and policy. When possible, we triangulated
data across sources.
The scan relied on three main data sources to identify the current status of states adoption
of the cooperation requirements in SNAP and federally-funded child care programs:
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) Child Support and Family Law
Legislation Database, which covers passed, pending and failed legislation from 2012-
2018 (http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-family-law-
database.aspx)
The CCDF Policies Database, which includes child care subsidy policies for the 50 states,
the District of Columbia, and the US territories and outlying areas from 2009 through
2015 (https://www.researchconnections.org/childcare/studies/36581)
USDA State Options Reports, the compilation of results of state surveys conducted by
the Food and Nutrition Service on the use of various SNAP policy options from 2002
through 2018 (https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/state-options-report)
In addition to these resources, we used information collected as part of a survey of IV-D
child support directors conducted by The National Council of Child Support Directors in
May 2018 to confirm information collected through our scan. The results of this survey are
not publicly available.
Discussions with federal stakeholders included representatives from the Administration for
Children and Families’ Oce of Child Support Enforcement, the Administration for Children
and Families’ Oce of Child Care, and the Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition
Service. To gain more insight into state-level policies, telephone discussions were conduct-
ed with IV-D child support directors and SNAP and/or child care subsidy program sta in
eight states: Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Dakota,
and Virginia. (We also conducted an interview with one county administrator.) These states
were selected because they provided variety in which programs had the cooperation re-
quirement (that is, SNAP-only, child care-only, or both), had cooperation requirements that
had been in eect for diering lengths of time, and represented a mix of county-adminis-
tered and state-administered child support systems.
All discussions were held with state-level administrators except in Colorado, where discus-
sion included a county-administrator as well. Further insights into state experiences with
child support cooperation requirements for child care subsidy recipients and SNAP partici-
pants were obtained through a meeting convened for this purpose at the National Child
Support Enforcement Association Policy Forum in February 2018.