EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION
2023 FAMILY LAW REVIEW COURSE
NATALIE S. LEMOS
Leinoff & Lemos, P.A.
BIOGRAPHY
NATALIE S. LEMOS
Natalie Lemos practices exclusively in the area of Marital and Family Law with her
partners, Andrew Leinoff, Paul Leinoff and Max Leinoff at Leinoff & Lemos, P.A.
in South Miami, Florida. Ms. Lemos became board certified in Marital and Family
Law in 2002. Her certification has been renewed in 2007, 2012 and 2017. She is a
member of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and the International
Academy of Family Lawyers. She is a past President of the Florida Chapter of the
AAML.
She was selected as 2022 Top 50 Lawyers in America list. She has been named one
of the Best Lawyers in America since 2006 as well as Super Lawyers, South
Florida's Top Lawyers and Florida Trend's Legal Elite. Ms. Lemos co-authored an
article for the Family Advocate (ABA Section of Family Law) “The Perils of a
Prenup: First Do No Harm to Your Client or Yourself”, Winter 2011. In 2021 she
was named “Lawyer of the Year” for Best Family Law Lawyers by Best Lawyers.
In 1989, she graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School and began
her practice in New York. In 1990, she moved to Miami, Florida where she began
practicing in the area of Marital and Family Law. For over thirty years, her practice
has been exclusively in the area of Marital and Family Law. She handles complex
equitable distribution cases involving business valuation issues. She has tried all
forms of family law cases including valuation disputes, relocation cases, timesharing
issues, and support issues. Ms. Lemos has drafted numerous pre-nuptial and post-
nuptial agreements.
Ms. Lemos is a member of the New York and Florida Bars (1990); she is an admitted
member of the U.S. District Courts for the Southern and Middle Districts of Florida,
the U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. Ms. Lemos
became an AAML Certified Mediator in 2016.
Ms. Lemos is a frequent lecturer for the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar, the
Florida Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and presented
for the FICPA and the ABA.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW………………………………….. 1
B. MARITAL ASSETS/LIABILITIES ………………………………. 1-6
C. NON-MARITAL ASSETS/LIABILITIES…………………………. 6-10
D. IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION…..….………………11-12
E. DATE OF VALUATION…………………………………………… 13-16
F. COMMINGLING…………………………………………………… 16-21
G. ENHANCEMENT/APPRECIATION…………………………….... 21-27
H. DISTRIBUTION……………………………………………………. 27-33
I DISSIPATION/DEPLETION…………………………………….... 33-39
J. INTERSPOUSAL GIFTS ………………………………………….. 39
K. VESTED/NON-VESTED BENEFITS, PENSIONS, QUALIFIED
PLANS, RETIREMENT ………………………………………..…. 39-49
L. METHOD AND MANNER OF
PAYMENT…………………………………………………………. 50
M. FACTUAL FINDINGS …………………………….…………..... 50-53
N. ORAL FINDINGS CONSISTENT WITH FINAL JUDGMENT….. 53
O. LUMP SUM EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION/EQUALIZER……… 53-54
P. ENFORCEMENT/MODIFICATION………………………………. 54-58
Q. MARITAL RESIDENCE………………………………………… 5
9
-60
R. PARTITION……………………………………………………… 60-62
S. CORPORATIONS/THIRD PARTIES……………………………… 62-67
T. VALUATIONS…………………………………………………....... 67-71
U. INTERIM PARTIAL EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION…………….. 71
V. TAX CONSIDERATIONS………………………………………… 72
W. PETS………………………………………………………………. 72-73
X. MISCELLANEOUS………………………………………………. 73-75
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A. INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 61.075(1), in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, in addition to
all other remedies available to a court to do equity between the parties, or in a proceeding for
disposition of assets following a dissolution of marriage by a court which lacked jurisdiction over
the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the assets, the court shall set apart to each
spouse that spouse's non-marital assets and liabilities, and in distributing the marital assets and
liabilities between the parties, the court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be
equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution based on all relevant factors,
including the factors as specified in Fla. Stat. § 61.075(1)(a)-(j).
A determination of how marital assets and liabilities are divided will usually impact most
other aspects of a divorce case.
Income producing properties may impact alimony and child support
Interest income on investments, real or imputed, may impact alimony and child
support
Allocation of assets and liabilities may impact the needs of a support seeking spouse
May impact allocation on payment of attorneys’ fees and costs
Consideration of non-marital assets may also impact support issues and attorneys’
fees issues.
Every asset and liability must be identified, classified, and valued. This includes marital
and non-marital assets and liabilities. Then, each marital asset and liability must be distributed
between the parties. The premise is for an equal division of marital assets and liabilities (also
referred to as “the marital estate”). If the Court elects to depart from an equal division of the marital
estate, there must be findings of fact in support of that determination.
B. MARITAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
1. Definition of Marital Assets and Liabilities:
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)1.-3., "marital assets and liabilities" include:
a. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred during the marriage, individually by either spouse
or jointly by them;
b. The enhancement in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting either from
the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure
thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both;
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c. The paydown of principal on a note and mortgage secured by a nonmarital real property
and a portion of the passive appreciation in the property if the note and mortgage are paid
with marital funds.
d. Interspousal gifts during the marriage;
e. All vested and non-vested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in
retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance plans and
programs;
f. All real property held as tenants by the entireties; and
g All personal property titled jointly by the parties as tenants by the entireties (even if
acquired prior to the marriage).
2. Burden of Proof:
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 61.075(8), all assets acquired, and liabilities incurred by either
spouse subsequent to the date of the marriage and not specifically established as non-marital assets
or liabilities are presumed to be marital assets and liabilities. Such presumption is overcome by a
showing that the assets and liabilities are non-marital assets and liabilities. Where assets/liabilities
acquired/incurred during the marriage, the burden shifts to the party trying to establish it as non-
marital. Once an asset/liability is established as pre-marital, the burden shifts to the opposing party
to establish the asset as marital.
When the marital character of an asset is in question, the burden of proving whether an asset
is non-marital is on the party claiming it to be so. Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA
2004). In Hamilton v. Hamilton, 328 So.3d 1093 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2021), the trial court applied the
wrong statutory presumption. Husband had credit card debt in his name incurred during the
marriage. Some of the debt was for household expenses and some for his accounting practice. The
trial court determined the Husband failed to meet the burden of proof to show which debt was for
household expenses and found all of the debt to be non-marital corporate debt. Appellate court
reversed. Presumption that debt was marital and burden of proof on party seeking to classify the
debt as non-marital. Burden of proof was on Wife if she was seeking to have some of the debt
deemed non-marital.
Assets acquired before marriage are not marital assets and remain the property of the owner
spouse in the absence of evidence of a gift or conveyance of the assets to the owner’s spouse. Moss
v. Moss, 829 So.2d 302 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Additionally, property acquired during the marriage
through the exchange of non-marital assets is non-marital. Beaty v. Gribble, 652 So.2d 1156 (Fla.
2d DCA 1995). Where a party asserts a marital claim to appreciation in a non-marital asset, they
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have the initial burden of proof to show marital efforts or funds used for improvement and the
burden then shifts to the owner spouse to show some enhancement is exempt. Yitzhari v. Yitzhari,
906 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
In Erdman v. Erdman, 301 So.3d 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), the Husband claimed that the
source of the deposit to acquire the marital residence which was purchased during the marriage,
was from a non-marital source but other than his vague testimony, no evidence was produced. The
residence was titled in joint names. The trial court erred in awarding the house to the husband and
providing him with a credit for the claimed non-marital contribution. The Court incorrectly ignored
the gift presumption which was not overcome based solely on the husband’s testimony. The source
of the initial contribution was irrelevant.
3. Standard of Review:
The standard of review for the classification of an asset/liability is reviewed de novo. See
e.g., Ramos v. Ramos, 230 So.3d 893, 895 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017). However, for valuation purposes,
standard of review is abuse of discretion. McGowan v.McGowan, 2022 WL 3441442; 1D21-966
(Fla. 1
st
DCA 2022).
4. Identification of Prospective /Potential Assets:
4.1. Future salary not a marital asset but accrued benefits may be
In Barner v. Barner, 716 So.2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the district court held that the
husband’s future earning ability was not an “asset” for purposes of equitable distribution. The
husband’s future salary could not be characterized as accruing during the marriage; therefore, the
wife had no right to that portion in equitable distribution. Compare to Dye v. Dye, 17 So.3d 34
(Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the husband, a county employee, accrued 1060 hours of sick leave and 928.7
hours of unused vacation time at the time of divorce, which upon termination of employment, the
husband would be entitled to compensation for his unused hours. The district court held that since
the husband’s employment contract provided for the method of valuing his unused hours, the value
of the unused sick and vacation days was subject to equitable distribution. However, if the unused
sick and vacation day valuation was speculative in nature, the court would not have required
equitable distribution.
4.2. Future book may be subject to equitable distribution
In the decision of Valentine v. Valentine, 137 So.3d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), the Third
District held that the award of fifty percent of any proceeds from a potential book the former wife
may write about the death of her sister must be read specifically as a reservation of jurisdiction for
a future court to determine whether any portion of this as-yet-unwritten publication is marital
property.
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During the marriage, the former wife's sister died under tragic circumstances and the former
wife kept a detailed journal regarding the death and her feelings. The former husband suggested
that this journal, or a book based thereon, might be published by the former wife and that a portion
of the royalties should be awarded to him in the equitable distribution plan as a marital asset. In a
protective order, the trial court placed the former wife on notice that should she ever publish the
journal or book, the former husband must be notified.
In the equitable distribution section of the final judgment, the trial court required that the
former wife convey to the former husband “[f]ifty percent of marital future proceeds from book
written by Wife.” But the final judgment also stated that “[t]he Family Law Court shall reserve
[jurisdiction] as to all current and future issues regarding the equitable distribution of the any [sic]
proceeds, royalties[,] or financial gain generated from the journal/book that was written during the
course of this marriage, or related matters” and that “[t]he court reserves jurisdiction as to the
equitable distribution matters regarding the Wife's book.” Thus, if the former wife publishes a book
based on the journal she kept during the marriage or publishes the journal itself, the court retained
jurisdiction to review the issue post-publication and to then determine what portion, if any, of the
royalties might qualify as marital assets.
4.3. Contingent Liability may be subject to equitable distribution
In Perkovich v. Humphrey-Perkovich, 2 So.3d 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the physician wife,
based on her treatment of patients during the marriage, may be prone to future malpractice lawsuits.
The trial court ordered the parties to divide any future claims that are not covered by malpractice
insurance. The husband appealed, contending he could not be held liable for potential future claims.
The appellate court reversed, holding that “no liability incurred; only the possibility of a liability is
present.” Pursuant to the concurring opinion, if a married couple has enjoyed the income from a
spouse’s profession, there may be times when a known contingent, but unliquidated, professional
liability should be treated as a marital liability, just as the related income was treated as marital
income. However, the contingent liability must not be speculative.
4.4. Interspousal gift following prenuptial agreement may create marital property
In Hooker v. Hooker, 220 So.3d 397 (Fla. 2017), the parties executed a prenuptial agreement
to keep their substantial pre-marital assets separate, together with any and all identifiable
appreciation, substitution, improvements, additions and/or replacements of or to any of the property
described. After the parties married, they heard about vacant land available, for which interested
persons needed to purchase a lottery ticket for the chance to purchase one of the lots. The Wife’s
father funded the purchase of the lottery ticket. The parties obtained the option to purchase a lot,
and the Husband did so with non-marital funds. Only the Husband signed the original purchase
money mortgage, but both parties signed a later mortgage document for a construction loan. The
property was developed into a working horse farm and marital home. The Wife furnished the home
and helped clean and care for the stables and horses. Later, the Wife expressed a desire to have a
5
summer home, so the Husband purchased a vacant lot in Lake George, New York with his non-
marital assets. He sent the Wife a card for their tenth wedding anniversary with a picture of the lot.
The mortgage on the property was in only the Husband’s name. The Wife was deeply involved in
the designing and building of the home, and she believed that she owned the home with the
Husband.
Even though the Wife actively contributed to the appreciation of the property (referencing
the marital home), the parties’ prenuptial agreement provided that any appreciation remained non-
marital. The Wife’s name was kept off the title and the original mortgage, and when the Husband
had the opportunity to make any donative intent clear through the creation of the corporation, he
chose to keep the corporation solely in his name and excluded the Wife’s name from the final sale
of the property. With the Lake George property, the facts evidence sufficient donative intent
through the Wife’s testimony about the Husband sending her a card for their tenth wedding
anniversary with a picture of the property. The Wife also purchased some furnishings and
incidentals with her separate funds. Delivery was made at the time the Wife obtained keys to the
property. With regard to the Husband’s surrender of dominion and control of the property, the Wife
had unfettered access to the home and made decisions on care and maintenance of the property with
the ability to incur expenses on behalf of the Husband.
4.5. Even where value is undetermined, asset may still be marital
In Niekamp v. Niekamp, 173 So.3d 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), the Wife’s business, a music
studio, was classified as a non-marital asset by the trial court. The Wife conceded the error on
appeal, but asserted it is harmless because: 1) there was no evidence of value and 2) the business
is based entirely on her goodwill and personal services. However, as noted by the Husband, the
business also has other assets, including tangible assets such as funds in bank accounts and two
books it sells, and perhaps some enterprise goodwill. Further, the failure to present evidence as to
value could have very well been to the Wife’s detriment. When an asset is acquired during the
marriage, it is presumed to be marital unless specifically established as non-marital. If the trial
court had properly classified the business as marital but lacked evidence of its value or of how much
of that value might have been attributable to the Wife’s personal goodwill, the court could have
granted each party a one-half interest.
4.6. Bonus checks may be considered marital assets
The Husband challenged the valuation and inclusion of certain assets in the marital estate,
namely the inclusion of two bonus checks of $17,000.00 and $29,000.00, which he received from
his work. He claims that those funds were depleted by the time of trial because he used it to pay
the mortgage, child support, alimony, and so on. The Wife, however, was able to show that not
only did the Husband not list the amounts on his amended financial affidavits, he also stopped
making any mortgage payments on the residence at least a year before receiving those checks and
stopped making child support and alimony payments thereafter. Additionally, at the time he
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received those checks, he was earning $143,989.88 in salary, from which he could have paid his
financial obligations to his family. The court had sufficient evidence from which to conclude that
the check amounts should be included in the marital estate. Byers v. Byers, 149 So.3d 161 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2014).
4.7. Annual Leave is a Marital Asset
In Rea-Manna v. Manna, 336 So.3d 804 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2022), Husband’s annual
leave was determined to be a marital asset but only to the maximinum allowed eventhough hours
accrued exceeded maximum allowed to be compensated.
5. Identification of Prospective/Potential Liabilities:
5.1. Negative Equity is a Marital Liability
Where the Court determines a property has negative equity, the negative equity is a marital
liability subject to equitable distribution. Lostaglio v. Lostaglio, 199 So.3d 560 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016).
5.2. Joint Tax Liability
Trial Court erred by failing to include a joint tax liability in its equitable distribution
determination. The trial court left it to the IRS to determine the treatment of the liability. Stuft v.
Stuft, 238 So.3d 419 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2018).
5.3. Adult Child’s Student Loan
Trial Court reversed where it failed to include their daughter’s student loan as a marital
liability when incurred prior to the date of filing. Conlin v. Conlin, 212 So.3d 487 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA
2017).
5.4. Cost to transfer property
Trial court failed to include the cost to transfer property awarded to a spouse even though
evidence presented as to the cost to transfer. Gupta v. Gupta, 327 So.3d 950 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2021).
C. NON-MARITAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
1. Gifts from a Third Party During the Marriage are Non-Marital:
In Madson v. Madson, 128 So.3d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), appellate court reversed where
the trial court erred by classifying former wife’s Coca–Cola shares as marital assets. At trial, the
former wife's son testified that he had purchased Coca–Cola shares for the former wife as a gift.
The former wife testified that the Coca–Cola shares were a gift from her son, and she neither
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purchased additional shares nor reinvested the original ones. A trial court “shall set apart to each
spouse that spouse's non-marital assets,” which include “[a]ssets acquired separately by either party
by noninterspousal gift.” § 61.075(1), (6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also McKee v. Mick, 120 So.3d
162, 163–64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (finding that the trial court erred by classifying a vehicle as marital
property and distributing it to the wife where the husband testified that the car used to belong to his
mother, who transferred title to him); Tradler v. Tradler, 100 So.3d 735, 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
(reversing and remanding the final judgment for the trial court to reclassify certain checks as non-
marital assets where the husband received them as gifts from his mother, kept them in his name
only, and never commingled the funds in a joint account); Capozza v. Capozza, 917 So.2d 365, 368
(Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (remanding “for a revised scheme of distribution deleting from the schedule
of marital assets the twenty shares ... which is to be considered the separate asset of [the husband],”
who had received them as a gift from his father).
2. Debt Accrued During the Marriage for Non-Marital Expenses are Non-Marital:
To the extent that a party incurred debts to cover non-marital expenses, the debt should not
be classified as marital debt for the purpose of equitable distribution. Fortune v. Fortune, 61 So.3d
441, 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing because the trial court classified the entire amount of a
loan as a marital debt without making a finding as to when the debt was incurred or what the debt
was used to pay); Walker v. Walker, 827 So.2d 363, 364–65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing because
the trial court classified the entire amount of a debt as a marital debt without determining which
portion of the debt was used to pay the husband's litigation and living expenses versus paying his
personal income tax and property taxes).
In Krift v. Obenour, 152 So.3d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), the trial court determined that the
credit card debt in the former husband's name was non-marital. His testimony concerning the nature
and purpose of his credit card expenses sufficiently overcame the presumption that the liability was
marital. The Fourth District found no error in the trial court's classification of the former husband's
credit card debt as non-marital and affirmed since all assets acquired and liabilities incurred by
either spouse subsequent to the date of the marriage and not specifically established as non-marital
assets or liabilities are presumed to be marital assets and liabilities.” § 61.075(8), Fla. Stat. (2012).
Distribution of the marital assets and liabilities must be supported by factual findings in the
judgment based on competent substantial evidence. The appellate courts review such findings for
an abuse of discretion. However, they review de novo the trial court’s legal conclusion that an asset
or liability is “marital” or “non-marital.” However, to the extent that a party incurred debts to cover
non-marital expenses, the debt should not be classified as marital debt for the purpose of equitable
distribution. Here, the Husband’s own testimony concerning the nature and purpose of his credit
card expenses sufficiently overcame the presumption that the liability was marital.
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3. Asset Acquired After the Date of Filing is Non-Marital:
In Smith v. Smith, 169 So.3d 220 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), the trial court included as marital
assets in the equitable distribution scheme both a Ford truck, which was owned by the Husband at
the time the petition was filed but sold during the pendency of the divorce, and a Scion, which was
purchased by the Husband after the date of filing, but prior to the final judgment. The Husband
sold the truck for $3,000.00 and then purchased the Scion for $3,000.00 as a replacement. Since
the parties did not enter into a marital settlement agreement, the applicable date for determining
whether assets and liabilities are classified as marital or non-marital is the date of the filing of the
petition. Assets and liabilities not in existence on that date should not be classified as marital. The
trial court needs to strike the Scion from the equitable distribution scheme and reduce the equalizing
payment owed to the Wife by $1,500.00.
Post-filing earnings which resulted in a tax refund was non-marital. Padmore v. Padmore,
335 So.3d 239 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2022).
4. Non-Marital Property Cannot be Awarded to the Non-Owner Spouse:
Once a determination of marital and non-marital assets is made, the court must set aside the
non-marital assets. In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 994 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), the trial court
erred in awarding to the wife the husband’s non-marital property in the equitable distribution
scheme. The trial court was concerned that the husband’s alleged lack of financial responsibility
and career growth may encumber the family residence in the future and awarded the wife the non-
marital home. The district court reversed, holding that the consideration of the husband’s non-
marital assets in making a distribution of marital assets was an abuse of discretion.
In Wilson v. Wilson, 992 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the district court determined that
the trial court erred in including a motel as a marital asset in an equitable distribution scheme. A
motel was gifted solely to the wife from her grandmother, which the wife managed during the
marriage. The trial court found that the wife’s non-marital interest in the motel became marital due
to the appreciation caused by the wife. However, the trial court erred by including the entire non-
marital asset and not just the appreciation. The district court held that the wife’s non-marital interest
did not become a marital asset and the trial court erred in not setting that portion aside when
awarding equitable distribution.
Once an asset has been determined to be non-marital, that asset may not be awarded to the
non-owner spouse as equitable distribution unless there has been agreement to the contrary. The
agreement may provide for such as part of a settlement agreement. Abernethy v. Abernethy, 670
So.2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
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5. If Court Determined Asset to be Non-Marital Must Make Finding:
In Goldman v. Goldman, 182 So.3d 722 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2015), Court awarded two bank
accounts to the Wife but failed to identify if marital or non-marital. If marital, then the court ordered
an unequal distribution without making the required findings. If non-marital, Court must identify
those assets as such.
6. Premarital Component of Wife’s TSP Supported by Wife’s Testimony:
Although there were no documents presented to support Wife’s claim as to the premarital
balance of her TSP account, she testified based on her personal knowledge, which the Court found
to be substantial competent evidence. Premarital value and passive appreciation may be deemed
non-marital. Neiditch v. Neiditch, 187 So.3d 374(Fla 5
th
DCA 2016).
7. Wife’s Credit Card Debt Incurred Prior to Marriage is Non-Marital:
Wife claimed credit card debt was incurred during the marriage. However, credit report in
evidence, established that the initial debt of $19,000 was incurred prior to the marriage and the
balance at the date of filing was largely comprised of interest and penalties. Debt found to be Wife’s
non-marital liability. Cilenti v. Cilenti, 192 So.3d 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
8. Mortgage Obtained During the Marriage but Recorded on Non-Marital Property was
Non-Marital:
Mortgage obtained during the marriage and signed by both parties. Funds used for
improvements to the husband’s non-marital property, the mortgage liability was non-marital. The
wife signed the mortgage but not the note, by signing the mortgage (which is often required by the
bank), she did not assume the liability. Frederick v. Frederick, 257 So.3d 1105 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018).
9. Engagement Rings and Wedding Rings Generally Non-Marital:
Generally, engagement rings and wedding rings are non-marital gifts of the receiving
spouse. Where those non-marital items of jewelry are converted into another piece of jewelry during
the marriage, the additional jewelry cost will be marital, and the initial engagement ring and
wedding rings will remain non-marital. Moody v. Newton, 264 So.3d 292 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2019).
10. Non-Pecuniary Compensation for a Personal Injury Loss May be Non-Marital:
Trial court is to apply “analytical approach” set forth in Weisfeld v. Weisfeld, 545 So.2d
1341 (Fla.1989) to determine the nature of the award. Court intended to award the non-pecuniary
compensatory damages to the husband as part of his non-economic award which should have been
his non-marital award.
If compensation for personal injury received during the marriage, the presumption of a
marital assets shifts to the injured party to prove that the award was for non-marital compensation.
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Failure to offer proof may result in a finding that the award was marital. Roth v. Roth, 312 So.3d
1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021).
11. Entity Formed After Marriage which Acquired Property Solely through Loan was Non-
Marital:
Husband formed an entity after the marriage. The entity acquired property through a loan
provided by Husband’s father. The entity (which was named as a third party defendant in the
divorce) defaulted on the loan and the property was turned over. Court found the property to be
non-marital. Turnover occurred before the divorce was filed. Apesteguy v. Keglevich, 319 So.3d
150 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2021).
12. Tickets to Future Sporting Events are Non-Marital:
Future season football tickets and parking passes are not a marital asset subject to equitable
distribution. Assets acquired after the date of filing are non-marital. Tanner v. Tanner, 323 So.3d
808 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2021).
13. Debt incurred via forgery is Non-Marital:
Fla. Stat. §61.075 (6)(b)(5) states that in the event of a forgery the liability shall be deemed
non-marital.
In Dampier v. Dampier, 298 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), the trial court improperly
refused to assign certain debts and obligations to the former wife which had been incurred as a
result of forgery by the former wife. In the final judgment, the trial court rejected the former wife’s
explanation concerning the disputed liabilities and determined they were incurred as a result of
fraud. Yet the trial judge considered these obligations as marital obligations and equitably
distributed them. The only reason given was that the court could not determine how the illegally
obtained funds were spent. The trial court erred in determining that it mattered whether the funds
had been misused or misspent. Section 61.075(6)(b)5. does not place the burden on the wronged
spouse to prove how the funds were used but makes it mandatory that the party that committed the
forgery be assigned the debt.
14. Military Disability is Non-Marital Asset:
Wife was to receive a portion of Husband’s retirement benefit when received. Husband
became disabled before eligible to receive retirement benefit. Huband’s disability was erroneously
deemed distributable by trial court which was reversed on appeal. Martin v. Martin, 2022 WL
3441473, 1D21-2647 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2022).
15. Pre-marital Personal Property not Marital:
In Twigg v. Twigg, 2022 WL 1434779, 2D21-543 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2022) trial court
improperly classified the Husband’s premarital car as marital. Reversed by appellate court. Car
11
was located at site owned by Wife’s brother to which Husband had no access. Value of car assessed
against Wife.
16. Court erred in classifying the Husband’s premarital bank accounts and post-marital
accounts funded with premarital monies as marital. Street v. Street, 303 So.3d 1253 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA
2020).
D. IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 61.075(7), the cut-off date for determining assets and liabilities to
be identified or classified as marital assets and liabilities is the earliest of the date the parties enter
into a valid separation agreement, such other date as may be expressly established by such
agreement, or the date of the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage.
1. Assets and Liabilities Acquired/Incurred After Date of Filing are Generally Non-Marital:
Assets acquired by one spouse after filing a petition for dissolution of marriage are
ordinarily deemed to be non-marital. Beers v. Beers, 724 So.2d 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
2. Student Loan Debt as Marital Liability:
Liabilities acquired during the marriage are also generally considered marital liabilities. In
Rogers v. Rogers¸ 12 So.3d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the trial court erred in holding that the wife
was responsible for her student loan debt when the debt was incurred during the marriage. The
husband argued that although the wife was in school during the marriage to obtain her paralegal
degree, he would not receive the benefit of her education. The district court held that this is not a
factor to be considered when allocating marital debt. Absent some other justification for an unequal
distribution, the student loan debt was a marital liability, incurred during the marriage, to be shared
equally amongst the parties. See also, Gudur v. Gudur, 277 So.3d 687 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019) (Student
loan debt incurred during the marriage is a marital liability even if the non-student spouse will not
benefit from the education).
3. College Expenses Funded by Debt During Marriage may be Considered a Marital
Liability:
In Wagner v. Wagner, 136 So.3d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), the husband appealed the
distribution of marital debt. Specifically, the husband contended that the trial court erred in
determining that a credit card debt for an adult child's college expenses incurred just before the wife
filed her petition for dissolution was not a marital debt and was the husband's responsibility. The
Second District disagreed.
The wife argued that any obligation a parent has to fund the college education of an adult
child is moral, not legal, and that the court cannot require a parent to pay those expenses unless the
12
parties have contracted for them in a marital settlement agreement. See Madson v. Madson, 636
So.2d 759, 761 (Fla. 2d DCA,1994); Riera v. Riera, 86 So.3d 1163, 1167–68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).
That is true for college expenses incurred after the petition for dissolution was filed and in the
future. However, the expenses were incurred during the marriage, albeit a few days before the
petition was filed.
The trial court may consider a party's intentional waste or depletion of marital assets to do
equity and justice between the parties. Santiago v. Santiago, 51 So.3d 637, 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011);
see also, David v. David, 58 So.3d 336, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (recognizing that intentional waste
of marital assets can justify an unequal distribution). The trial court did not make a finding of waste
of marital assets to justify an unequal distribution. See, Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 597 So.2d 835, 838
(Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (reversing determination that the husband wasted marital assets by assisting in
the support of his parents). In fact, the trial court “hope[d] that both parenting partners would take
part in funding the Davidson College expenses outside of Court.” Although the wife did not favor
paying the college expenses, based on all of the circumstances, the Second District determined that
the Husband's actions did not constitute intentional waste. Wagner v. Wagner, 136 So.3d 718 (Fla.
2d DCA 2014).
4. Physical Separation May Not Establish an Earlier Date for the Designation of Marital
versus Non-Marital Assets and Liabilities:
In Broadway v. Broadway, 132 So.3d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the record demonstrated
that the parties separated in early September 2010, and that the former husband purchased a 25–
foot pull-behind camper some time during the week the separation began. The former wife filed her
petition for dissolution of marriage on July 26, 2011. In the equitable distribution portion of the
final judgment, the trial court ruled that the camper was acquired post-separation and was
designated as a non-marital asset of which the former husband retained sole ownership. The First
District determined that the trial court erred.
The cut-off date for determining assets and liabilities to be identified or classified as marital
assets and liabilities is the earliest of the date the parties enter into a valid separation agreement,
such other date as may be expressly established by such agreement, or the date of the filing of a
petition for dissolution of marriage. § 61.075(7), Fla. Stat. (2011). A trial court's allocation of an
asset as marital or non-marital for purposes of equitable distribution is reviewed de novo. Puskar v.
Puskar, 29 So.3d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
In Morgan v. Morgan, 327 So.3d 898 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2021), trial court improperly used date
when parties “effectively separated” to classify assets as marital or non-marital. This was error.
Trial court should have used date of filing per statute.
13
5. Credit card debt incurred during the marriage and discharged in bankruptcy is marital:
In Diaz-Silveira v. Diaz-Silveira, 305 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), the trial court
awarded $14,200 in credit card debt to the husband. This was error. The debt had been discharged
by the credit card company. Thus, there was no debt to allocate as a part of equitable distribution.
The husband argued that he may still have a tax liability if the credit card company chooses to report
the write-off to the IRS. However, the husband's forensic accountant testified that if the debt was
discharged, it should not be included in the equitable distribution. The accountant further testified
that the husband had yet to receive the 1099-C form and had not received it in the previous two
years. At the close of trial, the husband still had not received the 1099-C form, and the record did
not contain an estimate of the amount of tax that may be due if/when the form is issued and received.
“The trial court correctly noted that it had to decide the case on the basis of the evidence before it
at that time and not what would or might happen in the future.” Hollinger v. Hollinger, 684 So. 2d
286, 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). “A party who wants a trial court to consider the consequences of his
receiving a tax burdened asset must present evidence of the tax consequences as to all assets so that
the trial court may order a distribution that is equitable.” Id. Therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion in placing the credit card debt in the husband’s column, thus depriving the wife of
$7,100.00 in equitable distribution.
E. DATE OF VALUATION
Florida Statute §61.075(7) provides that the date for determining value of assets and the
amount of liabilities identified or classified as marital is the date or dates as the judge determines is
just and equitable under the circumstances. Different assets may be valued as of different dates, as,
in the judge's discretion, the circumstances require.
1. Court’s Discretion as to Date of Valuation:
Choosing a valuation date of assets in dissolution actions is determined on a case by case
basis, depending upon the facts and circumstances. There was no presumption that one date should
be used as opposed to another. Perlmutter v. Perlmutter, 523 So.2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). The
Fourth District held that the date of the dissolution trial, rather than the date of filing of the action,
was the appropriate date for valuation of the marital assets for equitable distribution purposes.
The trial court must make a finding as to the date of valuation of pension and there must be
evidence as to the value or the trial court will be reversed. Here, trial court selected a valuation date
approximately one year before the filing date without any explanation. Smith v. Smith, 226 So.3d
948 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017).
2. Date of Final Hearing:
In Tucker v. Tucker, 966 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the trial court’s selection of the date
of the final dissolution hearing as the date for determining the value of marital assets was not an
14
abuse of discretion. The trial court selected that date since the parties had attempted reconciliation
in the years since the original petition for dissolution was filed, and the former husband had
purchased a townhouse and a vehicle subsequent to the filing of the petition.
In Massam v. Massam, 993 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), the trial court’s equitable
distribution scheme was reversed since the court did not include the unpaid rent of the husband’s
business as a marital liability. The final judgment gave the valuation date of assets and liabilities
as the date of trial. The trial court did not include the unpaid rent as a liability since the debt did
not accrue until after the petition for divorce was filed. Since the final judgment did not list the
time of filing as the valuation date, the district court was forced to depend upon the trial date as the
date of valuation. Therefore, the debt that was accrued after the parties’ separation was subject to
equitable distribution.
Error to use date of filing to value bank accounts and other investment accounts since
changes were due to market forces. Trial court should have used current values or should have
made findings explaining its decision. Schroll v. Schroll, 227 So.3d 232 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017).
Trial court used the valuation date of the marital residence appraised at date of filing and
also credited the spouse occupant with one-half of the mortgage reduction. Court should have either
used date of filing to value and not provided a credit or used value closer to trial (which included
appreciation) as the increase in value resulted from passive appreciation. The trial court was
reversed for combining the two different valuation dates. Mattison v. Mattison, 266 So.3d 258 (Fla.
5
th
DCA 2019).
3. Date of Filing:
In Schmitz v. Schmitz, 950 So.2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), the Court determined that the
date to be used for valuing marital assets and liabilities for the purpose of equitable distribution was
the date of the filing of the petition for dissolution, rather than the date of trial, since the parties did
not have a separation agreement or reach an agreement on any alternative date.
In Jordan v. Jordan, 127 So.3d 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), the Fourth District found that
competent substantial evidence was lacking to support the trial court's valuation of certain marital
assets and liabilities in the equitable distribution schedule attached to the final judgment.
As to the Former Husband’s challenge to the trial court's decision to value the marital assets
and liabilities as of the date of filing the petition for dissolution, the Fourth District found his
arguments without merit. “The date for determining value of assets and the amount of liabilities
identified or classified as marital is the date or dates as the judge determines is just and equitable
under the circumstances.” § 61.075(7), Fla. Stat. (2012). The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that the date of filing the petition for dissolution was an appropriate date to value
the assets.
15
In Clark, the court determined that one of the Husband’s investment accounts had a greater
balance at the beginning of the marriage than it did at the time of the filing of the petition for
dissolution of marriage. As there was no evidence that the account increased in value due to marital
funds, the Court properly found no legal basis to designate a portion of the account as marital. The
Court also did not err in using the petition filing date as the date for valuing the asset, since the date
for determining the value of assets classified as marital is the date the judge determines is just and
equitable. Here, however, it appears that the Court inadvertently misread the value on the account
statements, so the correct value needs to be ascertained with the equitable distribution scheme
revised accordingly. Clark v. Clark, 155 So.3d 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
4. Post Filing Efforts:
In Parry v. Parry, 933 So.2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), in determining which date to use, the
trial court valued stock on the dissolution petition filing date, rather than on the date of trial, since
the expert testified that the appreciation in value of the employer's stock was not passive but rather
due in part to the husband's work as a senior officer of the company.
Assets should not, ordinarily, be valued as of a post-dissolution date because the subsequent
change in the property's value due to non-marital labor or efforts cannot be distributed. Jahnke v.
Jahnke, 804 So.2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
In Catafulmo v. Catafulmo, 704 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the trial court properly
selected the date of the petition for dissolution, rather than the date of trial, as the valuation date for
equitable distribution, where the increase in the value of the husband's businesses resulted from his
individual efforts after the parties separated and after the filing of the petition, compared to merely
passive appreciation.
5. Date of Filing Separation Action in Out-of-State Action was the Valuation Date Selected
by the Trial Court:
A party filed suit for a separation in 1995 in Ohio and the parties thereafter lived separately
and had no communication and contact. This resulted in a divorce but one in which equitable
distribution was not determined. When Florida addressed the equitable distribution in 2009, the
trial court used the Ohio date of filing of the separation action for purposes of valuing the equitable
distribution. Kvinta v. Kvinta, 277 So.3d 1070 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2019).
6. Exceptions:
6.1. Appellate court considered separation in determining liability was non-marital
In Cardella-Navarro v. Navarro, 992 So.2d 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), where the trial court
assigned a portion of the business liabilities incurred by the husband’s business to the wife. The
wife appealed. The husband owned a yacht brokerage business as an S Corp and the husband was
16
the only shareholder. During the marriage, the company entered into an agreement for wholesale
financing with GE. The company went into default with GE for failure to pay $5,862,203.31 and
owed the state $211,478.82 for past-due sales taxes, interest and penalties. GE intervened and
became a party to the action, alleging they had in interest in the sale of the former marital home as
the property was collateral under the terms of the financing agreement. The trial court awarded
one-half of the business debt to the wife, approximately $4,694,000.00. The appellate court
reversed. The reasoning was that the husband controlled the company and most, not all, of the debt
arose after the parties separated. The trial court found that the husband mishandled corporate
finances and that it would be inequitable for one party to leave a short-term marriage with so much
debt. Also, the husband guaranteed the business loan and therefore there was no privity of contract
between the wife and creditor. In this case the trial court appears not to have considered the
liabilities having been incurred after the separation date while the appellate court did factor that in
in determining those liabilities to be non-marital.
6.2. Date of transfer (prior to filing date) was considered by the trial court
Three errors were made with regard to the trial court’s equitable distribution. First, the
distribution scheme should be revised to exclude an account in the amount of $23,660 from
inclusion as a marital asset. The Wife concedes the error. Second, the Husband, just weeks before
the Wife filed for divorce, transferred $100,000.00 to a Bulgarian bank. Upon converting the dollars
to Bulgarian leva, the account became worth approximately $91,015 in U.S. dollars. The funds
were not transferred for any nefarious reason, as the Husband did not know the Wife was going to
seek a divorce. The court ordered the Husband to pay the Wife $50,000.00 in U.S. dollars to
equitably divide the account. However, the Wife should bear her half of the decrease in value of
the account. The court was within its discretion in ordering the Husband to repay using U.S. dollars,
but it was error to value the asset as of the date it was transferred to Bulgaria and converted to leva.
The decrease in funds was an event that both parties bore at the time it occurred, which was before
the dissolution action began. In the absence of any evidence that notions of justice and equity
required valuing the account as of the date it was transferred, it was an abuse of discretion to use
that date. Third, the Husband testified that the Wife had used $4,000 in marital funds to make an
initial payment to her attorney. That amount was removed from a marital account about two months
prior to the date that the Wife filed for the dissolution. The Wife used marital funds for the down
payment for her attorney’s fees, making it at a time the parties were still living together. After they
separated, the temporary support began, which was specifically designed to include the Wife’s fees.
The Husband should be credited for half of the amount the Wife used to pay her fees. Stantchev v.
Stantcheva, 168 So.3d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
17
6.3. Date of valuation in oral ruling differed from date in final judgment
Where Court announced petition date as the appropriate date for valuing assets and liabilities
but instead used different date to determine the value of the business, appellate court reversed. On
remand trial court is to select valuation date and calculate the equitable distribution accordingly.
Holaway v. Holaway, 197 So.3d 612 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016).
F. COMMINGLING
1. Generally:
Non-marital property may become a marital asset when the non-marital assets are
commingled with marital assets. Non-marital property loses its non-marital character once
commingled. Pfrengle v. Pfrengle, 976 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)(holding that even if an
account is titled in one party’s name, the fact the marital and non-marital funds are commingled,
the entire account became marital.)
In Lakin v. Lakin, 901 So.2d 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), the district court held that funds
received from the husband’s mother’s estate lost their status as non-marital and were subject to
equitable distribution, although securities purchased with funds were kept separate from the money
market portion of the brokerage account when the funds were transferred from the estate to the joint
banking account. The money was transferred from the joint banking account to the brokerage
account, and the husband and the wife treated the entirety of account as a marital asset and the
account became marital.
In Holden v. Holden, 667 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), in which the court found that the
evidence did not support the finding that certificates of deposit held in the wife's name and
purchased with distributions on the wife's shares of stock in her family's business constituted marital
assets subject to equitable distribution as the stock itself was a non-marital asset, and the court was
presented evidence that distributions were included in the joint federal tax return. Also, the husband
testified that he assumed that the wife's non-marital income was the source of the purchase money
for acquisition of the property in the husband's name, and he did not establish that distributions
were commingled with marital assets. The certificate of deposits remained non-marital, not subject
to equitable distribution.
Similarly, in Robinson v. Robinson, 10 So.3d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), five shares of stock
in a closely held corporation that husband acquired prior to the marriage were non-marital property
and, thus, were required to be excluded from the equitable distribution plan in the dissolution
proceeding, regardless of the premarital value of the stock, where there was no evidence of
enhancement, commingling, or gift to the wife.
In McMullen v. McMullen, 148 So.3d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the First District agreed
with the former husband that the trial court erred in determining that $250,000 of the distribution
18
he received from a non-marital joint venture and transferred into his checking account was subject
to equitable distribution. There was competent substantial evidence that did not support the trial
court's finding that those funds were treated, used, or relied on by the parties as a marital asset. See
§ 61.075(6)(b) 3, Fla. Stat. (2011); Holden v. Holden, 667 So.2d 867, 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
However, as to the remainder of the equitable distribution award, the First District disagreed with
the former husband and found that there was competent substantial evidence that supported the trial
court's findings that the former husband's marital efforts and contributions enhanced the value of
the non-marital joint venture. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount
of the enhancement to which the former wife was entitled. See § 61.075(6)(a)1b, Fla Stat. (2011).
In Sorgen v. Sorgen, 162 So.3d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), the First District found that the
wife’s one-third interest in the proceeds from the sale of inherited real property ultimately was
commingled in the joint account, which created a presumption that she gifted an undivided one-half
interest in the proceeds from the sale of the home to the husband. The wife presented no evidence
to rebut that presumption. Although the wife argued that her one-third interest in the proceeds from
the sale of the home remained non-marital because no evidence existed that the funds representing
her one-third interest were untraceable from the funds in the joint account, the First District
ultimately determined that the funds were marital.
1.1. Burden of Proof
The spouse seeking to have jointly titled property declared a non-marital asset “has the
burden of overcoming this presumption by proving that a gift was not intended.” Robertson v.
Robertson, 593 So.2d 491, 494 (Fla.1991); see also § 61.075(6)(a) 3, Fla. Stat. (2008) (“All personal
property titled jointly by the parties as tenants by the entireties, whether acquired prior to or during
the marriage, shall be presumed to be a marital asset. In the event a party makes a claim to the
contrary, the burden of proof shall be on the party asserting the claim that the subject property, or
some portion thereof, is non-marital.”). “The burden of proof to overcome the gift presumption [is]
by clear and convincing evidence.” § 61.075(6)(a) 4, Fla. Stat. (2008)
2. Pre-Marital Property Transformed During Marriage by Acts of Non-Owner Spouse:
As to a chiropractic building owned by the Former Husband prior to the marriage, during
the marriage, Former Wife was an instrumental part in coordinating and helping with the vast
improvements that were done to the building, which included replacing walls, installing new
flooring, adding columns and a flag pole to the front, modifying lighting and other electrical work,
adding an additional parking lot, replacing the roof, and putting in new doors and windows.
Contrary to the Former Husband's arguments, these actions went beyond mere maintenance and
were improvements that enhanced the value of the building. These actions, combined with how the
proceeds from the sale of the building were used, sufficiently transformed the non-marital asset into
a marital asset. The Former Husband did not offer evidence to show that only a portion of the asset
was transformed rather than the entire asset. Thus, the trial court’s determination that the Jordan
19
Realty asset was a marital asset was affirmed. Jordan v. Jordan, 127 So.3d 794 (Fla. 4th DCA
2013).
3. Non-Marital Property and Prenuptial Agreement; Interspousal Gift:
In Hooker v. Hooker, 220 So.3d 397 (Fla. 2017), the parties executed a prenuptial agreement
to keep their substantial pre-marital assets separate, together with any and all identifiable
appreciation, substitution, improvements, additions and/or replacements of or to any of the property
described. After the parties married, they heard about vacant land available, for which interested
persons needed to purchase a lottery ticket for the chance to purchase one of the lots. The Wife’s
father funded the purchase of the lottery ticket. The parties obtained the option to purchase a lot,
and the Husband did so with non-marital funds. Only the Husband signed the original purchase
money mortgage, but both parties signed a later mortgage document for a construction loan. The
property was developed into a working horse farm and marital home. The Wife furnished the home
and helped clean and care for the stables and horses. Later, the Wife expressed a desire to have a
summer home, so the Husband purchased a vacant lot in Lake George, New York with his non-
marital assets. He sent the Wife a card for their tenth wedding anniversary with a picture of the lot.
The mortgage on the property was in only the Husband’s name. The Wife was deeply involved in
the designing and building of the home, and she believed that she owned the home with the
Husband.
Even though the Wife actively contributed to the appreciation of the property, the parties’
prenuptial agreement provided that any appreciation remained non-marital. The Wife’s name was
kept off the title and the original mortgage, and when the Husband had the opportunity to make any
donative intent clear through the creation of the corporation, he chose to keep the corporation solely
in his name and excluded the Wife’s name from the final sale of the property. With the Lake George
property, the facts evidence sufficient donative intent through the Wife’s testimony about the
Husband sending her a card for their tenth wedding anniversary with a picture of the property. The
Wife also purchased some furnishings and incidentals with her separate funds. Delivery was made
at the time the Wife obtained keys to the property. With regard to the Husband’s surrender of
dominion and control of the property, the Wife had unfettered access to the home and made
decisions on care and maintenance of the property with the ability to incur expenses on behalf of
the Husband. As to the Wife’s challenge of the award of a 25% interest in the property to her,
Section 61.075(1) allows for an unequal distribution of an asset when the court finds it is justified
based on a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors. The court’s determination is supported by the
record as to how it arrived at the percentages of interest.
4. Placing Proceeds from the Sale of a Non-Marital Asset into a Joint Account may Result
in the Proceeds Losing their Non-Marital Character:
20
Prior to the marriage, the Wife inherited a one-third interest in a home. The other two-thirds
interest in the home was inherited by the Wife’s two sisters. After the parties married, the sisters
separately sold their interests in the home to the Wife. The Wife testified that she purchased her
sisters’ interests using her separate funds, and the Husband testified that the Wife used joint funds
to purchase same. In any event, it is undisputed that after the purchase, the Wife and the Husband
renovated the home using joint funds, and they also received rental income from the home, which
they deposited into a joint account. The parties used funds from the joint account to pay the taxes
on the home and the rental income. The parties ultimately sold the home, and the proceeds were
deposited into a joint account. They used a portion of the proceeds to pay the capital gains taxes
on the sale of the home and kept the remaining proceeds in a joint account for the next ten years,
which they used to execute stock trades. When the Husband filed for divorce, the Wife moved the
funds from the joint account into her separate personal account. The circuit court denied the
Husband’s request to include the Wife’s one-third interest in the proceeds from the sale of the home
as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.
Because the proceeds from the sale of the home ultimately were commingled into the
parties’ joint account, the Wife’s one-third interest in the proceeds from the sale of the home became
a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. A party may show intent to keep an asset non-
marital if the non-marital property is placed into a separate account, no other funds are deposited
into it, and the account is never intermingled with the parties’ other funds.
However, when one spouse deposits funds into a joint account where they are commingled
with other funds so as to become untraceable, a presumption is created that the spouse made a gift
to the other spouse of an undivided one-half interest in the funds. The spouse seeking to have the
property declared a non-marital asset has the burden of overcoming the presumption by proving,
by clear and convincing evidence, that a gift was not intended. Here, the funds were deposited into
the joint account and joint funds were used to renovate the home, pay taxes on the home, and
execute stock trades. This commingling created a presumption that the Wife gifted an undivided
one-half interest in the funds to her Husband. Sorgen v. Sorgen, 162 So.3d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
Where the Wife commingled funds in a premarital account with funds earned during the
marriage, the Wife found to have commingled account and account became marital. Likewise,
when Wife took sales proceeds from premarital property and commingled into an account with
earnings during the marriage, all funds were deemed marital. Money is fungible and once
commingled loses its separate character. DiStefano v. Distefano, 253 So.3d 1178 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA
2018).
Premarital property did not become marital in its entirety when partial premarital interest in
land became full interest during the marriage. Only the interest acquired during the marriage was
marital. Landrum v. Landrum, 212 So.3d 486 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017).
21
Husband had an ownership interest in a crude oil company and its drilling rights before the
marriage. The Husband commingled the proceeds from the sale of the drilling rights with marital
funds and therefore, those proceeds were deemed marital. Sturms v. Sturms, 226 So.3d 1004 (Fla.
1
st
DCA 2017).
Contribution of marital funds to the enhancement of a premarital property may cause
appreciation to be marital but not the asset. Yon v. Yon, 286 So.3d 322 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019). In
this opinion the appellate court analyzed various assets and addressed claims of commingling in a
very thoughtful opinion.
G. ENHANCEMENT IN VALUE/APPRECIATION
1. Generally:
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. §61.075(6)(a)1b, a non-marital asset may be altered into a marital asset
to the extent that its value has been enhanced by marital funds or labor. Cole v. Roberts, 661 So.2d
370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). However, the appreciation must be attributable to active appreciation,
instead of merely passive appreciation.
The Husband transferred $250,000.00 of the distribution he received from a non-marital
joint venture into his checking account. Competent substantial evidence did not support the trial
court’s finding that those funds were treated, used, or relied on by the parties as a marital asset.
However, competent substantial evidence did support the trial court’s finding that the Husband’s
marital efforts and contributions enhanced the value of the non-marital joint venture, and the court
did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of the enhancement to which the Wife was
entitled. McMullen v. McMullen, 148 So.3d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
2. Where Accounts did not Appreciate, Accounts Remained Non-Marital:
In Gromet v. Jensen, 201 So.3d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), the Husband had three accounts,
an Interactive Brokers account, a Schwab IRA account, and a Schwab One account, all of which
were entirely funded with $400,000.00 he had inherited from his mother. The Wife had no access
or control over any of the Husband’s accounts. She asserted that because the Husband personally
managed his accounts during the marriage, any enhancement in value of the accounts was due to
the Husband’s marital efforts and labor, and therefore, the enhancement in value was a marital asset.
The trial court agreed that the three accounts were marital assets subject to equitable distribution,
as section 61.075(6)(a)1.b., Florida Statutes provides that marital assets include the enhancement
in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the
marriage. The enhancement in value of a non-marital asset due to marital labor or effort is a marital
asset subject to equitable distribution. The trial court erred in its finding. The burden was on the
Wife to establish that: 1) the Husband actively managed his accounts during the marriage; 2) as a
22
result of the Husband’s marital efforts, his accounts enhanced in value; and 3) the actual value of
the enhancement. While the trial court’s finding that the Husband actively managed his accounts
is supported by competent, substantial evidence, its finding that the accounts increased in value is
not. The record actually reflects that the Husband’s accounts decreased in value by the time the
Wife filed the petition. As there was no enhanced value, there is enhanced value to determine and
therefore, not subject to equitable distribution.
3. Method of Calculating the Passive Appreciation where there is Some Marital
Contribution to the Non-Marital Asset:
The Florida legislature amended Fla. Stat. 61.075 (6) (a)1 to add subsection c. which is
intended to provide the formula for calculating the marital portion of passive appreciation in a non-
marital property. Essentially, this statutory amendment was intended to clarify the decision in Kaaa
v. Kaaa, 58 So.3d 867 (Fla. 2010).
The formula applies where a note and mortgage on non-marital property is paid down with
marital funds during the marriage. A portion of the passive appreciation will be deemed marital
which portion is calculated by multiplying a coverture fraction by the passive appreciation in the
property during the marriage.
The passive appreciation is determined by subtracting the value of the property on the date
of the marriage (or acquisition if during the marriage), whichever is later, from the value on the
valuation date in the divorce, less any active appreciation during the marriage (for example,
principal pay down on the mortgage from marital funds) and less any additional indebtedness on
the property (for example, a line of credit).
The coverture fraction: numerator (total payment of principal from marital
funds)/denominator (the value of the property when acquired, date of marriage or date of
encumbrance, whichever is later). For example: If the principal pay down during the marriage
from marital funds was $20,000 and the property at date of marriage was $200,000 the percentage
of passive appreciation which is marital is 10%.
The total marital portion will be the principal pay down, the marital portion of the passive
appreciation and any active appreciation, if any. The value cannot exceed the total net equity in the
property at date of valuation.
The Court is required to apply this formula unless a party can establish that the application
of the formula would be inequitable.
4. Calculating Marital Appreciation in a Non-Marital Asset Must Include the Active
Appreciation Paid to Reduce Debt:
In Ballard v. Ballard, 158 So.3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the First District determined that
the trial court erred as a matter of law when it construed Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So.3d 867 (Fla.2010), to
23
exclude the amounts the parties paid down on the mortgage as a marital asset. When marital assets
are used during the marriage to reduce the mortgage on non-marital property, the increase in equity
is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. See, e.g., Gaetani–Slade v. Slade, 852 So.2d 343
(Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Spence v. Spence, 669 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Massis v. Massis,
551 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Heiny v. Heiny, 113 So.3d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Dwyer
v. Dwyer, 981 So.2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 841 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA
2003); Cole v. Roberts, 661 So.2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Adkins v. Adkins, 650 So.2d 61 (Fla.
3d DCA 1994). Neither the Second District nor the Supreme Court in Kaaa disturbed the trial
court's determination that the increase in equity resulting from paying down the mortgage with
marital funds constitutes a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. Ballard v. Ballard, 158
So.3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Betts v. Betts, 235 So.3d 958 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2017).
5. Pay Down of Mortgage During the Marriage Constitutes Marital Enhancement Even
Where the Asset did not Appreciate in Value:
In Somasca v. Somasca, 171 So.3d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), the Husband purchased a
building in 1998, well before the parties’ marriage in 2007. The building remained titled in the
Husband’s name alone throughout the marriage. The Husband testified that the value of this
building at the time of the parties’ marriage was $900,000. Shortly before the parties separated, the
Husband sold the building for $680,000. The Wife did not challenge the sales price or present any
evidence concerning the value of the building. Based on the evidence, the trial court found that the
building did not appreciate in value during the marriage. The Queens building was subject to a
mortgage, which was reduced by $23,651.16 from payments made during the marriage from marital
funds. The Wife argued that she was entitled to an equitable distribution in the amount of the
reduction in the mortgage indebtedness, but the trial court reasoned that since there was no
appreciation in the value of the building, her argument was moot. The Wife appealed, arguing that
the use of marital funds to pay down the mortgage on the Husband’s non-marital asset renders the
enhancement in the value of the property a marital asset in accordance with Ballard, which had not
yet been released at the time the trial court heard and decided this case. The Husband responded
that the evidence showed that the value of the building decreased during the marriage instead of
appreciating and that in the absence of appreciation in value of the property, the Wife had no claim
to a credit for one-half of the amount of the reduction in the mortgage.
The pay down on the mortgage enhanced the equity value of the Husband’s non-marital
asset. The use of marital funds to pay down the mortgage obviously caused an enhancement in the
value of the Husband’s equity in the property, because absent the reduction in the amount of the
mortgage indebtedness, the net proceeds that the Husband realized from the sale of the building
would have been reduced by an amount equal to the pay down of the debt. The trial court’s reliance
on Kaaa was misplaced because in Kaaa, the Supreme Court addressed a question involving passive,
market-driven appreciation in a non-marital asset, not the payoff or a reduction in the amount of a
mortgage on the property.
24
6. Pay Down of Mortgage may not Constitute Marital Enhancement where the non-Marital
Property did not Appreciate During the Marriage:
The Fourth District Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in Weaver v. Weaver,
174 So.3d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Long prior to the marriage, the Husband purchased a home in
his name alone. After the marriage, he refinanced mortgages on the property, and the Wife signed
the promissory note and mortgages. At the time of the final hearing, the mortgages totaled around
$136,000. The house was worth around $300,000 when the parties married but had fallen to around
$181,973 according to the property appraiser. The Husband claimed it was worth around $160,000,
and the Wife did not testify to its value. The Husband and Wife pooled their incomes and paid the
mortgage and other expenses from pooled funds. The Fourth District Court of Appeals held that
no evidence supported any increase or enhancement of value during the marriage. Although the
mortgage was reduced some during the marriage due to the expenditure of pooled resources, the
actual value of the home was not enhanced, so it was error for the court to award the Wife any
portion of this non-marital asset.
7. Once Active Appreciation is Found as to a Non-Marital Property, Burden Shifts to the
Owner Spouse to Establish Non-Marital Part of Appreciation (Passive):
Once it is proven that there was active appreciation of a non-marital business or property,
the burden then shifts to the other party to show that some, if any, portion of the enhanced value is
exempt from equitable distribution. Gaetani-Slade v. Slade, 852 So.2d 343, 347 (Fla. 1st DCA
2003)(stating that "once a non-owner spouse establishes that marital labor or funds were used to
improve [an asset] that was non-marital, the owner-spouse has the burden to show which parts [of
the enhanced value] are exempt ")(citing Adkins v. Adkins, 650 So.2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994);
O'Neill v. O'Neill, 868 So.2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(stating that "once it is established that marital
labor was used, the burden falls on the party claiming that the increase was non-marital to establish
whether any part of the increase was the result of passive market conditions and, thus, is exempt
from equitable distribution"); Young v. Young, 606 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(confirming
that a trial court cannot refuse to distribute the appreciated value of a non-marital asset improved
by marital labor or funds "because the [non-owner spouse] ha[s] not established how much the
improvements enhanced the value of the property," and that the burden is on the owner spouse to
prove whether any part of the enhanced value is exempt from distribution); Yitzhari v. Yitzhari,
906 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)(despite the husband's testimony which confirmed that during
the marriage he expended both marital funds and labor to manage, maintain and improve seven
properties titled wholly or partially in his name, the trial court erred in refusing to award any portion
of value of the properties to the wife because she failed "to carry her burden" of proving when, and
how much, marital funds were expended). Chapman v. Chapman, 866 So.2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA
2004).
25
In Palmer v. Palmer, 316 So. 3d 411 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021), the Fifth District affirmed the
trial court’s finding of active appreciation of a nonmarital business during the marriage. The trial
court described in its amended final judgment that the former husband decided in 2009 to take an
active role in Palmer Timber. The court found that “the financial standing of the company was bleak
for a variety of reasons.” The parties each presented evidence as to whether the former husband’s
efforts or labor had improved the financial condition of Palmer Timber. The trial court
acknowledged that the former husband was not involved in the “day-to-day management role” of
the company, but nevertheless detailed the various “leadership efforts” and “marital labor” that the
former husband provided to Palmer Timber from 2009 up to the former wife’s filing for dissolution
of marriage in May 2018. The involvement was found to have directly benefited or improved
Palmer Timber’s financial condition and, thus, the value of his stock. The Fifth District held that
competent substantial evidence in the record supported the trial court’s findings that the appreciated
value in the former husband’s stock from 2009 to 2018 was due to his marital labor and that
therefore, once the former wife met her burden of showing that the appreciated value in former
husband’s Palmer Timber stock was due to his marital labor, the burden then shifted to the former
husband to show that some portion of this enhanced value was exempt from equitable distribution.
8. Premarital Agreement and Enhancement:
Prior to and during the marriage, the Husband’s family had substantial businesses and real
estate investments. At the time of the marriage, the couple executed an antenuptial agreement in
which the Wife waived most rights to equitable distribution. The enforceability of the antenuptial
agreement was litigated first, and the court determined that it had been abandoned. Equitable
distribution was then litigated by a second judge. The court accepted the testimony of the
Husband’s financial expert. As such, the amount of appreciation to real estate treated as marital
property subject to equitable distribution was quite limited. Of the more than $29 million of assets
valued in the final judgment, more than $20 million were treated as the Husband’s non-marital
property. Only $8.4 million of property was subject to equitable distribution, and it was equally
divided. This is supported by competent substantial evidence, and there is no abuse of discretion
in the awards made by the court. However, in the final judgment, the court determined that shortly
before filing, the Wife removed approximately $220,000 from a certificate of deposit solely owned
by the Husband. There was no adjustment to any monetary award in the final judgment, so this
portion of the judgment was reversed to the extent of requiring the court to address this issue on
remand. Geraci v. Geraci, 155 So.3d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
9. Enhancement in Non-Marital Stock may not be a Marital Asset:
As a general proposition, the enhanced value of pre-marital stock from a company in which
the owning spouse works can be considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. Pagano
v. Pagano, 665 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1996).
26
In Robbie v. Robbie, 654 So.2d 616 (Fla.4
th
DCA 1995), the Court found the enhancement
in non-marital stock was marital. This is perhaps the seminal case on this point of law.
In Oxley v. Oxley, 695 So.2d 364 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1997), the Court found appreciation in non-
marital stock was non-marital as it was a result of passive appreciation – no marital effort involved
in enhancement.
Now, in the case of Witt-Bahls v. Bahls, 193 So.3d 35 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016), the Appellate
Court has further identified the factors Courts should consider in determining if enhancement in
non-marital stock is marital. In this case, the husband worked at the company in which he owned
premarital stock. The husband was, at best, middle management. He had been demoted several
times and was ultimately fired. This was a large, closely held company with thousands ofemployees.
The husband purchased the stock in the company before the marriage. He took out a loan to pay for
the shares and interest only on the loan was repaid during the marriage. When he was terminated,
the husband cashed out his stock, which had appreciated significantly in value. The Court held the
appreciation in the stock to be non-marital.
The Wife failed to establish that the husband occupied a significant management role (his
efforts causing appreciation in the stock). This established that the burden of proof is on the non-
owning spouse to evidence that the owning spouse has contributed marital efforts to the appreciation
in the pre-marital stock.
In the cases where the company stock was a family owned company and the owning spouse
held a significant management position, the result was different. See, e.g. Robbie and Pagano.
10. Premarital Business with No Appreciation:
Husband had a premarital business. He worked at the business during the marriage.
However, the business did not appreciate in value during the marriage. It went down in value during
the marriage. Accordingly, the business was a non-marital asset. Ramos v. Ramos, 230 So.3d 893
(Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017).
11. Premarital Property had no Equity at the Time of the Marriage, Appreciation is Marital:
Where premarital property had no equity at the time of the marriage, all of the appreciation
should have been determined to be marital. Matyjaszek v. Matyjaszek, 255 So.3d 372 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018).
12. Enhancement during the Marriage of Non-Marital Property:
27
In Nathey v. Nathey, 292 So. 3d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), the former husband constructed
a home prior to the marriage. During the marriage, the former husband paid the loan taken to
finance the construction of the home. The parties later took a line of credit on the home, which was
partly paid down during the marriage. In the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the trial
court characterized the home as a marital asset with equity of $253,522. The court then awarded
Mrs. Nathey $100,000 as her marital equity in the home. That property, however, was not a marital
asset. Because Mr. Nathey constructed the home before the marriage and kept title in his name, it
should have been characterized as his nonmarital property.
H. DISTRIBUTION
After the non-marital assets and liabilities are separated from the marital assets and
liabilities, the court will make a distribution of the marital assets. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 61.075(1),
the court begins with the premise that the distribution of marital assets and liabilities should be
equal. There are a number of justifications to make an unequal distribution, which include:
1. The Contribution to the Marriage by Each Spouse, Including Contributions to the Care
and Education of the Children and Services as Homemaker:
In Russ v. Russ, 576 So.2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), the third district held that an award to
the wife of 65% of the proceeds on the mortgage held by parties on a campground they previously
sold was supported by evidence that the wife made extraordinary contributions to the daily
operation and financial management of the campground business during the eight-year period while
the husband remained essentially idle, drinking large quantities of beer. Compare to Lanzetta v.
Lanzetta, 563 So.2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), where the court determined that the fact that the
husband had performed many household chores because the wife's medical ailments prevented her
from doing so was not such a special circumstance to warrant an unequal distribution.
An unequal distribution of marital assets and liabilities was also supported by findings that
a party suffered from emotional problems stemming mainly from marital difficulties and the
husband's infidelities, and that the wife did not work outside of the home for most of the eighteen-
year marriage and instead contributed as a homemaker, child care provider, and devoted mother,
and that husband had a flourishing pediatric practice. Goosby v. Lawrence, 711 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1998).
However, disparate earning abilities do not, without more explanation, justify an unequal
distribution of marital assets. Dease v. Dease, 688 So.2d 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). In Vilardi v.
Vilardi, 225 So.3d 395 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2017), the trial court erred in justifying an unequal distribution
based on disparate earning abilities that alone is NOT a sufficient basis to support an unequal
distribution.
2. The Economic Circumstances of the Parties:
28
In Bell v. Bell, 642 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the first district held that the former
wife who held a broker's license and was awarded a real estate business was improperly awarded a
greater share of marital assets on the basis of an alleged inability to provide for herself if assets
were distributed equally; former wife's income would not be fixed by the property received in
distribution, and although the former wife had the need to pay for property upkeep and labor, taxes,
utilities, and insurance expenses on the property awarded to her, the former husband would have
those expenses on property awarded to him.
The enhancement in the value of a business that was the result of the husband's business
acumen and the development of assets which belonged to him prior to marriage was justification
for an unequal distribution since the husband paid all expenses during marriage, which allowed the
wife to increase her personal financial status. Valdes v. Valdes, 894 So.2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).
3. The Duration of the Marriage:
In Hoffman v. Hoffman, 552 So.2d 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), the first district held that since
the marriage was just over a year’s duration, and there was a disparity of the spouse’s age, it was
proper to give an unequal distribution.
The trial court ordered a 60/40 distribution of the marital assets and liabilities favoring the
Wife, citing the parties’ past earning histories and future ability to earn income. The equitable
distribution statute provides that the trial court must begin with the premise that the distribution
should be equal and requires consideration and factual findings in the judgment regarding nine (9)
specified factors in assessing whether an unequal distribution is warranted. Here, the 60/40
distribution is premised solely on the parties’ income and fails to contain the factual findings
required by statute. Disparate earning abilities cannot, without more, justify unequal distribution
of marital assets and liabilities. Badgley v. Sanchez, 165 So.3d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
In Knecht v. Palmer, 252 So.3d 842 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2018), parties divorced following a three
year marriage (second for both). Husband entered marriage with a lot of debt and Wife entered the
marriage with significant assets. Wife used non-marital funds for renovations to her premarital
property, but she commingled funds by transferring funds to a joint account. By commingling
funds, those funds were misclassified by the trial court and should have been deemed marital.
However, it was clear trial court intended to award an unequal distribution, so the result was not
reversed.
4. Any Interruption of Personal Careers or Educational Opportunities of Either Party:
Husband claimed career interruption to enable wife to go to law school. Trial court awarded
unequal distribution, appellate court reversed. Cooley v. Cooley, 253 So.3d 1223 (Fla. 2n DCA
2008).
5. The Contribution of one Spouse to the Personal Career or Educational Opportunity of
29
the Other Spouse:
In Becker v. Becker, 639 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), the trial court abused its
discretion in finding a 50-50 split where the wife contributed little to marriage, the parties had no
children, and the husband paid the great majority of the wife's educational expenses. Additionally,
the wife worked before the marriage and after graduation but used all but one of her paychecks for
her own needs and wants while the husband paid all household expenses, and the marriage lasted
only four years during which time parties carefully kept their assets separate.
6. The Desirability of Retaining any Asset, Including an Interest in a Business, Corporation,
or Professional Practice, Intact and Free from any Claim or Interference by the Other Party:
As a general rule, it is improper for the trial court to leave the parties as joint owners of a
closely held business. This general rule was confirmed in the opinion of Bowen v. Volz, 271 So.3d
1162 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019). In Lift v. Lift, 1 So.3d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), the parties brought a
stipulation before the court. The stipulation provided that the wife would receive her veterinary
business and that the husband would accept the wife’s valuation of the business. Because
appropriately made stipulations entered by the parties are generally binding by the court and the
parties, the trial court erred by awarding each party 50% of the veterinary business. The district
court overturned this award, claiming that by forcing the husband and wife to be business partners
created an “intolerable situation,” and the trial court erred when the two parties clearly stated that
they did not want to continue working together after their divorce.
Similarly, in Manolakos v. Manolakos, 871 So.2d 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), the trial court
ordered that the former husband and the former wife remain equal owners in the chiropractic
businesses. According to the judgment, the former husband would manage and operate these
businesses for three years. During this time, he would be entitled to all the profits from the
businesses. After three years, the former wife was to begin working with the former husband and
upon her return, she was to begin receiving fifty percent of the net revenues. The court stated that
“dissolution of marriage, being what it is, it is clearly an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
order two parties who have stated they do not want to continue to work together after their divorce
to do just that.” See also Robbins v. Robbins, 549 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), granting a
former spouse a shared interest in the stock of a closely held corporation has the effect of “requiring
the former spouses to operate as business partners. Such a financial arrangement is intolerable.”
Also of note, in Menendez v. Rodriguez-Menendez 871 So.2d 951 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), and quoting
Robbins, the court held that the parties must, on remand, present proper valuation evidence so that
the trial court may, as the parties agree, award this asset to one of the spouses and “devise a plan of
distribution which causes the least interference with the ongoing business of the corporation, yet
which is practical and beneficial to both spouses.”
7. The Contribution of each Spouse to the Acquisition, Enhancement, and Production of
Income or the Improvement of, or the Incurring of Liabilities to, both the Marital Assets and the
30
Non-Marital Assets of the Parties:
See Boutwell v. Adams, 920 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)(holding that the facts that
husband experienced significant periods of unemployment toward the end of the marriage, that he
spent time tinkering with his motor vehicle collection when he could have directed more time and
energy to securing a job, and that he continued to spend extravagantly and to borrow money despite
the lack of a meaningful search for full employment were relevant to trial court's equitable
distribution of marital assets.)
However, the mere fact that one spouse contributed more financially, in itself, is insufficient
to award an unequal determination. In Williams v. Williams, 686 So.2d 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997),
the district court held that the fact that the husband, who served as the primary wage earner, also
made a significant contribution of premarital assets does not justify the trial court's disparate
treatment of the marital assets. The district court stated that affirming the unequal distribution in
this case would allow a trial court in every case the discretion to unequally distribute assets solely
because the primary wage earner made a premarital contribution, even in the absence of any
compelling factors.
Similarly, in Stough v. Stough, 18 So.3d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), the district court held
that a trial court cannot base unequal distribution on a spouse’s disproportionate financial
contributions to the marriage unless there is a showing of “extraordinary services over and above
the non-marital duties.” “Affirming the unequal distribution in this case would give a trial court in
every case the discretion to unequally distribute assets solely because one spouse has made a greater
financial contribution to the marriage than the other, despite the absence of compelling
circumstances.
8. The Desirability of Retaining the Marital Home as a Residence for any Dependent Child
of the Marriage, or any Other Party, when it would be Equitable to do so, it is in the Best Interest
of the Child or that Party, and it is Financially Feasible for the parties to Maintain the Residence
until the Child is Emancipated or until Exclusive Possession is otherwise Terminated by a Court of
Competent Jurisdiction. In making this Determination, the Court shall First Determine if it would
be in the Best Interest of the Dependent Child to Remain in the Marital Home; and, if not, whether
other Equities would be Served by Giving any other Party Exclusive Use and Possession of the
Marital Home:
Edgar v. Edgar, 668 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), which held that when children are
involved in proceedings to divide marital property, the wife is entitled to exclusive possession of
the marital home until the minor children reach the age of majority.
Dehler v. Dehler, 648 So.2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), which found that the general rule is
that absent compelling financial reasons, the parent with primary timesharing should be awarded
the exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the minor children reach majority or
become emancipated, or until the former wife remarries.
31
9. The Intentional Dissipation, Waste, Depletion, or Destruction of Marital Assets after the
filing of the Petition or within 2 Years prior to the Filing of the Petition:
See also Section I of these materials
See Beers v. Beers, 724 So.2d 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), which held that the two-year
provision was not intended to operate as a statute of limitation.
In Santiago v. Santiago, 51 So.3d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), the trial court imposed the
couple's federal income tax liability solely on the husband. The trial court made no finding on the
value of this tax liability, but there was evidence presented that the couple owed the IRS $101,000,
although the husband argued that the amount owed was much less. The trial court found that the
husband depleted money from the proceeds of the sale of his business, which occurred during the
marriage. However, the trial court did not make a finding as to the specific amount the husband
depleted, which was a disputed issue at the final hearing. The unequal distribution of assets may
have been justified by a finding that the husband intentionally depleted $100,000 in marital assets.
But the trial court also imposed the tax liability on the husband, which according to the record was
in the amount of $101,000, making the distribution even more disproportionate. This further
unequal distribution was an abuse of discretion because it penalized the husband twice for depleting
the marital funds.
Further, in Roth v. Roth, 973 So.2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), the trial court erred in including
dissipated assets in the equitable distribution scheme. It is error to include assets in an equitable
distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the dissolution proceedings.
(Quoting Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)). The exception to this rule
is when the dissipation is the result of misconduct. See Levy v. Levy, 900 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA
2005). Further, the dissipation must have occurred during the time the marriage was “undergoing
an irreconcilable breakdown”. Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So.2d 820, 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); See
Romano v. Romano, 632 So.2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In Roth, the dissipation of assets was
caused by the husband providing support for his wife and children, as well as maintaining the
marital home and his living accommodations during the separation. Therefore, the liquidation of
his bank accounts, CDs and IRAs to pay support and the fact that there was no evidence that the
Husband engaged in misconduct in expending the funds, it was error for the trial court to include
these funds in the equitable distribution scheme.
The trial court awarded an unequal distribution of marital assets based on the Husband’s
superior ability to earn wages as compared to the Wife. In distributing marital assets, the court
must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification for
an unequal distribution based on all relevant factors, including ten statutory factors. The court is
permitted to consider wage-earning ability in awarding an unequal distribution of marital assets,
but disparate earning capacity, without more, cannot act as the sole basis for unequal distribution.
With respect to the valuation of marital assets, the record does not disclose the trial court’s reasons
32
for assigning the values it did. The parties’ briefs suggest that it did so based on a determination
that the Husband improperly dissipated martial assets. If so, the evidence must support, and the
trial court must make a specific finding that a party engaged in intentional misconduct that resulted
in the dissipation of a marital asset during the dissolution proceedings before the trial court can
include that asset in the equitable distribution scheme. Kyriacou v. Kyriacou, 173 So.3d 1111 (Fla.
2d DCA 2015).
10. Any Other Factors Necessary to do Equity and Justice Between the Parties:
Ordinarily, the distribution of marital assets should be equal unless some relevant factors
justify disparate treatment, such as payment of permanent periodic alimony or performance of
extraordinary services over and above normal marital duties. Romano v. Romano, 632 So.2d 207
(Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
In Watson v. Watson, 124 So.3d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), the former wife argued that the
trial court's unequal distribution should be upheld because, under section 61.075(1)(j), the trial court
may consider any factor necessary to do equity and justice when crafting a distribution of assets.
According to the former wife's reasoning, awarding her all of the items in storage, resulting in an
unequal distribution, was justified because she had paid the costs to store the items, and testified
that their total value was less than half of the storage costs.
While the goal of equity and justice is certainly a factor to be considered in constructing a
distribution, it is not the only factor, nor does the statute provide that it should carry more weight
than the other enumerated factors. See § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). Rather, the statute provides
that an unequal distribution can be made if it is justified after “all relevant factors” have been
considered, including the factors contained in section 61.075(1)(a)-(j). See Boutwell, 920 So.2d at
153; see also Wagner v. Wagner, 61 So.3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), reh'g denied, (holding
that trial courts must consider the ten factors listed in section 61.075(1) when crafting an unequal
distribution of marital assets).
In the final judgment section entitled “Findings Relative to Equitable Distribution,” the trial
court considered the factors described in subparts (a), (b), (c), and (f) of section 61.075(1). The trial
court also found that the former wife expended money to preserve the items held in the storage
facility, and that the value of those items was less than half the cost of storage. The final judgment
did not address those mandatory factors listed in subparts (d), (e), (g), (h), or (i) of section 61.075(1).
Due to the omission of the statutorily mandated findings, the matter was remanded to allow the trial
court to make the requisite findings and craft a new equitable distribution scheme.
See also, Weaver v. Weaver, 174 So.3d 482 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2015), Court awarded Wife more
than 50% of the marital assets without any findings. Some additional personal property distributed
but Court did not specify if those assets made up for the unequal distribution.
In Pachter v. Pachter, 194 So.3d 567 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016), The Court found that the Husband
33
forged the Wife’s signature to remove funds from her IRA for a non-marital purpose. The Court
was justified in requiring the husband to repay the money improperly taken from her IRA account.
This sanction resulted in an unequal distribution.
Appellate opinion points to the unique facts of the case in affirming the trial court’s decision
to award all of the marital assets to the Wife. The Husband was an unemployed, alcoholic with a
history of domestic violence. Ultimately the husband burned the marital home to the ground and
was serving a 20 year sentence in prison. The husband’s interest in the stock ownership plan was
awarded to the wife.as that was the only way to provide meaningful financial relief to the wife after
the loss of the marital home. Hardy v. Hardy, 301 So. 3d 1025 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
11. Unequal Distribution Reversed:
Unequal distribution was reversed based on the duration of the marriage (four years), career
interruption, contribution of the parties and the economic circumstances. Cooley v. Cooley, 253
So.3d 1223 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018).
In King v. King, 273 So.3d 233 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019), the Husband acquired the marital
residence during the marriage but titled it in his name alone. Court awarded the residence to the
husband but did not make any findings to support its decision. Title alone is insufficient to support
an unequal distribution of assets.
Trial court reversed where it awarded a property that was supposed to be transferred to the
parties during the marriage by third parties but never was transferred. This resulted in an unequal
distribution as it included an asset awarded to one party that did not exist. Goley v. Goley, 272
So.3d 800 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
In Chatten v. Chatten, 334 So.3d 633 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2022) trial court accepted wife’s
testimony that she used non-marital inheritance for a down payment on jointly titled real property
acquired during the marriage in support of its unequal distribution in favor of the wife. Appellate
Court reversed as the wife failed to establish that the joint titling of the property was intended as
anything other than a gift. This opinion includes a good discussion of the statutory and case law
presumption on jointly titled real property acquired during the marriage where some non-marital
funds were contributed.
Multiple trial court rulings attempted to award unequal distributions to spouse but were
reversed for lack of findings which are required. Remanded for court to make findings or make
adjustments to the extent unequal distribution was unintended. See, McGowan v. McGowan,
2022 WL 3441442, 1D21-966 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2022); Moses v. Moses, 2021 WL 4228322,
5D20-2534 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2021) (Opinion not yet released for publication); Whittaker v.
Whittaker, 331 So.3d 719 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2021).
I. DISSIPATION/DEPLETION
34
See also Section 9 in H above.
1. Concealment of Income During the Marriage:
In Nguyen v. Huong Kim Huynh, 147 So.3d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the former wife
appealed a supplemental final judgment of dissolution of marriage and asserted seven errors. The
First District found merit only in her argument that the trial court erred in devising its equitable
distribution scheme relating to rental income from marital properties.
In allocating $502,279.00 in rental income assets to the former wife, the trial court did not
cite any supporting evidence in the record or explain the basis for this substantial amount (or either
of the two component amounts). The record did not otherwise disclose the source or reliability of
this amount. The First District was therefore unable to conduct a meaningful appellate review as to
whether competent substantial evidence supported the determination that the former wife received
and fraudulently conveyed, transferred, and/or hid $502,279.00 in proceeds from the rental
properties. Furbee v. Barrow, 45 So.3d 22, 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Thus, the equitable distribution scheme was reversed and remanded for the trial court to
make additional findings of fact explaining the evidentiary source of the amount allocated to the
former wife as rental income. Nguyen v. Huong Kim Huynh, 147 So.3d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
After remand, the Former Wife appealed the Court’s revised equitable distribution award.
The Court made specific findings as to the rental income collected from each property but failed to
include any expense. In addition, the Court assessed the entire amount of rental income against the
Wife instead of 50% of her intentional concealment from the husband. Nguyen v. Nguyen, 200
So.3d 783 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2016).
2. Withdrawal of Funds for Non-Marital Purpose but not Loss of Earnings:
In McNorton v. McNorton, 135 So.3d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), it was uncontested that the
husband withdrew funds from two marital retirement accounts to buy himself a new residence and
to use for his living expenses. The trial court properly determined that the withdrawn funds were
applied to a purpose unrelated to the marriage, and it correctly charged those assets to the husband’s
share of the equitable distribution. But the Second District determined that the court erred by
additionally charging him with lost earnings on the withdrawals.
A circuit court's valuation of an asset must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.
Tradler v. Tradler, 100 So.3d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). “Substantial evidence” means “some (more
than a mere iota or scintilla), real, material, pertinent, and relevant evidence (as distinguished from
ethereal, metaphysical, speculative or merely theoretical evidence or hypothetical possibilities)”
that has definite probative value. Lonergan v. Estate of Budahazi, 669 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1996).
The only evidence offered to prove either the fact or the amount of the supposed lost
35
earnings on the retirement account withdrawals came from the wife’s accountant. He testified that
he calculated the alleged loss by first determining the dates that the husband withdrew funds from
the accounts. He then ascertained the ending balances of a Standard and Poor's index on those dates
and compared them to the ending balance of the index on November 25, 2011, the Friday before
the dissolution trial began. He applied the percentage increase in the index to the amounts
withdrawn from the accounts to arrive at the amount by which the withdrawn sums would have
appreciated if they had been left in the accounts.
The accountant's testimony was insufficient for the simple reason that the Wife offered no
proof of how the funds in the retirement accounts were actually invested. For all the court knew,
they were held in bond funds or money market accounts. And even if the accounts were invested in
stocks, the increases (or decreases) in their values could not be determined by consulting an index
that was not shown to be relevant to those particular investments. Without evidence of the
composition of the retirement investments, the increase in a Standard and Poor's index simply had
no probative value. In short, the accountant's testimony in this regard was speculative. As such, it
could not justify charging the husband with lost earnings on the retirement fund withdrawals. See
Lassett v. Lassett, 768 So.2d 472, 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
The Second District reversed the final judgment insofar as it charged the husband’s share of
the equitable distribution with lost earnings of $13,167 and $254. The judgment was affirmed in all
other respects. McNorton v. McNorton, 135 So.3d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
3. Where no Proof that Post-Filing Funds used for Marital Purpose, Funds will be
Considered Dissipated:
In Byers v. Byers, 149 So.3d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the husband challenged the valuation
of certain assets and the inclusion of certain assets in the marital estate. The issues concerned the
inclusion of two bonus checks of $17,000 and $29,000, respectively, which he received while he
worked at Regions Bank. He essentially claimed those funds were depleted by the time of the final
hearing on the divorce petition, because he used it to pay, among other things, the mortgage, child
support, alimony, and so on. But his former wife was able to show that not only did he not list the
amounts on his amended financial affidavits, he also ceased making any mortgage payments on the
residence at least a year before receiving those checks and stopped making child support and
alimony payments thereafter. Additionally, at the time he received those bonus checks, he was
earning $143,989.88 in salary from Regions Bank, from which he could have paid his financial
obligations to his family. Thus, the trial court had sufficient evidence from which to conclude that
the check amounts should be included in the marital estate.
4. Where Assets are Used Post-Filing for Marital Expenses, Court should Not Include them
in the Equitable Distribution Scheme:
The parties had two marital retirement accounts totaling $23,187.07, and during the
pendency of the case, the Husband liquidated these accounts to pay his living expenses, temporary
36
alimony, and both parties’ health insurance premiums. The final judgment did not include any
determination that these funds were dissipated by the Husband’s intentional misconduct, but found
the Wife was entitled to half of the liquidated total. It is generally error to include assets in an
equitable distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the dissolution
proceedings. An exception to this general proposition exists when misconduct during the
dissolution proceedings results in the dissipation of a marital asset. In that case, the misconduct
may serve as a basis for assigning the dissipated asset to the spending spouse when calculating
equitable distribution. In order to determine that a spouse has dissipated marital assets, the court
must make a specific finding of intentional misconduct based on evidence showing that the marital
funds were used for one party’s own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time
when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. Misconduct is not shown by
mismanagement or simple squandering of marital assets in a manner of which the other spouse
disapproves. Here, the trial court did not find any misconduct on the part of the Husband, and the
uncontroverted evidence showed that the dissipated funds were used to pay marital expenses.
Winder v. Winder, 152 So.3d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). See also Jones v. Jones, 239 So.3d 211
(Fla. 1
st
DCA 2018) (where husband admitted to liquidating TSP account to pay expenses during
dissolution proceedings, including maintaining debt and there was no finding of misconduct, trial
court was reversed where value of TSP prior to liquidation was included in the equitable distribution
plan).
After the case was filed, the Wife took jewelry and the Husband’s guns from the house and
sold them. The court then incorporated the total value the Wife received from these sales into her
equalizing payment but made no finding that she engaged in intentional misconduct when she sold
the jewelry or the guns. As a general rule, it is error to include in the equitable distribution scheme
assets or sums that have been diminished or depleted during the dissolution proceedings. Only
where there is evidence of the spending spouse’s intentional dissipation or destruction of the asset,
and the trial court makes a specific finding that the dissipation resulted from intentional misconduct
can that dissipated asset be included within the equitable distribution. Intentional misconduct is
demonstrated by evidence that the marital funds were used for one party’s own benefit and for a
purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable
breakdown. The trial court erred by distributing these values to the Wife because both parties
conceded that the items were sold to pay reasonable living expenses and stemmed from debts
incurred during the marriage. Platt v. Platt, 164 So.3d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
The Wife argued that the court erred by attributing $85,000 to her as part of equitable
distribution where that money had already been spent on her necessary medical and dental expenses
during the pendency of the proceedings. Generally, it is error to include assets in the equitable
distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the dissolution proceedings. An
exception exists when misconduct during the dissolution proceedings results in the dissipation of a
marital asset. The trial court justified attributing the money to the Wife on the basis that she had
failed to fully document the expenses and her request for insurance reimbursement, which was
37
something that she agreed to do in a stipulation entered into by the parties. However, there was no
dispute that the money had been used to pay the Wife’s necessary medical expenses, and the
Husband’s expert made it clear that he was not alleging any misconduct on the part of the Wife in
relation to that money. The trial court’s decision to attribute the money to the Wife in the equitable
distribution amounts to a sanction for failing to comply with a documenting requirement, which is
not the standard for attributing dissipated assets to one spouse. Sikora v. Sikora, 173 So.3d 1028
(Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
“To include a dissipated asset in the equitable distribution scheme, there must be evidence
of the spending spouse’s intentional dissipation or destruction of the asset, and the trial court must
make a specific finding that the dissipation resulted from intentional misconduct.” Miller v. Miller,
186 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016). See also, Briggs v. Briggs, 336 So.3d 1286, (1
st
DCA 2022)
(trial court committed error by including funds used post-filing for expenses without a finding of
misconduct).
Court must make findings when assets are sold during the pendency of the proceedings
and do not exist at the time of the final hearing if there has been misconduct. If no finding of
misconduct, improper to include the assets in the equitable distribution scheme. Shaver v. Shaver,
203 So.3d 932 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2016). See also, Pansky v. Pansky, 204 So.3d 517 (Fla. 4
th
DCA
2016); Gotro v. Gotro, 218 So.3d 494 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017) (error to include assets diminished
during the dissolution proceedings absent a finding of misconduct); McKenzie v. McKenzie, 254
So.3d 993 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018).
In Ballard v. Ballard, 158 So.3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the First District determined that
the trial court abused its discretion by including within the equitable distribution scheme certain
furniture that belonged to the husband before the marriage. The court also abused its discretion by
including $42,012 from the Eglin Federal Credit Union account that had been significantly
diminished by the time of trial, without any finding that the husband had used the assets improperly.
The husband testified that he had used $20,000 from the account during the proceedings to pay his
attorney, and the trial court acknowledged in the final judgment that the husband claimed there were
no longer any funds in the account. Sums that have been diminished during dissolution proceedings
for purposes reasonably related to the marriage, such as attorney's fees for the dissolution, should
not be included in an equitable distribution scheme unless there is evidence that one spouse
intentionally dissipated the asset for his or her own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the
marriage. See, e.g., Zvida v. Zvida, 103 So.3d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). In that event, the trial
court must make a specific finding of intentional misconduct. Id. at 1055. Accord Lopez v. Lopez,
135 So.3d 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Bateh v. Bateh, 98 So.3d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Akers v.
Akers, 582 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Bush v. Bush, 824 So.2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002);
Ramos v. Ramos, 230 So.3d 893 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017) (husband’s use of coins to pay household
expenses was not necessarily misconduct, remanded for further findings).
38
Use of post-filing funds for the payment of attorneys’ fees is not dissipation. Pearson v.
Pearson, 268 So.3d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Arzillo v. Arzillo, 343 So.3d 137 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2022).
In Stewart v. Stewart, 237 So.3d 450 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2018), the undisputed testimony was
that the husband used savings to pay the temporary support obligation to the Wife and for attorney’s
fees. Without evidence of misconduct, the Court should not have used value of
dissipated/diminished asset.
Prior to the divorce, the husband transferred $80,000 to his parents in Croatia. The wife
knew about it and the husband testified she approved but the wife contradicted the husband’s
testimony. Further, the trial court found that the husband was unaware that a divorce was imminent
and was “blind-sided” by the filing even though there had been problems in the marriage for years.
Trial court correctly excluded the transferred funds from the marital estate. Sarazin v. Sarazin, 263
So.3d 273 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
In Van Maerssen v. Gerdts, 295 So. 3d 819, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), the evidence showed
that the husband liquidated the brokerage account and the retirement accounts a few months before
the final hearing and used the funds to pay two temporary attorney's fees awards entered against
him in favor of the wife a month prior to the liquidation. There was no evidence that the husband
used the funds for any other purpose. Although the wife argued on appeal that the husband did not
need to liquidate those marital assets, based on her accountant's testimony that the husband was
yielding a monthly surplus of income from his nonmarital assets at the time, the husband testified
he did not have sufficient funds to comply with the temporary fee awards. The trial court made no
finding as to whether the husband could have paid the temporary fee awards without liquidating the
marital accounts, and thus erred in including the accounts in the equitable distribution scheme and
awarding them to the husband.
5. Payment of College Expenses before Filing – Not Dissipation:
The Wife filed her petition for dissolution of marriage on July 27, 2011. The Wife made
the Husband aware that she planned to file for divorce by at least June 21, 2011. On June 22, 2011,
the Husband charged $6,757.75 on a credit card and on June 23, 2011, again charged $6,757.75 for
a total of $13,515.50. These charges were to pay for their adult daughter’s college expenses. The
Wife testified that the Husband did not discuss these charges with her and that she never agreed to
pay for same. The Husband testified that the parties had discussed with their daughter that they
would make every effort to help her financially, but what they could not cover, she would have to
pay with loans. The daughter missed her financial aid application deadline and the family received
a bill saying that the money was due right away or she wouldn’t be able to attend the college, and
that is why the Husband charged it on the credit card. The trial court made an interim finding that
the credit card debt incurred for college expenses was a marital debt, but in its supplemental findings
of fact, the court reconsidered the issue and found that it did not have the authority to order a parent
39
to pay for college expenses and given the timing of the incurrence of debt with regard to the filing
of the action, the court found that the debt was not an appropriate marital debt. Marital liabilities
include liabilities incurred during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by then.
Absent a valid separation agreement, the date of the filing of the petition for dissolution is the cut-
off date for determining whether assets and liabilities are classified as marital. All assets acquired
and liabilities incurred by either spouse subsequent to the date of the marriage and not specifically
established as non-marital assets or liabilities are presumed to be marital assets and liabilities. The
Wife did not make a showing that the college charges were non-marital liabilities. The Wife argued
that any obligation a parent has to fund the college education of an adult child is moral, not legal,
and that the court cannot require a parent to pay those expenses. This is true for college expenses
incurred after the petition is filed and in the future, but here, the expenses were incurred during the
marriage. The trial court may consider a party’s intentional waste or depletion of marital assets to
do equity and justice between the parties, but the trial court did not make a finding of waste of
marital assets to justify an unequal distribution. Even though the Wife did not favor paying the
college expenses, the Husband’s actions did not constitute intentional waste. Wagner v. Wagner,
136 So.3d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
6. Court Must Make Finding of Intentional Misconduct to find Dissipation:
Where the Court fails to make a finding of misconduct, only actual sums remaining at time
of final hearing should be included for equitable distribution. Griffin v. Griffin, 273 So.3d 282
(Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019); Will v. Will, 277 So.3d 182 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019); Mattison v. Mattison, 266
So.3d 258 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2019); Niederkohr v. Kuselias, 301 So.3d 1112 (Fla. 5
th
DCA
2020)(court found marital misconduct where wife used husband’s settlement proceeds for
cosmetic prodcedures and other non-marital purposes).
7. Where Funds Dissipated Based on Marital Misconduct:
Court may either assign the dissipated sums to the dissipating party or give the innocent
spouse a credit for one-half of the dissipated sums. Peterson v. Peterson, 321 So.3
rd
298 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2021).
8. Transfer of Assets to an Irrevocable Trust Found to be Misconduct:
After date of filing, the wife transferred substantial assets to an irrevocable trust. The trial
court included those transferred assets in the value of the marital estate and included it on the
wife’s side of the equitable distribution ledger. The trial court found the wife committed
misconduct by transferring assets from the marital estate for her own non-marital benefit.
Appellate court affirmed as the trial court found to have exercised judicial discretion
appropriately. Collier v. Collier, 343 So.3d 183 (1
st
DCA 2022).
40
J. INTERSPOUSAL GIFTS DURING MARRIAGE
Gifts between spouses during the marriage are considered marital property. In Robertson
v. Robertson, 593 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1991) the Court held that when a spouse re-titles real property
into joint names then a gift is presumed to have been intended and the property becomes marital
property. See also, Fla. Stat. 61.075 (6)(a)1d.
K. VESTED/NON-VESTED PENSIONS, BENEFITS, STOCK-OPTIONS,
RETIREMENT PLANS, QUALIFIED PLANS AND MILITARY PENSIONS
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)1e, marital assets and liabilities include all vested and
non-vested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-
sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance plans and programs.
In Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1997), Court held that the valuation of the
husband’s vested retirement plan should not include post-judgment contributions.
1. Calculating the Marital Portion of a Retirement Account:
In Fritz v. Fritz, 161 So.3d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), the husband contended that an order
for the division of his military retirement pay contained a legally improper coverture fraction and
applied it in an improper manner. The Second District explained the proper calculation of the
marital portion of a retirement account:
To determine the amount of a retirement or pension fund accumulated during the
marriage, the trial court “creat[es] a fraction where the numerator is the amount of
time the employee was married while participating in the plan, and the denominator
is the total time the employee has in the plan.” Trant v. Trant, 545 So.2d 428, 429
(Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (emphasis added). The trial court then multiplies the plan's
present value by the coverture fraction to calculate the total present value of the
retirement fund which accrued during the marriage. Id.
Thus, the calculation is based on the former spouse's present time in the retirement plan and
the present value of the retirement benefit—not the value of the pension at some point in the future
when the former spouse actually retires. The wife took issue with this calculation, arguing that the
husband agreed to a “deferred distribution method” and thus the coverture fraction cannot be
applied until the husband actually retires. The coverture fraction contained in the order did not
comport with what is required under the deferred distribution method. Under that method:
the court determines what the employee's benefit would be if he retired on the date
of the final hearing without any early retirement penalty. The court then multiplies
this dollar amount by the percentage to which the other spouse is entitled. This
41
method yields a fixed dollar amount which the awarded spouse receives from each
of the employee's pension payments after retirement.
Trant v. Trant, 545 So.2d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (emphasis added). Hence, the calculation
is performed based on the pension-holder's present time in the retirement plan and the present value
of that plan.
The calculation included in the order prepared by the wife did not assume retirement on the
date of the final hearing as agreed upon and did not use the present value of the husband's pension
to determine a fixed dollar amount to which the wife will be entitled. Instead, the denominator used
in the wife's coverture fraction was the husband's “total number of months of creditable military
service at retirement.” The order then applies this improper coverture fraction to the value of the
husband's pension plan on the date of his retirement. This fraction and its application allows the
wife to receive payments based, at least in part, on pension benefits earned by the husband after
dissolution, a result not supported by the parties' oral agreement. Further, this type of coverture
fraction and its application were explicitly rejected by the supreme court in Boyett v. Boyett, 703
So.2d 451, 452 (Fla.1997), because its application improperly awards the receiving spouse a portion
of all benefits earned post-dissolution. See also Lawrence v. Lawrence, 904 So.2d 445, 446 (Fla.
3d DCA 2005) (holding that an MPO that defined the coverture fraction as having a numerator of
the months of marriage during the husband's creditable military service and a denominator of the
husband's “total number of months of creditable military service” improperly allowed the wife to
benefit from contributions, work, and benefits made and earned after dissolution). Because the order
calculated the wife's portion of the husband's pension in a manner both different from what the
parties agreed to and contrary to Florida law, it was reversed. Fritz v. Fritz, 161 So.3d 425 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2014).
Trial court determined an enhanced multiplier to Husband’s pension which was error in that
the higher multiplier was based on the husband’s post-judgment continued work. Lovelass v.
Hutchinson, 250 So.3d 701 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018).
2. 401(k) Benefits Forfeited Prior to Filing:
In Fairchild v. Fairchild, 135 So.3d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), the parties agreed the trial
court erred in its equitable distribution worksheet by crediting Dr. Fairchild with $144,000 in
equitable distribution for his contributions toward the upkeep of a Clermont home during the
pendency of the divorce. As Dr. Fairchild properly concedes, the correct credit should be $72,000
(one-half of the monies he expended in connection with upkeep of the Clermont property).
However, Ms. Fairchild was also entitled to a credit for one-half of the $10,754.22 that she spent to
maintain the Clermont property during the pendency of the divorce proceeding (a credit of
$5,377.11). Also, she was entitled to half the 401(k) benefits forfeited to Dr. Fairchild from the
accounts of three employees terminated from his medical practice prior to the date of the filing of
the petition for dissolution. Ms. Fairchild's half totals $8,425.54, plus or minus gains or losses
42
attributable to these funds. Because Dr. Fairchild's right to this money was vested when these
employees were terminated, prior to the divorce filing, the funds should have been treated as marital
funds. See § 61.075(6)(a) 1.d., Fla. Stat. (2011) (defining marital assets to include “[a]ll vested and
nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-
sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance plans and programs”); § 61.076(1), Fla.
Stat. (2011) (instructing that “[a]ll vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during
the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance
plans and programs are marital assets subject to equitable distribution”). Fairchild v. Fairchild, 135
So.3d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
3. Stock Options:
3.1. Challenges of distributing stock options
With respect to employee stock options, equitable distribution may be more challenging.
Stock options may be vested or unvested. They may be speculative as to value and even if they will
be exercisable. They generally have an expiration date and employee stock options typically are not
transferable and lack the marketability of traded stock options.
3.2. Determination if for future services or for past services
Stock options and restricted shares may be given as deferred compensation for past services,
but they may also be given as compensation for present or future services. See Seither v. Seither,
779 So.2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(stating that when a stock “option is given as compensation, it
can be deferred compensation for past services, compensation for present services, or compensation
for future services”). As a general rule, when options are given as deferred compensation for past
services, the options are considered marital property, but when given for present services or future
services, they are considered non-marital property.
3.3. Unvested benefits may be marital
Jensen v. Jensen, 824 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), deals at length with the issue of
whether stock options granted during a marriage but yet unvested on the filing date of a dissolution
petition constitute marital property. In Jensen, during the marriage the husband was “granted several
thousand stock options” by his employer, Cisco Systems. The contract pursuant to which those
options were granted indicated that they were awarded “in recognition of past commendable service
[but were] contingent upon [the husband's] continued service with either Cisco Systems or any of
its subsidiaries.” Id. at 317. The trial court determined that the unvested options constituted marital
property and were to be equally divided between the husband and wife. The First District affirmed,
concluding that the unvested stock options were a form of deferred compensation under the present
§ 61.075(6)(a)1e. The court based that conclusion on its determination that the options were
awarded for the husband's past performance, despite the fact that he had to remain with the company
if he wished to exercise them. The First District thus held that, notwithstanding that the husband's
43
options were contingent on continued service, it was the date on which the options were granted
and not the vesting date that was critical as to the character of the options as marital or non-marital
property.
In Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So.2d 1147 ( Fla. 2d DCA 2003), the court agreed with various
cases from other jurisdictions which hold that the status of unvested options turns on the factual
issue of whether the unvested stock options and restricted shares were primarily awarded as deferred
compensation for past service or as an incentive for future services, citing a number of cases from
other jurisdictions.
In Ruberg, the issue concerning the stock options was whether the options were awards for
past performance or granted in consideration of the husband’s future job performance. The Second
District found that the plan documents clearly provided for options and restricted share grants to
employees for future services. Likewise, the individual agreements which made the grants clearly
indicate that the grants were intended as incentives for the husband to remain employed with the
company, to render future services, and to otherwise advance the future interests of the company.
Further, the monthly incremental vesting schedules for the stock options and restricted shares
suggest that each monthly increment of stock options and restricted shares vested as it was earned.
All the pertinent circumstances supported the conclusion that the trial court correctly determined
that the stock options and restricted shares that remained unvested as of the filing date of the
dissolution petition constituted separate, non-marital property that were mere expectancies for the
husband until he earned them. The court thus held that the stock options and restricted shares at
issue were not deferred compensation, and the trial court did not err in classifying them as non-
marital property.
Parry v. Parry, 933 So.2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), is a leading case involving the analysis and
determination of a husband’s stock package. There, the husband worked for Health Management
Associates, Inc. (HMA) a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company that maintained its corporate
headquarters in Naples. HMA and its subsidiaries owned and operate approximately fifty-two
hospitals in sixteen states. The husband was the company's executive vice president and general
counsel. The Second District ruled the trial court was mistaken in its determination that the
husband’s partially earned but unvested HMA stock and stock options were his non-marital assets.
When the divorce proceeding was filed, the husband had been awarded 28,756 shares of stock that
remained unvested. During the marriage and up to the date of filing, he had been granted options to
purchase 384,375 shares. Of these, options to purchase 204,375 shares had vested. During the
divorce proceeding, the husband exercised an option to purchase 14,200 shares and sold the stock
to pay a joint tax obligation and to advance funds to the wife, leaving vested options to purchase
190,175 shares. The Second District found that the trial court properly treated the vested stock and
stock options as marital assets and included them in its equitable distribution scheme.
However, the trial court erred in declaring that the stock and options that had been awarded
but had not vested during the marriage were the husband’s non-marital property. The court cited
44
the Ruberg decision as to the distinction between stock and option grants that are given as deferred
compensation for past service and those that are awarded as incentive for future service to the
employer, noting that the distinction is that an award that is in the nature of deferred compensation
and that is granted during the marriage is usually a marital asset because it is compensation for past
marital labor. On the other hand, an award given as an incentive for future service would be marital
only to the extent that the service is thereafter performed before the end of the marriage. In either
case, the trial court is charged with identifying and valuing the portion of the award that constitutes
a marital asset. See Fla. Stat. § 61.075(3)(b). The court noted that unlike the situation in Ruberg, at
the time of the cutoff date in Parry, there were several outstanding awards to which the husband
had devoted marital labor that was yet to be compensated under the vesting schedules. Therefore,
it was incumbent on the trial court to allocate and value the marital portions of those awards. The
court noted that while there is no Florida cases applying a “time rule,” the method is essentially the
same as the so-called “coverture fraction” applied by Florida courts to value future pension benefits.
See Trant v. Trant, 545 So.2d 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The court ruled that to the unvested assets,
the trial court should have applied a formula, whether called a coverture fraction or time rule, to
determine the portion earned by marital effort. Accordingly, the court reversed the determination
that all of the unvested HMA stock and stock options were the husband’s non-marital property.
The coverture fraction consists of a numerator “that is the amount of time the employee was
married while participating in the plan, and the denominator is the total time the employee has in
the plan.” Trant, at 429. The fraction is to be multiplied by the present value of the pension, the
result representing the marital portion to be equitably distributed. In Parry, the court ruled that the
numerator should represent the number of months in which marital labor was d to earning the award,
that is, the number of months between the grant date and the petition filing date, which will vary
because the awards were granted on different dates. The denominator would be the total number
of months in which the award was to be earned. Because all of the restricted stock awards at issue
had a four-year vesting period, as to those the denominator was always 48. Determining the
denominator for the option grants was less straightforward, because one-quarter of the shares in
each option vested every twelve months. Therefore, each grant would entail denominators of 12,
24, 36, and 48, each of which would apply to one-quarter of the shares in the option.
The trial court valued the stock using a discount to reflect the lack of marketability. The
HMA board chairman and the husband’s financial expert both testified that the stock's value was
affected by numerous regulations and restrictions that limit the husband’s ability to sell it,
warranting the application of a marketability discount. The Second District thus affirmed. See
Williams v. Williams, 683 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (affirming the exercise of the court's
discretion in applying a marketability discount because it was supported by expert testimony);
Miller v. Miller, 662 So.2d 391 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's decision not to apply marketability the discount when the evidence showed that the stock
was readily marketable).
45
Hollister v. Hollister, 965 So.2d 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), involved the question of stock
appreciation rights (“SARs”). The husband was granted 46,667 SARs during the marriage with a
base equity value of $10 per share. The SARs were then replaced with new SARS having a lower
equity value, which were 100% vested as of the date of the petition for dissolution. At the time of
trial, the company had not determined the value of the SARs and had no obligation to do so until
several years after the date of trial. The husband thus contended that any appreciation would be
due to his future performance and thus would be non-marital. The trial court agreed and found that
the SARs "have no marital value" because any appreciation would be based on the company's future
performance. The Second District noted that a court presumes that an asset is marital when a spouse
acquires the asset after the date of the marriage and the asset has not specifically been established
as non-marital. § 61.075(7), Fla. Stat. (2008). The cut-off date for determining marital assets, unless
the parties enter into a valid separation agreement, is the date the petition was filed. § 61.075(7).
Section 61.075(6)(a)1e defines marital assets to include "[a]ll vested and nonvested benefits, rights,
and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, deferred
compensation, and insurance plans and programs[.]" The SARs were fully vested before the petition
for dissolution was filed and should have been designated as a marital asset. Parry, supra. (Fla. 2d
DCA 2006) (stating that the trial court properly treated vested stock options as marital assets and
included them in the equitable distribution scheme). The Court ruled that to the extent that any
appreciation of the SARs was for performance before the petition for dissolution was filed, that
amount should be valued as a marital asset for purposes of equitable distribution. See Parry, 933
So.2d at 13 (stating that "an award given as an incentive for future service would be marital only to
the extent that the service is thereafter performed before the end of the marriage"). The trial court
essentially found that the SARs were not a marital asset in finding that they had no marital value.
The Second District found that fact does not preclude the court from identifying the SARs as marital
assets and accounting for them as part of the equitable distribution, and imposing a constructive
trust on one-half of the SARs, as in Jensen, supra (recognizing that a constructive trust is a deferred
distribution method and that "[t]he deferred distribution approach for a stock option that cannot be
valued as of yet is the only prudent and plausible approach to adopt").
Compare to Ross v. Ross, 20 So.3d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), which stated that insurance
plans or programs referred to in this section are those which are intended to create value as an asset,
such as whole life insurance involving cash surrender value purchased for retirement planning,
which are different from a term life insurance, payable only upon death, which is not in the same
class of terms as those set forth in this section.
In Goodman v. Goodman, 231 So.3d 574 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2017), the trial court erred by
including stock options as an asset for equitable distribution and also as income for support
purposes.
4. Disability Benefits Generally Non-Marital:
46
Disability benefits are generally not a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. In Kay
v. Kay, 988 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), the district court reversed the trial court’s
determination that a disability pension was marital because during the marriage the wife and the
husband maintained the policy with marital funds. After separation, the husband allowed the policy
to lapse and the wife, upon discovering this information, contacted her attorney and arranged to
have the policy reinstated. The trial court relied upon decisions from other states which found that
since the policy was acquired with marital funds during the marriage, it was subject to equitable
distribution. The nature of a disability pension is designed to compensate the employee for lost
earnings and injuries sustained on the job, and therefore it is personal to the employee and should
not be considered a marital asset. (Quoting Freeman v. Freeman, 468 So.2d 326, 328 (Fla. 5th DCA
1985)). The district court found that the policy was to reimburse the husband due to his inability to
work, and therefore the disability policy was not subject to equitable distribution.
Compare to Gibbons v. Gibbons, 10 So.3d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), in which the second
district held that disability benefits that compensated the husband for future lost income were
separate property not subject to equitable distribution. However, the husband’s policies were not
to provide payments until after he reached the age of 65. The trial court held that these payments
were subject to equitable distribution because they closely resembled retirement payments. The
district court disagreed. A spouse’s entitlement to pension or retirement benefits must be
considered a marital asset for purposes of equitable distribution. However, the husband’s policies
were to continue indefinitely, but subject to the condition that he remain disabled. Further, the
policies did not contain a retirement component. Therefore, the district court held that the post-65
policies were not subject to equitable distribution. The district court did clarify that if a retirement
plan was established under the guise of a disability pension, then it would be a marital asset subject
to equitable distribution.
5. Military Pensions:
The parties were divorced in 1993. At the time, the Former Husband had been in the military
for eleven (11) years. The parties entered into a marital settlement agreement which gave the
Former Wife half of the pension “accrued to date”, which was 27.5% of the Former Husband’s
pension after twenty (20) years. The court retained jurisdiction in its final judgment because if the
Former Husband retired before twenty (20) years, the percentage would need to be increased in
order for the Former Wife to receive the correct percentage of the pension accrued during the
marriage. The Former Husband ended up staying in the military for thirty (30) years, and the
Former Wife demanded 27.5% of his thirty-year pension. The Former Husband filed a
supplemental petition seeking to establish that the Former Wife was only entitled to 27.5% of the
amount of the pension available after twenty (20) years of service. The Former Wife moved to
dismiss the supplemental petition. Initially, she did not prevail, but the court then determined that
it had no jurisdiction to award the requested relief and that the final judgment could not be modified
since the Former Husband’s petition failed to adhere to the filing deadlines under rules 1.540 and
12.540.
47
The Former Wife mischaracterized the petition. The Former Husband was not trying to
change the final judgment; rather, he was trying to enforce its terms as he understood them. In
1993, the court had the power to equitably distribute the marital assets, which included all vested
and non-vested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement and pension
plans. Because the pension was a military pension, special information needed to be included. The
amount of the pension to be distributed to the Former Wife could be expressed in dollars or as a
percentage, but if a percentage was used, it was intended to distribute the benefits accrued during
the marriage. The final judgment used the 27.5% calculation as a method to give the Former Wife
50% of the amount accrued during the marriage. Because the Former Husband served more than
twenty (20) years, the pension he earned was larger than anticipated. From the face of the record,
the Former Wife’s entitlement was based on the amount of a twenty-year pension. The court is not
authorized to increase or decrease the amount of equitable distribution, but it can clarify the dollar
amount of the pension that was described by percentage in the final judgment. Ingram v. Ingram,
133 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
In Fritz v. Fritz, 161 So.3d 425 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2014), the husband, an active-duty military
officer, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The Wife filed a counter-petition, seeking
equitable distribution of the marital assets, including the division of retirement accounts. The day
before the dissolution hearing, the parties reached an oral settlement agreement. At the hearing, the
parties orally presented the terms of the settlement agreement to the court. As to the Husband’s
military pension, the Wife announced that the parties had agreed to equally divide the marital
portion and that the Wife’s marital portion of the pension was 48.12%. The Husband said that he
could only agree that the portion of the pension that accrued during the marriage would be divided
evenly. The court summarized its understanding of the parties’ agreement, which was that everyone
agreed to 50% of what was accrued from the date of marriage to the date of filing, and both parties
said that was correct and agreed on a forensic accountant to prepare the MPO. The parties could
not agree on the proper language to be included in the MPO to effectuate the agreement. The
Husband argued that the MPO proposed by the Wife provided that the coverture fraction would be
calculated based on the number of months of marriage divided by the Husband’s total number of
months of creditable military service at retirement, which would improperly allow the Wife to share
in the Husband’s post-filing earnings. She argued that the denominator could not be determined
until the Husband retired. The Husband objected that this did not accurately reflect the parties’
agreement, but the trial court ultimately signed the Wife’s proposed MPO over the Husband’s
objections.
The only agreement clear on the face of the transcript of the original hearing was that the
Wife would receive one half of the portion of the Husband’s pension that was earned during the
course of the marriage. Additionally, the MPO signed by the court contained a legally improper
coverture fraction. To determine the amount of a retirement or pension fund accumulated during
48
the marriage, the trial court creates a fraction where the numerator is the amount of time the
employee was married while participating in the plan, and the denominator is the total time the
employee has in the plan. The court then multiplies the plan’s present value by the coverture
fraction to calculate the total the total present value of the retirement fund which accrued during the
marriage. The denominator used by the Wife is improper in that it allowed the Wife to receive
payments based, at least in part, on pension benefits earned by the Husband after dissolution, and
this type of coverture fraction has been explicitly rejected by the Florida Supreme Court. Fritz v.
Fritz, 161 So.3d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
The trial court ordered the Wife to transfer her interest in the former marital home to the
Husband, and in turn, for the Husband to make the mortgage payments on the property. The trial
court also awarded the Wife 44.19% of the Husband’s military retirement pay. The amended final
judgment stated: “The Former Wife’s percentage of the Former Husband’s military retirement shall
be 44.19% of the Former Husband’s retirement pay which the parties agreed was 44.19% of
$2,296.00 equaling $1,014.37 and subject to COLA [Cost of Living Adjustment].” The Wife
argued that this language needed to be corrected to eliminate the specific dollar amount to avoid
any confusion, as the dollar amount will change as cost of living adjustments are made. The
language under review is ambiguous and apt to lead to confusion about how the annual increases
of the Wife’s share of the military retirement pay should be calculated and upon what figure they
should be based. The Wife also argued that the court erred in requiring her to deed her interest in
the former marital home to the Husband without requiring the Husband to accomplish her release
as an obligor on the note secured by the mortgage against the property. The court could not address
this issue, as it was not preserved for review. Banks v. Banks, 168 So.3d 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
Florida has a bright line rule that all retirement points earned on a military pension after the
date of filing are non-marital. Trial court used a different date to determine the value which was
error. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 251 So.3d 977 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2018).
In a case of first impression, the trial court determined that the husband’s pension was
marital. The husband had 8 years of premarital service that had no value until the husband
purchased the military years of service. Because marital funds were used, the pension became
marital in its entirety. Martin v. Martin, 276 So.3d 393 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
6. QDRO to Reflect Language in Agreement and Cannot Add Terms:
Where husband had salary and cost of living increases, post filing, Wife was not entitled to
the benefit generated by husband’s post-filing efforts. Wife was entitled to receive what the MSA
provided: 50% of the value of the husband’s benefits accumulated up to the date of filing. Also,
since the MSA did not provide for survivor benefits, Wife was not entitled to them. Storey v.
Storey, 192 So.3d 670 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016).
49
7. Marital Portion of Pension was not De Minimus and Reversed Trial Court:
In Coleman v. Bland, 187 So.3d 298 (Fla 5
th
DCA 2016), the trial court found that the
marital portion of the husband’s retirement was de minimus. It was calculated based on a 39 month
marriage as part of 31 years of service. However, the amount was nearly $90 per month and
therefore not de minimus and should have been awarded to the Wife.
8. Husband’s Portion of Wife’s Military Pension Awarded to Wife as Lump Sum Alimony:
Trial court awarded the wife the husband’s 45% interest in her military retirement plan as
lump sum alimony to do equity between the parties and the court was concerned about the
enforceability of the alimony award. Husband has liquidated his 401k upon filing and cleaned out
the parties’ account and then filed separate tax return and took all of the deductions. Rawson v.
Rawson, 264 So.3d 325 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
9. Former Husband’s Annuity Choice Shortchanged Former Wife and Resulted in Lump
Sum Award:
The former husband made an election at retirement of “survivor annuity” which benefitted
his current wife instead of electing “life only annuity” which would have provided greater benefits
to his former wife. Trial court awarded former wife a lump sum payment of half the benefits she
lost resulting from the former husband’s election. Kvinta v. Kvinta, 277 So.3d 1070 (Fla. 5
th
DCA
2019).
10. Errors in Findings of Marital and Non-Marital in Pensions:
Court erroneously determined that the Wife’s FRS pension was non-marital when evidence
established that she began making contributions to the plan during the marriage. Reversed for trial
court to determine what portion of the pension was marital. Pearson v. Pearson, 268 So.3d 863
(Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Trial court included in marital portion of husband’s pension his contributions prior to the
marriage. Reversed. Julia v. Julia, 263 So.3d 795 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2019).
Parties were married twice. Trial court included the duration of the first marriage in
calculating the marital portion of the pension, in error. Hubbard v. Berth, 279 So.3d 246 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2019).
11. No Income Withholding Order for a Pension:
Parties agreed to an Income Deduction Order to enforce a municipal pension distribution,
but appellate court reversed. Income Deduction Order cannot be used to divide a pension to achieve
equitable distribution. Palmateer v. Palmateer, 260 So.3d 476 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019).
50
L. METHOD AND MANNER OF PAYMENT
Court must state with specificity which party shall be responsible for the payment of
which debts. Error to simply state the parties shall equally divide the credit card debt. Court must
state which spouse is responsible for which specific debt. Ridings v. Ridings, 198 So.3d 1128
(Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016).
The trial court erred when it awarded the husband a sum certain to equalize the wife’s
interest in her medical practice. However, the trial court did not require payment until the wife’s
interest was converted to cash (i.e., upon sale) which could never happen. Trial court cannot
provide an award to the husband based on an indefinite date in the future. Trial court reversed
and directed to establish a payment plan or adjust the equitable distribution. Gudur v. Gudur, 277
So.3d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Barrett v. Barrett, 313 So.3d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021), noting that a lump-sum equalizing
payment is proper only when the paying spouse can “make the payment without substantially
endangering his or her economic status.” Abramovic v. Abramovic, 188 So. 3d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA
2016). In Barrett, there was no evidence that the former wife could afford a $279,586 payment.
The trial court awarded her no liquid assets, and she carried significant debt. The former wife
correctly noted that the trial court could have protected the former husband's payment by ordering
installment payments and requiring security and a reasonable rate of interest. See § 61.075(10)(b),
Fla. Stat. (2017).
M. FACTUAL FINDINGS
1. Fla.Stat. § 61.075(3):
In any contested dissolution proceeding where there has been no stipulation or agreement,
any distribution of marital assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by factual findings in the
judgment or order based on competent substantial evidence with reference to the factors enumerated
in subsection (1). The distribution of all marital assets and marital liabilities, whether equal or
unequal, shall include specific written findings of fact as to the (a) Clear identification of non-
marital assets and ownership interests; (b) Identification of marital assets, including the individual
valuation of significant assets, and designation of which spouse shall be entitled to each asset;
(c) Identification of the marital liabilities and designation of which spouse shall be responsible for
each liability; and (d) Any other findings necessary to advise the parties or the reviewing court of
the trial court's rationale for the distribution of marital assets and allocation of liabilities.
2. Factual Findings required:
51
In the absence of factual findings, a trial court’s decision may be overturned. As in Jalileyan
v. Jalileyan, 4 So.3d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), the equitable distribution award was reversed
because the final judgment indicated that the trial court made an unequal distribution of the marital
assets, mainly by awarding the marital residence to the former wife, yet failed to make factual
findings to explain or justify the disproportionate equitable distribution. Similarly, in Austin v.
Austin, 12 So.3d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the trial court ordered all marital liabilities to be equally
divided without providing identification of each liability and without identifying which party was
responsible for each liability. Such a distribution is not permitted.
In Williams v. Williams, 133 So.3d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the First District was unable
to determine how the trial court valued the parties’ art collection at $376,086, when the former
husband’s expert witness appraised it at $470,107 and the former wife’s expert witness appraised it
at $688,550. The issue was therefore reversed and remanded for the trial court to explain how it
reached the value it placed on the collection and to set forth a value as to the pieces housed in
Florida. See Blossman v. Blossman, 92 So.3d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Wendroff v. Wendroff,
614 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Augoshe v. Lehman, 962 So.2d 398, 402–03 (Fla. 2d DCA
2007). Additionally, as to the equalization payment the court awarded to the wife, the final
judgment does not indicate how the trial court reached the figure of $195,507 for this payment. The
judgment states only that the figure included the Social Security checks, the withdrawal from the
joint bank account, and the FEMA payment. These items do not total the amount of the equalization
payment, and there are no findings or explanation in the final judgment as to how the court reached
the amount of the equalization payment.
A trial court must support any distribution of marital assets or liabilities with factual findings
in the judgment, based on competent substantial evidence, with reference to the statutory factors.
See § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat.; Winney v. Winney, 979 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Nicewonder v.
Nicewonder, 602 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). It must make specific written findings of fact
identifying marital assets and individually valuing significant assets. See § 61.075(3)(b), Fla. Stat.;
Bateh v. Bateh, 98 So.3d 750, 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Wendroff v. Wendroff, 614 So.2d 590,
593–94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The lack of any such findings in the final judgment made meaningful
appellate review of the equalization payment impossible. Williams v. Williams, 133 So.3d 605 (Fla.
1st DCA 2014); Callwood v. Callwood, 221 So.3d 1198 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017); Vaughn v. Vaughn,
250 So.3d 126 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018).
See also Fernandez-Tretiakova v. Fernandez, 313 So. 3d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), noting
that reversible error occurs where the equitable distribution in the final judgment is not supported
by factual findings with reference to the factors listed in section 61.075(1), as required by section
61.075(3) when ‘a stipulation and agreement has not been entered and filed.’” Richardson v.
Knight, 197 So. 3d 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat.); see also Rodriguez
v. Rodriguez, 994 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). In Fernandez, the only reference to section
61.075(1), Florida Statutes, in the final judgment was where the trial court stated: [t]he
Court finds that the wife has established a need for and that the husband has the present
52
ability to pay bridge the gap alimony for a period of two years after consideration of all relevant
factors pursuant to Section 61.075. The final judgment then discussed the factors laid out in section
61.08(2)(a)-(j), Florida Statutes, regarding alimony. There was no further mention of the factors
enumerated in section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes. Moreover, the parties did not agree to
an equitable distribution plan. The trial court did not make specific findings referencing the ten
factors enumerated in section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes.
In Naylor v. Naylor, 127 So.3d 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), the former husband argued that
the trial court's $20,000 valuation of his tools for purposes of equitable distribution was not
supported by competent, substantial evidence. The only evidence as to what tools had been
accumulated during the marriage came from former husband, who valued them at $100 in his
deposition testimony and at $500 during the dissolution hearing. Although the former wife assigned
a $20,000 value to “Misc. Tools” in her financial affidavit when listing marital assets, she
acknowledged during the dissolution hearing that that was a “blanket statement ... with no
specifics.” She further acknowledged that she had no written documentation showing what tools
the couple had, and she gave no testimony regarding any specific tools. Thus, the final judgment
was reversed as to the trial court's $20,000 valuation of the tools and the case remanded for further
proceedings as to this issue. See Lassett v. Lassett, 768 So.2d 472, 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding
that the trial court erred in valuing the wife's jewelry at $10,000 and distributing that amount to her
as part of her share of marital assets where the only testimony as to the value of the jewelry came
from the husband and concluding that the husband's “unsupported opinion as to the value of the
jewelry that was not definitively described is not sufficient to warrant the distribution of that amount
to the wife”); see also Justice v. Justice, 80 So.3d 405, 407–10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (noting that the
former wife's financial affidavit reflected that the parties owned $10,000 worth of jewelry and that
she testified regarding “each piece of jewelry and its value” and “each piece of furniture and
household item,” holding that the trial court erred in failing to distribute the parties' furniture and
jewelry, and explaining that because the parties presented evidence as to the identity and value of
the furniture and jewelry “it seems there is sufficient evidence for the trial court to make this
determination”). Cf. Noone v. Noone, 727 So.2d 972, 974–75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (rejecting the
husband's argument that the assignment of $10,000 worth of furniture and furnishings was
unsupported by competent evidence where the wife introduced photographs of the furniture and her
financial affidavit valued the furniture at $10,000). Naylor v. Naylor, 127 So.3d 1288 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2013).
Where Court failed to identify the assets as marital or non-marital and then failed to value
all of the assets, the equitable distribution scheme will be reversed. Buckalew v. Buckalew, 197
So.3d 148 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016). In Price v. Price, 233 So.3d 525 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018), it was
reversible error where the court failed to identify whether assets were marital and failed to make
findings concerning personal property.
53
Court entered an equitable distribution scheme identifying the assets and liabilities to be
divided but failing to place a value on each asset and liability. This was error requiring reversal.
Pierre v. Pierre, 185 So.3d 1264 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016).
Court failed to clearly identify and value all assets and liabilities; therefore, the case was
remanded. Pierre v. Jonassaint, 212 So.3d 1131 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2017). See also, Tritschler v.
Tritschler, 273 So.3d 1161 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (trial court failed to identify all of the assets, failed
to award all of the assets and failed to equally divide the marital estate, reversed and remanded).
Trial court failed to make findings as to the classification of the husband’s automotive
business as marital or non-marital when the issue was disputed and therefore case remanded for
findings by the trial court. Davis v. Davis, 245 So.3d 810 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018).
Where each of the parties challenged certain determinations by the court in its equitable
distribution scheme but neither claimed an overall unequal distribution, the trial court was affirmed
as it did not constitute an abuse of discretion and the court accomplished equity between the parties.
Dorsey v. Dorsey, 266 So.3d 1282 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
N. ORAL FINDINGS CONSISTENT WITH FINAL JUDGMENT
In Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 203 So.3d 186 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016), after hearing testimony, the
trial court made an oral ruling and asked wife’s counsel to prepare the final judgment. However,
the final judgment departed significantly from the Court’s oral ruling. The differences were
significant enough to suggest that the final judgment did not accurately reflect the Court’s
independent judgment. Final Judgment reversed. See also, Suk v. Chang, 189 So.3d 224 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2016) (where oral pronouncement markedly different than final judgment, error requiring
reversal).
O. LUMP SUM EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION/EQUALIZER PAYMENTS
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. 61.075(10), to do equity between the parties, the court may, in lieu of
or to supplement, facilitate, or effectuate the equitable division of marital assets and liabilities, order
a monetary payment in a lump sum or in installments paid over a fixed period of time. There is a
new statutory requirement under Fla. Stat. 61.075 (10) (b): “If installment payments are ordered,
the court may require security and a reasonable rate of interest or may otherwise recognize the time
value of the money to be paid in the judgment or order.”
When making a lump sum distribution, the trial court may consider all assets and income
available to a party. Monas v. Monas, 665 So.2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Payment schedules are
necessary to enable a party to enforce the judgment awarding lump-sum equitable distribution.
McAvoy v. McAvoy, 662 So.2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). If a trial court does impose an
installment schedule, the party receiving the distribution is entitled to the benefit of the award
immediately, or if differed, then entitled to interest a statutory rate. Harper v. Harper, 586 So.2d
54
1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Thomas-Nance v. Nance, 189 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2016) (if
payment plan is unreasonable such as here, where payment plan would take twenty years, court
could consider other options including ordering the sale or refinance of the property or reducing
payment to judgment to allow execution against other assets).
Lump sum equalizer needs to be based on the payor’s ability to pay without substantially
endangering his/her economic status. Abramovic v. Abramovic, 188 So.3d 61 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016);
Jones v. Jones, 295 So.3d 1226 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2020) (Court must make finding that a party has the
ability to pay the equalizer).
In Lopez v. Hernandez, 252 So.3d 266 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018), trial court allowed the wife 55
months to buy-out the husband’s interest in the marital home which the appellate court found
reasonable.
P. ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION
1. Property Settlement Agreement is Not Modifiable:
In Ingram v. Ingram, 133 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), the former husband filed a
supplemental petition, which was dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that
it could not modify an award of equitable distribution that had been determined in a 1993 final
judgment. The Second District concluded that the petition was not actually making such a request.
The parties entered into a marital settlement agreement that was incorporated into the final
judgment. In part, that agreement provides:
The parties agree that [the Former Wife] is entitled to one-half of [the Former
Husband's] military pension which has accrued to date. Which results in her being
entitled to 27.5 percent of the disposable retired pay [the Former Husband] will
receive upon his retirement a[sic] the end of twenty years’ service. And by and
through this agreement [the Former Husband] assigns and relinquishes to [the
Former Wife] that 27.5 percent of the disposable retired pay. Her portion of the
pension is to be paid to her upon his retirement according to the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act. Should [the Former Husband] retire or resign
before completing twenty years in military service, then the Court will have
jurisdiction [sic] to re-determine [the Former Wife's] interest in his pension.
The final judgment, in addition to adopting the marital settlement agreement, finds:
The parties were married for eleven years, during which time [the Former Husband]
was in active military service. [The Former Wife] is entitled, under the laws of the
55
State of Florida, to 27.5 percent of [the Former Husband's] disposable retired pay
upon his retirement from military service.
This finding results in an adjudication that states:
[The Former Wife] is hereby awarded 27.5 percent of [the Former
Husband's] disposable retired pay upon his retirement from military service. The
court retains jurisdiction to reconsider the percentage of retired pay should [the
Former Husband] retire before completing twenty years of military service.
The former husband had been in the military for approximately eleven years. To give the
former wife one-half of the pension “accrued to date,” it was necessary to give her 27.5 percent of
his anticipated pension after twenty years. The court retained jurisdiction because, if the former
husband retired before twenty years, the percentage would need to be increased in order for the
former wife to receive the correct percentage of the pension accrued during the marriage.
The former husband stayed in the military for thirty years. The Former Wife demanded 27.5
percent of his thirty-year pension. The former husband filed his supplemental petition seeking to
establish that the former wife was entitled only to the 27.5 percent of the amount of the pension
available after twenty years of service.
The former wife moved to dismiss the supplemental petition, characterizing the petition as
a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). See also Fla. Fam. L. R. P.
12.540. Initially, the former wife did not prevail on this motion and the matter was referred to a
magistrate. The magistrate ruled in favor of the former husband. However, when the matter
ultimately was reviewed by the circuit court, it concluded that it had no jurisdiction to award the
requested relief. The court determined that the final judgment could not be modified since the
former husband's petition failed to adhere to the filing deadlines under rules 1.540 and 12.540.
The Second District concluded that the former wife mischaracterized the supplemental
petition. The former husband was not actually trying to change the final judgment; he was trying to
enforce its terms as he understood them. In 1993, the circuit court had the power to equitably
distribute the marital assets, which included “[a]ll vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds
accrued during the marriage in retirement, [and] pension ... plans.” See § 61.075(5)(a)(4), Fla. Stat.
(1993) (emphasis added); see also Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So.2d 451, 452 (Fla.1997) (holding that
post-dissolution contributions to a retirement plan are not considered marital assets that accrue
during the marriage); Brathwaite v. Brathwaite, 58 So.3d 398, 400–01 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding
that pre-marriage contributions to a retirement plan are not considered marital assets acquired
during the marriage). Because the pension was a military pension, special information needed to be
included in the judgment. See § 61.076, Fla. Stat (1993). Pursuant to section 61.076(2)(c), the
amount of the pension to be distributed to the Former Wife could be expressed “in dollars” or “as a
56
percentage of the disposable retired or retainer pay.” If a percentage was used, it was intended to
distribute the benefits “accrued during the marriage.” § 61.076(1).
The final judgment used the 27.5 percent calculation as a method to give the former wife 50
percent of the amount accrued during the marriage. The amount of the pension that accrued after
the marriage affected this percentage calculation, but the court was not and, at least in the absence
of some special agreement between the parties, could not distribute pension benefits that accrued
after the dissolution of the marriage. Because the former husband served for more than twenty years,
the pension he has earned was larger than a twenty-year pension. However, from the face of this
record, the wife's entitlement in the final judgment was based on the amount of a twenty-year
pension. Ingram v. Ingram, 133 So.3d 1205, 1206-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
2. Equitable Distribution is Not Enforceable by Contempt:
In Byrne v. Byrne, 133 So.3d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), the former wife argued that
contempt cannot be used to enforce her obligation to pay certain mortgages. The Fourth District
agreed, stating that the law is well-settled that contempt does not lie to enforce a property settlement
arising out of a dissolution of marriage. See Simpson v. Simpson, 68 So.3d 958, 961 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011); Randall v. Randall, 948 So.2d 71, 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Filan v. Filan, 549 So.2d 1105,
1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Hobbs v. Hobbs, 518 So.2d 439, 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Contrary to
the former husband's contention, this was not a case where the trial court used its contempt powers
to compel performance of an act. See Riley v. Riley, 509 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
(affirming a contempt order which was based on the former husband's failure to designate the
former wife as the primary beneficiary of a life insurance policy, as required by the property
settlement agreement); Burke v. Burke, 336 So.2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (affirming the
portion of the order which found the former husband in contempt for failing to execute documents
as provided for in a property settlement agreement).
Furthermore, the former husband lacked standing to request and receive appointment of a
receiver to collect the rental payments made by tenants living in the former marital home. A receiver
may not be appointed unless the person seeking appointment has standing “by virtue of a legal or
equitable claim, such as a claim of ownership of the property in controversy, or a lien or property
right therein ....” Warrington v. First Valley Bank, 531 So.2d 986, 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (citation
omitted). Pursuant to the final judgment of dissolution, the former husband was left with no legal
interest in the former marital home. Further, nothing in the record established that at the time of the
hearing, the former husband had an equitable interest in the former marital property, such as a lien
or other property right. Thus, the Fourth District reversed the contempt order in its entirety. Byrne
v. Byrne, 133 So.3d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s determination that each party owned
non-marital real property in Italy and its division of the marital property. However, it did err with
57
respect to the Husband’s retirement benefit. Due to the Husband’s employment in Italy during the
marriage, he was apparently entitled to a retirement benefit when he reaches sixty-five years of age
and is no longer employed, seemingly similar to social security. The magistrate did not receive any
expert testimony concerning this benefit. He awarded half of this benefit to the Wife, and he ordered
the Husband to file the necessary documents in Italy to accomplish this split and pay the Wife her
half. The report concluded with the sentence: “Such payment is in the form of support and the
remedy of contempt is available to the Wife for the Husband’s failure to make the required
payments.” This was error, as it appears that the benefit is an asset that was equitably distributed,
and if so, contempt would not be a proper method of enforcement. The trial court did not err by
adopting the magistrate’s decision to divide this benefit equally. Russo v. Russo, 129 So.3d 507
(Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
In Farghali v. Farghali, 187 So.3d 338 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016), Court ordered enforcement of
equitable distribution through contempt powers. This is reversible error. Property rights cannot be
enforced with contempt; Stufft v. Stufft, 238 So.3d 419 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2018).
Trial court tried to make the equitable distribution payments enforceable by contempt by
treating it as alimony. Appellate court reversed. Vinson v. Vinson, 296 So.3d 960 (Fla. 1
st
DCA
2020).
Appellate court found no ambiguity regarding agreement for lump sum alimony to be paid
in lieu of assets received by the opposing party and therefore not enforceable by contempt. Further,
trial court should not have permitted extensive parol evidence where the agreement was clear and
unambiguous. Suarez v. Suarez, 317 So.3d 230 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2021).
3. Contempt May be Used to Compel a Party to Act:
In Williams v. Williams, 251 So.3d 926 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018), court could find wife in
contempt of court for failing to make any effort to refinance the property.
4. Income Deduction Order is Not Available for Equalizer Payments:
Court initially required Wife to make equalizer payments. In the event of her default, the
husband was entitled to an Income Deduction Order. IDO is not available to enforce property rights.
Abramovic v. Abramovic, 188 So.3d 61 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016).
5. Trial Court Cannot Modify the Equitable Distribution in an Enforcement Proceeding:
The trial court attempted to redistribute assets as part of its enforcement proceeding which
was error. Farid v. Rabbath, 273 So.3d 221 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
58
6. Trial Court Reversed Where it Tried to Impose an Equitable Lien on the Marital
Residence:
Court was required to make findings that the former husband’s conduct was sufficiently
egregious to justify the imposition of an equitable lien. However, trial court relied on
unsubstantiated, unverified allegations and the record was insufficient to support the court’s ruling.
De Diego v. Barrios, 271 So.3d 1181 (Fla.3d DCA 2019).
7. Trial Court May Clarify Equitable Distribution Award:
In Rhoulhac v. Francois, 295 So. 3d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), the Fourth District disagreed
with the trial court’s statements that equitable distribution is non-modifiable, especially when the
time periods to challenge the final judgment by motion for rehearing or appeal had long expired.
The trial court which entered the final judgment “retain[ed] jurisdiction to enforce and modify and
clarify the terms of th[e] Judgment.” Even without the reservation of jurisdiction, “[w]here terms
of a final judgment are ambiguous as applied to facts developing after the judgment, a court may
clarify what is implicit in the judgment and enforce the judgment. A clarification seeks to make a
judgment clearer and more precise, as opposed to a modification, which seeks to change the status
quo and alter the rights and obligations of the parties.” Bustamante v. O'Brien, 286 So. 3d 352 (Fla.
1st DCA 2019). In Rhoulhac, the trial court failed to distribute a marital home that was purchased
during the marriage in the husband’s name alone. The trial court determined the home was marital.
The wife was awarded exclusive use and occupancy until the child’s 18
th
birthday. However, the
trial court failed to award the property to either party. The former wife was therefore allowed to
amend her supplemental petition to allege the final judgment’s ambiguity as to the marital home’s
disposition so the trial court could value the marital home under section 61.075(3) and apply the
section 61.077 factors to determine whether the former wife was entitled to any credits or set-offs
upon the marital home’s sale.
8. Trial Court Could Enforce Agreement and Address Ambiguity Not Time Barred by One
Year Limitation:
Marital Settlement Agreement was silent as to the method of valuing and paying pension
benefits. 25 years after agreement, former wife tried to have a QDRO entered to get her share of
the former husband’s municipal pension. Pension plan not subject to Qdro. Former wife tried to
modify the MSA to obtain her retirement benefits claiming mutual mistake, etc. Former Husband
responded that the claim was time barred by Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540. Trial court agreed with former
husband. Appellate court reversed. Trial court could have considered relief being sough as one for
enforcement, not to set aside and therefore not time barred. If trial court found terms of the MSA
ambiguous, it must first determine the parties’ intent at the entry of the MSA and then determine
how to enforce the provision. Mandelko v. Lopresti, 2022 WL 3378790, 4D21-2041 (Fla. 4
th
DCA
2022).
59
Q. MARITAL RESIDENCE
1. Buy-Out of Marital Residence Must be Over a Reasonable Period of Time:
In Evans v. Evans, 128 So.3d 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), the former husband argued that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding the former wife the use and possession of the marital
residence, but directing her to buy out the former husband's one-half interest, worth $37,500, at the
rate of $150 per month, plus interest, over the course of twenty years. Regarding the division of the
parties' equity in the marital home, section 61.075(10), Florida Statutes, grants the trial court the
discretion to order an equitable distribution of marital assets payable in installments over a fixed
period of time. The present installment scenario, however, which spans twenty years, effectively
deprives the former husband of his present one-half interest in the marital home. Cf. Posner v.
Posner, 39 So.3d 411, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding the trial court abused its discretion where
the installment plan worked “[t]o deprive the husband of the majority of the assets of the marriage
for the rest of his life”). The equitable distribution installment plan concerning the marital home
was therefore reversed. Evans v. Evans, 128 So.3d 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
Husband received a house through an inheritance. He subsequently titled the house in joint names.
At final hearing, Wife requested partition as neither party could afford to buy-out the other. Husband
asked court to award him the house for sentimental reasons and the trial court agreed. It asked the
Husband how much he could afford to pay in an equalizer pay out and the Husband stated $100 per
month. The payout to the Wife was $25,000. The Appellate court found the payment plan was
patently unreasonable as it required the Wife to wait for more than 20 years for her share of the
equitable distribution. Thomas-Nance v. Nance, 189 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2016).
2. When the Court Orders the Sale of the Marital Home, Details Regarding Sale Must also
be Included:
Where the Court ordered the sale of the marital home, it must state how carrying costs will
be paid pending sale and what credits, if any, are to be afforded. Court must also set forth
consequences if sale or refinance does not occur and how proceeds are to be allocated. Jones v.
Jones, 184 So.3d 1238 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016).
3. Court May Set the Listing Price:
Court set listing price of marital residence but failed to consider a pending contract on the
property. Ghannam v. Ghannam, 188 So.3d 892 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016).
60
4. Court Must Address Relieving Non-Owning Spouse of Liability Attendant with the
Transfer of the Marital Home:
In Lostaglio v. Lostaglio, 199 So.3d 560 (Fla.5
th
DCA 2016), trial court was reversed for
failing to address relieving the non-owning spouse of the mortgage liability after it awarded the
marital residence to the other spouse.
The Second District reversed the trial court in Goff v. Goff, 331 So.3d 312 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA
2022). The trial court awarded the former husband the marital residence but should have also
required him to remove the former wife’s name from the mortgage within a reasonable period of
time and include a hold harmless provision. See also Patel v. Patel, 162 So.3d 165 (Fla. 5
th
DCA
2015).
5. Disposition of Marital Home Must Not Require Additional Judicial Labor for the Order
to be Fnal:
Where the Court retained jurisdiction in the final judgment to determine the disposition of
the marital residence in the event the wife was unable to refinance the property, the order was not
final as it required additional judicial labor. Fischer v. Fischer, 224 So.3d 919 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017).
6. No Error to Award the Wife Exclusive Use and Also Award Each Party a 50% Interest
in the Property:
Trial court awarded the wife exclusive use of the former marital residence while awarding
each party a 50% interest in the property for equitable distribution purposes. Morgan v. Morgan,
213 So.3d 378 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017).
7. Award of the Marital Residence until the Youngest Child Reaches Majority:
In Ortiz v. Ortiz, 315 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021), the Second District discussed the
general rule that a trial court should award the primary residential parent exclusive use and
possession of the marital residence until the youngest child reaches majority or is emancipated, or
the primary residential parent remarries, unless there are special circumstances. In Ortiz, both of
the parties’ incomes were insufficient to meet all of their expenses. However, the trial court made
sufficient findings that were supported by substantial competent evidence to justify awarding the
wife exclusive use and possession of the marital home. The trial court found that the wife has
consistently been able to make mortgage payments for the marital home since the parties’
separation. The Court made additional detailed findings to support the award of exclusive use of
the marital residence to the Wife until the youngest child reached majority.
R. PARTITION
1. Split of Authority as to Requirement for it to be pled:
61
Partition actions may be brought to require the sale of property pursuant to Ch. 64, Florida
Statutes. As partition has traditionally been described as a statutorily created remedy, failure to
plead partition has been deemed fatal. However, there appears to be a split in jurisdictions as to
whether a request for partition must be specifically plead.
In Ortiz v. Ortiz, 315 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021), the Second District ruled that the trial
court’s conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the request for partition was erroneous
because the trial court has the power to divide and distribute the marital home under Chapter 61,
regardless of whether the party specifically pled for partition. The court cited Riley v. Edwards-
Riley, 963 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that chapter 61 allows the trial court to divide
and distribute all marital assets, including the marital home, and, as a result “it is no longer
necessary to seek partition as part of dissolution action to divide or distribute a parcel of property
owned by a husband and a wife”); see also § 61.075(6)(a) 2.
In Hodges v. Hodges, 128 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the trial court ordered the
partition of the marital home if the husband failed to pay the wife her equity in the home within six
months. Neither party had requested partition. See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 646 So. 2d 297 (Fla.
5th DCA 1994) (trial court without authority to order partition of property in absence of plea by
either party). Accordingly, the Fifth District reversed the order to the extent that it required the sale
of the property. However, the Fifth District stated that the wife may move to enforce the directive
to pay her equity, in which case the trial court may order the sale of the property as a mechanism to
enforce that aspect of the order, if requested in a motion.
In Salituri v. Salituri, 184 So. 3d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), the trial court erroneously
ordered partition of the marital home depending on the outcome of a foreclosure appeal. There was
no pleading seeking partition and the husband did not acquiesce to it at trial. See Reyes v.
Reyes, 714 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Thus, in the Fourth District, partition must be
specifically plead.
In Martinez-Noda v. Pascual, 305 So. 3d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), the former wife re-opened
the dissolution of marriage proceedings by requesting a partition of the former marital home. As
“the power of the trial court to deny partition should be invoked only in extreme cases, where
otherwise manifest injustice, fraud or oppression would result if the remedy were granted,” the
Third District affirmed the order granting the partition. Sudholt v. Sudholt, 389 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1980); see Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2005) (“Although contract
principles play a role in dissolution proceedings, courts must remember that ‘proceedings under
chapter 61 are in equity and governed by basic rules of fairness as opposed to the strict rule of
law.’”) (quoting Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997)); Green v. Green, 16 So. 3d 298 (Fla.
1st DCA 2009) (“Partition principles are flexibly applied in order to arrive at a fair, equitable, and
just decree”).
2. Partition May be Appropriate Even Where There are Minor Children:
62
The Wife requested that the trial court partition the home. Instead, the court denied her
request and awarded exclusive use and possession of the home to the Husband, who was the primary
residential parent of the parties’ son. Although the general rule is that the trial court should award
the primary residential parent exclusive use and possession of the marital residence until the child
reaches majority, special circumstances may justify partition and sale of the marital home where
the parties’ incomes are inadequate to meet their debts, obligations, and normal living expenses, as
well as the expense of maintaining the marital residence. Here, partition of the home was warranted.
The family lived in the marital home for a short period of time when the parties separated, the
parties did not have other significant marital assets, and there was a large difference in the parties’
earning capacity. Also, the payments related to the marital home were significant and the Husband
could find a place for himself and the minor child to live that is less expensive. Dottaviano v.
Dottaviano, 170 So.3d 98 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
S. CORPORATIONS AND THIRD PARTIES
Anson v. Anson, 772 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2000) has a thorough analysis of the role
of a corporation in the context of a dissolution proceeding. A “stockholder’s interest in a
corporation is limited to the legal rights flowing from the ownership of capital stock. Those rights
do not include a pro-rata interest in corporate assets. A corporation owned by both spouses is a
marital asset, but the earnings are not a marital asset until payments are made for services or as
dividends.
1. Consider Whether to Add the Corporation as a Party:
A corporation should be added as a party to the dissolution of marriage proceedings if
transfer of the corporate assets is requested by a party. If a corporation is not joined, then the trial
court has no power to order a transfer of corporate assets. Keller v. Keller, 521 So.2d 273 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1988). Further, the party who is ordered to transfer the property may not be able to convince
the corporation to do so, and the party who is to receive the property is without recourse. Nichols
v. Nichols, 578 So.2d 851(Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
In Ehman v. Ehman, 156 So.3d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), the final judgment awarded the wife
three properties that belonged to Tierra Technologies, LLC. This was improper because Tierra
Technologies has never been a party in the dissolution proceedings.
Tierra Technologies was never brought in as a party to this dissolution proceeding, and the
trial court did not have the power or authority to transfer the property of a corporation without the
joinder of that entity. See Mathes v. Mathes, 91 So.3d 207, 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also
Minsky v. Minsky, 779 So.2d 375, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“In this dissolution action, the trial
court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights of nonparties.”); cf. Austin v. Austin,
120 So.3d 669, 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“[A] trial court has the power to value and distribute
corporate stock determined to be a marital asset.” (citing Mathes, 91 So.3d at 208)). Consequently,
because the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Tierra Technologies, the Second District
63
determined that it was error to award property owned by Tierra Technologies to the wife as part of
the equitable distribution of marital assets. Ehman v. Ehman, 156 So.3d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
A similar situation arose concerning the award of a Mercedes automobile in a marital
distribution scheme in Keller v. Keller, 521 So.2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). In reviewing this
award, the Fifth District said:
The problem with the award of the Mercedes is that it was owned by a
corporation in which the appellant owned 87% of the stock, not by the appellant
himself. This corporation was not joined as a party and, thus, the trial court had no
power to transfer this corporate asset. Id. at 276 (citing Feldman v. Feldman, 390
So.2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)).
2. When Adding the Corporation is Not Necessary:
Joinder is not necessary where one party does not seek a claim against the corporation or a
claim of unequal distribution in any property of the corporation. Ashourian v. Ashourian, 483 So.2d
486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Even without joinder, the court may prevent a party from disposing of
corporate assets under the party’s control, or can order the transfer of corporate stock to the other.
Id. Dismissal is not permitted, however, where the parties’ course of conduct demonstrates a
blending of marital and business partnerships. Hoecker v. Hoecker, 426 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA
1983). When both parties have access to the corporate books, checkbooks, bills, and personal
expenses taken from the corporation, there exists a blending of marital and business partnerships
and joinder is required.
In Sandstrom v. Sandstrom 617 So.2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), the trial court awarded the
wife a share of the proceeds from the sale of an office building after the wife argued that the
corporation which owned the building and the husband were one in the same. The Fourth District
ruled that the trial court erred when it awarded the wife funds from the sale of a building since the
husband owned it with two other stockholders, as the wife had never filed a claim against the
corporation, and the corporation was never a party to the dissolution proceedings.
In Keller v. Keller, 521 So.2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), the trial court awarded a vehicle to
the wife in the divorce proceedings. The Fifth District reversed, holding the vehicle was owned by
a corporation in which the husband owned 87% of the stock. The court ruled that the corporation
was not joined as a party and, thus, the trial court had no power to transfer this corporate asset.
However, the court awarded the wife a share of the increase of the value of property as part of the
equitable distribution scheme subject to the husband’s active participation in the appreciation in
value of the asset.
In Feldman v. Feldman, 390 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), the Husband was ordered to
transfer to the wife a percentage of the stock of his clothing store. The trial court’s order was
reversed, the appellate court ruling that the trial court was not empowered to order the transfer of
64
the assets of a corporation which was not a party to the litigation. See also Couture v. Couture, 307
So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); and Noe v. Noe, 431 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
In Eldridge v. Eldridge, 147 So.3d 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), the Fifth District held that
the trial court erred in awarding the Former Wife one-half of the shareholder distributions from the
marital business, Apex Pest Control, Inc. (“Apex”).
During the marriage, the parties were equal shareholders in Apex, a closely-held subchapter
S corporation. The original Final Judgment generally reflected the parties' agreement that the former
husband was to purchase the former wife's fifty percent interest in the capital stock of Apex at a set
amount. Various parcels of marital property, including the marital home, were to be sold, with the
former wife receiving all of the proceeds. The former husband's fifty percent interest in those
properties would be set off against the purchase price for the former wife's Apex stock. In addition,
the trial court added a paragraph to the original Judgment, deferring delivery of the stock certificates
until the marital home sold. This paragraph was not addressed by the parties' stipulation, and the
record does not reflect that it was requested by either party.
The original judgment anticipated that the former wife would earn a net income of $10,575
per month in investments once she received the monies from the sale of the marital properties. Until
such time, she was temporarily awarded $2,500 in alimony per week. Based on the parties' “lavish”
lifestyle during the marriage, the trial court found that the former wife had an additional need for
permanent monthly alimony of $4,400. The payment of that amount was to commence one week
after the sale of the marital home. In the meantime, the former husband was to pay the Former Wife
$1,500 per month in addition to the $2,500 per week. Additionally, in its oral pronouncement, the
trial court ruled: “Until the sale of the marital home [Former Husband] and [Former Wife] will each
be fifty percent owners of Apex; until the sale of the marital home [Former Wife] will still receive
Twenty–Five Hundred Dollars [sic] week.”
The timing of the parties' divorce coincided with the recent recession and housing market
crash. Although the parties and the trial court anticipated a quick sale of the marital home, it became
a three-year ordeal. The former wife received the former husband's share of the proceeds from the
sale of the properties, but there was an approximately one-million-dollar shortfall, which was being
paid at the rate of roughly $14,000 per month.
Just before the marital home sold in 2009, the former wife, for the first time, claimed that
she was entitled not just to the monies as set forth above, but also to one-half of all distributions
made by Apex in the preceding three years. Despite the fact that the original judgment clearly
labeled various monetary awards as alimony, the former wife took the position that they were,
instead, corporate distributions. In support of her argument, the former wife noted that the former
husband had been utilizing accounting practices that made it appear that her income from Apex was
significantly more than she was actually receiving in distributions. These practices exposed the
65
former wife to a large tax liability. Nevertheless, the language deeming the payments alimony was
agreed upon by the parties. The Fifth District therefore found that the trial court erred to the extent
it reclassified the temporary alimony payments as corporate distributions. See McCann v. Walker,
852 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that unambiguous language in a final judgment
must be given its literal meaning).
Likewise, the trial court erred in granting the former wife's motion to compel equal
distributions from Apex from the time of entry of the original judgment until the sale of the marital
home. This award totaled $923,739.99, plus interest.
Shareholders of subchapter S corporations may agree to unequal payment of dividends or
distributions, which was what the parties did. See Little v. Caswell–Doyle–Jones Corp., 305 So.2d
842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). An exchange between the parties' attorneys, which occurred on the record,
clearly reflected the parties' agreement that the former husband would receive Apex as his separate
property, and this was part and parcel of the overall equitable distribution scheme. Specifically, the
former husband's counsel stated: “If we value [Apex] at five million dollars and we put it all on
[Former Husband's] side of the ledger for distribution purposes, that leaves [Former Husband]
indebted to [Former Wife] in the amount of two million five hundred thousand dollars.” The former
wife's counsel expressed no disagreement with that disposition.
The former wife erroneously relied upon Zold v. Zold, 880 So.2d 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004),
affirmed in part, vacated in part, 911 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 2005), to support the order requiring payment
of corporate distributions. In Zold, the court was required to determine the husband's available
monthly income from a subchapter S corporation for purposes of paying support. The court noted
that “[c]ourt ordered obligations in marital litigation should not place an ex-marital partner in the
position of having to breach a corporate fiduciary obligation ....” Id. at 781. Zold, however, is
distinguishable because it did not involve a marital settlement agreement, equitable distribution, or
an agreement between the shareholders. Additionally, the other shareholder in Zold—to whom the
husband owed a fiduciary duty—was a third party rather than the other spouse. The trial court's
reliance on Zold was therefore misplaced.
Unlike in Zold, the parties' partial settlement agreement and the original judgment
established that the former wife would no longer receive corporate distributions but, instead, the
former husband would buy out her interest. The trial court's addition of a term stating that the former
wife shall retain “a secured interest” was not intended to alter the agreed-upon ownership structure
of Apex; rather, it was a method of securing payment based on the agreed-upon terms. The former
wife understood that a firm price had been set for the purchase of her share of the corporation.
Moreover, at no time during the three-year period between the entry of the original judgment
and the sale of the marital home did the former wife attempt to participate in the running of the
corporation. The dissent's dismissal of this fact notwithstanding, in addition, at no time during that
66
three-year period did she ever demand additional corporate distributions. These facts weigh heavily
in favor of finding that the agreement did not contemplate the former wife maintaining an ownership
interest in Apex during that three-year period. The Fifth District reversed the 2012 Order to the
extent it required payment of corporate distributions. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 147 So.3d 1048 (Fla.
5th DCA 2014).
In Bair v. Bair, 214 So.3d 750 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2017), trial court erroneously ordered retained
earnings to be paid out while also including the retained earnings in the business valuation.
3. Spouse Does Not Need to be an Owner or Officer of a Corporation for it to be a Marital
Asset:
Where Court found the wife had no ownership interest in the corporation and was not an
officer, but corporation established during the marriage, the Court committed error. Salituri v.
Salituri, 184 So.3d 1250 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016).
4. Court Cannot Direct Corporation to Continue to Make Payments if Not a Party to the
Proceedings:
In Buchanan v. Buchanan, 225 So.3d 1002 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017), the court ordered the
husband’s company to continue to pay the wife’s salary. The husband’s company was not joined
as a party and therefore, the court had no power to order the company to take any action.
5. Third Parties:
Court cannot rule on third party rights without the third party being included in the litigation.
Hua v. Tsung, 222 So.3d 584 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017).
In Martinez v. Martinez, 219 So.3d 259 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2017), trial court correctly included
the husband’s son from a prior marriage as a third party since the wife alleged that the husband and
son acted in concert to dissipate the marital estate.
The trial court erred when it awarded to the husband properties that had been transferred to
the parties’ son over which the court had no jurisdiction. Perez v. Perez, 238 So.3d 422 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2018).
Property purchased in the name of one of the spouse’s parents based on an oral agreement
that the parties would pay the debt on the property and 50% of the title to the property would be
transferred to the parties. However, the transfer never occurred. In order for the court to consider
if the parties had an interest in the property the court would need to have jurisdiction over the
spouse’s parents, which it did not. Goley v. Goley, 272 So.3d 800 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
67
Husband’s mother was allowed to intervene in the divorce. She had a partial interest in
real property along with the spouses’ who held their interest as tenants by the entireties. Since her
interest in the property may be impacted regarding survivorship rights, trial court correctly
allowed her to intervene. Bailey v. Bailey, 310 So.3d 103 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2021).
6. Corporation’s Action Against a Party Post-Divorce:
After the parties divorced, the corporation (which was a marital asset), sued the former wife
for civil theft and other counts. The former wife argued that the claims, at best, were tantamount
to dissipation and should have been brought in the divorce proceedings. She alleged that the
releases exchanged in the divorce should have barred this proceeding. However, because the money
belonged to the company, this action was theft from the company and not dissipation. Doctor
Rooter Supply & Service v. McVay, 226 So.3d 1068 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2017).
7. Adding Husband’s Mother as a Party to Impose a Constructive Trust:
Former Husband’s premarital property was transferred to his father a few months before the
parties married. The former wife handles the decision making on the construction and the parties
lived in the house during their marriage and made monthly payments to the father which wife
testified were for the mortgage and husband testified were lease payments base don an oral lease.
Payments were made from marital funds.Parties claimed mortgage interest deduction on their
income tax returns during the marriage. Trial court found that the husband’s father never intended
to keep an ownership interest in the property and imposed a constructive trust on the property.
Hudsband’s father had passed away and his mother was now the titled owner of the property – she
was added to the litigation as a third party.Tril court found clear and convincing evidence of the
four factors to impose a constructive trust:evidence of an implied promise that the home would be
their marital home, former wife assisted with design nd construction and marital home used for
mortgage payments, confidential relationship existed and failure to impose a constructive trust
would result in unjust enrichment to the former husband. Silvas v. Silvas, 334 so3d 630 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2022).
T. VALUATIONS
1. Business Valuations:
1.1. Trial court has the discretion to determine what discounts should apply in
valuing a business
68
Early in the marriage, the parties purchased what was then a much smaller business called
Mainline. At the Husband’s request, the Wife signed an agreement relinquishing her rights in
Mainline for three million dollars. Two trial judges, after two bench trials, invalidated this
agreement on the basis of overreaching and misrepresentation, as postnuptial agreements governing
the disposition of the parties’ assets are not enforceable if entered into in the absence of full and
fair disclosure of the assets at issue. After the second trial, the judge fixed the value of Mainline at
$43,063,800 and allocated it equally between the parties. A trial court should be accorded the
discretion to determine whether a marketability discount should apply to the valuation of a closely
held corporation in a dissolution of marriage case where the court is traditionally charged with
achieving equity through the use of various remedies.
The Wife argued that the judge erred by treating Mainline as if it were a small professional
association or sole proprietorship, the entire intangible value of which was inextricably linked to a
single person. She argued that Mainline had substantial enterprise goodwill that should be
calculated on the basis of “the income/going-concern valuation method.” If an expert is permitted
to testify and render an opinion based upon a valuation method that the expert claims to be
acceptable within his or her profession, then the trial court should have considerable discretion in
deciding to what extent it accepts or rejects the expert testimony. The Wife also argued that the
trial judge erred in denying her claim for pre-judgment interest on the value of her share of Mainline
from the valuation date to the date of the final judgment. The trial judge did not err in determining
that it would be inequitable to allow the Wife to receive pre-judgment interest since the partial
settlement agreement entered into by the parties included past, present and future distributions from
Mainline to the Husband, especially where the equitable distribution to the parties was substantial
and where there was no evidence that any passive increase in the value of Mainline after the parties’
partial settlement agreement was executed exceeded Mainline’s distributions to the Husband.
Kearney v. Kearney, 129 So.3d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
1.2. Error by trial court in valuing Husband’s business
The Husband challenged the values reflected in the equitable distribution worksheet,
specifically the value of his business. The court ordered the Husband to make an equalizer payment
to the Wife of $35,777 based on same. The Husband owned an electrical company, at which the
Wife worked for some time until it downsized and all of the employees were laid off due to the
economy. The Husband continued to operate the business, and at the time of trial, it was moving
toward profitability with a pending job, for which it billed $100,000.00, and accounts receivable of
$40,000. The parties stipulated that the accounts receivable was $16,951 prior to trial and that it
had other assets valued at $36,228 and debt of $100,451. The court initially calculated the accounts
receivable at $60,000, which was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The $100,000
job was the gross amount for the job, not the net. Also, the $40,000 figure the court used was the
amount the company had already received including the $100,000 job, and that figure was also a
69
gross number. Further, there is an indeterminate amount of overlap between the two figures.
Marcheck v. Marcheck, 159 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
1.3. Consideration of Goodwill in determining the fair market value of a business
There are two types of goodwill (value of a business in excess of its book value):
“Enterprise goodwill” and “Personal goodwill”. It is important to analyze both types of goodwill,
as one is considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution and the other is not a marital
asset.
Enterprise goodwill is a marital asset. Thompson v. Thompson, 576 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1991);
Held v. Held, 912 So.2d 637 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2005). What is enterprise goodwill? It has been defined
as a value separate and apart from the reputation or continued presence of the owner spouse. A good
example of a business with enterprise goodwill is McDonald’s. A McDonald’s franchise has
enterprise goodwill as the value of the business in excess of its book value is not attributable to the
particular owner of the franchise.
Personal goodwill is the other type of goodwill. This is a non-marital asset. This form of
goodwill is attributable to the skill, reputation and continued participation of an individual. The
easiest way to define this is what is the business worth “with” the owner in place and what is it
worth “without” the owner in place and the out of place owner is not subject to a non-compete
agreement. This analysis is sometimes referred to as the “with” and “without” method. See also
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 120 So.3
rd
31 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2013).
Trial court erred in awarding business to the wife without making a finding on the value of
the business aside from the wife’s personal goodwill. Higgins v. Higgins, 226 So.3d 901 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017).
2. Errors in Valuation:
Trial court assigned par value to the value of the corporate stock, but this value had nothing
to do with the fair market value. Trial court failed to consider its assets and liabilities in determining
value and improperly relied on the capitalization scheme. Soria v. Soria, 237 So.3d 545 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018).
It was error for the trial court to determine the value of the business without considering
accounts payable. Schroll v. Schroll, 227 So.3d 232 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017).
70
Trial court reversed on its goodwill determination as it was not based on competent
evidence. Good discussion about competing expert testimony on goodwill. King v. King, 313 So.3d
887 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2021).
3. Valuation of Personal Property and other Assets:
The trial court failed to designate the coffee table, end tables and watch as the non-marital assets
of the Husband. Additionally, with the exception of two firearms, the trial court failed to properly
establish the value of the firearm collection when determining the equitable distribution of same.
Brummer v. Brummer, 153 So.3d 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
It is unclear from the final judgment how the court reached its figure in valuing the parties’ art
collection. The amount did not align with either of the figures offered by the parties’ respective
expert witnesses. As the final judgment contains no specific findings as to the value of the
collection, other than the total amount itself, it is impossible to determine how the trial court reached
the value it placed on the collection and whether the value is supported by competent, substantial
evidence. Additionally, the final judgment expressly indicates that the valuation only included the
pieces housed in New Mexico and not those housed in Florida. The trial court must set forth a value
as to the pieces in Florida. As to the equalization payment the court awarded to the Wife, the final
judgment does not indicate how it reached the dollar figure for this payment. It only states that the
figure included the Social Security checks, the withdrawal from the joint back account and the
FEMA payment, but these items do not total the amount of the equalization payment. A trial court
must support any distribution of marital assets and liabilities with factual findings in the judgment,
based on competent, substantial evidence, with reference to the statutory factors, and it must make
specific written finds of fact identifying marital assets and individually valuing significant assets.
Williams v. Williams, 133 So.3d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
4. Court Failed to Determine the Value of the Marital Business, Reversed:
Trial court left the parties as joint owners in the marital business due to a lack of evidence
regarding the value of the business. Reversed. Bowen v. Volz, 271 So.3d 1162 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019).
5. Trial Court Cannot “split the difference” between disputed valuations:
In Giles v. Giles, 298 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), the former wife correctly argued that
the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the marital residence because competent substantial
evidence did not support the value assigned by the trial court. See Augoshe v. Lehman, 962 So. 2d
398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). In setting the value of the marital residence at $307,000, the trial court
appears to have averaged the value presented by the former wife ($325,000) and the value
presented by the former husband ($289,000). “This is an improper method of valuation.” Id. at
71
403. The trial court cannot determine valuation by “split[ting] the difference” or averaging the
values presented by the parties. Solomon v. Solomon, 861 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
U. INTERIM PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION
1. Fla. Stat. 61.075(5)
After filing a sworn motion setting forth the factual basis for an interim distribution and the
“good cause” (which under the statute means “extraordinary circumstances”), the Court may award
an interim distribution. Court must make findings as to the value of the marital assets and liabilities
subject to the motion and that “the partial distribution will not cause inequity or prejudice to either
party’s claims for support or attorney’s fees.” 61.075(5)(b).
After a hearing on the Wife’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees, the court issued an order
finding that the Husband lacked the ability to pay the Wife’s fees and directed that each party
receive $25,000 from marital bank accounts that were previously inaccessible due to a court order.
The court acknowledged that it lacked authority to order an interim partial equitable distribution
because the statutory requirements for such order were not met. However, by ordering that both
parties’ fees be paid from a marital account without indicating any intent to reallocate this money
at a final hearing, the court effectively made an interim partial equitable distribution. An interim
partial equitable distribution may not be ordered in the absence of a verified motion requesting such
a distribution. Kemp v. Kemp, 171 So.3d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
In Calvarese v. Calvarese, 312 So.3d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), the husband appealed a
nonfinal order granting the wife’s motion for interim partial equitable distribution and the
husband’s motion for interim partial equitable distribution of property. In the order, the court
ordered the distribution of two individual retirement accounts held by the husband to be divided
equally between the parties after taxes and penalties were paid: one, a traditional IRA
approximated at $185,000 in value, and another, a Roth IRA, approximated at $130,000 in value.
The court reversed the distribution of the traditional IRA, because neither party pled for
distribution, and there was no good cause to support it. The court pointed out that for an interim
distribution, a party must show good cause. See § 61.075(5), Fla. Stat. (2020). The court pointed
out that “extraordinary circumstances” are necessary to constitute good cause. Defanti v. Russell,
126 So. 3d 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). No such extraordinary circumstances were presented in this
case to justify the liquidation of both IRAs before the final hearing. The court therefore reversed
the trial court’s order.
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V. TAX CONSIDERATIONS
A trial court is required to consider the tax consequences in establishing an equitable
distribution scheme. Failure to do so, may be reversible error. Nicewonder v. Nicewonder, 602
So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 1992); Rey v. Rey, 598 So.2d 141 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 1992); Sharon v. Sharon,
862 So.2d 789,791 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2003); Diaz v. Diaz, 970 So.2d 429,432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
However, where no evidence is presented to the Court, it cannot be faulted for failing to address the
tax considerations. Diaz at 432; Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So.2d 884,886 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2000). If
a court awards assets to one party with tax consequences and to the other without, the result will be
inequitable. Tradler v. Tradler, 100 So.3
rd
735 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2012).
In the past, courts did not consider tax consequences absent evidence of an imminent sale.
This was referred to as “the imminent sale doctrine”. See e.g., England v. England, 626 So.2d 330
(Fla. 1
st
DCA 1993). However, it appears that Florida courts no longer require an imminent sale in
order to consider tax consequences of equitable distribution. This is particularly so with respect to
qualified plans, pensions and retirement accounts where there is almost absolute certainty as to the
fact that a taxable event will occur. See, e.g., Austin v. Austin, 12 So.3d 314 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2009)
(trial court reversed where it failed to include tax consequence for liquidation of IRA as testified to
by CPA).
Of course, if there is an award of a marital residence or a business with no prospect of sale
following the divorce, calculating the tax consequences on a potential sale in the undetermined
future and reducing the value of the asset after such a consideration, may not be appropriate. See,
e.g., White v. White, 717 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 1998).
Trial court erred by applying the wrong legal standard as to evidence of capital gains taxes
in the event the husband sold marital business. The trial court determined that there was no evidence
of an imminent sale. Ruling was reversed as imminent sale is not the standard for court to apply in
considering taxes imbedded in assets awarded in equitable distribution. “A trial court is not
forbidden from accounting for future tax consequences simply because there is no evidence a sale
of that asset is imminent.” Bathke v. Costley, 332 So.3d 1076 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2021).
W. PETS
1. Dog is Personal Property- Vauation Issue:
In Springer v Springer, 322 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021), the former husband requested
the former wife be held in contempt for failing to return his dog to him. The dog was in the former
wife’s custody at the time the final judgment of dissolution was entered. Following an evidentiary
hearing on the former husband’s motion, the trial court awarded the former husband the fair market
value of the dog instead of the dog itself. This was error. The Second District reversed, noting the
73
long established rule that “while a dog may be considered by many to be a member of the family,
under Florida law, animals are considered to be personal property.” Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d
109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The owner thereof cannot be deprived of the use thereof, except in accord
with all of the elements of due process.
2. Family Dogs – Court Analyzes and Rejects Former Wife’s Claim of Emotional Support
Dog:
In Harby v. Harby, 331 So.3d 814 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2021), the parties had two dogs during the
marriage. The former wife claimed during the intact marriage she prinmarily cared for the dogs but
during the three years of separation prior to final hearing, the dogs lived with former husband. The
former wife claimed one of the dogs was her emotional support dog but after considering the
evidence, the trial court did not find the former wife established any mental or physical disabilities.
Moreover, while the dog may have been “emotionally comforting” to the former wife, it was also
an emotional comfort to the children who lived primarily with the former husband. Trial court may
consider a party’s sentimental interest in property. Trial court affirmed as no abuse of discretion in
awarding the dogs to the former husband.
X. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Court Cannot Rewrite the Agreement of the Parties:
The parties reached a settlement agreement immediately prior to trial, the terms of which
were read into the court record. The Husband was to purchase the Wife’s 50% interest in the capital
stock of the marital business. Various properties, including the marital home, were to be sold, with
the Wife receiving the proceeds. The Husband’s 50% interest in the properties would be set off
against the purchase price of the Wife’s stock from the marital business. The court ruled that until
the sale of the marital home, the parties would each be 50% owners of the marital business and the
Wife would receive $2,500.00 per week. Despite the fact that the court and the parties contemplated
a quick sale of the marital home, it took three (3) years to sell. Just before it sold, the Wife claimed
that she was entitled to one half of all distributions made by the marital business in the preceding
three (3) years. The trial court erred in granting equal distributions from the marital business from
the time of the original judgment until the sale of the marital home. Shareholders of a subchapter
S corporation may agree to unequal payment of dividends or distributions, which is precisely what
the parties did here. The agreement was that the Husband would receive the marital business as his
separate property, and this was part of the overall equitable distribution scheme. Eldridge v.
Eldridge, 147 So.3d 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
The parties’ consent final judgment reserved jurisdiction for the court to enter a separate
order when the Former Husband retired from the Navy to set forth the amount of benefits to which
74
the Former Wife was entitled. The terms of the consent final judgment were unambiguous, and the
court simply should have performed the mathematical equation set forth therein. Johnson v.
Johnson, 162 So.3d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
2. Credits and Setoffs:
The trial court credited the Husband $144,000 in equitable distribution for his contributions
toward the upkeep of a Clermont home during the pendency of the divorce. The Husband properly
concedes that the correct credit should be for half of that amount. The Wife should also be entitled
to a credit for one-half of the $10,754.22 that she spent to maintain this property during the
dissolution proceedings. Third, the Wife is entitled to half of the 401k benefits forfeited to her
Husband from the accounts of three (3) employees terminated from his medical practice prior to the
date of filing the petition for dissolution. Because the Husband’s right to this money was vested
when the employees were terminated, prior to the divorce filing, the funds should have been treated
as marital funds. Fairchild v. Fairchild, 135 So.3d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
The Husband requested a set off of the amount of the fair rental value of the marital home,
and the trial court denied same. The final judgment, however, was silent concerning the
Husband’s entitlement to a credit or setoff for half the rental value of the Wife’s exclusive use and
possession of the marital home. The final judgment did state that all proceeds from the sale of the
residence shall be equally divided by the parties after accounting for the expenses allocated to
each party. The court also explained that it was electing not to charge the Wife the fair rental
value of her exclusive use and possession of the marital home because she was to be solely
responsible for the utilities, the other expenses were evenly split between the parties, and she was
paying half the costs associated with the parties’ yacht. The statute is clear that the eight (8)
factors enumerated therein must be considered before determining the issue of credits or setoffs in
the final judgment. Caine v. Caine, 152 So.3d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
In Coffy v. Coffy, 321 So. 3d 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) the court noted with approval the
general rule permitting parties to trade child support arrears for an equitable distribution settlement,
noted that “We see no reason to disturb the parties’ mutual agreement to the pre-payment of part of
the husband’s child support obligation for both of his children through the transfer of equity in the
marital home that the wife will utilize to support her children.” See Daizi v. Daizi, 549 So. 2d 754
(Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“[T]he trial court has the power to effect equitable distribution, including the
power, where appropriate, to award the husband’s equity to the wife in lieu of child support.
3. Oral MSA:
Oral MSA requires testimony under oath or for Court to confirm parties understand the
agreement and have had an opportunity to confer with counsel. Where Court heard from the
75
attorneys as to the terms of settlement but did not inquire of the parties, the final judgment adopting
the agreement was reversed. Richardson v. Knight, 197 So.3d 143 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016).
4. Motion for Rehearing if Error in Equitable Distribution:
If error in equitable distribution, must file for rehearing to afford the trial court with an
opportunity to correct the error. Farghali v. Farghali, 187 So.3d 338 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016); Shuflet
v. Shuflet, 199 So.3d 504 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016). If a party fails to do so, they may have waived their
right to appeal based on the trial court error.
76
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(1) ……………………………………………………….. 1,7,19,27,32,51,52
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(1)(a)-(j)………………………………………………….. 1,32
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(1)(j)……………………………………………………… 32
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(3) ……………………………………………………. 50,51,58
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(3)(b)………………………………………………………
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(5) …………………………………………………………
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(5)(b)………………………………………………………
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(5)(a)(4) ………………………………………………….
44,51
71
71
55
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)1 …………………………………………………….
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)1b ………………………………………………….
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)1c …………………………………….......................
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)1d ………………………………………………….
1
18,21
21
42
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)1e…………………………………………………...
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a) 2 …………………………………………………..
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a) 3 ………………………………………….……..
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a) 4 …………………………………………..……..
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(b) 3………………………………………………….
Fla. Stat. § 61.075 (6)(b)5………………………………………………….
40,42,45
61
18
18
18
10
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(7) ………………………………………………………. 11-14,45
77
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(8) ………………………………………………………. 2,7
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(10) ……………………………………………………… 53,59
Fla. Stat. § 61.075(10)(b) ……………………………………………………. 50,53
Fla. Stat. § 61.076…………………………………………………………….. 55
Fla. Stat. § 61.076 (1)……. …………………………………………………… 42,56
Fla. Stat. § 61.076 (2)(c)………………………………………………………. 55
Fla. Stat. §61.077……………………………………………………………… 58
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540. ……………………………………………………. 46,55
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b)…………………………………………………… 46,55,58
CASE LAW
Abernethy v. Abernethy, 670 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).…….............. 8
Abramovic v. Abramovic, 188 So.3d 61 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)…………… 50,54,57
Addi Diaz-Silveira v. Diaz-Silveira, 305 So.3d 646 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2020)…. 13
Adkins v. Adkins, 650 So.2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) ……………………….. 23,24
Akers v. Akers, 582 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ………………………. 37
Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) …………………………….. 2
Anson v. Anson, 772 So.2d 52,54 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2000)…………………………….. 62
Apesteguy v. Keglevich 319 So.3d 150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)……………………… 10
Arzillo v. Arzillo, 343 So.3d 137 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2022)…………………………….. 38
Ashourian v. Ashourian, 483 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)……………….. 63
Augoshe v. Lehman, 962 So.2d 398, 40203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…………… 51,70
78
Austin v. Austin, 12 So.3
rd
314 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2009)………………………… 51,62,72
Badgley v. Sanchez, 165 So.3d 742 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2015)……………………. 28
Bailey v. Bailey, 310 So.3d 103 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 20121)………………………. 67
Bair v. Bair, 214 So.3d 750 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2017) ……………………………. 66
Ballard v. Ballard, 158 So.3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…………………….. 22,23,37
Banks v. Banks, 168 S.3d 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…………………………. 48
Barner v. Barner, 716 So.2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)………………………. 3
Barrett v. Barrett, 313 So. 3d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)…………………………….. 50
Bateh v. Bateh, 98 So.3d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…………………………… 37,51
Bathke v. Costley, 332 So.3d 1076 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2021)…………………….. 72
Beaty v. Gribble, 652 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)………………………. 2
Becker v. Becker, 639 So.3d 742 (Fla.5
th
DCA 1994)………………………… 29
Beers v. Beers, 724 So.2d 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ………………………. 11,31
Bell v. Bell, 642 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ……………………………. 28
Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 1995)………………………. 73
Betts v. Betts, 235 So.3d 958 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2017) …………………………… 23
Blossman v. Blossman, 92 So.3d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)……………… 51
Boutwell v. Adams, 920 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2006)……………………… 30,32
Bowen v. Volz, 271 So.3d 1162 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019)………………………….. 29,70
Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So.2d 451, 452 (Fla.1997)……………………………… 40,41,55
Brathwaite v. Brathwaite, 58 So.3d 398, 40001 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)………… 55
79
Briggs v. Briggs, 336 So.3d 1286 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2022)………………………… 37
Broadway v. Broadway, 132 So.3d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ……………….. 12
Brummer v. Brummer, 153 So.3d 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)………………… 70
Buckalew v. Buckalew, 197 So.3d 148 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)…………………. 52
Buchanan v. Buchanan, 225 So.3d 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ………………. 66
Burke v. Burke, 336 So.2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…………………. 56
Bush v. Bush, 824 So.2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…………………………… 37
Bustamante v. O’Brien, 286 So.3d 352 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019)…………………. 58
Byers v. Byers, 149 So.3d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).………………………… 6,35
Byrne v. Byrne, 133 So.3d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)………………………. 56
Caine v. Caine, 152 So.3d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…………………………. 74
Callwood v. Callwood, 221 So.3d 1198 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017)………………… 51
Calvarese v. Calvarese, 312 So. 3d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)………………………. 71
Capozza v. Capozza, 917 So.2d 365, 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ……………... 7
Cardella-Navarro v. Navarro, 992 So.2d 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) …………… 15
Catafulmo v. Catafulmo, 704 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)………………. 15
Chapman v. Chapman, 866 So.2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)………………….. 24
Chatten v. Chatten, 334 So.3d 633 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2022)………………………. 33
Cilenti v. Cilenti, 192 So.3d 673(Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2016)……………………… 9
Clark v. Clark, 155 So.3d 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ………………………… 15
Coffy v. Coffy, 321 So.3d 230 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2012)………………………….. 74
80
Cole v. Roberts, 661 So.2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…………………………. 21,23
Coleman v. Bland, 187 So.3d 298 (Fla 5
th
DCA 2016)………………………… 49
Collier v. Collier, 343 So.3d 183 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2002)………………………… 39
Conlin v. Conlin, 212 So.3d 487 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2017)…………………………. 6
Cooley v. Cooley, 253 So.3d 1223 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018)………………………. 28,33
Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1994)……………………….. 31
Couture v. Couture, 307 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)………………………. 64
Daizi v. Daizi, 549 So.2d 754 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 1989)……………………………. 74
Dampier v. Dampier,298 So.3d 695 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2020)………………………. 10
David v. David, 58 So.3d 336, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) ……………………… 12
Davis v. Davis, 245 So.3d 810 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018)…………………………… 53
De Diego v. Barrios, 271 So.3d 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ………………… 58
Dease v. Dease, 688 So.2d 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)………………………….. 27
Defanti v. Russell, 126 So.3d 377 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2013)……………………….. 71
Dehler v. Dehler, 648 So.2d 819 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1995)………………………….. 30
Diaz v. Diaz, 970 So.2d 429 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2007)…………………………….. 72
Distefano v. Distefano, 253 So.3d 1178 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018) ………………… 20
Doctor Rooter Supply & Service v. McVay, 226 So.3d 1068 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2017).. 67
Dorsey v. Dorsey, 266 So.3d 1282 (Fla 1
st
DCA 2019) ……………………….. 53
Dottaviano v. Dottaviano, 170 So.3d 98 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)……………….. 62
Dwyer v. Dwyer, 981 So.2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)………………………. 23
81
Dye v. Dye, 17 So.3d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ……………………………….. 3
Edgar v. Edgar, 668 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 1996)……………………….. 30
Ehman v. Ehman, 156 So.3d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)………………………….. 62,63
Eldridge v. Eldridge, 147 So.3d 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)………………….. 64,66,73
England v. England, 626 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 1993)…………………….. 72
Erdman v. Erdman, 301 So.3d 316 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019) …………………….. 3
Evans v. Evans, 128 So.3d 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…………………………. 59
Fairchild v. Fairchild, 135 So.3d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…………………….
41,42,74
Farghali v. Farghali, 187 So.3d 338 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)……………………… 57,75
Farid v. Rabbath, 273 So.3d 221 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019) ……………………….. 57
Feldman v. Feldman, 390 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)……………………. 63
Fernandez-Tretiakova v. Fernandez, 313 So. 3d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) …………. 51
Filan v. Filan, 549 So.2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) ……………………. 56
Fischer v. Fischer, 224 So.3d 919 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017) ………………………… 60
Fortune v. Fortune, 61 So.3d 441, 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ………………… 7
Frederick v. Frederick, 257 So.3d 1105 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018)………………….. 9
Freeman v. Freeman, 468 So.2d 326, 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)………………. 46
Fritz v. Fritz, 161 So.3d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) …………………………….. 40,41,47,48
Furbee v. Barrow, 45 So.3d 22, 24 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2010)……………………… 34
GaetaniSlade v. Slade, 852 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ………………... 23,24
Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So.2d 737 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1990)………………………. 31
82
Geraci v. Geraci, 155 So.3d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)……………………….. 25
Ghannam v. Ghannam, 188 So.3d 892 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016)………………….. 59
Gibbons v. Gibbons, 10 So.3d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)………………………. 46
Giles v. Giles, 298 So.3d 1277 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA)………………………………… 70
Goff v. Goff, 331 So.3d 312 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2022)……………………………. 60
Goldman v. Goldman, 182 So.3d 722 (Fla. 5
th
DCA, 2015)………………….. 9
Goley v. Goley, 272 So.3d 800 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019) ……………………….. .. 33,66
Goodman v. Goodman, 231 So.3d 574 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2017) ………………… 45
Goosby v. Lawrence, 711 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) …………………… 27
Gotro v. Gotro, 218 So.3d 494 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017) ………………………….. 37
Green v. Green, 16 So.3d 298 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2009)…………………………… 61
Griffin v. Griffin, 273 So.3d 282 (Fla.1
st
DCA 2019) ………………………… 39
Gromet v. Jensen, 201 So.3d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) ………………………. 21
Gudur v. Gudur, 277 So.3d 687 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019) ……………………… 11,50
Gupta v. Gupta, 327 So.3d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)……………………………… 6
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 328 So.3d 1093 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2021)……………………….. 2
Harby v. Harby, 331 So.3d 814 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2021)………………………………. 73
Hardy v. Hardy, 301 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019)………………………… 33
Harper v. Harper, 586 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ………………………. 53
Heiny v. Heiny, 113 So.3d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) …………………………. 23
83
Held v. Held, 912 So.2d 637 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2005) ……………………………. 69
Higgins v. Higgins, 232 So.3d 378 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017) …………………….. 69
Hobbs v. Hobbs, 518 So.2d 439, 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) ………………….. 56
Hodges v. Hodges, 128 So.3d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…………………….. 61
Hoecker v. Hoecker, 426 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)………………….. 63
Hoffman v.Hoffman, 552 So.2d 958 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 1989)…………………….
28
Holaway v. Holaway, 197 So.3d 612 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016) ………………….. 17
Holden v. Holden, 667 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ………………………
17,18
Hollinger v. Hollinger, 684 So.2d 286,288 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 1996)……………… 13
Hollister v. Hollister, 965 So.2d 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) …………………… 45
Hooker v. Hooker, 220 So.3d 397 (Fla. 2017)…………………................... 4,19
Hua v. Tsung, 222 So.3d 584 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017) …………………………… 66
Hubbard v. Berth, 279 So.3d 246 (Fla 5
th
DCA 2019)……………………….. 49
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 250 So.3d 701 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018)……………… 41
Ingram v. Ingram, 133 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ………………… 47,54
Jahnke v. Jahnke, 804 So.2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). ………………………. 15
Jalileyan v. Jalileyan, 4 So.3d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)……………………... 51
Jensen v. Jensen, 824 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ………………………… 42
Johnson v. Johnson, 162 So.3d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). …………………….. 74
Jones v. Jones, 239 So.3d 211 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2018)……………………………. 36
Jones v. Jones, 184 So.3d 1238 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016)………………………… 59
Jones v. Jones, 295 So.3d 1226 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2020)…………………………… 54
84
Jordan v. Jordan, 127 So.3d 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)………………………… 14,19
Julia v. Julia, 263 So.3d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ……………………………. 49
Justice v. Justice, 80 So.3d 405, 40710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ………………… 52
Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So.3d 867 (Fla., 2010) ……………………………….......... 22,23
Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So.2d 884 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2000)…………………… 72
Kay v. Kay, 988 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…………………………….. 46
Kearney v. Kearney, 129 So.3d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…………………….. 68
Keller v. Keller, 521 So.2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)………………………….
62,63
Kemp v. Kemp, 171 So.3d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). ………………………… 71
King v. King, 273 So.3d 233 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019) …………………………… 33
King v. King, 313 So.3d 887 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2021)……………………………. 70
Knecht v. Palmer, 252 So.3d 842 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2018)………………………. 28
Krift v. Obenour, 152 So.3d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ………………………. 7
Kvinta v. Kvinta, 277 So.3d 1070 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2019)………………………. 15,49
Kyriacou v. Kyriacou, 173 So.3d 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…………………. 32
Lakin v. Lakin, 901 So.2d 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ………………………… 17
Landrum v. Landrum, 212 So.3d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)………………….. 20
Lanzetta v. Lanzetta, 563 So.2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) …………………… 27
Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So.2d 1154 (Fla. 2005)………………………. 61
Lassett v. Lassett, 768 So.2d 472, 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)………………….. 35,52
Lawrence v. Lawrence, 904 So.2d 445, 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)……………. 41
85
Levy v. Levy, 900 So.2
nd
737 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2005)…………………………… 31
Lift v. Lift, 1 So.3d 259 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2009)…………………………………. 29
Little v. CaswellDoyleJones Corp., 305 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)… 65
Lonergan v. Estate of Budahazi, 669 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…. 34
Lopez v. Hernandez, 252 So.3d 266 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018)…………………….. 54
Lopez v. Lopez, 135 So.3d 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)………………………… 37
Lostaglio v. Lostaglio, 199 So.3d 560 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016)…………………… 6,60
Madson v. Madson, 128 So.3d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…………………….. 6
Madson v. Madson, 636 So.2d 759, 761 (Fla. 2d DCA,1994) ……………….. 12
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 251 So.3d 977 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2018)…………………. 48
Mandelko v. Lopestri, 2022 WL 3378790 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2022)…………….. 58
Manolakos v. Manolokas, 871 So.2d 258 (Fla 4
th
DCA 2004)……………….. 29
Marcheck v. Marcheck, 159 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)………………… 69
Martin v. Martin, 2022 WL 3441473 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2022)…………………… 10
Martin v. Martin, 276 So.3d 393 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019)……………………… 48
Martinez v. Martinez, 219 So.3d 259 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2017)……………………. 66
Martinez-Noda v. Pascual, 305 So.3d 321 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2020)………………. 61
Massam v. Massam, 993 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) …………………… 14
Massis v. Massis, 551 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ……………………….. 23
Mathes v. Mathes, 91 So.3d 207, 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) …………………… 62
Mattison v. Mattison, 266 So.3d 258 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2019)…………………….. 14,39
86
Matyjaszek v. Matyjasek, 255 So.3d 372 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018)……………….. 26
McAvoy v. McAvoy, 662 So.2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)……………………. 53
McCann v. Walker, 852 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)………………… 65
McGowan v. McGowan, 2022 WL 3441442 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2022)……………. 3,33
McKee v. Mick, 120 So.3d 162, 16364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)……………… 7
McMullen v. McMullen, 148 So.3d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ………………… 17,21
McNorton v. McNorton, 135 So.3d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…………………. 34
McKenzie v. McKenzie, 254 So.3d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)……………….. 37
Menendez v. Rodriguez-Menendez, 871 So.2d 951 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) ……… 29
Miller v. Miller, 186 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)……………………… …. 37
Miller v. Miller, 662 So.2d 391 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) ………………………….. 44
Minsky v. Minsky, 779 So.2d 375, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)………………….. 62
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 841 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ……………………... 23
Monas v. Monas, 665 So.2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)………………………… 53
Moody v. Newton, 264 So.3d 292 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2019)……………………….. 9
Morgan v. Morgan, 213 So.3d 378 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017)……………………….. 60
Morgan v. Morgan, 327 So.3d 898 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2021)………………………. 12
Moses v. Moses, 2021 WL 4228322 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2021)……………………. 33
Moss v. Moss, 829 So.2d 302 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…………………………… 2
Nathey v. Nathey, 292 So.3d 483 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2020)……………………………….. 27
Naylor v. Naylor, 127 So.3d 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)………………………. 52
87
Niederkohr v. Kuselias, 301 So.3d 1112 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2020)………………… 39
Neiditch v. Neiditch, 187 So.3d 374 (Fla 5
th
DCA, 2016)……………………. 9
Nicewonder v. Nicewonder, 602 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 1992)……………. 51,72
Nichols v. Nichols, 578 So.2d 851(Fla. 2d DCA 1991). ……………………… 62
Niekamp v. Niekamp, 173 So.3d 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) …………………. 5
Nguyen v. Huong Kim Huynh, 147 So.3d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) …………. 34
Nguyen v. Nguyen, 200 So.3d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)……………………. 34
Noe v. Noe, 431 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)………………………………. 64
Noone v. Noone, 727 So.2d 972, 97475 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ………………. 52
O'Neill v. O'Neill, 868 So.2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ………………………….. 24
Ortiz v. Ortiz, 315 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…………………………………… 60
Oxley v. Oxley, 695 So.2d 364 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1997) ………………………….. 26
Pachter v. Pachter, 194 So.3d 567 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)……………………….. 32
Padmore v. Padmore, 335 So.3d 239 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2022)……………………. 8
Pagano v. Pagano, 665 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1996)……………………
25,26
Palmateer v. Palmateer, 260 So.3d 476 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019) ………………….. 49
Palmer v. Palmer, 316 So. 3d 411 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)………………………………... 25
Pansky v. Pansky, 204 So.3d 517 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)………………………… 37
Parry v. Parry, 933 So.2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) …………………………… 15,43-45
Patel v. Patel, 162 So.3d 165 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2015)…………………………….. 60
Pearson v. Pearson, 268 So.3d 863 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019) ……………………… 38,49
88
Perez v. Perez, 238 So.3d 422 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2018)………………………… 66
Perkovich v. Humphrey-Perkovich, 2 So.3d 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ………… 4
Perlmutter v. Perlmutter, 523 So.2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)………………… 13
Peterson v. Peterson, 321 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)……………………………. 39
Pfrengle v. Pfrengle, 976 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ……………………. 17
Pierre v. Pierre, 185 So.3d 1264 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)………………………... 53
Pierre v. Jonassaint, 212 So.3d 1131 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2017)……………………… 53
Platt v. Platt, 164 So.3d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). ……………………………. 36
Posner v. Posner, 39 So.3d 411, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) …………………….. 59
Price v. Price, 233 So.3d 525 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018)……………………………… 52
Puskar v. Puskar, 29 So.3d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA, 2010)………………………… 12
Ramos v. Ramos, 230 So.3d 893 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017)………………………… 3,26,37
Randall v. Randall, 948 So.2d 71, 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ……………………. 56
Rawson v. Rawson, 264 So.3d 325 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019)………………………. 49
Rea-Manna v. Manna, 336 So.3
rd
804 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2022)……………………… 6
Rey v. Rey, 598 So.2d 141 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 1992)………………………………. 72
Reyes v. Reyes, 714 So.2
nd
646 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1998)…………………………. 61
Rhoulhac v. Francois, 295 So.3d 330 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2020)……………………. 58
Richardson v. Knight, 197 So.3d 143 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)……………………. 51,75
Ridings v. Ridings, 198 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)……………………… 50
Riera v. Riera, 86 So.3d 1163, 116768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ………………… 12
Riley v. Edwards-Riley, 963 So.2
nd
829 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 2007)…………………. 61
89
Riley v. Riley, 509 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) …………………… 5
6
Robbie v. Robbie, 654 So.2d 616 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1995) ………………………… 26
Robbins v. Robbins, 549 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 1989)…………………….. 29
Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So.2d 491, 494 (Fla.1991) ……………………….
40
Robinson v. Robinson, 10 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) …………………… 17
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 994 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)………………… 8,51
Rogers v. Rogers¸ 12 So.3d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ………………………… 11
Romano v. Romano, 632 So.2d 207 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1994)……………………… 31
Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 597 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…………….. 12
Ross v. Ross, 20 So.3d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)……………………………… 45
Roth v. Roth, 973 So.2d 580 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2008)…………………………….. 3
1
Roth v. Roth, 312 So. 3d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)…………………………………..
10
Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)……………………… 4
3
Russ v. Russ, 576 So.2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)……………………………… 2
7
Russo v. Russo, 129 So.3d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). …………………………. 5
7
Salituri v. Salituri, 184 So.3d 1250 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)………………………. 6
1
,6
6
Sandstrom v. Sandstrom 617 So.2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…………………. 6
3
Santiago v. Santiago, 51 So.3d 637, 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ………………… 1
2
,3
1
Sarazin v. Sarazin, 263 So.3d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)……………………….. 3
8
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 120 So.3
rd
31 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2013)……………………….. 6
9
90
Schmitz v. Schmitz, 950 So.2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)……………………… 14
Schroll v. Schroll, 227 So.3d 232 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017)………………………… 14,69
Seither v. Seither, 779 So.2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…………………………. 42
Sharon v. Sharon, 862 So.2d 789 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2003)………………………… 72
Shaver v. Shaver, 203 So.3d 932 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2016)………………………… 37
Shuflet v. Shuflet, 199 So.3d 504 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016)……………………….. 75
Sikora v. Sikora, 173 So.3d 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)……………………….. 37
Simpson v. Simpson, 68 So.3d 958, 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)……………….. 56
Smith v. Smith, 169 So.3d 220 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) …………………………. 8
Smith v. Smith, 226 So.3d 948 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2017)………………………….. 13
Solomon v. Solomon, 861 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2003)…………………. 71
Somasca v. Somasca, 171 So.3d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) …………………… 23
Sorgen v. Sorgen, 162 So.3d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ………………………... 18,20
Soria v. Soria, 237 So.3d 545 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2018)………………………… 69
Spence v. Spence, 669 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ……………………... 23
Springer v Springer, 322 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)……………………………. 72
Stantchev v. Stantcheva, 168 So.3d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).……………….. 16
Stewart v. Stewart, 237 So.3d 450 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2018)………………………. 38
Storey v. Storey, 192 So.3d 670 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016)…………………………. 48
Stough v. Stough, 18 So.3d 601(Fla. 1
st
DCA 2009)………………………….. 30
Street v. Street, 303 So.3d 1253 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2020)………………………… 11
91
Stuft v. Stuft, 238 So.3d 419 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2018)…………………………….. 6,57
Sturms v. Sturms, 226 So.3d 1004 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017)………………………. 21
Suarez v. Suarez, 317 So. 3d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)………………………………. 57
Sudholt v. Sudholt, 389 So.2d 301 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 1980)…………………………….. 61
Suk v. Chang, 189 So.3d 224 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2016)…………………………… 53
Tanner v. Tanner, 323 So. 3d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)……………………………… 10
Thomas-Nance v. Nance, 189 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2016)……………….. 54,59
Thompson v. Thompson, 576 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1991)…………………………… 69
Tradler v. Tradler, 100 So.3d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)………………………… 7,34,72
Trant v. Trant, 545 So.2d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) ………………………. 40,41
Tritschler v. Tritschler, 273 So.3d 1161 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019) ……………….. 53
Tucker v. Tucker, 966 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ………………………… 13
Twigg v. Twigg, 2022 WL 1434779 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2022) …………………... 10
Valdes v. Valdes, 894 So.2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). ………………………. 28
Valentine v. Valentine, 137 So.3d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) …………………. 3
Van Maerssen v. Gerdts, 295 So.3d 819 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2020)………………… 38
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 250 So.3d 126 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018)………………….…. 51
Vilardi v. Vilardi, 225 So.3d 395 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2017)………………………. 27
Vinson v. Vinson, 296 So.3d 960 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2020) ………………………. 57
Wagner v. Wagner, 61 So.3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ………………. 32
Wagner v. Wagner, 136 So.3d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)……………………... 11,12,39
92
Walker v. Walker, 827 So.2d 363, 36465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)……………… 7
Warrington v. First Valley Bank, 531 So.2d 986, 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)….. 56
Watson v. Watson, 124 So.3d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ……………………… 32
Watson v. Watson, 646 So.2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)……………………… 61
Weaver v. Weaver, 174 So.3d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) …………………….. 24,32
Weisfeld v. Weisfeld, 545 So.2d 1341 (Fla. 1989) …………………………… 9
Wendroff v. Wendroff, 614 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)………………….. 51
White v. White, 717 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 1998)…………………………… 72
Whittaker v. Whittaker, 331 So.3d 719 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2021)………………….. 33
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 203 So.3d 186 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2016)………………. ... 53
Will v. Will, 277 So.3d 182 (Fla. 2
nd
DCA 2019) …………………………… 39
Williams v. Williams, 133 So.3d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)………………….. 51,70
Williams v. Williams, 683 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 1996)…………………. 44
Williams v. Williams, 686 So.2d 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) …………………. 30
Williams v. Williams, 251 So.3d 926 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2018)………………….. 57
Wilson v. Wilson, 992 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)……………………….. 8
Winney v. Winney, 979 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)……………………… 51
Winder v. Winder, 152 So.3d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)………………………. 36
Witt-Bahls v. Bahls, 193 So.3d 35 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 2016) ……………………… 26
Yitzhari v. Yitzhari, 906 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) …………………… 3,24
Yon v. Yon, 286 So.3d 322 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2019)……………………………… 21
93
Young v. Young, 606 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ………………………. 24
Zold v. Zold, 880 So.2d 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)………………………….. 65
Zvida v. Zvida, 103 So.3d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)………………………… 37