OIG-24-33
June 25, 2024
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
FINAL MANAGEMENT ALERT
Management Alert - CBP Has Limited Information to
Assess Interview-Waived Nonimmigrant Visa Holders
(REDACTED)
WARNING: This document is Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES). Do not distribute or copy this report without the expressed written consent of the Office of Inspector General.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 | www.oig.dhs.gov
OIG Project No. 24-011-AUD-CBP (a)
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
June 25, 2024
MEMORANDUM FOR: Troy Miller
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
FROM: Glenn Sklar
Principal Deputy Inspector General
SUBJECT: Management Alert
- CBP Has Limited Information to Assess
Interview-Waived Nonimmigrant Visa Holders -
Law
Enforcement Sensitive
Attached is our final management alert,
CBP Has Limited Information to Assess Interview-
Waived Nonimmigrant Visa Holders –
Law Enforcement Sensitive. This alert informs you of an
urgent issue we discovered during an ongoing audit and the actions CBP has taken to address
the issue. Specifically, we found that CBP has limited information on whether nonimmigrant
visa holders have been interviewed by Department of State.
Your office concurred with the two recommendations in the draft management alert. Based
on information in your office’s response to the draft management alert, we consider
recommendation 1 open and resolved and recommendation 2 open and unresolved. As
appropriate, we incorporated your technical comments. We have appended your office’s
response verbatim to this final management alert.
As prescribed by Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01,
Follow-Up and
Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations
, within 90 days of
the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that
includes, for each recommendation, any update to your concurrence or nonconcurrence and
any planned corrective action with a targeted completion date or completed corrective
action. Also, please include information on responsible parties and any other supporting
documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the recommendation.
Please send your response or closure request to [email protected].
Consistent with our responsibility under the
Inspector General Act of 1978
, we will provide
copies of our alert to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation
responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post a redacted version of
the alert on our website for public dissemination.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of Homeland Security | Washington, DC 20528 | www.oig.dhs.gov
2
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
Please contact me with any questions, or your staff may contact Kristen Bernard, Deputy
Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.
Attachment
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S.
Department
of
Homeland Security
Summary of
Issues
The Department
of
State (
DoS
) issues nonimmigrant visas
to
individuals seeking entry into
the
United States on a temporary basis for
tour
ism, medical treatment, business, temporary work,
study,
or
other reasons.
In
2020, due
to
the
COVID-19
pandemic, and
to
address staffing
limitat
ions and vi
sa
backlogs, Dos and the Department
of
Homeland Security agreed
to
expand
DoS
' authorities
to
waive requirements
to
conduct consular interviews and collect fingerprints
for some individuals seeking nonimmigrant visas. According
to
Dos, from calendar years
2020
through
2023
, it granted nonimmigrant visas
to
approximately
7.1
million individuals w i
thout
conducting in-person consular interviews. Dos al
so
did
not
collect fingerprints for
an
un
known
number
of
visas during
the
same period. In December 2023, Dos and
OHS
agreed
to
expand
the
categories
of
visas and applicants whose consular interviews could be waived beginning on
January 1, 2024. The fingerprint waiver program ended in December 2023. During
our
ongoing
audit
of
U.S.
Customs
and
Border
Protect
i
on's
(
CBP
} Screeni
ng
of
Visa Holders That Received
Waivers
from
Department
of
State (24-011-AU
D-CBP
),
we found
that
CBP
Office
of
Field
Operations (
OFO
)
port
directors at some
U.S.
ports
of
entry had
not
been aware
of
the interview
and fingerprint waiver program.
In March 2024, Dos began providing
OHS
and
CBP
with
information on visa holders who did
not
receive interviews.
CBP
OFO
alerted
the
port
directors
at
the
ports
of
entry
that
the
inspection
information technology systems now include an
as
part
of
an
individual's record. However, only
CBP
off
icers conducting have access
to
these records; officers conducting
at
the ports
of
entry do
not
have access
to
these records. Because consular interviews can be
an
important
mechanism
for
collecting
information from visa applicants
to
verify identity and determine admissibility before they arrive
in the
Un
ited States, having knowledge
of
who was waived and who was
not
could allow
CBP
officers
to
make more informed decisions
Moreover, having
the
would also allow
CBP
to
track trends for effective
monitoring and evaluation.
Background
CBP
, one
of
OHS
'
22
components,
is
one
of
the
world's largest law enforcement organizations
and
is
charged wi
th
protecting
the
Homeland against illegal entry,
illicit
activi
ty
,
or
other threats
to
promote national and economic security.
CBP
OFO
is responsible for verifying identification
documents, collecting biometrics, and confirming biographic information
of
travelers arriving at
U.S.
ports
of
entry.
CBP
officers
use
these data elements,
as
well
as
a traveler's criminal and
immigration history,
to
determine admissibility into the United States.
Both Dos and
OHS
have responsibilities for ensuring the security
of
the
American people.
DoS
'
Bureau
of
Consular Affairs is responsible
for
screening and vetting foreign nationals who wish
to
www.oig.dhs.gov
1
OIG
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24
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LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
, a
CBP
officer may review identity documents
su
ch
as
passports, visas, and/ or driver's licenses
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.
S.
Department
of
Homeland S
ecurity
enter
the United States on a temporary basis for tourism, medical treatment, business,
temporary work, study,
or
other reasons before issuing them visas.
1
When applying for a
nonimmigrant visa, applicants must submit biographic (such
as
name
an
d date
of
birth) and
biometric (such
as
fingerprints and photographs} data for review by a consular officer. According
to
the Immigration
and
Nationality Actof2023(1NA),
as
amended, nonimmigrant visa applicants
aged 14 through
79
generally must be interviewed by a consu l
ar
officer.
2
The Secretary
of
State
may wa i
ve
this requirement for travelers in certain visa categories.
3
DoS
' processes for reviewing visa applications helps assure
CBP
that
an
individual's identity,
background, and biographic information have been verified before they arrive in the United
States.
It
is
important
for
CBP
to
maintain awareness
of
exceptions
to
this process, such
as
who
was waived and who was not,
so
that
CB
P officers can make informed decisions on admissibility
into
the
Un
ited States.
CB
P's screening process is multi-layered and consists
of
- and
4
CBP
Officers
Received
Limited
Information
on
whether
Non
immig
rant
Visa
Holde
rs
Had
Been
Inte
rviewed
Dos, in concurrence
with
OHS,
waived in-person interviews
for
approximately
7.1
million
applicants
for
nonimmigrant visas from
FY
2020 through
FY
2023. Dos and
OHS
also agreed
to
wai
ve
finger
pr
i
nt
collection for certain categories
of
vi
sas
during
the
same period. The
temporary expanded authorities
to
waive in-person interviews and fingerprint collection
for
certain visa applicants were in it ia
ll
y
put
in place for unusual
or
emergent circumstances
associated
with
the
COVID-19
pandemic, including protecting critical elements
of
the food supply
chain, and
to
assist Dos wi
th
the
large volume
of
visa applications, which outweighed its
resources.
The most recent temporary authorities, which are reviewed on a yearly basis, expired on
December 31, 2023. However, Dos argued
that
these temporary authorities should be renewed
1
The classes of nonimmigrant vi
sas
are generally defined in Section
lO
l
(a
)(l S)
of
the Immigration Nationality
Act
(I
NA).
8
Un
ited States Code (
U.S.C.
)
§ll
0l (a)(lS).
2
8
U.S.C.
§1202(h)(l );
INA
§222(h);
22
Code
of
Federal
Regu
l
at
ions
§4
1.102.
3
8
U.S.C.
§1202(h
)(
l)(C)(i) authorizes the Secretary
of
State
to
waive the in-person interview
req
uirement when
su
ch
a waiver is in t he national interest.
See
22
Code
of
Federal
Regu
lations §§41.102(b)-(
c)
for
the
Secretary of State's
aut hori
ty
to
waive in-person interviews in the
nat
ional interest.
4
All t ravelers seeki ng
to
enter t he United States must present themselves and their belongings
for
inspection
at
the
border. The initial inspection by a
CBP
officer at the port
of
entry
is
called a
Du
ring t he
and ask general questions about
the
purpose
of
the ind ividual's visit.
Du
ring a
CBP
officer may
also review other relevant information about the traveler, including pertinent law enforcement information.
If
the
off
icer determines
that
t he traveler
war
rants additional inspection, the officer
will
refer the traveler
for
additional
scrut iny,
or
www.oig.dhs.
gov
2
OIG
-24-
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LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
•
•
•
•
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.
S.
Department
of
Homeland Security
and expanded
to
address
the
growing worldwide demand for visas moving forward
into
2024.
Thu
s,
in
the
months preceding
the
expiration deadline, Dos sought concurrence from
OHS
on its
proposal
to
broaden the set
of
visa categories eligible for interview waivers
as
well
as
eliminate
5
the fingerprint requirement for certain visa applicants.
6
,
OHS
agreed
to
support
DoS'
proposal
to
expand
the
categories
7
of visas for which interviews can be waived contingent on several conditions.
One
main
condition was
that
Dos must inform
OHS
which visa applicants were
not
interviewed. This would
come in
the
form
of
a in
CBP
's information technology systems used
for
5
The
Homeland
Security
Act
of
2002, Section 428 divides visa issuance responsibilities between Dos and
DHS.
On
September
28,
2003,
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and then-Secretary of Homeland Security Thomas Ridge
signed a memorandum
of
understanding
(MOU
) implementing Section
428
of
the
Homeland Security Act. The
MOU
describes each department's responsibilities in the area
of
vi
sa
issuance. Among its
major
elements, and
with
certain exceptions, the
MOU
states
that
Dos may propose and issue visa regulations subject
to
DHS
consultation and
final approval. The
MOU
also states
that
the Secretary
of
Homeland Security has final responsibility over visa
guidance prescribing wh
en
a consular officer may waive a visa applicant's personal appearanc
e.
6
Dos requested
DHS
' concurrence on eliminating
the
fingerprint requirement under Section
303
of
the
Enhanced
Border
Security
and
Visa
Entry
Reform
Act
of
2002, Pub.
L.
No.107-173 (codified
as
8
U.S.C.
§1732) for first-time
nonimmigrant visa applicants from countries participating in
the
Visa
Waiver Program; and
for
first-time and
returning H-2 visa applicants who qualify for interview waivers. H-2 visas allow
applicants
to
work
in
temporary
j obs
in
agriculture,
construction,
forestry,
and
other
industries.
The H-2A visa is
for
temporary
agricultural
jobs,
while
the
H-28 visa is
for
temporary
non-agric
ul
tura
l
jobs.
7
In response
to
DHS'
opposition, Dos agreed
to
stop waiving fingerprint collection for H-2 visa applicants (i.e.,
applicants seeking
to
work
in
temporary
jobs
in
agriculture,
const
ruc
tion,
forest
ry, and
other
industr
i
es
).
www.oig.dhs.
gov
3
OIG
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LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S.
Department
of
Homeland Security
inspections at ports
of
entry. Other conditions include
Dos
providing
OHS
a security and
terrorism risk assessment
of
the proposed expansion
of
interview waivers, a list
of
fiscal year
2024
nonimmigrant visa processing goals for
DoS
' Bureau
of
Consular Affairs, and
DoS
' current
and planned efforts
to
increase consular
capacity-
staffing, policy, and
technology-
to
meet
the growing worldwide demand for visas. Having
an
would allow
CBP
officers conducting at the ports
of
entry
to
know whether t
he
requirement
for a consular interview had been waived for individuals they encounter.
Based
on
that
knowledge, the officers could
if
deemed appropriate.
According
to
OHS,
having the
also allows
CBP
to
track trends for effective
monitoring and evaluation.
Even
though the agreed-upon expanded authorities took effect
on
January 1,
2024,
OHS
and
CBP
did not receive
to
show
CBP
officers which visa holders had not been
interviewed until March
29,
2024.
To
provide the , Dos established a feed into
CBP's
information technology systems for screening and vetting
so
that
CBP
officers would
be
able
to
see
an
in
a visa holder's record.
8
CBP
Officers
Conducting
Do
Not
Have
Full
Visibility
of
Visa
Interview
Waivers
CBP
officers conducting
have
not had
access
to
the
information since
2020.
Though
CBP
notified its
port
directors at ports
of
entry that the
was available beginning
in
March
2024,
it
only provided
access
to
this
information
to
officers conducting and not
to
officers
conducting-
. According
to
CBP
official
s,
they did not want officers
conducting-
to
send
all individuals whose
req
uirement for consular interviews had been waived
and "inundate" that process until they have had the time
to
assess
the
information and determine the level
of
risks,
if
any.
CBP
OFO
officials told
us
that no formal notification was provided
to
the Field Offices and frontline officers because
CBP
did not want
to
overload the officers with information. Further, they added that
CBP
receives
hundreds
of
alerts each day, but officials must prioritize what information is shared with
frontline officers.
In lieu
of
providi
ng
officers conducting with
access
to
t
he
information,
CBP
OFO
officials stated they plan
to
work with the National Targeting Center
to
to
identify risks,
if
any, posed by v
isa
holders who had their interviews
waived. Although this proposed action differs from
CBP
's prior statements
that
it
needed the
for its officers conducting ,
we
encourage
CBP
to
use
all
8
In Nove
mber
2023, senior representativ
es
from
DHS;
DoS;
Justice; Commerce;
the
Federal Bureau
of
Investigations;
the
Office
of
the
Di
rector
of
National Intelligence;
the
Office
of
Management and Budget; and other Government
agencies, offices, and departments
met
at
the White House with t he National Security Council
to
discuss visa
int erview waiver authorities.
www.oig.dhs.gov
4
OIG-24-
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LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S.
Department
of
Homeland S
ecurity
available resources
to
evaluate potential risk. Because
of
the
importance
of
this issue, we
will
continue
to
monitor
CBP
's progress in working
with
the
National Targeting Center
or
in
establishing other means
to
manage risks.
While the
is
now available
at
,
CBP
does
not
ha
ve
the
system capability
to
gather information on individuals who were granted visa interview and
fingerprint waivers prior
to
March 2024.
As
a result, more than 4 years after
the
waiver expansion
began,
CBP
has
no
assurance
that
individuals
with
waivers who arrived at
U.S.
ports
of
entry
from 2020 through 2023 were identified
at
for
further screening.
Prior
to
March 2024,
CBP
OFO
did
not
inform its
port
directors
that
Dos had been waiving certain
requirements for interviews and fingerprints.
We
spoke
with
CBP
OFO
port
directors at 16 land
ports
of
entry.
Of
the 16 we spoke
with
, all reported
that
they were unaware
that
some visa
holders had not receiv
ed
consular interviews nor had
their
fingerprints collected before being
issued
their
visas. In our discussions, half (eight)
of
the
port
directors
told
us
that
even if they
had known, they would not have altered their inspection process. These
port
directors
emphasized
that
visa holders wi
th
waivers are subjected
to
the
as
any
other visa holder. However,
the
other eight
port
directors stated
that
knowing certain visa
categories were exempt from interview and fingerprint requirements may have been beneficial in
alerting
CBP
off
icers
that
an individual may require additional screening and vetting.
Because Dos interviews can
be
an
important
mechanism for collecting information from visa
applicants
to
verify
identit
y, background, and biographic information before they arrive in the
United States,
ha
ving knowledge
of
who was waived and who was
not
could allow
CBP
officers
to
make more informed deci sions
Moreover,
ha
ving
the
al
so
allows
CBP
to
track trends for effective monitoring
and evaluation. While
CBP
begins
to
evaluate
the
data on whi
ch
individuals received interview
waivers,
it
can still take actions
to
mit igate potential risks. Developing strategies
to
address
potential risks would better position
CBP
to
carry
out
its mission
of
keeping
the
homeland safe.
Recommendations
Recommendation
1:
We
recommend
the
Senior Official Performing
the
Duties
of
the
Commissioner
of
CBP
wor
k
with
the National Targeting Center
to
establish other means
to
manage risks,
if
any, posed
by
visa holders who received interview waivers from
the
Department
of
State.
Recommendation
2:
We
recommend the Senior Official Performing
the
Duties
of
the
Commissioner
of
CBP
develop and implement a comprehensive plan
to
perform trend analyses
to
analyze ri
sks
posed by individuals whose consular interviews were waived
by
the Department
www.oig.dhs.gov
5
OIG
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LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S.
Department
of
Homeland Security
of
State
with
data captured
at
implement mitigation plans.
, and using
the
resu lts, develop and
M
anagement
Comments
and
OIG
Analysis
CBP
provided written comments in response
to
the
draft
management alert. Appendix B
contai
ns
CBP
's management comments in
their
entirety.
We
also received technical comments
from
CBP
and
the
Dos and revi
sed
the
management alert,
as
approp
ri
ate.
CBP
concurred wi
th
both recommendations. Based on
the
information received, we consider recommendation 1
open and resolved, and recommendation 2 open and unresolved. A summary
of
CB
P's response
and
our
analysis follows.
CBP
leadership disagreed
with
our
conclusions.
CBP
stated
that
DoS
' decision
to
waive a visa
applicant's interview
or
biometr
i
cs
during t he visa issuance process does not change
how
CBP
officers conduct .
CBP
also stated
that
all travelers, regardless
of
whether
they received a waiver, are inspected by
CBP
when they reach a
U.S.
port
of
entry
to
include
an
interview, biographic, and biometric vetting. The presence
of
an
is
supplemental information,
but
not
critical
to
the
CBP
also disagreed
that
the
scope and conclusions
of
our
audit
work
rises
to
the
posted
definition
of
a " Management Alert" on
OIG
's website.
OIG
updated
the
policy on
October
28,
2021
, and agreed
that
the
website should be updated
to
reflect
that
change.
OIG
leadership updated
the
language on June
21,
2024
to
better align
with
our
current policy on
Management Alerts.
Recommendation
1:
Work
with
the
National Targeting Center
to
establish other means
to
manage risks, if any, posed
by
visa holders who received interview waivers from
the
Dos.
Response:
Concur.
CBP
OFO
and its National Targeting Center
will
identify a role fo
r-
- information in the targeting environment,
as
supported by analysi
s,
intelligence, and
existing protocol
s.
Estimated Completion Date (
ECO
): June
30
, 2025.
OIG
Anal
y
si
s:
We
appreciate
CB
P's planned efforts
to
work
with
the National Targeting Center
to
assess
risk going forward.
We
consider these actions responsive
to
the
recommendation, which
we consider open and resolved.
We
will
close this recommendation when
CBP
provides
documentation supporting how
they
identified and implemented a role for
information in
the
targeting environment,
as
supported by analysis, intelligence, and existing
protocols.
Recommenda
t
ion
2:
Deve
lop and implement a comprehensive plan
to
perform t rend analyses
and analyze risks posed by individuals whose consular interviews were waived
by
the Dos
with
www.oig.dhs.gov
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LAW
ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE
www.oig.dhs.gov
7
OIG-24-33
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
data captured at , and using the results, develop and implement
mitigation plans.
Response: Concur. In collaboration with DHS and Operational Components, as appropriate, CBP
OFO and its National Targeting Center will identify a role for information in the
targeting environment, as supported by analysis, intelligence, and existing protocols. ECD: June
30, 2025.
OIG Analysis: We appreciate CBP’s planned efforts to work with the National Targeting Center to
identify risk going forward. However, this action is not responsive to the intent of this
recommendation, which is to perform a trend analysis and analyze risk posed by individuals
whose interviews were previously waived. Therefore, we consider this recommendation open
and unresolved. We will close the recommendation when CBP provides a comprehensive plan to
perform trend analyses and analyze risks posed by individuals whose consular interviews were
waived by DoS with data captured at and use the results to develop and
implement mitigation plans.
www.oig.dhs.gov
8
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LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Appendix A
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002
(Pub. L. No. 107−296) by amendment to the
Inspector General Act
of 1978
.
We issued this management alert as part of an ongoing audit: 24-011-AUD-CBP –
“CBP’s
Screening of Visa Holders That Received Waivers from Department of State
.” The objective of our
ongoing audit is to determine (1) the extent to which CBP was aware of DoS’ policy changes to
grant certain categories of visas without in-person interviews and biometrics; and (2) the extent
to which CBP can identify and fully screen visa holders with waivers upon arrival at U.S. ports of
entry. As part of our audit, from January 30, 2024, to May 16, 2024, we:
• Conducted site visits at four different ports of entry in Texas and New Mexico in CBP’s El
Paso, Texas, Field Office area of responsibility. We observed the pedestrian and vehicle
and processes, interviewed CBP officers, and met with field
office and port leadership.
• Interviewed 16 port directors at land ports of entry across the United States representing
each CBP field office with land border crossing responsibilities.
• Interviewed officials from CBP OFO; DHS’ Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans; and CBP’s
Office of Planning, Program Analysis, and Evaluation.
• Reviewed interagency correspondence between DHS and DoS; DoS visa application
policies; and CBP OFO operational policies, directives, and training documents. We
analyzed aggregate data obtained from DoS regarding visa populations and interview and
fingerprint waivers.
We conducted this work pursuant to the
Inspector General Act of 1978,
5 U.S.C. §§ 401-424, and in
connection with an ongoing audit being performed according to generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require we plan and perform our audit work to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Additional information and recommendations related to the issue addressed in this
management alert may be included in the report resulting from our audit.
DHS OIG’s Access to DHS Information
During this audit, CBP provided responses to our requests for information and did not delay or
deny access to information we requested.
www.oig.dhs.gov
9
OIG-24-33
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Appendix B:
CBP Comments on the Draft Alert
www.oig.dhs.gov
10
OIG-24-33
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov
11
OIG-24-33
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov
12
OIG-24-33
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Appendix C:
Alert Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner, CBP-Office of Field Operations
DHS Component Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
External
Department of State
Additional Information
To view this and any other DHS OIG reports, Please visit our website: www.oig.dhs.gov
For further information or questions, please contact the DHS OIG Office of Public Affairs via email:
DHS OIG Hotline
To report fraud, waste, abuse, or criminal misconduct involving U.S. Department of Homeland
Security programs, personnel, and funds, please visit: www.oig.dhs.gov/hotline
If you cannot access our website, please contact the hotline by phone or mail:
Call: 1-800-323-8603
U.S. Mail:
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305
