Critical thinking is not a universal abstract category
Moore’s (2011a) evidence for critical thinking not being a universal category is data
from interviews with ‘about six’ academics from each of the following disciplines: Phil-
osophy, History and Literary/Cultural Studies (p. 264). Such a small sample size hardly
constitutes compelling data as Moore himself admits (p. 263) but, leaving this aside,
what does the data demonstrate? In the samples cited, academics surveyed seem to
think that critical thinking is differently constituted in their respective disciplines.
He provides a number of examples (for additional examples, see Moore, 2011a,
pp. 265–267):
In explaining what being critical is, I say to my students ‘if someone is talking to you and
they’re saying this is my argument. And what they give you is not an argument, you
should be able to pull them up and say that was not an argument. What you’ve given
doesn’t support the conclusion’. (Philosophy informant#2)
[Being critical in History] is concerned … with the sources and the way in which you use
them. It’s building on the sources, or organising them in a particular way to con struct a
particular … picture of the past. (History informant#2)
… we are less obviously critical about the texts we study. In selecting them for a course,
we have in a sense given them the benefit of the doubt. I’m never totally uncritical, but if
I’m teaching a Shakespearean play, we’re not going to say ‘Shakespeare was a deficient
playwright, wasn’the’. Instead the questions we ask [are]: why do such texts have value
as literature, and how does this value come through? (Literary studies informant#2)
He takes these divergences of view to be more than unsupported opinions by a small
number of discipline-based experts. He takes them to constitute revealing metaphors
that demonstrate something important about the nature of critical thinking. The first
(philosophical approach) he notes is concerned with rational evaluation. The second
(historical) approach is concerned with constructing narratives. The third (literary)
approach is concerned with textual interpretation. These different metaphors (evalua-
tive, constructive, interpretive) are thought to be differences in the nature of critical
thinking. The first is logico-semantic in nature, the second is creative, the third,
exploratory and interrogative. Critical thinking is not a ‘universal category’ he con-
cludes, but displays ‘diverse modes of thought’ and should be considered specificto
the disciplines (Moore, 2004, 2011a).
Note that this position derives from assessment, by the investigator, of a small per-
spectival data set. It is the investigator’s attitude of what seems to be the case, from how
things seem to be to the participants.
Moore explains why this misunderstanding about the nature of critical thinking has
occurred. Discussions about critical thinking have been held in a ‘“vitrinous” realm,
detached from the domains in which critical thinking actually needs to be applied’
and, quoting Atkinson (1997, p. 74), has not been ‘rooted in any actual educational
reality’ (Moore, 2011a, p. 264). The examples used purport to indicate dissimilarities
between different kinds of critical thinking. Elsewhere he discusses three different
‘dimensions’ of critical thinking (Moore, 2004, pp. 8–11). However, in his most
recent paper, he uses vaguer language, and refers to ‘configuration[s] of critical
elements’,a‘multiplicity of practices’, a range of ‘heuristics’, ‘family resemblances’,
‘discursive modes’ and ‘distinctive critical modes’
(Moore, 2011b, pp. 14, 16, 17, 19).
Regardless of whether these differences are regarded as ‘dimensions’ or in the other
ways indicated, his claim is that these differences amount to a rejection of the generalist
532 M. Davies