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978-0-16-081729-8

The

Ftyng

Tigers

Chennault'sAmerican

Volunteer

Group

in

China

They

volunteered. For a

variety of

reasons--patriotic, altuistic,

mercenary, or

just

"for

the hell

of

it"-nearly

three

hundred U.S. servicemen

and a couple of

female nurses

volunteeredto fightawar in aplace theyknew

little about.

Recruited

at military

bases

around the

county,

the

mernbers of the

American

Volunteer

Group

(AVG)

set

offfor

the unknown in the summer

and fall of

1941.

While

U.S. support for the Allied

cause

was

growing

at

a

steady

pace,

most

Americans

still felt distanced from

the conflict

enveloping

Europe andAsia and did

not want to

go

to war. At the highest levels ofthe

govemmenq

however, entering

the

war appeared inevitable.

The AVG was one way of

gaining

experience

in this

vicious

war, while increasing

support

for the nations

fighting the Axis

powers.

Despite incredible

odds against them from

numerically superior Japanese

forces

and a

near

complete lack

of supply

and replacement

parts,

they took the

first

successfrrl fight

to the Japanese

during

a time of Japan's unrelenting

successes.

It

was not

pretty,

and their legend has

eclipsed

the

reality,

but

the reality of the

AVG is

still an

amazng story. Led by

Claire

Lee

Cherurault

they

made history.

The

Captain from Louisiana

Claire Chennault was a

proud

man with stong convictions.

From his

child-

hood in

the bayous of Louisiana to his rise as the

leader

of

the air

force

of China,

he

battled his superiors and

the enemy

alike with tough aggressive

tactics.

He was

successful against the enemy, not

so

much with his superiors,

but he never

gave

up.

His

pilots

absorbed this lesson

and

never forgot i! especially

when the chips

were

down.

The

details of his birth are inconsistent. In

his memoits, he claimed

to have

been

bom

in 1890,

the date he

gave

when he entered

the Army. On

another occa-

sion,

he

used

1892.

His

passport,

however,

had

September

6,

1893, and census

records from 1900

show his

parents

had one son,

aged six. Graduating

from the

equivalent

of

high

school when he was thirteen,

he entered

Louisiana State

Universif at fourteen. It

was at LSU that

he had his first taste of

military

life

as

a

cadet in the student

body.

He

found that

he liked military

life, although

the

disci-

pline

sometimes irked him.

After receiving

a

teaching certificate in

1910, Chennault's

first

job

and

leader-

ship challenge

rvas iN

the teacher in a

one-room schoolhouse

inAthens,

Louisiana.

His

predecessors

at

the school had rarely

lasted more than one

terrn because of the

antics and

physical

assaults

of ttre stapping

baclovoods school

kids. Still

legally a

minor,

Chennault's

discussions behind the

schoolhouse with

unruly

farm

boys

got

the school firmly

under his

rein. He

proved

that

he

was

in

charge,

then channelled

their aggressiveness

into

sports.

Chennault married in

1911 and

soon had the first of

his ten children, eight

with

Nell Chennault

and, later, two

with Chen Xiangmei

:'Anna"

Chennault.

The

need for

a

larger

paycheck

had him

searching for betterjobs;

and by 1916,

he

was making

automobile

tires in a factory

in Akron, Ohio.

It

was

there ln 1917,

after the

United States

entered

World War I, that

he first applied for military

flight taining.

Rejected

for flight

training

due to his age and

four

dependents, Chennault

accepted

a commission

as a first lieutenant

in the infanby and an assignment

to the

90th Division,

headquartered

at

SanAntonio, Texas. He managed

a fiansfer across

town to Kelly

Field

where his

duty consisted ofproviding basic

military instuction

to the

aviation cadets hoping

to

wintheirwings intheArmy.

Formally

rejected

for flight taining

three more times, Chennault

nonetheless

leamed

to

fly

in the

Curtiss

JN-4

"Jenny''trainer.

Befriending some

Kelly flying

instuctors,

the resourcefi.rl

lieutenant

gained

enough experience to solo unofficially.

He logged

more time in

idle JN-4s

after tansferring to a satellite

field

as

the

engi-

neering

efficiency

officer, where his

duties consisted of checking the

planes

in and

out and

overseeing theirrefueling.

There

were no regulations

regarding

nonaviators

flying

govemment-owned

aircraft, and

Chennault racked

up more

than eighty houn by the

time

of

his tznsfer

to Mitchel

Field,

NewYorlg

as adjutant

ofthe

46th Punuit

Squadron.

The squadron

received

orders to

ship

overseas

in

the fall

of

1918,

but

a change in the orden kept

the

squadron from

sailing. Even

though

Chennault deqperately

wanted to

join

the

fighting,

this reprieve

probably

was a

blessing in disguise.

ffthe 46th had shipped

out, he

would have

either

been in fansit

or

just

aoiving

in France when the war

ended. In

either

case, he likelywouldneverhave

become

a militarypilot.

Transferred

to Langley

Field,

Virginia" he had a near-deathbout with

influenza.

While recovering,

he received

orders

to

report

to Kelly Field agarq but

this time as

a student flyer.

His

his

short temper

for

those in

positions

of authority, nearly

grounded

him for

good.

lritated

at the way

an insfructor failed

to

explain a

student's errors and insteadjust snatched the con-

tols away,

often

banging the

stick against the student's thighs

for

emphasis,

Chennault

warned the instnrctor

that

he

would not tolerate such treatrnent and

wouldrefuse to

take the

contols back

Soon enough,

Chennault made

an error.

The instructor

banged

the

stick

against

the fiery

Louisianan's

legs

and waited for him to take control again.

Chennault

did

not,

and

the trainer

dove for the

ground.

At

the

last

second,

the

insfuctor

realuedttrat

Chennault meant

what he had said.

Regaining

contol,

he

landed

and immediately

recommended

Chennault

for

washout.

A recheck

by

a

2

more

tolerant

insfructor

reversed

this

judgement,

and Chennault

graduated

in

the

spring

of

l9l9

as

a

punuit

pilot.

Caught

in the force

reductions

following

World War I, he

was discharged with-

in

a

year,

but the National

Defense

Act

of

1920 reorganizdthe

Army's flying

com-

ponent.

The Air

Service

was made

a combat branch

of

the Army,

and the

nurrber

of

pilots

was

greatly

increased.

Chennault received a Regular

commission

in

Septem-

ber 1920

as

one of flfteen

hundred

officers assigned to theAir

Seryice.

Throughout

the 1920s,

Chennault flew in

several

pursuit

squadrons with flyers

nowfamous

inU.S.

militaryaviationhistory.

Fr-ank'Monk" Hunter,

afutureEighth

Air Force

commander,

was his

first

squadron comrnander. Chennault

practiced

dog-

fighting

with

Joe Cannon, later

TwelfttrAir Force

commander, and with Don

Stace,

an eventual

comrnander

of Seventh Air Force. Flying

with them as they

praCIiced

interceptions,

he

wi0ressed

the latter

two collide.

Stace, flying

a French-built

Spad, fell out at the top ofa half-loop in

a descend-

ing

spiral.

Cannorg

pursuing

in

a

British

Se-5, couldnot avoid

Stace

andthe

two

hit.

Stace managed

to recover

his

damaged

Spad

and landed

safely. Cannon was

not

so

fortunate

and rode his

mangled

biplane into

the

ground.

Unbeliwably, he suruived

the crash

and

went on to

a distinguished

career.

Chennault

assumed

command

of the

l9ttr Pursuit

Squadron in Hawaiilrr-lg23.

While

there, he

began

to develop his

theories ofpursuit interception and the

use of

a

ground-waming

network. Frustated

by the unrealistic rules dwing maneuvers, he

ignored

the restrictions

that allowed

attacks against bomber fonnations

only after

they

were in

the target

area and

attacks against ships

only when they were offthe

coastline

and

simulating

gun

fire

against shore

positions.

He achiwed a little

wam-

ing

by stationing

men

atop the

base water tower 16

sigral

when they

saw

approach-

ing

bombers

or

ships. The time

gained

allowed his

pursuits

to intercept

the bomben

much

farther

out than

before.

Similarly, the Naqy found ibelf

under

mock

snafing

attracks miles

out to sea. Although

his methods

worked

he

was chastised for not

sticking

to the

rules.

In

1930,

Chennault

attended

the Army Air Corps Tactical

School

at Langley

Field,

Vrginia.

One of the

senior instnrctors at

fhe

school, Capt. Clayton

Bissell,

was an

ace from

World

War I and taught tactics in

the

pursuit

course using his

experiences

in the

Great

War. Chennault beliwed that

these tactics were wasteful

of

both time

and resources.

The

odds against two opposing forces meeting in the

empty sky

without

some sort

of

intelligence

or early waming apparatus

gave

the

attacker

the

advantage.

Following

graduation"

because

of

his

commiflnelrt

to

pur-

suits,

Chennault

was named

an insfirctor in the

pursrit

course

at

the school and

moved

wittr

it

in the

sunmer

of

1931

to Ma:rwell Field Alabama

Bomber

advocates

were

beginning to become

dominant

in

the

Air

Corps, and

war

games

conducted in l93l

seemed to

prove

the bomber

proponents

corect.

However,

the maneuvers

didnot include

an advance waming networt and no

pur-

suit

pilots

hadbeen

involved

in

the

planning.

To

Chennault, it was a foregone con-

clusion

that

the bomber

would

win

in

that scenmio.

The

intoduction

ofthe Martin B-10

bomber in 1933 sturgfhened the

position

of the bomber

advocates,

The

standard

pursuit

aircraft

of

the

day,

the Boeing P-26,

could not catch the

B-10

and

had

only

two machineguns

compared

to the

bomber's

five. Against the doctrine that'lhe bomber would

always

get

througtr,"

Chennault's

counterbelief--{hat fight€rs, with adequate armament

andprotection

and

given

ade-

quate

waming, could" in fact, stop abomberforce---causedheated

arguments

atthe

school.

Chennault managed to be included

in

the

war

games

of

1933,

in which

bombers

flying from

Wright

Field,

Ohio,

advanced

towards

opposing

foices,

including

pursuits,

in

the area around

Ft. Kno4 Kentucky.

He

placed

observers

with

field radios

between Wright

Field and Ft. Knox, and

the

pursuits

subsequenaly

inter-

cepted every bomber

flying from

Wright

Field. This

tactic, combined

with

the study

of

British

and German waming systems,

led to Chennault's

writing

The

Role

of

Defensive Pursuit, which showed

how

defending

pursuits

could

intercept

bomber

formations. Further, for

the

bombers to achieve their

missio4

it

outlined

the

need

for

any bomber

formation to have accompanying

fighters

to

provide

protection

against the

intercepting

pursuits.

He

also stessed

the need for

coordinated

maneuvering

ofpunuits

when

attack-

ing

or defending.

His

writing and demonstations

in the

air

painted

a vivid

picture

of

how

the effectiveness of any one aircxaft could

be

negated when

met by

a

pair

of

opposing fighters. This type of close teamwork

was also

anathema

to the tactics

from World War I where many of the air battles were

one-venurl-one

jousts.

Chennault

got

an opportunity to test his combat

flying

techniques.In

1932, a

Navy aerobatic team impressed the Tactical School's

comrnandant,

Lt. Col. John

Curry, who asked Chennault to form such a team

for the

Air Corps.

Chennault

selected

his teammates

with

a flying audition using

the

Boeing P-128,

a biplane

pursuit.

His

criterion was simple: stay on

my wing and

you

make the team.

Three

Captain Claire Chennault

in

a

Boeing P-Iz at

Maxwell

Field,

Alabama,

in 1932.

pilots

at Maxwell

made

it: Lt.

Haynvood

"Possum"

Hansell

and two

flying

sergeants,

John

"I

uke" Williamson

and

Billy MacDonald. MacDonald

served as

the

spare team

pilot

rlrtil Hansell

left

the team after the

first

year.

During

the team's

existence

(1,932

to

1936),it

developed an

international repu-

tation

for

coordinated

team

aerobatics. The

pilots

flew

so smoothly

that,

from

the

grorlrd,

the three

airplanes

seemed as though they

were confrolled

by one stick.

Dubbed

the

'oThree

Men

on a

Flying

Trapeze" following

their

inaugural

perfor-

mance,

they

were

so

effective in

executing

their

complicated

maneuvers-loops,

spins,

chandelles,

and Immelmanns-that

Chennault

felt it

proved

prnsuits

could

stay

together

in

the rigorous

maneuvers required in

combat.

The

team

disbanded

in 1936

due to

fiscal

constraints

after its last

performance

ata December

1935

air

show. In

the audience was Gen.

Mow Pang

Tsu

of

the

Chinese

Air Force,

who made

a note

of the display

team's leader

for

futrne

refer-

ence.

With

his

health

failing,

and

permanently grounded

due

to low

blood

presswe,

chronic

bronchitis,

and

deafrress

brought on by

his many

years

of open cockpit

fly-

ing,

Chennault

began

planning

to

retire

with twenty

years

of service

in

1937

.

During

the

winter

of

1936,

Chennault

was

frequently in

the

hospital in Hot

Springs,

Arkansas.

In

February

1,937,

a medical

board

recommended

medical retirement.

Since he had

made

many

influentialAir

Corps enemies during

the bomber ver-

sus

pursuit

debate,

Chennault knew

that

his

career was

finished and that

he had no

chance

of ever flying

a

IJ.S. military

arplane

again. He submitted

his retirement

papers,

effective

April

30,

1937

,

and

retired

with

the

permanent

rank

of captain,

ArmyAir

Corps.

He

had

been

negotiating

with

the

Chinese

for months

and

finally accepted a

two-year

confract

from

the Nationalist

Chinese

Air Force

(CAF),

including

a three-

month

trial to

conduct

a complete

and thorough

review

ofthe CAF.

With a salary of

one thousand

dollars

a month

an4

just

as

important, the

right

to

fly

any aircraft

in

the

Chinese inventory

Chennault had

started

his

journey

to

China.

China in

Crisis

In

the

early 1930s,

China wum

in

the

midst

of a civil war between

the Nationalist

forces

of

Gener:alissimo

Chiang

Kai-shek

and Commurist

forces led

by

ZhouEnlai

and Mao

Zedong,

but

was

further divided

internally

by

regional

warlords.

In 1931,

the

Japanese InrperialArmy

invaded Manchuria,

avast

areain northeast China.

Torn

by internal

politics

and

powerless

to

repulse

the Japanese

invasion,

Chinese

forces

rtrder

Chiang

were

forced

fbrtlrer

and

farther

to the South.

In 1932,

a LJ.S. military

mission

established

the

first flying

faining school

in

China. Led

by Col.

Jack

Jouett, this mission

usedAir Corps

reserve

officers

to teach

Chinese

students

the

basics

of

flying

and

military

aviation. Unfortunately,

like all

things

China at the

time, internal

politics

reared its head and

led

to the

demise

of the mission.

A local

rebellion

entrenched

itself in

a

heavily

fortified,

walled

coastal

position

opposite Formosa,

and the Chinese

asked

Jouett

to use

his

U.S.

pilots

to bomb the fortifications

so that

govemment

ground forces

could

storm

the

position.

Jouett

refusd

as

involvement

in

intemal Chinese

mattem was

outside

his

orders.

krstead,

General

Mow flew

the mission

in fiaining

airc'raft and

success-

fully breached the wall. This allowed the

government

to retake

the fortess

and

quell

the

rebellion,

but the credibility of Jouett and the

military

mission was damaged.

Fascist Italy,

under dictator Benito Mussolini, offered

to t:ain the

Chinese

and sell

ttrem all the Italian aircraft they

could

afford. The Chinese

accepted

the offer

and

told the United States to leave,

wen

though the mission

had tumed out

some very

capable aviators

for

two

years.

The ttalians

operated their training facilities on an

"everybody

graduates"

philosophy,

a

philosophy

in keeping

with the

importance the

Chinese

placed

on

face. Usually, only the

sons of very

prominent

or wealthy

families were

accepted

for

pilot

training, and

the

failure

of any

reflected

badly

on

the family

and ulti-

mately

on Generalissimo Chiang. The ltalians were

happy to

pass

everyone who

applied for

training, no matter their actual

piloting

skill,

with

inevitable

results.

The

accident

rate

was high during taining and almost as bad

in the

line squadrons

where the

pilots

were

posted

after

graduation.

Likewise, the

Italian

Fiat fighters

and Savoia-Marchetti

bombers, obsolete even by

1930s standards,ruely

were

in

commission

due

to high

accident

rates,

even though

Chinese

squadrons

reported

all aircraft

on

the field

as being combat-ready

regardless of their

true condition.

With such deceit

covering up actual capability, the Chinese

military cooperation

with Italy could not

continue, especially considering

Italy's

growing

alliance

with

Japan.

It was

during this time of crisis and chaos

n 1937 that Chennault

arrived

in

China" hired by the

Generalissimo's wife, Madame Chiang,

head of China's

avia-

tion

commission and a

l9l7

graduate

of Wellesley

College

in Massachusetts.

Chennault

undertook the task of inspecting the CAF

from top to bottom,

from the

taining

of

aircrews

and zupport

personnel

to the constuction

of dozens

of airfields

throughout the county. Additionally, he inspected the condition

and

"suitability

for

a

given

mission" of the many types

of Chinese

aircraft. Chennault

found

tlnt of the

five hundred

aircraft listed

on

the inventory when he began

his

inspection, only

ninety-one were actually

in

flyng

condition.

His honest accounting

was

the final

staw that

broke

the Italian monopoly

on Chinese

military aviation.

China was

in

a

precarious position

n 1937 . Japanese

forces occupied

most

of

China's eastern coastline, including all

of

the

port

cities.

All

military and civil

imports

and supplies had to be brought

overland

via the

ancient Silk

Road through

the

SovietUnion or overthe Burma Road from Rangoon,

Burma. Chinese

ground

forces,

while

numerically

superior to the

Japanese,

suffered

from a

lack of fraining,

modem

weapons, and logistic

suppo{

as

did

the CAF.

hr July 1937, a

skirmish betweeir Japanese

and Chinese

forces occuned

near

the capital at Peking,"

the so-called'Marco Polo Bridge

lncident."

This was the

beginning

of full-scale war betrveen China and Japan

and has been

considered by

*All

Chinese

place

names

are those

ofthe era

vice

ttre

modern spelling

or

pronunciationo

e.g.,

the

World

War

Il-era

Chrurgking

instead

of today's

Chongqing

and

Peking

for modern

Beijing.

6

Chennault with Chinese head

of state

Chiang

Kai-shek

and Madame

Chiang.

some

as

the

beginning

ofWorld

War

tI

in the Pacific.

Chennault

offered

his

services

in

whatever

capacrty

needed

)

an

offer

quickly

accepted; and

Chiang

gave

him the

job

of directing

the

combat

faining

of

China's

fighter

pilots

at Nanchang.

The

few

older

pilots,

mainly

graduates

of Jouett's regime

or

from

Western tain-

ing

schools

elsewhere,

were

competent

pilots.

They

were

capable of

flying

the few

effective

fighters

available,

like

the

Curtiss Hawk

biplanes

or

Boeing P-26 mono-

planes,

and

could

even

turn in

a

credible

perfonnance

with the Fiat

biplanes.

Unfortunately,

the

majority

of

the

pilots

had

been ftained

by

the Italians,

ffid

even

takeoffs

and

landings

resulted

in

crashes and

desfroyed equipment, not to mention

casualties.

Chennault

reported

to

Chiang

the state

of China's combat an

force

without

the

niceties

of etiquette.

While

a terrible

breach

ofprotocol, such a report demonsfated

to

Chiang

that

Chennault

would

tell the

urvarnished fi:uth.

Such

a man

was a valu-

able

asset

to

Chiang.

Chennault

became

the

de facto

Chinese

Air Force

commander, advising

the

Generalissimo

and his

wife,

as

well as the

CAF

leadership,

on

how to best

employ

the

air

assets

available.

True

to his history

of

practicing

what

he

preached,

Chennault

probably

flew

conrbat

missions

during this

time. Observation

is

the term

he

used,

but

surviving

the

antiatrcraft

fire

and Japanese

fighters he

faced required

more

than

just

observing.

In addition

to

taining

the

combat

pilots,

Chennault instituted a low-tech,

but

effective,

early

warning

network.

Relying

on

telephones

and radios, he

soon had a

web

of observation

and

reporting

posts

that relayed their reports

back to the cenfal-

uedheadquarters.

Tracked

on a

map that had

the

location

of

each

post

marke4

only

a few

reports

were needed

to

determine

the

course

and approximate

speed of attack-

ing

Japanese

arcraft,

aRd

Chennault

could

quickly get

his fighter

pilots

in

position

to intercept.

Superior Japanese

numbers eventuallywore

the Chinese

down;

andby

October

1937

,

ftirbhadtoo

few fighters to make a difference

in

any air battle.

It

was

at this

juncture

that Soviet aid came to China.

Reqponding to a Chinese

appeal

for intema-

tional aid,

Russia sent

several

squadrons of

Polikarpov

I-15 biplane

and

t-16

monoplane

fighters. The two had complimentary

attributes:

the

I-15 was

very

manzuverable

while

the [-16 was very fast forttre

time.

For nearly two

years,

squadrons equipped with

Soviet,

but

Chinese-flown,

fight€rs tangled

with Japanese

army and navy

pilots.

In the

air,

many times

the bat-

fles came to

a

draw, but the Japanese

gound

forces

relentlessly

pustred into China;

Soviet zupport was withdrawn

after

Germany

invaded

the Soviet

Union

in the

sum-

mer of 194L, and China was once

again left nearly defenseless

in the air' China

needed help,

needed it

soon; and supporten

in the United

States

worked

hard to

get

tlntheh.

Birth of theAVG

In the fall

of

1938,

China

hired a collection of

Westem

volunteer

mercenary

pilots

called

the Intemational

Squadron.

While composed

mostly of

advenhrers

in

Asia

at the time,

it

did

have a few

good pilots.

One, Jim

Allison

from the United

States,

hadfought

againstthe Germans

andltalians

inthe Spanish

CivilWar.

Others

had

senred

in the air forces

ofvarious

nations.

However,

some were

not so

competent.

In his memoirs,

Chennault

tells

of a

twenty-year-old

claiming

twelve thousand

flying hours

under

his belt.

Since

Chennaulthadjustless thantenthousandhours

logged a.ftermore

thantwentyyears

of

flying, he knew

the

youngster

was at least stetching

the tuth,

if not outight

lying.

Chennault told

his

old

Flying Trapeze friend,

Billy lvlacDonald,

now working

for Chennault as an instuctor, to take the

young

man up

to see

what

he

could

do.

The braggart admitted to MacDonald that

he had never

flown

a

plane

before,

but

was

motivated

by the

high

salaries offered

by the Chinese.

The

actions of the

Intemational

Squadron

on the

ground

caused

its demise.

Drunken boasting about an upcoming

mission led to a

Japanese

bombing

raid on

the squadron's flightline that destroyed all of their

aircraft.

After this

experience

with mercenaries, Chennault

was

in

no hurry to experi-

ment again. However, the Generalissimo and

his wife,

in October

1940,

directed

Chennault

to

go

back

to

the United

States to acquire U.S.

aircraft,

pilots,

and

ground

crews. Since

the

United States

remained a

neutal

country

in the war

at the

time,

Chumault thought

his task

was

hopeless, but followed

his

instnrctions.

In Washington, D.C., Chennault

met

with

Dr.

T.V. Soong,

the

brother of

Madame Chiang and a

man

well connected

with

powerfirl

people

in Washinglon.

Soong had Chennault draw up the

requirements for two

hundred

fight€rs

and one

hundred

bombers, along with the

logistics and

persomrel

necessary

for such a

force

in China" Chennault spent the

fall

and winter of

1940

preparing

lisb ofneeded

sup-

plies,

while working with Soong to

gain

the

ear

of

policy

makers

who could

help

acquire the airplanes and supplies. Soong,

meanwhile,

used

his contacts

with

8

Secretary

of the

Navy Frank

Knox and

Secretary of the Treasury Henry

Morganthau

to

plant

the

idea with

President Franklin Roosevelt.

In

response,

Roosevelt

sent his

administative assistan! Dr. Lauchlin

Currie, to

China to assess

the

situation.

Currie's subsequent repo(

pointing

out

the

dire state

of Chinese

defenses

and the impact

should

Japan

knock

China out of

the

war,

gave

new

wgency

for aid to

the

Chinese.

hitially,

the

plan

included

tlree

groups:

ttre FirstAmerican

Volunteer Group of

one hundred

fighter

airplanes

and

associated air and

goutd

ctews; the Second,

of

one hundred

bombers and

their

crews; and ttre

Thir{

another of fighter airsraft and

crew

mernbers.

By using

Chinese

funds to buy the aircraft and supplies and

pay

tlre

salaries of the

proposed

crews, the

U.S.

govenrnent

could retain a fagade of neutal-

ity,

while helping

China againstthe

Japanese. Because Pearl Harbore,nded formation

of the

second

and third

groups,

the

volunteers became simply

the

American

VolunteerGroup.

The aircraft

chosen

for the AVG

was the rezult of a compromise. Even though

the

aviation

industy had

increased

its

production

for the needs of both the

United

States and

other counties,

nothing

was available for the

Chinese.

krstead" Dr. Soong

and

SecretaryMorganthauworkedout

adeal withthe Britishto

gveup

the lastone

hundred

of an order

of Curtiss

P-40s in exchange for an order

of

a much improved

P-40 model

soon to

start

production.

The British agrced.' and

Chennault

and

China

had

their

first one hundred

fighters.

'

Chennault

was less than

impressed with the P-40.

With only a

single-stage

supercharger,

it

could not

fly above

twenty thousand feet; and the Chinese would

receive

just

the

basic

airframe without

radios, bomb rac}s, fittirigs for extemal fuel

tanls,

or even

gunsights.'IWhile

maneuverability at high speeds was better, it could

nottum atlow

speeds

with the

Japanese fighters ttrcAVGwouldgoup against. Still,

the P40

possessed

a number

of

positive qualities,

including high speed in a dive,

powerful

armameng

and the

ability to absorb an immense amount of damage. Most

important,

the P40

was available.

To ensure the

legality

of the

plan,

a

commercial company, Chinese

Aircraft

tvlanufacffing

Company

(C.AMCO),

was usedto buythe equipment

andto hire

and

pay

the

personnel.

CAMCO

was run by William Pawley, a long-time Curtiss sales-

man

in the Far East

who had

political

connections

in the

United

States. Further, the

board

of directors

of

China Defense Supplies, Inc., a subsidiary of

CAMCO

based in

the

United

States, included

both Franklin Delano, the President's uncle, and

Washington lawyer

Thomas

Corcomn,

a

close

friend and

special

advisor to President

Rooswelt.

CAMCO

also

gotthe

contzctto

service

andmaintainthe aircraft at ie factory

at Loiwing

China, after

they arrived in that

country. Since

the

United

States was

selling the

equipment to

a civilian company and the recruited menrbers would

be

listedas

employees

ofCAMCO,

nzutality issues

were consideredresolvedas

far as

the

U.S.

government

was concemed.

Early

models

of

the

P-40s

contained a mixed armament of two

nosemounted

.50-caliber

machineguns

and four smaller

guns

in the wings

(later

variants would

have

six wing-mounted

Browning

.50+aliber machineguns). Cbrtiss

installed

ttre

nose

guru

at tlrc

faotory,

brut

not the

wing

guns.

Chennault,

through

CAIvICO,

was

forced to scrcu4ge and improvise to equip his

force. He

managed to

convince

the

British to

give

him enough .3O3-caliber machineguns

to equip

fiffy

aircraft and

then

bought

e,nough

Colt 7,92-rnfir

machineguns that were

in common

use

throughout

Asia to equip the remaining fighters. This mixture

of different

caliber

guns

and

mrmitions later caused logistic headaches.

Equipment however,

was only one

facet of the

plan.

Equally

important were

the men needed to fly

and

fix the P40s. Chennault envisioned

recruiting

100 expe-

rienced military fighter

pilots,

as

well

as 150

ground

technicians

he would

need to

service

and repair the P40s. The Army and the

Navy,

however, both

trying to

expand their aviation

progruns

for the impending wax,

were

reluctant

to release

m€,11.

Chennault finally received letters from the War

and

Navy Deparfirents

that

insfiucted the senrices to

give

his recnriters access to

military bases

and simplify

the

process

of

separating the

men from active

service.

RetiredArmy

aviators

naveledto

Army

airfields at

Bolling,

Selfridge,

MacDill, March,

Mitchel,

Langley,

Eglin,

Maxwell, Barksdale,

and

Rando$h to interview

pilots

and

maintenance

techni-

cians. Similarly,

former

naval aviators went to

Norfo[q San

Diego,

Pensacola,

and

Jacksonville Naval Air Stations, as well as to

Marine Corps

Air

Base

Quantico,

to

talk to interested

personnel.

Prospects

were offered monthly confiacts

ranglng

from

$300

for crew chiefs

and other specialists to

$600

for

officer

pilots.

These figures

were

far in excess of

whatthey

eamedon active duty,

making the money apowerfirl

incentive.

For

exam-

ple,

a staf

sergeant

in

the

Air

Corps eaming

$72

a month

had

his

pay quadrupled.

Most

of

the

pilots

recruited

were ensigls or

second

lieutenants, and

their

pay

more

ttran

doubled.

The three flight leaders selected due to

their extensive

fighter experi-

ence{reg Boyington from

the

Marine

Corps

and James

Howard and John

Newkirk from

the Navy-were otrered

$650

a

month.

Additionally,

each

person

recruited received tavel documents,

a fain ticket

to

the

port

of departure

in

Califomia"

per

diem while

awaiting

tansporcatior5

one

hun-

dred dolla$

for incidentals, a ticket for

passage

by ship to

Burma with

onward

pas-

sage

provided

to China and

five hundred

dollars

in cash

in lizu of

tickets

for retum

tansportation from

China.

In

the event of disability

or death,

CAMCO

would

pay

an amount

equivalent to six months salary to the employee's

beneficiary.

In

retumo

each

employee

agreed

to

perform

the

duties

the

employer

directed.

Each confract

also included

clauses dealingwith early terminationby

ttre

employerfor

due cause,

such

as insubordinatioq

dnrg or alcohol abuse, or

for disabilities

incuned outside

the line

of duty as a result of the employee's misconduct.

Not

writtert but

implied

by the

recnriters,

was a bounry of five hundred dollars

for every

Japanese

airc'raft

destoyed.

Eventually, ninety-nine

pilots

(fifty-nine

naval

aviators, seven

marines, and

thirty-three Army flyers) took

passage

to Asia. Although

a comparable-sized

Air

Corps fighter

unit called

for nearly

one

thousand maintenance

and support

toops,

theAVG hired 184. These line

chiefs, crew chiefs, engine

and

airframe

mechanics,

annorers, radiomen,

propeller

specialists,

parachute

riggers,

photographers,

weath-

l0

AVG

Curtiss

P-40

Not

the

sleekest

fighter

of

the

era,the

P40

stands

as

one

of the

utsung

workhorses

of the

Allied

war

effort in

the

air.

Curtiss

replaced

the

drag inducing

tadial

engine

of

the

P-36

with

the

slim tiquid-cooled

V-IzAllison

engine

that

produced

I

,040

horsepower.

The

P-40

was

designed

for

combat

below

twenty

thousand

feet, putting

tt

ata

distinct

disadv

antagewhen

deating

with more

mod-

ern

courterparts

later

in

the

war. However,

at lower

altitudes,

the P-40

was fast,

particularly

in

a

dive.

At

speeds

above

240knots,

the

P40s

could

outturn

such

nirnble

Japanese

fighters

as

the

Oscar

and

Zero.At

those

speeds,

the lighter

built

Japaner.

ngnt-

ers

could

not

achieve

the

same

roll

rates

as the P-40s,

and

their

ailerons

did

not

work

as

well.

Enormously

rugged,

the P40

absorbed

purishment

that

would

have

downed

a

Japanese

fighter.

If

a

pilot

found

an

adversary

on

his

tail and

fir-

itg,

the

heary

armor

plate

in

the

back

of his

cockpit

seat

often

saved

his life,

but

furning

with

the

Japanese

only

gave

the

enemy

away

to negate

the

advantages

of

the

annor.

The

attackmaneuver

Chennault

taught-a

high-speed

dive

and

a

climb

back

to

altitude

to

set

up another

diving

pass-was

the most

effective

tac-

tic

for

P-40 pilots.

The

initial

varrant

of

the

P-40

the AVG

acquired

was

similar

to the

Tomahawk

that

British

Commonwealth

pilots

flew.

By

the

spring

of

1

942,

the

P-40s

remaining

to

the

AVG

were

badly

battered

from

constant

cornbat, impro-

vised

maintenance,

and

lack

of

spare

parts.

Cherurault's

desperate

appeals

for

replacement

aircraftwere

grudgingly

met

with

a

fickle

of

inrproved

P-40s

that

were

faster

and

had

better

armament.

The

famous

shark

mouths

of the

Flyurg

Tigers

citme

about,

like

much

of the

AVq

somewhat

casually.

A

pilot

saw

a

photograph

with

the

gn*hg,

saw-

toothed

artwork thatbecame

associated

with the

AVG

on a Tomahawk

i1p"qF

No.

l1'2

Squadron.

It,

in

turno

had

been

copied

from

German

Messercchmitt

Bf

110

twin-engine

fighters

used in

earlier

attacks

on Britain.

In

keeping

with

Chinese

fraditions,

eachAVG

P-40

also had

apar

of

eyes

drawn

on

its

nose

above

the

shark

mouth

for

the

plane's

personal

devit

to

see.

Said

pilot

R.

T

Smittl

of

the resulto

"It

looked

mean

as hell.oo

It

was

only

later

that

the

AVG

became

the Flying

Tigers.

Back

in

the

United

States,

the

Washington

Squadron,

as ttre

group

with Thomas

Corcoran

and

Dr.

T.V.

Soong

was

known,

believed

that

publicity

was

a

crucial

compo-

nent

to

the

success

of the

AVG

operation.

They

approached

the

Walt Disney

Company

about

designing

an insignia,

not

aware

of the

new

shark

artwork

on

the

AVG's

fighters,

Disney produced

the

now

famous

logo

of a

winged

Bengal

Tigerjumping

through

a

stylized

V

for

Victory

symbol.

The

press

pickeA

up

the

story

and

the

first

published

account

using

the

term

Flying

Tigers

appeared

on

Decembet

27

in

the

year's

last

edition

of

Time

magazine,

a week

after

the

AVG's

first

conrbat

on

December

20,

1941,

Distinctive

shark-mouthed

P40s.

The

P-40E

(bottom)

had

more

armirment

and

a

more

powerftrl

engine

with

a

larger

nose

air

intake.

ennen,

clerks,

and

orderlies

proved

to

be

the backbone

of

the

group throughout

its

brief existence.

The

AVG volunteers

had

many

reasons

to set

sail

for

the

unknown

in

the

fall

of

1941.

Some,

like

Navy weathermen

Allen

Fritzlce,

Donald

Whelpley,

and

Randall

Richardson,

volunteered

to escape

the

boredom

of

a

peacetime

routine.

Yeoman

T2

TomTrumble

had

done

aprevious

tour in Shanghai aboardthe

cruiserlJSS Augusta

and left

a Russian

girlfriend

behind.

He

joined

the AVG

to 0y to find her again.

Forthe

officers,

the motives

rangd from

boredom or a chance to

prove

them-

selves in

combat,

to escaping

from

a bad assignment, orto improvingbad financial

situations.

Greg Boyington

was in the latter

category.

Having

gone

through a

painftl

divorce and reqponsible

for an ex-wife and

several small children, he had

ruined his

credit and incurred

substantial

debb, and the

Marine

Corps

had

orde,red

him

to

submit amonthly

report

to his

comrnander on

howhe

accounted forhis

pay

in

settling those

debts.

Another

Marine,

Chuck Older,

wanted to

find

out how

good

a fighter

pilot

he

was in

combat. Recruited

from

Quantico,

Olderhadread avidly ofAmericans serv-

ing in

the Royal

Air Force

during the Battle of Britain. He

wanted

to

see

for himself

what

combat was like

and felt

that ttre

Unit€d States

might nwer

enterthe conflict.

David L.

"Tet''

Hill,

a Navy

dive

bomber

pilot

who

had

senred on the aircraft cani-

ers

USS

^Sarafoga

and

USS Rnnger,wantdto fly fighters. TheAVG

offered him an

opporhmity

to

do

just

that while

adding a dose of adve,lrture and almost tipling his

ensign's

pay.

Hill

said that he

could not resist the temptation. Air

Corps

pilot

Charles

Bond

had

the

boring

job

of ferrying

bombers

fresh from

the

factories

up to

Canadian

bases. He

volunteered

because

of

the lure

of adventure

in

a

foreigr

coun-

0y,

a chance

to satisfy his

dream

to

get

into fighters,

and an opportunity to eam

money

to buy his

parents

a home. The rest

of the

AVG memb€rs'motives ran

the

gamut

from

a spirit

of adventure in

the

mysterious Far

East to simple financial

gain.

Tbaining

a Fighter

Grcup for

Combat

Chennault had

expected

the aircraft,

supplies,

and

personnel

to

be

in

place

by

the

spring

of

1941,

but the fnst

group

ofAVG volunteers did

not

sail

from

San

Francisco

until June 1941.

This

group got

to Rangoon inAogust, while the last con-

tingent

of

personnel

arrived in

Novenrber. Chennault originally had

planned

to base

them at Kunming,

deep in the interior

of China and safe from

Japanese

reconnais-

sance flights

and bombing

attacks. However,

because of the delays

in

putting

the

AVG

together,

the first

group

arrived

at

the height

of the

monsoon

seasor! and the

dirt strip at Kunming

was a river

of

mud.

Chennault

managed

to convince the

British Royal

Air Force

to let him

use the Kyedaw auxiliary field" 175 miles north

of

Rangoon,

as his

taining

base while the Chinese

ground

rock and

paved

the

Kunming

runwaybyhand.

Kyedaw,

just

norttr

of

Toungoo,

Burm4 featured a rare asphalt runway, one that

was four

thousand

feet long,

but that was about ib only

positive

atfribute. The living

quarters

were

several

miles away from

the

flight line

and consisted of open bay bar-

racks

with large

sloping

roofs and

the top third of each wall open

for

air circulation.

Unforhrnately,

the

openings

were

not

screend

giving

native

creatures access to the

barracks. The

men

slept

under

mosquito

netting and were sometimes awakened by

rats

falling

from the

overhead

beams onto the netting or by someone shooting a

cobra

that had

entered the

barracks.

13

ies.

At first,

assembly

went very

slowly, with the language

barrier between an

English-qpeaking

management

and a mainly Chinese

workforce contibuting to the

slow

pace.

The

few

words

each side knew

of

the

other's language did not always

suffice for

the complex

ideas

and technical

jargon

necessary

in aviation

Once ttre

concepb

were

understood,

however, assenrbly

speededup, as the Chinese workers

proved

efficient

and industious.

.

After the

complete

assenrbly

of each airframe, the P40

was tested and any

remaining

faults adjusted.

Once signed

off,

the AVG

sent a

pilot

down from

Kyedaw

to

ferry the

fighter

back. The

pilots

were told

to

look

foi

the railroad and

follow

it north.

They

dubbed

ttris style of navigation

as IF&

"I

follow railroads."

In the

meantime,

the

harsh

conditions and the

probability

of actually fighting

caused nearly

a

dozenAVG

ernployees

to

rethink

their situation. Eight

pilob

and

several

ground

crew members

went to Chennault and resigned. He

sigredtheirter-

mination

papers,

calling

them

dishonorable discharges, stating that he

would rather

be short-handed

with men

who

wanted to fight and do their

job

than to keep

mal-

contents

around

to spread

their morale-sapping

complaine.

Ofthe

ones who

did stay,

Chennault had a mixed bag

oftalent.

He

had wanted

men

in their

mid-20s

with a minimum

of several hundred hours

in

pursuit

airsraft,

but he

had

only a few

ofthose. The

experience ranged from

just

out of flying school

to

Navy

patol

plane

pilots

with

thousands

of

hours in lumbering

flyi4g boats that

had

onlythe

element

of flight in

commonwiththe P40.

The

youngest

pilot,

Henry

Gilbert, was fresh from

eaming his naval aviator

wings at Pensacola

when he

arrived in Burma in

October 1941. The oldest of

Chennault's

combat

pilots

was Louis Hoffinano

who

got

his Navy wings in 1929

and had

almost as

many flying

hours as

Chennault. With such a broad mix of expe-

rienceo

Chennault revised

his

plans

for intoducing

the AVG to combat.

If

they had

been all

experienced

fighter

pilob,

he would have start€d directly

with combat

taining.

hstead

he had

to conduct classes on how to fly in formation

and

how to fight

in the

P-40. He

told them of the P-40's ability to dive

and the

heavy

punch

of the two

nose-mounted

.50-caliber machineguns and compared

its

stengths against

the

Japanese

aircraft they would face.

The

Japanese

fighters

were much more manzuverable

than the P-4Os,

particu-

larly at

slow

qpeeds,

but their

manzuverability

came at the

price

of structural weak-

ness,

a lack of

armor for

the

pilot

and engine, and unprotected fuel tanks. Chennault

endlesslyrepeatedhis

emphasisnottotumwiththe

enemy,butratherto dive athigh

speed,

open

fire at long

range

with the .50-caliber

guns,

then add in the lighter

weight

wing

guns

as the

range

closed. After diving, the

pilots

were instructed to

zoom

past

the taryet

if it had

not been

desfioyed, then

pull

up sharpty, and climb to

repeatthe

attack.

Chennault

pointed

out the

wlnerable areas ofthe Japanese bombers most like-

ly

to be encountered.

Like

most

Japanese aircraft

of

the time, their range and

bomb

capacity

were achieved

by no

protection

for the

crew or

the

fuel tanks. Consequent-

ly, when

attacked they

caught

fire

easily.

The

early

experiences

of theAVG

drove Chennault almost to despalr, despite

the classroom

education

ofhis

pilots.

They

started slowly with cockpit checks, then

15

to

familiarization flights---+ritical for leaming both

the

P-40 and the

local area

asi

see,n from above---to aerobatics and

mock

combat.

To

gle

theAVG

practice

attacks against

bornbers,

the

RAF occasionally

sent

up one oftheir

few Bristol Blenheim light

bomben

based

at

Mingadalon.

TheAVG

would

practice

high-speed

attacks, seeking

to

find the best

approach

to

kill a

Japanese bomber while avoiding

the retum fire from

its defensive

guns.

For

fighter-versus-fighter

practice,

they used each other.

Going

up

in a flight of

two, the opposing

pilots

would

fly

to their

respective comeni

and

commence

a full-

throttle, head-on attack to experie,nce the time comp'ression

so cornmon

in combat

reports that describe how

quickly

events seem

to happen.

It was during

one

of these

mock attacks thattheAVG suffered

its fint

casualty.

Gil Brighq a former Navy dive bomber

pilot

flew

against

another

Navy

pilot

John

Armstong. Each held his course urtil a

mid-air collision

seemed

inevitable,

the

premise

being

that in

comba!

the thumb-size bullets

of

the

P-40's .50s would

destoy the

light-weight

Japanese

adversary long before

the

aircraft closed.

Bright

rolled right,

expecting

Armstrong to also roll right,

and the

planes

should

have

passedbellytobelly.Armstong,

however,

didnotrollright.

Heheldhis

groundand

his

left wing chopped offBright's

left

wing.

Bright was

thrown clear

of the

spinning

wreckage of his fighter, but

Armsfiong

was

not. The

AVG recovered

the body

from

the cockpit and buriedArmstong with

honors in the local

British cemetery.

TWo more

pilots

were

killed in

quick

succession,

but due

to

inexperience

flying

the

P-40

and

not mock

combat. One

man

got

himself

into an

inverted

flat spin and

couldnot

recover,

while the otherpilot overstessed

the

aircraft

during

apost-main-

tenance test

flight

and

pulled

the

tail

offhis Curtiss

fighter.

Too low to bail

out,

he

perished"

and both

men

were buried alongside

their comrade.

Besides the loss of P-40s due to Chennault's

realistic

taining

regime,

the AVG

had a

series of blunders

and mishaps committed by

both

pilots

and

ground

crews.

In

early

November 1941, a former Navy Catalina

flying boat

pilot

named

Edwin

Conantfiiedlandingthemuch

smallerC\rtiss fighterfromthe

same altitudehenor-

mally

did

in the

Catalina,

about twenty feet

too high.

The

plane

stalled,

then

dropped

from

about twenty-five

feet. It

bounced

once,

the

main

landing

gear

col-

lapsed"

and the

fighter

spun around

to

stop

in a cloud ofdust.

Two

days

later,

Novemba 3,1941,

Conant did

the same

thing,

popping

a

tire

from the

exteme drop.

He

ground-looped

this time

and wound

up offthe

end

of the

nrnway.

The

day became

known as

"Circus

Day''by

the

AVG since

Conant's

mishap

was

just

the

first

of an

incredible run

of

accidents.

Following

Conant's

land-

ing,

another Catalina driver

landed

too

high,

collapsed

the

landing

gear,

and wound

up offthe runway with the beilly, wing,

and

propeller

severely

damaged.

Sandy

Sandell, an experienced P-40

pilot,

then

ground-looped on his

landing.

Chennaulthad seen enough and called

a halt to flying

forthe

day, ordering

the

remaining

planes

dispersed to avoid

having

them

all

parked

together

and vulnerable

to a

Japanese bombing

raid. However, the chaos continued.

Acrew

chief taxied

his

aircraft

into

a second

P-40,

chewing

up that machine's

right

aileron.

Another crew

chief did

the

same, except the damage consisted

of

two damaged

propellers and a

shock-damaged engine. A third

man

built up

too much

speed while

taxiing

and

t6

Iil

liiiiiiiiii

CAMCO

repair

facility

at Loiwing,

China.

stood

the

fighter

on its nose

when he

applied the brakes,

damaging another

propeller

and

engine.

In

the

final

accident

of this

My,a

mechanic

on a

bicycle,

watching

one

ofthe

instead

ofwhere he was

going,

crashed

into the

wing ofyet

another

P-40,

breaking

its

aileron. TWo

days Later,

Conant

nearly

desfroyed a third

P-40

and

received

a

good

deal

ofkidding

about becoming alapanese ace

if

he

con-

tinued

wrecking

aircraft.

Aganintronally,

Chennault formed

the

group

into a headquarters

section and

three

squadrons.

Each

squadron

leader

picked

the men in his

squadron,

almost

like

forming

teams

for

a

saod-lot

baseball

game.

The lstAVG Pursuit

Squadron,

led

by

Robert

"Sandy"

SandelI,

a former

Air

Corps

pilot

recruited

from

Ma:rwell

Field,

consisted

of a mixed

goup

of Army

and Navy

pilots.

The lst

Pursuit became the

Adam

and

Eve

squadron,

after mankind's

first

pursuit,

ffid

carried

a

green

apple

on

the

side

of

the

fuselage.

They

originally

painted

a red apple,

but Chennault said it

looked

too

much

like

the

Japanese

Rising

Sun synrbol and could

lead

to confusion

in

combat.

Former

Navy

fighter

pilot

Jack Newkirk

led

the 2dAVG Pursuit Squadron

and

picked

all Narry

pilots.

They

named

their

squadron the Panda Bears in

deference to

their

employer's

native

wildlife

and

painted

the

black and white animal's likeness

on

each

of their

P40s.

The

3d AVG

Pursuit

Squadron,

with

all

Army

pilots,

was rlrder

the

command

ofArvid

Olson,aP40

pilotrecruited

from Mitchel Field. The

squadronbecame the

Hell's

fuigels,

after

the

World

War

I movie

of the same name,

using

a stylued red

outline

of the

female

form

with a halo

and angel's wings.

Maj.

Gen. Henry

'oHapt"

Arnold,

chief of

the Air

Corps,

had flatly refused

to

grve

up any

ofhis

experienced

staffofficers, knowing

that theAir

Corps

would need

t7

them desperately as it began the buildup

prior

to

the war.

Chennault

asked

for six,

pleaded

for three, and finally, nearly begged

forjust one.

Arnold

rebuffed

him at

everyttlnr

Chennault at

first

servedas

his own stafl

planning

everything

fromlogistics

to

operations to

gathering

and dissuninating

intelligence.

He acquired

a few stays

from aroundAsi4

including reserrre naval officer and

newspaper

columnist

Joseph

Alsop. Alsop served as Chennault's zupply officer

for nearly

five months,

but

was

caught in

Hong

Kong scrounging

supplies when the Japanese

occupied

it.

The

poorlytainedAVG

staffputatemendousburden

on Chennault.

Not only

didhe have to comrnand the

flyers, he also hadto

plan

each

attaclg

constantly

bad-

ger

the U.S.

govemment

for

promised

supplies

and

reinforcements,

and

maintain

communication and cooperation with

the

Chinese

government

and

the

British

forces in Burma.

Inevitably, many items fell through

the cracl<s,

and

much of the

standard

planning

common to other U.S.

forces lacked the

detail

others thought

nec-

essary

for success. Chennault

gave

most of

his

orders

verbally,

and

the AVG

almost

always tanslated them into successful action.

After the monsoon

season ended

in late November,

the base

at

Kunming was

ready to handle aircraft. The

pilots prepared

their

aircraft

to fly the six

hundred

miles from Burma to Kunming,

while

the

ground

staffplanned

to follow

with all

the

parts

and

equipment

in

tuck convoys up

the Burma

Road.

The events

of the

fint

weekend

in December, howevero

changed

all these

plans.

FlyingTigers atWar

On

December

7

,

lg4l,the American Volunteer Group

had nearly

eighty

pilots

and sixty-two combat-ready

P40s,

with

the rest of

the initial one

hundred

aircraft

either written offin accidents or still waiting

on

installation of

machineguns

or

radios. Twenty

pilots

still were

not

checked out

in either

the

P-40 or Chennault's

tacticso

and Chennault

refused to let a man fly until

he was satisfied

the new

pilot

could

handle

both the Chrtiss

fighter and

combat.

This

discipline

probably

saved

lives

since theAVG suffered

relatively few combat

losses.

Much like today's RED

FLAG

exercises

held at the vast

faining

ranges

near

Nellis Air Force

Base,

Nevada, Chennault's

intense taining

meant

combat

was

not

such a shock and his small

force

was

more

efective

from

the

first combat

mission.

It also meant his

pilots

had a better chance of surviving

to

fight another

day.

Chennault found out about the Japanese attack

on

Pearl Harbor

nearly sevur

houn after it happened. He took

immediate

steps

to

put

the

AVG on

a war

footing,

placing

one squadron on

ready

status

with the

pilots

prepared

for an immediate

scranrble.

He readied

a second squadron

for support ofthe

first and diqpersed

the

final

squadron

to an

outlying

affield as his reserve.

In

addition to

the

devastating

Pearl Harbor attack,

Japanese

forces also stuck

the

Philippines,

destoying

most

of

the

U.S.

air forces

there and

hit

hard at British

facilities in

Malaya and Singapore.

Most important for the

AVG

the Japanese

stuck

talgets

in Thailand

and

Burma.

l8

Gqods headed for China over the Burma Road came

through

the

port

of

Rangoon;

and the Chinese, the British"

and Chennault

all

knew that the

port

was

vihllyimporhntto

keeping

China srpplied.As

torturous astheBurmaRoadwas,

it

was the only overland route

available for war material

to keep China

fighting. Thus,

the loss

of Rangoon could have meant the loss of China

as well. Thailand

sulren-

dered

on Decernber 10, and the

Japanese

immediately assembled

their

forces for an

assault

on Burma.

Coordinating with the RAF,

Chennault sent

the Hell:s

Angels to Mingadalon

airdrome, not

far from Rangoon, to bolster the RAF's single

squadron of

Brewster

Buffalo

fighters. Simultaneously, he

ordered

the two other

squadrons

to fly to

Kunming.

The AVG's first offensive action

was

a reconnaissance

mission. Chennault

borrowed an aerial

camera

from

the RAF and mounted

it in a compartrrent

behind

a P-40's cockpit. He had

a hole cut in the belly and stipped

the

plane

of armatnent

and amor,

creating an

instant

photo

reconnaissance

aircraft that

Erik Shilling flew

over Bangkok, Thailand.

The

photographs

showed both

docks and

airfields cov-

ered with

Japanese equipment and

personnel.

The first

cornbat action soon followed.

On

December

20, Japanese

bombers

attacked

the AVG base at Kunming. Receiving advance

notice of the

raid from the

Chinese wanring net, Chennault launched both squadrons,

se,nding JackNewkirk's

Panda Bears to

the expected interception

point

and Sandell's

Adam

and Eves to a

supporting

area west of the expected combat ainpace.

According

to Chennault in his

post-war

memoirs:

This was the decisive mome,nt

I

had

been

awaiting

for more than

four

years-American

pilots

inAmerican fighter

planes

aided by

a Chinese

ground

waming net

about

to tackJe aformation

of the

Imperial

Japanese Air Force, which was

then sweeping

the

Pacific skies victorious everywhere. I

felt that the fate of China

was riding

in the P-40 cockpits tbrough

the wintery sky of

Yunnan

[the

Chinese

province

in which Kunming

was located].

I

yearnedheartily

to be tenyears

younger

and crouchedin

a cock-

pit

instead

of a dugout tasting the

stale rubber

of

an orygen mask

and

peering

ahead into limitless

space

through

the

cherry-red

rings

ofa

gunsight

He was disappointed in

ttris first combat e,ncounter by

ttre AVG

After a few brief

radio

ffansmissions

by

the Panda Bears,

he heard

no more and

in frustrationn

ordered Sandell's

squadron to

head to

the bombers'probable

retum route.

After

some tense minutes, the

pacing

Chennault and the Chinese

heaxd

gunfte

some dis-

tance

away and the heavier

explosions ofbombs.

Shortly thereafter,

Newkirk returned with his

squadron. They

had sighted

the

formation of ten twin-engine

bombers thirty miles southeast

of

Kunming.

The

bombers also

sighted ttre fight€rs, th€n

jettisoned

their

payloads

and tumed

tail, div-

ing to

pick

up speed. Uncertain and hesitating, the fighters

lost

precious

seconds

in

T9

identiffing the

bombers

as the enemy. The fleeing

Japanese

put

those

seconds

to

good

use

and

outdistanced

the P-40s.

Sandell's squadron also

reacted

badly.

The

sight

of

the escaping

prey

made

the

AVG

pilots

forget all

their

training. Instead

of

a disciplined,

diving

attack

with

an

intact leader

and wingman element, the

excited

pilots

flew

individually

into

the

melee.

They tried near-impossible shots and agreed

later that

only

luck

had

kept

them from either colliding

with

each

other or

shooting

each

other

down.

However,

they downed three

of

the

bombers and damaged

others,

some

crashing

as

they

returned home. Ed Rector

chased

the

Japanese

too long

before

turning back

and

ran

out of

gas.

He

belly-landed in a

rice

paddy,

but was

uninjrned.

Immediately

after the last P-40 landed, Chennault

gathered

all

the

pilots

together to

debrief the

action. Blaming

the

lack

of

results,

particularly

by

Sandell's

squadron, on

excitement,

he

once agaLnsfiessed

the

need

for flight

discipline,

taking

advantage

of the P40's

speed

advantage from a dive,

and

the need

to set up

for

another

attack

This attackwas

the

last

action in China

for

some

time, but

the Flying

Tigers

were about to

join

the RAII

in

the fight for Rangoon

in Burma.

At

Mingadalon,

the

Brewster

Buffaloes

of

the IL{Ii's

67 Squadron

parked

at the

northern

end of

the air-

field's

north-south

nxlway, while the

AVG

used

the eastern

end

of

the

intersecting

east-west runway. At first, the

two units did

not

share

much

in

the way

of opera-

tional intelligence

or communications. Pleas

by

Chennault

for the

British

radio

fre-

quencies

went unanswered, and the RAF ignored

the

frequencies

the

AVG used.

Likewise,

any limited

advance warning

provided

by

the

British

radio direction

find-

ing

equipment

generally

was

not relayed to the AVG

The

dust

raised

by the Buffalos taking offusually

was

the AVG's

first indica-

tion

of

an incoming

raid.

The

AVG would then start

their

engines

and

take off,

somehow

avoiding the RAF fighters flying from the other

rutway.

This

was the

situation on

Decenfier 23, 1941. Seeing

the

British

launch,

Olson's

squadron

followed

suit, finally receiving a

nondescriptive

radio call

that

the

"enemy

is

approaching from the

east:"

In fact, the bombers

and escorts

completed

their bomb run

on

Rangoon's

docks before the

AVG

pilots

sighted

tklem.

The AVG

pilots

flew into

the Japanese formation,

downing

six,

but

losing

two

planes

and

pilots,

while the

RAF failed

to make contact.

This first

raid on Rangoon

turned

the

crty

into bedlam.

Refugees

attempting

to

get

out of Rangoon

poured

into the

sfeets.

The native

Burmese

population,

never

happy

with their

colonial

masters,

the British,

rioted.

Massive

fires,

looting, ffid

killing followed.

The AVG

cooks

fled, forcing the 3d Squadron

to live on

a diet

of

stale bread and

canned beer

fbr

several

days.

TWo

days

hater, for

a Christnas

present,

the Japanese

sent

flights of

bombers

and fighters

to finish

offRangoon.

LarHrching from

fropical

temperatures

and

high

humidity,

the

pilots

soon

forHrd

themselves

shivering

from the

rapidly chilling

sweat

on their

skin.

Achieving

a height advantz3e, theAVG

finally

put

into

practice

Chennault's tactic

of diving, firing their healy .50-caliber

guns

as

they attacked.

Olson radioed

Chennault the news that they had downed

fifteen

ofthe

bombers

and

nine

fighters, losing

only

two atcraft

in the exchange

(both

AVG

pilots

sunrived

2T

::i

:'r:::i:

: :':::

F,:'':,l

iii;'i:,"i"

:!iii:iiiitlliti:fi

m.1i1.;..'.l...i..,rlliii...'.;...1ffi...l...i.l',iuiiili,ffl:E

and

were

soon

back in

action).

The RAF

put

up sixteen

Buffaloes, claimed seven

Japanese,

but

lost

nine

aircraft

and

six

pilots.

Following this

fight,

however, the

Hell's

Angels

could

only muster

eleven serviceable

P40s.

Olson

requested rein-

forcements,

and

Chennault

obliged

by sending

the

Panda Bears to relieve him.

The

IL{Ii's

cooperation

increased

dramatically

after

this fight. Frequencies

were

shared, rations provided,

and

a

means

of

annoulcing a scramble by

ringing

a

salvaged

ship's

bell made

the

RAII

and AVG

partrrers

in

the defense

of

Rangoon.

The

Allied

air commander

in

the

theater,

RAII

Group Captain

Manning,

compared

the results

of the first

two

Japanese raids to the defense of Great

Britain in the

autumn

of 1940.

Despite

their losses

in

the

au.,

Japanese

grortrd

forces

crossed

into

Burma

from

Thailand

and

advanced

on Rangoon,

ultimately dooming

the

city. While

the

pilots

fought

like

tigers in

the

au', aLlthe

other

men worked on

the

docks to salvage every-

thing

they

could

thatwould

help

the

rurit stay

in

the fight. TheAVG

stood

its

ground,

sending

up

increasingly

battered P40s

against Japanese

formations

thateventually

containedaratro

of three

escorts for

each bornber.

A Long

Sluggrng

Match

With

the

arrival

of

the

2dsquadro

n

atRangoon,

the

Tigers

went

on

the offen-

sive.

On

January

3, 1942,

four

P40s

took

offfor

the

Japanese-occupied

Thailand

base

of

Tak,

nearly

I70

miles

from

Rangoon.

Bert

Christman turned back

with

engine trouble,

but Jack

Newkirk,

James

Howard, and Tex Hill

continued on.

They

circled

past

the target

arcato

have

the

sun behind

them and

make

the Japanese anti-

arqaft gunners'

job

more

difficult. The field was crammed

with

nearly

a

dozen

22

Pilots

of

the

AVG

2d

Squadron

Panda Bears

in

front of a

P-40.

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fighters,

some

with

propellers

turning

over

in

preparation

for a

mission oftheir

own.

In fact,

three

fighters

had already taken

offand

were

orbiting

over

the

field.

Hill,

intent

on

the massed

group

on the

ground

and

preoccupied

with seeing

the

enemy

planes

on

the

grorHrd,

did

not look

for

enemy

fighters

and

followed

Howard

into his

strafing run.

Newkirk

saw the airborne

enemy

fighters

and

turned

into them,

shooting one down

Howard

also was so

focused

on

his

sfafing

nm

thathe

was utaware

that

he

had

a

Japanese

fighter

on

his

tail.

Hill

saw

it

and

pulled

arourd

as

quickly

as

he

coul{

fir-

ing

as

he

went.

He

did

not

eh,

but used

the fracers

like

a

garden

hose, spraying

as

he

turned.

Howard

completed

his

strafing

run,

which

produced

a

large explosion,

then

made

another

run.

Pulling

up,

his

engine caught

a

burst

of

fire

from the

grorurd

and

quit.

He

turned

to belly

land

on the strip

he had

just

finished

strafing,

but

his

engine

caught again and

he

climbed slowly away. Newkirk

and

Hill

had already

departed

the

area

due

to the

heary

grorxrd

fire,

leaving

Howard

with

a

lonely

flight

home.

Hill

and Newkirk were credited with aerial

victories

and

Howard wittr

destroying

four

fighters

on

the

ground.

This

surprise

raid had

been successful, but ttre

Japanese

retaliated

the

next My,

sending a dawn attack against the dispersal

fields used

by

the

P\AII and

the

AVG

Instead

of

keeping

the

fighters

on

Mingadalon, the

AVG

flew all of

them

each

night

to

several arxiliary

fields that had

been hastily consfructed

after

the war

began.

The

Japanese attack

did

little

damage,

but

the

AVG was rurable

to

reach

a

position

to

attackand

the bornbers escaped rurscathed.

At noon,

the story was

different.

The

AVG and

RAF

had

resettled

for the day's

alert

duty

at

Mingadalon,

when the

Japanese

attacked

again.

Fourteen

planes

of

the

2d

squadron

got

offthe

grorHrdo

but they were ovenvhelmed

by

the Japanese.

Three

P-40s

were

shot down, with

the

pilots

all suffering

various

degrees

of

injury, but

alive,

while only one Japanese

fighter

was

claimed.

This

was

the

only

encourter

GrorHrd crew of

the AVG

3d Squadron

Hells

Angels

in front of

a

P40.

23

between

the AVG

and the Japanese in

which the Japanese shot down

more

aircraft

than they lost.

Thatnight,

the Japanese returned.

Althoughtheywere

poornight

fighters, three

P-40s

took offto intercept

the raid. Their

pilots,

with no contoller to

guide

them

and

only visual

means

of

locating

the

Japanese,

achieved

poor

results, to no one's

surprise. TheAVG

was forbnate

to

safely

land all three fighten without damage.

Trro

nights

later,

pilot

Pete

Wright would

not

be

so lucky. Taking offat 3:30

a.m.,

he failed

to locate

the Japanese

bornbers even after opening

his

canopy

to lis-

ten. He

finally

tied to retum

to base

guided

by

the lights of vehicles lining the run-

way. Whur he

lowered his

landing

gear,

he

was sprayed with

hydraulic fluid. He

stuck his head

out the

side of his

coclqit to avoid the oil

and hit the

ground

in a left

skid. The landinggearbuckledunderthe

side loadandcollapsed, theP-40 skidding

to a

stop against

a Chevrolet

sedan

parked

to the side of the runway, slamming

Wright's face

into the

windshield. Although

bloody and battered Wright was

more

fortunate

than

pilot

Ken

Merritt,

who was

in

the Chevrolet.

Merritt

was

killed

instantly

in

the itnpact

and

joined

the others laid to

rest in

the

British

cemetery.

So

it

went for

most

of January 1942.T\e Japanese launched

raid

after

raid,

slowly and

methodically

reducing

the

port

cryacity of Rangoon,

Time

after time,

the

diminishing number

of

P-40s

and RAF Buffaloes tackled the seemingly limit-

less number

of Japanese fighten

and

bombers.

What theAVG

did not know

was that ttreirunexpected defbnbe

ofRangoon had

seriously

disrupted

the

Japanese timetable for conquering Burma and invading

India. The

Japanese

were not

able to knock

out

Rangoorl and a tickle

of

supplies

continued

into

China. Japanese

aviation losses forced a halt to bombing operations

for nearly

two

weeks in

January

until those

losses

were

made

good.

The replace-

ments

hadbeen

destined for

Japanese

ofensives

in

China

and India;

without

that air

support, the

Japalnese had

to slow

their advances on the

gound.

At Kunming,

almost

a

backwater compared to

Rangoon,

the

pilots

grew

increasingly

bored

and

ftNfated at the lack

of

action. Eleven

pilots

resigned, and

the unwavering

Chennault

gave

them

dishonorable

discharges from the organiza-

tion. Finally,

on January 24,1942,

the

lst

squadron

was ordered to relieve the

valiant

but depleted,2d

squadron

at Rangoon.

For the

next month,

the

grim

slugging match between the

AVG

pilots

and the

Japanese

continued.

In the

air, the ragged P-40s continued attacking bomber and

fighter formations,

but the

scarcity

of supplies and

replacement

parts

reduced the

number

of

sorties that

could be flown. Tires

wore completely bald and often blew

on

landing.

Battery

plates

grcw

so thin that they would

not hold

a charge for more

than

a

few

houn.

The

crew chiefs

and support technicians

performed

miracles

of

improvisation

in

gettrng

the fighters

ready to fly, but

if

any of the

lst

squadron

planes

had

been on

U.S. military

bases, they would

have

been deemed unflyable.

In

the middle

of

February,

five

PanAmAirlines flying boats landed at Calcutt4

India,

with ttrc first

shipment

ofparts and

supplies

theAVG had received in its

eight

months

of existence.

Tires,

batteries,

propellers, gun

switch solenoids, oxygenbot-

tles, and

ammunition

all arrived

just

in time

to

keep the Tigers'claws

sharp

for

a

lit-

tle longer.

24

By the

end of

February,

the Japanese

grorurd

advance

win

only

twenty

miles

from Rangoon,

where

all

social order

had

ceased,

making

the vital

supply

scroung-

ing

trips to the

dock

area

dangerous endeavors.

At the end

the

month,

the

British

ordered an evacuation.

Their few remaining Buffaloes

flew

north to

near the

old

Tigers'base

at Kyedaw. The AVG lst

squadron

also

left

Rangoon,

settling

in at

a

field near Magrve,

Burma.

Meanwhile,

the two squadrons at

Krlrming

had

suffered

a

loss of

five

aircraft

on

a

single

flight. Following

a

formal

dinner

and

presentation

of

awards

from

Generalissimo

Chiang and

his

wife,

P40s

were

assigned

as escorts

for the

return

flight

of

the

dignitaries

in their Douglas DC-2 transport.

Former

Marine

Greg

Boyington

led

the escort

ftight for nearly

two

hours

into steadily

worsening

head-

winds and

clouds.

Eventually, his flight

became

separated

from the

DC-2, which

was

providing

navigation.

Boyington

turned

his fighters

around to

head

back

to

Krurming,

but

got

lost.

With

gim gauges

on empty,

the flight

descended

into the clouds,

hoping

not to

fly

into

a

mountain.

Breaking

out

just

above the

peaks,

they spotted

a cemetery

the

only

relatively flat

piece

of

grourd

within

reach.

All five

pilots

made belly

landings

and

escaped

trrharme{ but

the

same could

not

be

said oftheir

aircraft.

Returning on

foot

the two hrurdred miles

back

to Kunming took

nearly a week.

Chennault,

need-

less

to say, was

upset

at the

loss

of

a

significant

portion

of

his

inventory.

Boyington

made

good

at least

part

of the

loss.

Taking a

few

mechanics

back

to

the

site of the crashes,

he managed

to

repair

two of the

P40s well

enough

for

flight

and took

everything, except

the

skins, off the

totally wrecked

P-40s that

could

be

used to repair

aircraft back at

Kunming. To lighten the

flyable

aircr:aft,

they stipped

them

of their armament, armor

plating,

ffid anything

not

required

for basic

flight.

Boyington

loaded

each

fighter

with

only

thifty

gallons

of

gas

and

had the

grourd

crew hold the tail

up

in ahonzontal

position.

He

held the brakes

while

he ran the

engine to

full throffle, then signaled the crew to

let

go.

In

both

takeoffs,

he raced

toward

the sheer

drop

at the edge

ofthe cemetery.

In a

masterfrrl display

of

flying,

he

dropped down the side

of

the

mourtain,

using

the dive

to build

up spee4

then

flew to

abetter fieldurtrere

the

P40

couldbe

filledwith

enough

gas

to

getbackto Kunming.

Back in Burma,

the situation went from

bad

to

worse.

The

field at

Magwe

had

no

early warning

ability, no facilities,

and

no

protection

for the crews

or

planes.

Furthermore,

the

Japanese

had

modified their tactics.

Instead of

sending

bomber

formations

surrourded by a

large number

of

fighters and

nytng

to slug

it

out

with

the

Flying

Tigers,

they sent

high

altitude

reconnaissance

planes

to determine

when

the AVG

was on the

grorlrd.

Chennault

knew

that

one strrprise

raid

on

Magwe would

finish

his fighters

there,

so

he

also changed tactics.

He

directed the

squadron

to send

two

and

three

plane

pafiols

to

raid

the advance

Japanese

fields,

including

their

new

possession

at

Mingadalon,

to thwart enemy aircraft

buildup

and

to

lessen the

chance

of

a surprise

attack

on

the

AVG Meanwhile, he

sent

the

3d squadron

to

replace the

lst

squadron,

which

had

been

facing

combat

for nearly

three

months without

respite.

On

March 19, I942,two

pilots

from

the 3d squadron

flew

more than

250

miles

from

Magwe

to the enemy base at

Moulmein, far

beyond

what

the Japanese

thought

25

Stilwell

at first

attempted

to

stem ttre

advancing Japanese

in Burma. Brutally

repulsed,

Stilwell

retreated

with

his

forces,

leading a

gnreling

forced march of

120

miles

through

unmapped,

thick

jungle

into lndia. For a

young

man, this was an

impressive

task. For

a man

of

60, Stilwell's

effort was

incredible.

Stilwell

wanted

the AVG

to fly

low-level reconnaissance

missions

over

the

fighting,

ffid

Generalissimo

Chiang wanted it to fly

grorurd-attack

missions again^st

tlre

Japanese.

Tlained

and

orgarrmed

as a fighter interceptor unit

and not

in

close air

strpport,

the

pilots

still urdertook

these

missions. However,

in aneabmutiny within

the

AVG

the weary

pilots

presented

a

petition

to

Chennault

threatening to resign en

masse

ifhe

continued

ordering these

missions.

Chennault

quelled

the

mutiny, but

at

ttre

expense

of relations

with

Stilwello

who thought

that

Chennault

should simply

order

his

civilian

pilots

to

comply

with their

orders.

In

April,

Chennault

agreed to

be recalled

into the Army

as a colonel.

One

week

later,

he

was

promoted

to brigadier

general,

but

Bissell was

promoted

a day sooner

to

keep

him

senior to

Chennault.

Earlier,

before

the

war

started, Chennault

had

offered to return

to active

duty, but had

been

rebuffed by

Gen. George

C.

Marshall,

Army

Chief of Stafl

and

General Arnold.

Now, however, the situation was

differ-

ent.

The

Army

Air Forces

thought

it

could

get

a

combat-proven

fighter

group

in

place

by

absorbing

the

AVG and

its

equipment, but the

pilots

objected.

Although

they

had

been

released from

ttreir respective

services

and

taken

up

a

confract

with a

foreign

government,

they

believed

they had been

grraranteed

reen@

back

to their

original

service.

Moreover,

China had

bought and

paid

for the alrplanes and equip-

ment

as

well as

the

salaries of the

AVG

Chennault,

when

finally notified

of the

plan,

explained

to

Washington

that the

men

would

not

allow themselves

to

be arbitrarily drafted into

the AnhyAir Forces.

First,

most

of the

pilots

came from

the Narry

or

Marine

Corps

ffid, if

forced,

pre-

fened

to

return

to

duty

wearing their

original unifonns. Second,

disrupting

the

working

of

the AVG-no

matter

how

slipshod it

might

seem seven

thousand

miles

away

in

Washington,

D.C.-would

desfroy the effort of

the Tigers.

Bissell

flew

into the

AVG's

main

base

at Loiwing and told

the

gattrered

men

that,

effective

at the

end

of

May,

they

would all be brought

into

the

service of

the

Army.

They

could

join

as

volunteers

and remain

in

place

or

they would be

met

with

a

draft

notice

the moment

of their return

to the

United

States

and be drafted

into ttre

infanfif

as

privates.

The threat

backfired;

it may even have changed

the minds of

some

of

the

men

who

had

considered

staying. Many

ofthe

formerNavy

and Marine

Corps

pilots

wanted to

return

to their

former

serices,

not

join

the Army,

while

oth-

ers

just

wanted

a

break from

the

constant

combat,

poor

foo{ and chronic

fatigue

built

trp

during theirAvc

time.

Although

the

Army

wanted

the AVG

Generals

Marshall and Arnold were

determined

to

keep

Chennault

from

gaining

command

of the

Chinese

theater.

So,

while

directing

his

forces

against

far

larger

Japanese

forces and winning every

encoutrter

thus far,

Chennault

was forced

to

maneuver

politically

simply

to keep his

force

intact.

Fortunately,

Chennault

carried

political

clout

with

his

direct

access to

the

White House.

The

President

had

asked

the crusty

Louisianan to write

him

direct-

27

ly

when necessary, and

Chennault

took the

President up on

his offer.

As long as

President Roosevelt lived

Chennault

had the ultimate

in

political

backing.

He

final-

ly arranged a

compromise.

The AVG

would

merge

into the

Army Air Forces, effec-

tive July 4, 1942, rfhe

could

remain in

tactical

comrnand

of the air

forces in China.

Further, he

would seek to convince the

remaining

AVG members to

accept the

fransfer. He knew his appeal

to his men would

carry

frr more weight

than Bissell's

threats.

Swan Song

On

April

18,1942, in a surprise attack against

the Japanese

home islands, Lt.

Col. James

"Jimmy''

Doolittle led sixteen NorthAmericanB-2l

medium bombers

from

the deck of ttre USS Hornet.The stategic

ramifications of

the raid echoed

far

into

China, eventhoughthe raidcaused onlyminordamage

andthe aircraft didnot

survive: fifteen

crashed

in

China and one

landed

in Russia, with

that

crew

intemed.

The Army had not informed

Chennaull

beforehand

of the

raid

on

liokyo, and

he

was livid. He

believed

he

could

have

put

into

place

another waming

and recovery

system that would have

saved

the

planes

and crews.

He also believed

the system

would have helped the

Chinese avoid the

massive

retaliation of the Japanese,

who

already

occupied the coastal areas. After

Doolittle's attaclg

they

pushed

fax inland to

seize

any

airfields that could

possibly

be used

for future

missions against

Japan.

Along the

way,

they

torhred and executed

thousands of

Chinese citizens

for their

efforts in

aiding

the Doolittle

Raiders. Chennault

believed

to

his last day that

he

couldhavep,reventedmostofthose

casualties

hadhebeenbrought

into the

planning

process

for the raid. However,

Clayton

Bissell, who

had coordinated

Doolittle's

flight, didnotthink

Chennaultneededto

know about

the raid.

Chennault

also rued the

loss

of the

B-25s, which

were supposed

to form his

bombing

force.

With

just

a squadron of such bomben,

Chermault

believed

he could

have thwarted

Japanese drives in several

areas in the

theater. Instea{

he had to

press

his increasingly tired

pilots

and P-40s

into the dive-bomber

role.

By the first

of May, Japanese

ground

forces had completed

the conquest

of

Burma. Approaching

the nortlrem tip of the county,

they were

in a

position

to tum

east

and invade

Southem

China or

tum

west

and enter

Indi4 both

deemed

perilous

to

the

Allies.

For the AVG in

particular,

the continued

Japanese

advance meant

that

they

once again had to abandon their

base

under

pressure

from

the e,tremy, this

time

Loiwing

on May l. Unfortunately, many

preciots

supplies were destoyed

to

keep

them from

the Japanese, including

twenty-two

damaged

and under

repair P-40s.

The

problem

was

more

than the

loss

of

Burma.

Ifthe

Japanese

were

able to tum

east and enter

China

from Burma,

the

last remaining overland

zupply

route to China

was

gone.

Sooner, rather

than

later,

the Chinese

would

run

out

of the

means to wage

war and would have to

capitulate to the Japanese.

The

Japanese

forces employed

in

defeating

China could then tum to other areas, such

asAustalia

or India.

If

either

of

these

had

occurred,

significant Allied

resources from other

theaters would

have

been required

to halt the Japanese.

28

Primitive

maintenance

was the

rule for the American

Vohrnteer Group.

The

only sigrificant

geographic

obstacle the Japanese

faced was tlrc mile4eep

Salween River

gorge

between

China and the tip ofnortlrem Bumra. Once

across the

gorge,

Japan's mobility

would have been unlimited. British forces

had managed to

blowup

the onlybridge acrosstheriver,

butthe Japanese b,roughtuppontoonbridg-

ing

equipment to replace

the desfroyed

qpan.

Bob Neale, on a reconnaissance

mis-

siorl

saw thousands

ofJapanese troops

and hundreds ofvehicles

snaking

along tlre

narrow

road that hugged

tlre Burmese

side of the

gorge.

While

Japanese Army engi-

neers worked feverishly

to throw

a b,ridge across tlre river,

the nearly twenty-mile-

long

columnwas vulnerableto

attaclq rilithno

placeto

take cover.

On May 7, L942, former

Navy dive

bomber

pilots

Tex Hill,

Tom Jones,

F.d

Rector,

and Frank Lawlor

attacked the Japanese toops

gathered

in the

gorge.

They

flew

four of the new P-40s,

armed with

Russian-made 570-pound

bombs,

while

four

older P-40s

flew

protective

cover above them.

They

destroyed

the

pontoon.

segments

of the bridge and

brought down sections of the

rock

walls,

tapping the

Japanese

betrreen the river

and the rubble. They then stafed

the

Japanese

column,

killing and

wounding hundreds

of toops and setting many vehicles on

fire. Even

tlrc

circling cover flight

joined

the action, adding to the carnage on

the

ground.

For the next four

days, Chennault

sent every

alrplane in China within

reach of

the

gorge

against the

Japanese column. AVG P-40s,

Chinese

Air

Force

Curtiss

Hawks-biplanes

that

had one

gun

and

carried a single

bomb-and several

old

Russian

Tirpolev

SB twin-engine

bombers flew

mission after mission against

the

exposed Japanese. The

attacls stopped

the Japanese cold.

It would take over

two

yean

of hard fighting

to dislodge the

Japanese from

Burma and reopen the Bumra

Road,

but the

Japanese never again

threatened either China

from the west or

Indira

fromthe

east.

Despite

the victory at the

Salween River Gorge, Chennault still

faced aircraft

flying from

Burma, Indochina"

and China. The Japanese

had moved

planes

onto

29

fields

in Burma

to

the

west and Indochina

to the

south; and

following the conquests

made

after

the Doolittle

Raid,

they

set

up

forward

operating

fields in

China

to the

east. In response,

Chennault

operated

the Flyurg Tigers like a fire

brigade.

He

con-

stantly

rotated

his

minuscule

forces

to

poorly

prepared

airsfrips

in

each

threatened

area. Pilots

landed

close to

the target

in

the late

evening before

a

raid

and

refueled

their

planes.

They

spent an

rmcomfortable

night

in the

cockpit or

under the wing,

then

set

out at first light

to

hit

the

enemy

before

it

could

attackthe

AVG

A

sfike

against Hanoi,

more

than forn

hrurdred miles from Krrrming,

is

a

good

example

ofthis

phase

of operations.

On May 12,

six

Tigers flew

to a

former

Chinese

faining

field

located

only

one

hrtrdred

miles from

the

Gia

Lam

airbase at

Hanoi

and nearly

the

same

distance inside

Japanese-occupied

territory.

They landed

after a

dangerous

late

afternoon

flight

from

Krlrming,

flying

around billowing

thurder-

storms

and

gasping

morlrtain

tops. The

planes

carried

fragmentation bombs urder

the

wings,

o high-e"plosive

bomb

under

the

belly,

and armor-piercing and

incendi-

ary rorHrds

for

the machineguns.

The

pilots

refueled

their

planes

and

took

offagain,

hoping

to

catch

the

Japanese

unaware

by

attacking

near

dusk. When

they arrive4

they

fourd

an

unprepared

enemy

with aircraft

lined

up

neatly alongside the nmway,

not ready

to

defend against

the

unexpected

altack. A

Japanese

fansport alongside

the runway,

a1rrynghigh

ranking

officers

attending

a

planning

conference,

was the

first

targetto

be strafed. It

went

up

in

flames

and smoke

in a

satisffing explosion.

The

AVG

lost

one

P-40

and its

pilot;

but,

in

addition

to the transport, they

destoyed

ten more

Japanese

plar-res,

damaged

an estimated

fifteen,

ffid

qatered

the

runway.

Just as important,

they

demonsfated

to the

Japanese

that no

place

was too

far

away for

the AVG

to

strike.

This

constant

shuttling

made

the AVG's nrtrrbers

seem

larger

than

they

were.

After

the

war, the

Japanese

admiffed

they thought

Chennault

had

several

hrtrdred

fighter

planes

at

his

disposal, instead

of

the

several dozen

that

in fact

existed.

End

of

theAVG

As

the

Chinese

spring

turned into

summer,

the days oftheAvc corurted down.

Washington

and

China reached

an agreement

for

the

Flying Tigers to

be

integrated

into

the regular

Army

Air

Forces

as the 23d Fighter

Group. On

paper,

this

looked

like

an

efficient

way

for

the Army

to

gain

an

experienced

fighter

group

capable of

carrying

the fight

immediately

to the

enemy.

China, on the other

hand,

received

promises

of increased

amourts

of

military

aidas

well

as the

open

support of the

United

States.

The

actual

fransfer,

however,

was

far

different.

The

official date

for

the

AVG's

assimilation

into

theAAIt

was

set

for

July

4,1942;but

by

ttren, most of the

men had

decided not

to

enter the Army.

They

left

China singly and

in

small

groups

to

make

their

way back

to

the United

States.

Once home,

most

rejoined

their

former military

services,

some

joined

another

service,

while a

few

went

to

work

in

the

rapidly

expanding

aviation

industry.

Chennault's

personal

appeal convinced only

a

handftrl

of Flying

Tigers

to

join

the23d,

31

Near the

end of June, some brand

new second

lieutenants

arrived

to become

the

nucleus

ofthe

23d Fight€r

Group.

Fresh out offlight

school,

these eager,

but

inex-

perienced pilots

were

likely

to be easy

targets

for the experienced

Japanese

combat

pilots.

Another

appeal

from

Chennault

resulted

in nineteenAVG

pilots

and thirty-

six

ground

crewmen staying an extatwo weeks

to

help withthe

newunit.

On July

4, 1942, Bob

Neale

led

a

flight of

four P-40s against

a

goup

of fight-

ers strafing a

field

near Hengyang.

Attacking the

twelve Japanese

and

facing loq

for

the

Flying

Tigers, odds of only three to one,

the

AVG flew

its last combat

mis-

sion, downing six ofthe €nemy, withno

losses.

Chennault spenthis last day asAVG comrnanderdoingpapenrork

inhis office,

now located near the

Chinese capital

of Chungking.

He had moved

there a

few

days

earlier to ulssume his new role

as comrnander

of

the China

Air

Tisk Force

(CATF),

a motley

collection of U.S. and Chinese

aviation

assets.

He remained subordinate

to

Brigadier

Ge,neral Bissell, who was

headquartered

inNew

Delhi, India.

Chiang Kai-Shek and his wife had

planned

an elaborate

barbeque

dinner

to

honor

the American Volunteer Group's effort.

The dinner

was

held in Chungking,

where most

of

the remaining AVG

crewmen

ended

up.

A torrential

downpour

causedmostto reconsider attending, andthey celeb'ratedwith

a

fewbeers atthe

air-

field. Chennault

did

go,

and

he listened to Madame

Chiang

praise

the

Flying

Tigers

for their

efforts on behalf of China and

her

people.

As the Chinese

had experienced

before

the mixture

of theAVG and alcohol,

they senred

only

nonalcoholic

punch

at

their

soiree.

It

was over by eleven

p.m.,

and the

AVG

quietly

passed

away.

Five

pilots

agreed to

join

the AAF and

remain

in

place:

Tex Hill,

Ed Rector,

Charlie Sawyer, Frank Schiel, and Gil

Bright. Hill, the

former

Navy ensign, became

an

Army

Air Forces major and the squadron

commander

for the 75th

Fighter

SquadrorL leading his

greenpilots

onmissions

thaq except

forthe different

insipia

on the P-40s, were remarkably like those of

the AVG

In October lg42,Hillflew

as the

mission commander

for nine

P-40s escorting

twelve bombers on a raid against Japanese-occupied

Hong

Kong. Encopntering

twenty-four

Japanese

fighters,

Hill downed

one and

repeatedly

attacked the others.

Following

the

mission,

all of the bombers

retumed safely.

Hill later received

the

Distinguished

Service

Cross

for that action,

just

one

example of the many medals for valor that

former

Flyng

Tigers

eamed

as

part

of

the regular military. TWo received

the

Medal of

Honor: Jim

Howard,

flying the

NorttrAmerican P-51 Mustang in Europe, and Greg

Boyington,

flying

the Chance-

Vought

F4U

Corsair for the

USMC

as the

leader of VMF-2l4-the

legendary

Black

Sheep Squadron. Hill, Howand" and several

otherAVG

pilots

went on

to end

their careers as

general

officers.

Chennault

continued serving as

the air commander

in

China

for

nearly three

years.

He

was

head

of the CATF until

March 10,l943,then

as

a major

general,

he

was in

charge of the

Fourteenth

Air

Force. He headed

the smallest combat

air

force

of

the

war, but always

managed

to achieve

impressive combat

results with the tiny

forces at his

disposal, as

he had

while commanding

the

Flying

Tigers.

Chennault's association with

President Roosevelt

gave

him

some

protection

from military

politics,

but following Roosevelt's

death

in April1945, Chennault

32

An

AVG

P40

over the

rugged

morHrtains

of

northern

China.

found

himself

squeezed

out

by

General Arnold. In

a

letter

thatmonth

to the

overall

China-Burma-India

theater

air

commander,

Lt.

Gen.

Albert

Wedemeyer,

Arnold

wrote:

General

Chennault has

been

in

China

for

a

long

period

of

time

fighting

a defensive

war

with

minimum

resowces.

The meager-

ness

of supplies

and

the resulting

guerrilla

type of warfare

must

change

to a modern

type

of striking,

offensive air

power.

I firmly

believe that

the

quickest

and most

effective way

to

change

at

warfare in

your

Theater,

employing modern

offensive

thought,

tactics

and techniques,

is

to change

commandets.

I

would appre-

ciate

your

concurence

in

General

Chennault's early

withdrawal

from

the

China

Theater.

He

should

take advantage of the

retire-

ment

privileges

now

available

to

physically

disqualified

officers

that

make

their

pay

not

subject

to income

tax.

On

July

8,

I

gks,Chennault

requested

retirement,

a

request

quickly granted.

The

legacy

of the Flyurg

Tigers

has

grown

since those dark days ofWorld

War

II,

and

accounts

of Japanese

aircraft

the AVG

desfroyed vary

greatly.

Chennault,

in

his

memoirs,

says 299

Japanese

aircraft

were

desfroyed,

with

153 more

probably

desfroyed,

while

theAVG had

L2P40s

destroyed

in

combat, with 61

destroyed on

the

groffid,

including

the 22

that

were

burned as

the AVG

left Loiwing. Daniel

Ford,

n Flying

Tigers:

Claire

Chennault

and the

American Volunteer Group,

gtrves

115

as

the number

of Japanese

aircraft

destroyed

in

aerial combat.

However,

bonuses

were

paid

to AVG

pilots

for

destroying atcraft, both

in

the

air and

on

the

grourd,

ffid Ford

says that

China

"evidently

paid

bonuses

for 294

planes."

The

33

AVG lost twenty-three

pilots:

tur

in action, three

during enemy

attacks

on

AVG

facilities,

and ten

in flyrng

accidents, against

the unknown

hundreds of

the anemy

killed in air

baffles and

ground

attacks.

By any

measure,

the success of

the

AVG is

remarkable.

For

a time, the

Flying

Tigers were

the only

source of

positive

news for the

Allies

during the spectacular successes of

the Japanese

in late l94l and.early

1942.

They fought the Japanese air forces to a bloody

standstill,

helped stop at

least one

sfiategic campaign, and tied

up

enemy

resources

far in excess of

U.S. and Chinese

lives

and teasure expended. They had assistance

from Britain's

Royal

Air Force,

especially during the battles for Rangoon, but

the Chinese

workers

were the

real

source

of

success for the AVG The

Chinese

built,

by

hand, the

many airfields used

by the AVG;

they operated, at

great peril

to

thernselves,

a highly efficient

early

warning

air

raid network;

they suffered

uncountable

casualties

helping downed

Tigers reach

safety; and they endured

years

ofJapanese

occupation

and

atrocities,

buying the

time to setup theAVG's an{later,

the U.S.

Army's campaigr

againstthe

Japanese.

Time has made the AVG's memory a collection

ofblack

and white

photos,

an

old movie

starring John Wayme, and

a collection

of bools

in the

library. They were

more than

that.

They

we,re

men

and women

who volunteered,

for various

reasons, to

take

the

fight

to an enemy that most

Americans

knew

little about. When

the

23d

Fighter

Group took on the

few remaining Flying

Tigers and

their decrepit

shark-

mouthed P-40s, it also took

on

the legacy created

by

its forebears.

Most of

the

Flyrng Tigen have now

passed

away,

with time

doing what

an

implacable enemy

couldnot.

The history

ofthe

23d

did

not

end

in World

War

tr. During the War

in Southeast

Asia" it again flew

combat over

the skies ofAsia

in Republic

F-105

Thunderchiefs.

Affectionately

know as,'oThuds," these

planes

carried

the brunt of

the air war over

North Viefiram for many

years.

The 23d answered

the call

to arms

again during

Operation

Desert

Storm.In the

FairchildA-10

Thunderbolt

tr

ground

attack

jet,

popularly

called the

"Warthog,"

its

pilots

flew

more than

twenty-seven

hundred

combat sorties

anddestoyedtwenty-five

hundredkaqi

militaryvehicles,

including

tanls. Taking

on

roles never

imagined by

the Air

Force, they used

innovative

think-

ing that the

original

Flying Tigers

would

have appreciated.

The 23d's

A-10

pilots

flew

combat search and rescue missions,

helping to save

fellowAllied

airmen.

They

took on

Iraqi

snrface-to-aLmissiles in deadly duels

where

the odds were

usually on

the side of the enemy. They flew long-range

missions to

find and destoy

the mili-

tarily impotent,

but

politically

strategic,

SCUD

missiles of

the

haqi forces.

Appearing

deep inside areas the kaqis considaed

safe

from attaclq the

technologi-

cal descendants

ofthe

P-40s

stafed

nearly five dozen

sites, blowing

up

fifty-seven

ofthe missiles.

The A*10s

the

23d now

flies are adomed

with

painted

shark

mouths.

The two

letter identifier

on the tail of each aircraft

is FT,

for Flying Tiger,

a fitting fibute

from

one

group

of warriors to another.

34

The

author

would

like

to thank

the following

for

their invaluable

assistance in

putting

this

project

together.

Ms.

Terry

Kiss,

librarian,

Office

ofAir Force

History

Maj.

Dan

Kostecka,

historian,

office

ofAir

Force

History

Maj.

Doug

Lanfi,historian,

Office

ofAir Force

History

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