PIONEER INSTITUTE
Pioneer’s Mission
Pioneer Institute is an independent, non-partisan, privately funded research organization that
seeks to improve the quality of life in Massachusetts through civic discourse and intellectually
rigorous, data-driven public policy solutions based on free market principles, individual liberty and
responsibility, and the ideal of effective, limited and accountable government.
Pioneer Institute is a tax-exempt 501(c)3 organization funded through the donations of individuals, foundations and businesses
committed to the principles Pioneer espouses. To ensure its independence, Pioneer does not accept government grants.
Pioneer Education seeks to increase the edu-
cation options available to parents and students,
drive system-wide reform, and ensure account-
ability in public education. e Center’s work
builds on Pioneer’s legacy as a recognized leader
in the charter public school movement, and as
a champion of greater academic rigor in Mas-
sachusetts’ elementary and secondary schools.
Current initiatives promote choice and compe-
tition, school-based management, and enhanced
academic performance in public schools.
Pioneer Health seeks to refocus the Massachu-
setts conversation about health care costs away
from government-imposed interventions, toward
market-based reforms. Current initiatives include
driving public discourse on Medicaid; present-
ing a strong consumer perspective as the state
considers a dramatic overhaul of the health care
payment process; and supporting thoughtful tort
reforms.
is paper is a publication of Pioneer Oppor-
tunity, which seeks to keep Massachusetts com-
petitive by promoting a healthy business climate,
transparent regulation, small business creation in
urban areas and sound environmental and devel-
opment policy. Current initiatives promote mar-
ket reforms to increase the supply of aordable
housing, reduce the cost of doing business, and
revitalize urban areas.
Pioneer Public seeks limited, accountable gov-
ernment by promoting competitive delivery of
public services, elimination of unnecessary reg-
ulation, and a focus on core government func-
tions. Current initiatives promote reform of how
the state builds, manages, repairs and nances its
transportation assets as well as public employee
benet reform.
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THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
Table of Contents
1. State of Capital Projects
____________________
4
2. MBTA just doesn’t have the people
to achieve the aggressive new targets
____________
5
3. Acquiring the talent for the job
________________
6
3.1 A new approach to projects
__________________
6
3.2 Addressing hiring difficulties
_________________
8
4. Confusing leadership & management structure
______
8
5. Unbalanced workload
_____________________
8
6. Better HR plan and management structure are
required to meet much larger budget targets
_______
8
7. Structure for Capital Projects and Maintenance
______
9
8. Key talent recruitment
____________________
10
8.1. Appropriate senior salary scales
_______________
10
8.2. Reduce length and complexity of hiring procedures
____
10
8.3. Monitoring of the staffing compliment
of the Capital Investment Plan rollout
____________
11
9. City to Regional Co-operation
_______________
11
Conclusion
____________________________
11
4
THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
brightest in key positions, with the result that some positions
have remained vacant for extended periods of time. Cumber-
some hiring policies are part of the reason for a shortage of
critical skills that prevent the T from ramping up rollout of the
capital investment projects needed to meet signicant infra-
structure shortcomings.
is paper makes recommendations that will ramp up
the deployment of the right talent in the right positions. Our
ultimate objective is to signicantly increase capital invest-
ment delivery. Revitalizing the MBTA will require ve major
changes that amount to a Marshall Plan for hiring and con-
tracting — better hiring practices, improved internal orga-
nization, strategic use of external expertise, appropriate pro-
curement models and city-to-regional co-operation. Nothing
less will get the MBTA riders the modernization of transit
services they need.
1. State of Capital Projects
e MBTA has suered from underspending on capital
projects and the eects of this can be seen in the poor state
of repair of the Red, Orange, Blue and Green Lines and
commuter rail, recent derailments, res, and long delays.
Management has ramped up capital spending targets, but
has a long way to go to achieve a state of good repair and
modernize the system. e graph below illustrates the
underspending of capital budgets.
Let’s start with the good news for the MBTA. e Gover-
nor and the Massachusetts Legislature have committed over
$8.5 billion to repair and modernize the T between scal years
2020 and 2024. Now, the bad news. If the past is prologue, the
T currently has nowhere near the capacity to spend that much.
is paper is an urgent call to put all options on the table to
meeting the challenge, including models for accomplishing
the work but with a special focus on acquiring the talent to
do the work.
As Pioneer recently reported in a paper on capital spend-
ing entitled “e MBTA’s Capital Spending Crisis,” the T has
historically struggled severely when its capital spending bud-
get was increased dramatically.
1
It is one thing to approve a
capital budget on paper for $1.6 billion per annum, but quite
another to actually execute on that volume of projects.
Back in 2001, when the MBTA budgeted $250 million in
annual capital expenditures, it was generally able to achieve at
least a 90 percent spend rate. But when, in 2009, the budget
was hiked to meet the goal of spending an annual average of
$750 million over the ve-year plan starting that year, it took
the T four years to ratchet up its capacity to approximate that
new objective.
Unsurprisingly, a key element in achieving a dramatical-
ly higher spend rate is attracting and retaining professional
expertise in capital delivery.
e problem with the MBTA capital program is not a lack
of money, but the ability to spend it. e MBTA suers from a
hiring crisis and has had great diculty attracting the best and
Figure 1. Actual spending in $Millions versus the Budgeted 2020–2025 Capital Spending
0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
Fiscal Year
24230222120191817161514131211100908070600504030201
Source: MBTA Audited Financial Statements
Projected Spending
2019 in $ Millions
Good Repair
Required Spend With
‘Rail’ in $ Millions
Good Repair Required
Spending in $ Millions
Current Spending
in $ Millions
5
THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
0
Fiscal Year
24230222120191817161514131211100908070600504030201
$500
In “The MBTA’s Capital Spending Crisis,” Pioneer Institute mentioned the onerous legal obstacles to
speeding up capital delivery, such as the filed sub-bid law. The MBTA is required to conduct a se
parate
trade contractor selection process for 18 types of sub-contractors when the it uses Construction Manager at
Risk contracts (M.G.L c 149A). Furthermore, state law prohibits the MBTA from using Design-Build and
Construction Manager-at-Risk project delivery methods for contracts of less than $5 million. Most other
states do not place dollar values on alternative project delivery methods.
The real solution is put the MBTA on a similar (and shorter) procurement footing as other U.S.
transit agencies. The state Legislature should allow the MBTA to use any Federal Transit Agen-
cy-approved standard procurement procedures for transit agencies with approval of the Massa-
chusetts Inspector General, which would achieve this.
The table below puts the capital spending problem in stark relief. We have looked at the five-year
plans and translated the average amount budgeted for in each five-year into an average annual target.
We then compared this number to the average annual spend over the CIP period for each of these
CIPs for each of these years to show how spending has been falling behind.
Figure 2. MBTA Average annual budget versus average annual spend.
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
Source: MBTA Audited Financial Statements
2
e MBTA clearly has a problem meeting capital expenditure targets. Part of the reason is that inter-
nal stang, management and internal structural limitations make procurement excruciatingly di-
cult. All this can be overcome, however, with the correct plan to attract and retain the correct people.
Cooperation of all at the MBTA and MassDOT is needed to meet the challenge of modernizing the
MBTA. A sense of ownership and community will go a long way, but some key interventions will be
needed to ramp up delivery.
2. MBTA just doesn’t have the people to achieve the aggressive new targets.
In “e MBTA Capital Spending Crisis,” we pointed out three massive jumps in spending targets
that were followed by lags of several years before the T could ramp up capital expenditures. ese
lags were caused by not having capital delivery sta and internal systems that were sucient to meet
the targets.
Average annual spent
during CIP period
Average annual spend
rate badged in CIP
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THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
infrastructure. Other transit agencies, other state agencies
and big infrastructure companies have used alternative models
to get projects done more quickly that will be helpful to the
MBTA and will ll those gaps. Management should look at
solutions utilized by other successful agencies.
In 2003, the National Highway Research Program, in
conjunction with the Transportation Research Board, pub-
lished a paper dealing with the practice of outsourcing where
it makes sense:
What is new is that some state DOTs have begun to
outsource their capital program delivery functions,
e.g. major facility designs and related PS&E (plans,
specications, and estimates) production, major proj-
ect construction supervision, and comprehensive, long
term major area or system maintenance functions…
Although most states retain overall ultimate manage-
ment responsibility of the delivery process, some are
beginning to consider delegating some of that respon-
sibility as well.
5
In April 2019, a report by the Federal Highway Admin-
istration’s Oce of International Programs entitled “Con-
struction Management Practices in Europe and Canada” lays
out the stang issues being experienced internationally with
regard to construction and project management:
Historically, agencies have maintained design and
construction administration sta in-house to ensure
quality design and construction. However, increasing
industry demand for engineers and technicians, more
competition for workers, a large number of retirements,
the need for broader skill sets, and dierent expecta-
tions of young engineers are making it dicult for
some agencies to maintain an appropriate stang level.
(FHWA2003).
U.S. transportation agencies are shifting methodology, with
much of the planning, design, and construction work being
outsourced. is is as much a trend in
transit agencies as in highway depart-
ments.
Figure 3. provides a useful summa-
ry from the Federal Highway Author-
ity report. e column on the left lists
planning, design, and construction
activities, which traditionally have
been done in-house. e remaining
columns list the approximate amount
of work outsourced to the private sector. e percentages
are only estimates provided by international highway agency
interviewees, but they reect the overall use of in-house sta
versus consultants.
In comments made to Boston 25 News, it was clear that
MBTA leadership recognizes the stang problem:
Steve Poftak, who took over as head of the MBTA in
January, told the authority’s oversight board Monday
that the gures outlined in the existing ve-year cap-
ital investment plan — a 66 percent jump in spending
for expansion, reliability and modernization project —
is ‘not something the MBTA will be able to execute.’
3
Instead, he suggested a new model with smaller but
steady annual increases for those categories. e
change would give the MBTA time to add the sta
and capacity needed to spend at least $1.5 billion per
year on maintenance by scal year 2024, ocials said,
and bring the entire transit system up to a state of good
repair by 2032. at’s the spending that is going to
rebuild the system and create a reliable and dependable
MBTA that we want to run...By focusing on the whole
ve years and, in fact, the whole 15 years, it could mean
you don’t spend as much this year, but you get those
contracts in place and those studies in place so we’re
ramping up.”
4
e MBTA currently has around 6,200 employees, but
has a number of key vacancies that stretch back a number of
years. Poftak recently hired a head of capital projects and has
highlighted the 80 to 90 key vacancies he is attempting to ll
to ramp up capital project delivery. is new appointment is
clearly a step in the right direction.
However a number of key vacancies pre-date Poftak and
were a challenge for his predecessors to ll. For the T to fulll
its capital spending mandate will require a number of addi-
tional highly skilled professionals with construction experi-
ence, and perhaps a new approach to these capital projects is
required.
3. Acquiring the talent for the job
ere are broadly two approaches to acquiring the talent to
ramp up capital delivery and service at the MBTA that are
outlined in this paper. e rst is to take a new approach to
projects, particularly Capital Projects, but in some cases oper-
ations also. Broadly speaking this means nding an organi-
zation that already has the talent for a particular project or
service. e other broad approach is to hire the right talent,
particularly senior talent needed at the T, deploy them in
improved internal structures and retain them over time.
3.1 A new approach to projects
It is clear that even with revamped hiring procedures and
improved internal structures there will still be gaps in what’s
needed to complete modernization of MBTA systems and
These lags were
caused by not having
capital delivery staff
and internal systems
that were sufficient
to meet the targets.
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THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
Figure 3. Construction management outsourcing analysis
Outsourcing Activity Ontario Germany England
2
Scotland The Netherlands Finland
Design 80–90% 30–100%
3
100% 100%
4
70%
5
100%
Testing
100% 50% 100% 100%
6
100% 100%
Construction 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Construction Contract Administration
95% 0% 90% 100% 50% 0%
Maintenance
100% 0%
7
100%8 100% 100% 100%
Source: Federal Highway Administration
Some international agencies use private consultants for some of the work, while others have
almost completely outsourced traditional state agency functions:
Germany and the Netherlands are most like the United States in their approach to design
and construction stang. ey maintain a higher level of in-house engineers to perform
design and construction administration. e Bavarian highway agency in Munich, Ger-
many, performs about 30 percent of its design for interstates in-house and about 70 percent
for federal highways and state roads… Germany also maintains its system with state sta,
but it is the only country that still performs that function.
6
e Netherlands department is being downsized, but recognizes the need to maintain expertise
for technical aspects of the program such as for bridges and tunnels.
England and Scotland are perhaps the most dierent from the United States in their use of
in-house sta. e Private Finance Initiative of 1991 and a series of other issues have led
the Highways Agency in England to outsource 95 percent of its expenditures. It has only a
small engineering sta in-house, and has changed from the role of providing engineering
functions to overseeing them.
6
Closer to home, the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) has used an outside project management
agency to roll out its Capital Investment Program. Historically service had deteriorated and the
infrastructure was old. e decision was taken to get outside expertise to handle system modern-
ization. Chicago Transit Partners (CTP), a joint venture of three companies specializing in con-
struction, engineering and design management: DMJM+Harris, Inc. and Consoer, Townsend
Envirodyne Engineers, Inc., both of Chicago, and Kenny Construction Company of Wheeling,
Ill was ultimately chosen to become the eective project manager and their contract has been
renewed several times since 2005.
7
It is an extraordinarily large project and they have been paid
signicant fees for their work. Since this program has rolled out, the authority has rebuilt over 40
stations and added an additional three, among other advances. Winning accolades from the public
and the American Public Transit Association for much-improved service and reliability.
8
In 2019
CTP was again chosen to head up improvement projects for the CTA.
To get projects completed, some large private rms have already retained skills the MBTA
may be struggling to recruit. To speed delivery, some projects are best handled by such rms, even
on the operational side in some instances.
For its current projects, the MBTA should explore whether it would be desirable to outsource
some of the project management and have only internal senior sta to oversee, inspect and sign
o as the project unfolds, with external contracts including much of the project management.
Some operations can be outsourced for eciency gains. After a rough start, Keolis has recently
improved commuter rail service. However the full impact of outsourcing is probably not being felt
in this case, as the equipment, infrastructure and stang are largely the same that had been used
by the previous contractor. Some eciency gains should result from the outsourced model alone,
but with faster trains, better fare collection systems, fast boarding stations and a better-drafted
contract with Keolis, much more could be achieved. ere may be other operational systems that
are currently not functioning well that may benet from private expertise in cases where bringing
on signicant internal expertise is proving unachievable.
For its current projects,
the MBTA should
explore whether it
would be desirable to
outsource much of the
project management
and have only internal
senior staff to oversee,
inspect and sign off
as the project unfolds,
with external contracts
including much of the
project management.
8
THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
Poftak’s plan involves hiring another 80 full-time employ-
ees to focus on capital projects, bringing the sta up to the
budgeted level in that area, and a high-ranking ocial to
oversee the programs.
12
Chief of Capital Projects Jay Neider
was hired in May 2019 and a process is underway to sta his
oce
13
. However the timelines to ll the capital positions is
likely to be too long to facilitate the required capital spending
increase.
4. Confusing leadership & management
structure.
Senior MBTA leadership has acknowledged that T manage-
ment structures are messy. Poftak said as much to the FMCB:
“the T’s management structure is very confusing. He said 271
of the 278 nonaliated (nonunion) management positions
at the agency have dierent titles. Transportation Secretary
Stephanie Pollack seemed taken aback by the statistic, and
asked (Matt) St. Hilaire ( the HR director) to conrm the
numbers were accurate. When he conrmed the numbers, she
said: “at can be tough to manage.”
14
With complex reporting lines, progress slows, duplication
can occur, or items fall o the radar. Take the Aquarium sta-
tion on the Blue Line for example. Several years have gone by
since the decision to “weatherproof” the subway station after
two storms severely damaged the elevators and escalators,
which had to be replaced and rewired. Engineering reports
and plans to carry out the improvements needed to keep water
out of the station are apparently gathering dust at the MBTA
oces. is item should have been completed immediately
after the last major station ood, but it has not yet been done.
When the next major storm again wrecks the access equip-
ment, everyone will ask why the project hasn’t been completed.
A simpler reporting structure, with predetermined roles and
responsibilities will make clear exactly who is responsible to
complete each project.
5. Unbalanced workload
Pioneer institute is reliably informed that project managers
often simultaneously oversee many diverse projects, with some
handling up to 16 projects. If true, this results in a dilution of
focus and may be one of the reasons why some projects get lost
in the noise of the system. Clear reporting lines and realistic
workloads are a must.
6. Better HR plan and management structure
are required to meet much larger budget
targets
Key areas need attention to meet the increased capital spend-
ing included in the 2020–2024 Capital Investment Plan,
e MBTA has already brought in outside companies to
work with in-house sta on important projects. Specialists
were brought in for the Green Line Extension, the Red Line/
Orange Line Program oce, and the Positive Train Control
Project to beef up the team’s eorts. However these teams still
have to be managed by senior internal experts. is method,
or even complete project outsourcing, should be used when it
is the best t.
3.2 Addressing hiring difficulties
We should be asking why it has been so dicult to the tal-
ent necessary for the key positions the T so urgently needs.
One of the problems is that there
are around 96 steps that have to
be followed to hire a single per-
son at the MBTA. is is borne
out by the Human Resources
Quarterly Update presented
at the July 22, 2019 Fiscal and
Management Control Board
joint meeting
9
. According to the
report, it takes between 62 and
145 days to complete these steps.
Union leaders need to work with
MBTA management to reduce
the grind associated with getting
sta hired. e laborious process prevents the T from operat-
ing at full capacity.
e human resources department has announced a target
to reduce the 96 steps to 47. ey could perhaps be further
reduced, but 47 would certainly be a giant leap forward. Addi-
tionally, many of these remaining steps should be conducted
simultaneously to speed up the process. e MBTA urgently
needs to hire senior executive project managers, contract man-
agers and other senior sta who can quantify problems and
turn them into contracts that can be funded and let.
A second problem is that advertised salaries for these posi-
tions are below industry norms for highly skilled positions.
Senior project managers or engineers with multiple years of
real world experience come at a premium, and the current
environment can prevent management from negotiating
aggressively to attract the talent needed to rapidly ramp up
capital delivery.
Retaining or replacing good people is dicult at the
MBTA. Bruce Mohl wrote in a revealing April 2019 article of
the employee exodus: “According to numbers presented, ... the
T has hired 2,520 employees since 2015, but over that same
time period 3,052 employees have left the agency.”
10
at rep-
resents almost half of the sta turning over in four years. “e
biggest imbalance occurred in scal 2017, when a voluntary
retirement program was implemented and 348 employees were
hired at the T and 746 left the agency.”
11
We should be asking why
it has been so difficult to
the talent necessary for
the key positions the T so
urgently needs. One of the
problems is that there are
around 96 steps that have
to be followed to hire a
single person at the MBTA.
9
THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
process was eventually halted with approval of the Legislature
as the rationale for paying capital sta from the capital budget
became clear.
In its fourth annual report to the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture, the Fiscal and Management Control Board wrote:
Because the Legislature agreed in the FY19 budget
that some employees are appropriately paid from cap-
ital budget funds, the Authority will not complete the
transfer of all capital employees to its operating budget,
reecting this new guidance (see Section III C, below).
In FY19, the Authority will implement a Capital Pol-
icy to further ensure capital and operating funds are
used appropriately in the future.
15
is kind of messy restructuring, by shifting some peo-
ple and then halting the process midway, is bad for morale
and speed of delivery. However it does establish the principle
that some capital project sta can be funded from the capital
budget.
When looking at the overall picture of senior sta, one
way to simplify the reporting lines and ensure sucient senior
stang would be to populate a simple grid structure such as
gure 4 below. is would clarify how senior executive proj-
ect management and engineering heads should relate to each
other. Individual project managers can then be linked to each
head to clarify reporting lines and project responsibilities clar-
ied. Implementing a structure like this will enable experi-
enced senior project managers to focus on clearly delineated
responsibilities with a clearly identied team of people who
handle each project.
plus additional maintenance funding Governor Baker has
announced. While the current sta and systems have signi-
cantly increased spending in recent years, a much larger eort
will be needed to meet dramatically higher targets.
Key areas that need restructuring:
Clear internal structures for capital projects & maintenance
Recruitment of key talent
Appropriate senior salary scales
Shorter, simpler hiring processes
Monitoring the lling of positions in the Capital Programs
oce.
Limited project manager workloads for focused and speedy
implementation
Hiring selected outside expertise to complement internal
competencies
Collectively, these steps will reorganize internal structures,
improve management and bring in much-needed new talent,
which should be complemented by critical external skills.
7. Structure for Capital Projects and
Maintenance
Subsequent to the organizational review ordered by Gover-
nor Baker, sta were transferred from the capital to the oper-
ational budget to separate the two functions and prevent the
funding of operations from the capital budget. However this
Figure 4.
Proposed MBTA project
delivery structure
- RED LINE -
CAPITAL PROJECTS
- ORANGE LINE -
CAPITAL PROJECTS
- BLUE LINE -
CAPITAL PROJECTS
- GREEN LINE -
CAPITAL PROJECTS
- COMMUTER RAIL -
CAPITAL PROJECTS
- BUS -
CAPITAL PROJECTS
Chief Chief Chief Chief Chief Chief
Deputy Chief(s) Deputy Chief(s) Deputy Chief(s) Deputy Chief(s) Deputy Chief(s) Deputy Chief(s)
Chief Engineer Chief Engineer Chief Engineer Chief Engineer Chief Engineer Chief Engineer
Vehicles Vehicles Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects
Power Power Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects
Signal and
Communication
Signal and
Communication
Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects
Stations and
Fare Collection
Stations and
Fare Collection
Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects
Bridges
and Tunnels
Bridges
and Tunnels
Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects
Right of Way Right of Way Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects Projects
Note: the MBTA often refers to Right of Way (ROW) as the Track Department.
DIRECTOR OF CAPITAL PROJECTS OF
ASS’T DIRECTOR OF CAPITAL PROJECTS OF
10
THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
Two MBTA job vacancies have recently been advertised,
one for a project manager and another for a senior project
manager. Below is a rough comparison from www.glassdoor.
com and https://www.salary.com/ of commensurate salary
oerings in Boston.
In addition, Pioneer is advocating for additional senior
executives above these levels to take charge of signicant proj-
ects and lead the conversion of problems into projects in the
Chief Engineer’s oce, in contract management to let con-
tracts, and in project management to oversee project delivery.
e use of capital dollars to fund this Marshall Plan would be
justied so long as the funds are used exclusively for capital
project delivery.
8.2 Reduce length and complexity of hiring procedures
is paper earlier alluded to the 96 administrative steps it takes
to hire one person. ose not experienced in large bureaucra-
cies might nd this dicult to believe. It is a product of past
errors and complex bargaining agreements that lead to adding
steps to prevent the same mistakes from being made again.
However the more steps are added, the more dicult the pro-
cess becomes. And in many instances lengthening the process
does not solve the problem. A bold approach is needed to sim-
plify hiring. We laud eorts to halve the number of steps in the
hiring process and encourage additional steps in this direction.
Retaining good sta is the other half of the hiring prob-
lem. Competitive compensation and a good corporate culture
often go a long way toward keeping good sta. A key indicator
that these elements are lacking at the MBTA is the high turn-
over rate. Almost half the sta has turned over in the past four
years, and the diculty the T has had lling these positions is
a sign of not oering competitive salaries and a positive work
environment.
Retaining sta requires a good work environment. Many
surveys
17
of sta workplace concerns identify key issues that
help retain good sta:
Appropriate compensation and benets
Opportunities for advancement
Supportive management(not micro-managing but
expecting results)
Peer respect and recognition play a signicant role (Brag
on the good results)
18
Of course these new directors must be connected to the
engineering and maintenance (E & M) people for their rel-
evant competency. Capital project solutions must link to the
ongoing problems on the ground to ensure that the new work
addresses ongoing maintenance needs.
8. Key talent recruitment
Current project sta have done a great job of ramping up cap-
ital projects, but quickly growing from $900 million or $1
billion annually to $1.6 billion will require a combination of
additional internal and external expertise.
Many problems at the MBTA are tied up in complex legal
requirements. However the hiring of senior management sta
is not one of these. e Massachusetts Labor Relations Com-
mission decision of December 7, 2000 excluded from collective
bargaining a signicant number of T position titles including
the terms chief, division chief, deputy chief, major section
chief, deputy division chief, director, and assistant director,
as well as several senior project manager and organizational
manager positions. is allows the MBTA to appoint senior
people at negotiated competitive salaries in key positions need-
ed to expedite urgently needed capital projects. Basically, the
idea would be to have the T use the “exempt positions” ruling
to hire experienced new capital project delivery sta from the
outside at market rates.
16
All subsequent collective bargaining
agreements have subscribed to this delineation of manageri-
al jobs. Pioneer believes key executive level positions should
be created under the rulings, including ones in procurement,
project management, contract management, engineering and
project design.
e MBTA needs to recruit senior and experienced proj-
ect managers, engineers, contract managers and the like to
oversee the multitude of new repair projects that will improve
service at the T. As stated above, some of these positions can
be funded from the capital projects budget, as they will exclu-
sively be rolling out capital projects. ere are times when this
is the right thing to do; now is one of those times.
8.1 Appropriate senior salary scales
Salary scales for the positions identied above are below
industry standards, making it dicult to attract and retain
high-caliber employees. Benet and remuneration packages,
together with working conditions, need to be improved.
Figure 5. Salary offerings at the MBTA comparison
MBTA Advert Glass Door Ave Base Pay Salary.com
Project Manager $90,892–$105,379 Average $106,565 $103,000–133,000
Senior Project Manager $105,379–$117,279 Average $129,386 $143,000–183,000
Source: www.glassdoor.com and https://www.salary.com/
11
THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
that the Trains, busses, stations and transit routes function in
multiple cities in the Metro region, within the state of Massa-
chusetts. By denition then this means that multiple City and
state organizations and structures have a role to play in mak-
ing the T successful. e MBTA cannot do what it needs to
do in terms of bus route scheduling, coordinated construction
projects, and planning for the future without the hands-on
involvement of the City of Boston and other key communities
in the Metro region. Successful transit systems around the
world have a good working relationship with cities and state
regional planning, and political authorities. Everyone needs
to give a bit to make transit work. Collaboration will bring
about the changes necessary to make the system supply a much
improved service to the communities in the T’s areas of geo-
graphical reach.
8.3 Monitoring of the staffing compliment of the Capital
Investment Plan rollout
Pioneer Institute is calling for monthly reporting to the FMCB
about the sta compliment specically allocated to the Capital
Investment Plan. is is distinct from overall HR quarterly
reporting of the whole MBTA sta compliment. With a large
ramp up of the ve year Capital Investment Plan approved,
the people needed to achieve the spending goals need to be
in place. Without aggressive monitoring, key vacancies may
again go unlled, causing delays in issuing new contracts and
the management of existing projects.
9. City to Regional Co-operation
e T operates in and for the Metropolitan region.is means
Conclusion
Pioneer recommends the following key steps to deal
with ongoing capital project and infrastructure delays
that are causing the MBTA to function poorly and to
signicantly modernize the subway, commuter rail and
bus systems.
1. We reiterate our call for the Legislature to allow the
MBTA to place the MBTA on the same footing as
other Massachusetts departments and entities and to
use any of the Federal Transit Authority’s standard
procurement procedures with the approval of the
state Inspector General, which would eectively put
it on a similar (and shorter) procurement footing as
other U.S. transit agencies.
2. e human resources department needs to explore
legal methods to reduce the 96 steps to recruit new
talent even lower than the 47-step target which the
MBTA is aiming for and plan systems to conduct
many of these steps simultaneously to speed the
recruitment process. Even 47 steps, while an
improvement, is still a lengthy process.
3. e MBTA needs to conduct an assessment of
project and contract management reporting lines,
and simplify its current internal organizational
structure. In doing so, it must alleviate the complex
reporting lines that are slowing progress.
4. e MBTA should undertake a review of the
workload of individual project and contract
managers, to ensure that the workload is reasonable
and that managers are working on a realistic number
of projects at any one time.
5. e MBTA should oer appropriate salaries
to attract and retain the talent needed in senior
positions. Currently, pay scales are well below
industry standards; leave, and working condition
package need to be improved.
6. e MBTA must hire select outside skills where
necessary in order to speed up delivery of the Capital
Investment Program.
7. e MBTA Fiscal and Management Control Board
must receive a regular report on lling of position
specically allocated to capital investment projects
to ensure swift replacement of key skills when the
vacancies occur. Capital project sta should be
monitored separately from overall human resources
quarterly reporting.
8. MBTA management should assemble projects that
can be operated by an outside contractor where
eective internal capacity is not easily found. Other
agencies, such as the Chicago Transit Authority,
have been doing this on a large scale.
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THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
13
THE $8.5 BILLION “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR MBTA NEEDS…
Endnotes
1 ht tps://pioneerinstitute.org/featured/study-calls-for-easing-mbta-procurement-restrictions-and-beeng-
up-projec t-management-capacity/
2 NOTE: “MBTA average annual budget” is the total ve-year capital budget divided by ve; i.e., the average
amount that would need to be spent each year over the ve year period to achieve a 100 percent spend rate.
“Average annual spend” is the average of amounts reported as having been “Expended on completion of major
construction projects and improvements” in MBTA Audited Financial Statements over the ve-year CIP
period. For 5-year CIP periods beginning with FY2016–2020 that have not yet been fully realized, “Average
annual spend” is the average annual amount that has been spent thus far; i.e. for the FY2016–2020 CIP it is
averaged over four years since FY2020 spending has not yet occurred, for the FY2017-2021 CIP it is averaged
over three years, etc. e $1 billion amount included in the above chart for FY2019 is the amount reported
by GM Poftak in Commonwealth Magazine in July 2019 as FY2019 capital spending. e audited amount is
expected to be reported in November, 2019.
3 https://www.boston25news.com/news/mbta-altering-approach-to-system-repairs/947122285
4 https://www.boston25news.com/news/mbta-altering-approach-to-system-repairs/947122285
5 http://www.trb.org/Ma in/Blurbs/153218.aspx
6 ht tps://international.fhwa.dot.gov/construction_mgmt/chapter_two_b.cf m
7 https://www.pocketlist.com/chicago-transit-authority-again-selects-chicago-transit-partners-oversee-
capital-improvements
8 https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/tracandcommuting/chicago-remade-its-127-year-old-rapi d-
transit-s ystem-are-there-lessons-for-metro/2019/08/02/b369c240-8326-11e9-bce7-40b4105f7ca0_story.
html?noredirect=on
9 https://cdn.mbta.com/sites/default/f iles/2019-07/02.%20Human%20Resources%20Quarterly%20
Update.pdf
10 https://commonwealthmagazine.org/transportation/t-notes-the-great-employee-exodu s/
11 https://commonwealthmagazine.org/transportation/t-notes-the-great-employee-exodus/
12 https://www.boston25news.com/news/mbta-altering- approach-to-system-repairs/947122285
13 https://cdn.mbta.com/sites/default/files/2019-07/02.%20Human%20Resources%20Quarterly%20
Update.pdf
14 https://commonwealthmagazine.org/transportation/t-notes-the-great-employee-exodus/
15 FMCB Fourth Annual Report to the Massachusetts Legislature. December 17, 2018.
16 M.G.L. Chapter 161A Section 26:State labor relations law; applicability.
17 https://www.hrbartender.com / 2019/recru iting/turnover-2019-employees-leave/
18 https://www.forbes.com/sites/victorlipman/2015/10/10/why-do- employees-leave-their-jobs-new-survey-
oers-answers/#3b6ab7467ea1
14
PIONEER INSTITUTE
About Pioneer
Pioneer Institute is an independent, non-partisan, privately
funded research organization that seeks to improve the quality
of life in Massachusetts through civic discourse and intellec-
tually rigorous, data-driven public policy solutions based on
free market principles, individual liberty and responsibility,
and the ideal of eective, limited and accountable government.
About the Authors
Gregory Sullivan is Pioneer’s Research Director, and over-
sees PioneerPublic and PioneerOpportunity. Prior to joining
Pioneer, Sullivan served two ve-year terms as Inspector
General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by appoint-
ment of the Governor, Attorney General, and Auditor. Prior
to serving as Inspector General, Greg held several positions
within the state Oce of Inspector General. Sullivan was a
17-year member of the Massachusetts House of Representa-
tives, serving on the committees of Ways and Means, Human
Services, and Post-Audit and Oversight. Greg holds a bache-
lor’s degree from Harvard College, a master’s degree in public
administration from e Kennedy School of Public Admin-
istration at Harvard, and a master’s degree from the Sloan
School at M.I.T., with a concentration in nance.
Ian Ollis is a former South African Member of Parliament
having served two terms. He was the Shadow Minister of
Transportation, Shadow Minister of Labor, and Shadow
Minister Education during this time. In 2013 he drafted the
Democratic Alliance national Transportation Policy. During
his time as Member of Parliament Ian exposed a number of
cases of corruption leading to major reforms. Previously Ian
served as a City Councillor in Johannesburg, serving on the
Transportation and City Planning Committees. He has a
Masters Degree in Arts from the University of the Witwa-
tersrand in South Africa. Ian is currently completing a City
Planning Masters degree in transportation at M.I.T and
interning at Pioneer Institute as a Senior Research Analyst
developing a transportation policy platform.
