3.7 percent each year. By contrast, the worsening of the
Argentinean terms of trade created a drag on growth averag-
ing 1.4 percentage points each year between 1999 and 2001,
a period during which GDP fell by 2.5 percent annually.
These estimates should be viewed with some caution
since we are applying to only two countries a statistical
relation drawn from a much larger sample. Nevertheless, our
results provide persuasive evidence of the key role played by
terms-of-trade movements in determining whether output
rose or fell in Ecuador and Argentina in recent years.
Moreover, our results suggest that a fixed rate regime, in
contrast to a flexible rate regime, permits terms-of-trade
movements to exert a strong influence on output growth in
developing countries.
Conclusion
This article has explored how the exchange rate regime
adopted by developing countries can affect their ability to
adjust to terms-of-trade fluctuations. Our statistical analysis
has shown that a terms-of-trade shock will have little impact
on growth under a flexible exchange rate system because the
exchange rate’s own movements will absorb the effects of the
shock. Under a fixed exchange rate, however, this buffer is
absent and the adjustment will fall primarily on growth:
consequently, a worsening of the terms of trade will lead to a
contraction in output.
Our analysis has also shown that movements in the terms
of trade represent a sizable source of volatility for developing
countries. The contrasting experiences of Ecuador and
Argentina are a case in point: in recent years, terms-of-trade
shocks have been an important determinant of the direction
and extent of output changes in these countries.
The effectiveness of the flexible exchange rate in respond-
ing to these shocks is only one of the many considerations
that developing countries would weigh in choosing an
exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, in light of the significant
volatility risks that terms-of-trade movements pose for out-
put growth in developing countries, the consideration
appears to be an important one.
Notes
1. The studies include Mendoza (1995), Kose (2002), and Broda (2003).
2. Since Friedman’s (1953) famous case for flexible exchange rate regimes, this
argument has become one of the least disputed in favor of flexible rates.
3. Broda (2003) finds that the share explained by terms-of-trade movements
is substantially smaller. His analysis is based on empirical estimates, while the
calculations in Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002) are based on calibrations of
their models.
4. If wages in these industries were to adjust quickly, contracting in line with
the drop in income, the terms-of-trade shock would have only a moderate
impact on activity. In practice, however, wages exhibit substantial inertia. The
failure of wages to react fast enough shifts the burden of adjustment onto the
exchange rate.
5. The magnitude of the fall in output in each exchange rate regime will
depend on the magnitude of the terms-of-trade change. However, for a given
movement in the terms of trade, the fall in output should always be larger in a
country with a fixed exchange rate regime than in a country with a flexible
regime.
6. Many considerations enter into a country’s choice of an exchange rate
regime. A full assessment of the optimal exchange rate regime is beyond the
scope of this article. Readers interested in the pros and cons of alternative
exchange rate regimes might consult Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Calvo and
Mishkin (2003), Ghosh et al.(1997), McKenzie (1999), and Tornell and Velasco
(2000).
7. Several countries classified by the International Monetary Fund as fixed
regimes experienced substantial depreciations of their exchange rate, making
them more like flexible regimes in practice. For example, El Salvador (in 1983-
84), Guatemala (in 1986-88), and Nicaragua (in 1985-87) were classified as
fixed regimes (with currencies pegged to the dollar), but their currencies
depreciated by 10 percent, 41 percent, and 106 percent, respectively. Con-
versely, several countries classified as flexible regimes—including India (in
1993-96) and Bolivia (in 1985-90)—acted more like fixed regimes when they
limited the fluctuations of their exchange rate.
8. The nominal exchange rate is the price of one country’s currency in terms of
the currency of another country—for example, the quantity of pesos required
to purchase one dollar. The real exchange rate—the nominal exchange rate
adjusted for price differences—is the price of one country’s consumption
basket in terms of the consumption basket of another country. The real
exchange rate, for example, might be understood as the quantity of Mexican
consumption baskets that one must sell in Mexico to purchase one U.S.
consumption basket in the United States. Specifically, the relation is RER =
NER * P(US) / P(Mex),where RER is the real exchange rate, NER the nominal
exchange rate, P(US) the dollar price of the U.S. consumption basket, and
P(Mex) the peso price of the Mexican consumption basket.
9. Because of the rich dynamics of the statistical model, the terms of trade
worsen by slightly more than 10 percent initially, but then ease somewhat so
that the total change is equivalent to a permanent 10 percent change.
10. Because the exchange rate is defined as units of domestic currency per unit
of foreign currency, the depreciation appears as an increase in the chart.
11. We end our analysis of Argentina in 2001 because the sharp contraction in
2002 after the collapse of the currency board stemmed primarily from the failure
of the banking sector and other factors unrelated to movements in the terms of
trade. Such factors are outside the scope of this article.
12. Oil and bananas together accounted for 59 percent of Ecuadorian exports in
2001.
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 9, NUMBER 11
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