Testimony of Susan Hedman Before the House Committee on

Testimony of Susan Hedman

Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

March 15, 2016

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings and distinguished Members of the Committee. I’m

Susan Hedman, the former EPA Region 5 Administrator. Thank you for this opportunity to testify about my role

in EPA’s response to the Flint water crisis—and the reasons that I decided to resign.

I first learned that Flint was not implementing corrosion control treatment on June 30, 2015

-- approximately

fourteen months after the City started using Flint River water that was not treated with orthophosphate.

The

very next day I offered technical assistance to Flint’s Mayor -- assistance from EPA experts on lead and drinking

water distribution systems.

The following week, we issued our first statement encouraging Flint residents to

contact their water utility for lead testing and providing information about limiting exposure to lead in tap

water.

On July 21

, three weeks after I first learned about this problem, the Michigan Department of Environmental

Quality (MDEQ) agreed with EPA’s recommendation to require Flint to implement corrosion control as soon as

possible -- a recommendation that my staff had been making since late April, when they first found out that

corrosion control was not being implemented.

That should have solved the problem – but it did not. During the weeks and months that followed, MDEQ was

slow to deliver on the agreement we reached on July 21

and the City of Flint was hampered by a lack of

institutional capacity and resources.

During this briefing, the EPA Region 5 Water Division Director told me that her staff started asking MDEQ to

require Flint to implement corrosion control in late April, when MDEQ first told EPA staff that Flint was not

implementing control. (In February, MDEQ told EPA that Flint had an “Optimized Corrosion Control Program.”)

The Water Division Director also told me that she had scheduled a call with the head of the MDEQ drinking

water program and was confident that MDEQ would agree to require Flint to implement corrosion control

during that call. She also said that water testing completed in December indicated that Flint was only slightly

above the lead levels found in systems that EPA deems fully optimized for corrosion control – and that new test

results would be available before the upcoming EPA-MDEQ call.

I had previously been briefed on and closely followed several other drinking water issues in Flint, including

when MDEQ issued a Notice of Violation for Total Trihalomethane exceedances (December 2014) and when

Rep. Kildee requested information on loan forgiveness for the City of Flint’s Drinking Water State Revolving Fund

loans (April 2015).

The Flint Mayor was familiar with this form of technical assistance. In February 2015, I helped the Mayor find

an EPA drinking water expert to work with the City to address Total Trihalomethane violations.

The EPA statement was picked up by Flint-area media and links to EPA information about lead in drinking water

appeared on local media websites. I also sent the statement to the Mayor right after we released it.

Page 2 of 12

EPA responded in the only we could: by working within the cooperative federalism framework of the Safe

Drinking Water Act. That framework assigns legal primacy to states to implement drinking water regulations

and gives EPA the job of setting standards and providing technical assistance. So, in keeping with that

framework, we provided technical support to the State and the City -- to implement corrosion control and to

provide the assistance that Flint residents needed to limit their exposure to lead.

Most of the time, this cooperative federalism model works well – even in a crisis. In fact, it worked exactly the

way it’s supposed to work when the Toledo water crisis occurred in 2014.

But, as we all know, it did not work

in Flint.

Consequently, EPA was forced to evaluate the enforcement tools available under the Safe Drinking Water Act,

which are more limited than the enforcement provisions in other federal environmental statutes. And, while I

used the threat of enforcement action to motivate the State and City to move forward, we found that the

enforcement options available to us were of limited utility last fall, due to the unique circumstances of this

case.

In the end, with the help of the EPA Task Force, corrosion control was finally implemented – and testing now

indicates that the protective coating that prevents lead from leaching into tap water is being restored.

That’s the good news.

The bad news is that this problem should never have happened in the first place, and I need to remind you: EPA

had nothing at all to do with that.

Finally, I’d like to say a few words about my resignation:

I resigned, in part, because of the false allegations about me that were published

in early January – which EPA

was unable to correct on the record before they began to damage the Agency’s ability to perform critical work in

Flint. By the third week of January, I was widely portrayed in the media as someone who “. . . sat on the

sidelines during the crisis . . . and . . . downplayed concerns raised by an E.P.A. scientist about lead in the

water.”

In August 2014, the Toledo reported high levels of the toxin microcystin in drinking water. Ohio EPA

immediately told US EPA about the problem and the Mayor immediately issued a Do Not Drink Order. Ohio EPA

asked US EPA for technical assistance – and Ohio EPA immediately implemented the sampling protocols that we

recommended. And, Governor Kasich told EPA that he would call out the National Guard to distribute bottled

water – and that happened right away, as well.

See Appendix One.

Examples of articles containing the false allegations:

http://www.democracynow.org/2016/1/8/amid_state_fed_cover_up_the

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/flint-lead-water-epa_us_569522a8e4b086bc1cd5373c

http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/12/epa-stayed-silent-flints-tainted-water/78719620

http://flintwaterstudy.org/2016/01/miguel-del-toral-emerges-from-epas-house-arrest-flintwaterstudy-supports-

requested-federal-relief-for-flint/

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/opinion/sunday/fix-flints-water-system-now.html

Page 3 of 12

That’s completely untrue. My testimony today and the material in Appendices Two and Three

make clear that I

did not sit on the sidelines and I did not downplay any concerns raised by EPA scientists or apologize for any

memos they wrote – in fact, I repeatedly asked for a final memo about lead in a form that EPA could publicly

release. And, when MDEQ attacked a Region 5 scientist

by calling him a “rogue employee,” I immediately

called the MDEQ Director to complain -- and in a subsequent call with the MDEQ Director and the Governor’s

staff, I made it clear that the scientist is a valued member of the Region 5 Water Division team -- and I made it

even clearer when I subsequently appointed the scientist to EPA’s Flint Task Force.

There wasn’t time for these explanations in January -- in the wake of all the emergency declarations. Flint

residents had lost trust in governmental institutions – and the false allegations about me gave the people of

Flint less reason to trust EPA.

On the day I resigned, I sent a note to Administrator McCarthy saying: “In light of the allegations that have been

made about me . . . and the time it will take to set the record straight, I think this is the best course of action to

ensure the effectiveness of EPA’s response to the Flint water crisis and to make sure that Flint residents get the

help that they deserve.”

That was one reason for my resignation, but there was another: quite simply, this tragedy happened on my

watch.

I did not make the catastrophic decision to provide drinking water without corrosion control treatment;

I did not vote to cut funding for water infrastructure or for EPA;

And I did not design the imperfect statutory framework that we rely on to keep our drinking water safe.

But I was the Regional Administrator when this crisis occurred.

Having spent my entire adult life as an advocate for environmental and public health issues – and much of that

time representing citizen groups – I knew that only one thing mattered to Flint residents: the water wasn’t safe

to drink.

What happened in Flint, should not have happened anywhere in United States – and I was horrified that it

happened in my region, the Great Lakes Region. I thought – and still think – that resigning was the honorable

thing to do.

Although I have left government service – I have not stopped worrying about the people of Flint. I am very

encouraged to see that the corrosion control treatment that was implemented in December is re-coating the

pipes and that the water may soon be safe to drink. I am even more encouraged to read that there is growing

Congressional support for funding to replace lead service lines in Flint and to fund water infrastructure

Appendix Two highlights some of the actions that I took as part of EPA’s response to the Flint water crisis.

Appendix Three provides background on an e-mail exchange with the Flint Mayor that was the focus of the false

allegations that were made against me in early January 2016.

http://www.npr.org/2015/09/29/444497051/high-lead-levels-in-michigan-kids-after-city-switches-water-

source

Page 4 of 12

throughout the country. I’d like to close by asking all of you to support that legislation -- and, more generally, to

support the long overdue investments that are needed in this nation’s water infrastructure.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I welcome any questions.

Page 5 of 12

APPENDIX ONE

Safe Drinking Water Act Enforcement Options

Given EPA Region 5’s longstanding reputation

for aggressive enforcement of environmental laws, it is perhaps

not surprising that during the summer and fall of 2015 the Region 5 Flint team actively evaluated and

reevaluated the enforcement options available under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Unfortunately, we found

that the utility of the enforcement tools available to us was quite limited because of the unique circumstances

of this case.

The Safe Drinking Water Act contains two major enforcement provisions:

Section 1414 of the Safe Drinking Water Act authorizes EPA to take enforcement action when a water system

violates applicable regulations and the primacy agency (in this case MDEQ) fails to take action within 30 days.

This section is a useful enforcement tool where a water system violates a Maximum Contaminant Level

established by EPA regulations. For instance, EPA could have used this authority when the Flint water system

violated the Maximum Contaminant Levels for Total Trihalomethanes in 2014, if MDEQ had failed to take

enforcement Action.

However, in cases involving lead, there is no Maximum Contaminant Level to apply.

Instead, the 1991 Lead and Copper Rule is a treatment technique rule that:

. . . includes a lead “action level” of 15 parts per billion. If more than 10% of tap water samples exceed

the action level, the PWS has not violated the rule, but other requirements – corrosion control, public

education, additional water monitoring and lead service line replacement – can be triggered.

In Flint’s case, EPA’s ability to take action under Section 1414 of the Safe Drinking Water Act was limited by a

lack of evidence demonstrating that the lead “action level” had been exceeded. However, EPA was nonetheless

able to work with MDEQ and the City of Flint to implement corrosion control, to carry out public education

campaigns and to improve and expand water monitoring – the same outcome that would have been achieved if

we had been able to proceed under Section 1414.

Section 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act authorizes EPA to take action when state and local authorities fail

to act when a contaminant presents “imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons” served

by a public water system. We considered this option and there were times when I told the State and City that I

was prepared to move to an enforcement posture if they didn’t move more quickly. However, I decided to hold

EPA Region 5 has become known as “The Enforcement Region” because of the region’s track record of

initiating and successfully concluding more environmental enforcement cases than any of the other nine EPA

regions. In fact, during several recent years Region 5 enforcement actions produced more than half of the total

pollution reductions and injunctive relief achieved by the entire agency. Much of this enforcement work was

targeted in communities that are over-burdened with risks to public health – communities that are

disproportionately minority and low-income.

MDEQ issued a Notice of Violation on December 16, 2014.

“Lead in Flint, Michigan’s Drinking Water: Federal Regulatory Role,” CRS Insight Report by Mary Tiemann,

February 16, 2016 (IN10446).

Page 6 of 12

off because I was advised that the Michigan Attorney General

would likely argue that EPA was jurisdictionally

barred from using Section 1431 because of the growing list of actions that the State and City were taking to

protect public health, including:

MDEQ’s letter requiring Flint to implement corrosion control on August 17

;

Mayor Walling’s announcement that Flint would implement corrosion control on September 3

;

The City/County Health Advisory recommending that Flint residents use filters and flush pipes before

drawing water for drinking or cooking on September 25

;

The State/City Action Plan that included distribution of filters and bottled water to Flint residents and

water testing in schools that was announced on October 2

;

The State/City decision to use treated water from the Great Lakes Water Authority instead of Flint River

water starting on October 16

; and

MDEQ’s permit authorizing Flint to implement corrosion control that was issued on October 30

To be clear, I was less concerned about losing a legal argument than about the length of time it might take to

resolve it – and the impact that an extended legal proceeding might have on forward progress to address the

water crisis. During October and November – when MDEQ and the City were working effectively with the EPA

Flint Task Force to implement corrosion control – a contentious challenge to an EPA order could have further

delayed or even halted that critical work. If that had happened, we would not be seeing the reductions in lead

levels that are currently occurring in Flint.

Those concerns were on my mind as I reviewed a citizen group petition asking EPA to take emergency action,

pursuant to Section 1431.

On December 10,

2015, the day after Flint started corrosion control treatment, I

sent a letter to the petitioners summarizing the steps that EPA, the State of Michigan and the City of Flint had

taken to address elevated lead levels – and I further deferred action on the petition until such time as the

Agency determines that corrosion control is fully optimized for the Flint system.

That letter was intended to

send a message to the petitioners and to the City and State that EPA was prepared to take action under Section

1431 if corrosion control was not fully optimized.

Because MDEQ does not have in-house counsel, we recognized that issuing an order would result in

involvement by the Michigan Attorney General, who had recently issued a statement, emphasized his

commitment “to stopping overregulation and excessive mandates from the EPA.” www.mlive.com/lansing-

news/index.ssf/2015/09/gov_rick_snyder_administration.html

Petition for Emergency Action under the Safe Drinking Water Act, submitted to the Environmental Protection

Agency by Coalition for Clean Water et al. on October 1, 2015.

Shortly after signing the letter, I asked the EPA Regional Counsel to reach out to the petitioners’ attorney to

ask whether there were any additional steps to protect public health that the petitioners would like to

recommend. The Regional Counsel reported that he made that offer in a conference call with the petitioners’

attorney on December 17, 2015, and again in an e-mail in January 2016, but received no recommendations in

response.

Page 7 of 12

On January 21, 2016, EPA issued a Section 1431 Order, citing both the City and the State. As predicted, Michigan

challenged EPA’s legal authority to issue the order – but MDEQ pledged cooperation with EPA in the climate of

intergovernmental collaboration created by federal, state and local emergency declarations to assist Flint.

Page 8 of 12

APPENDIX TWO

My Role In The EPA Response To The Flint Water Crisis

Many people at the Environmental Protection Agency have played and continue to play critical roles in the

response to the Flint water crisis. For purposes of this testimony, I have assembled this partial list of my

activities to show when I first became involved in the response and the types of actions that I undertook:

I first learned that Flint was not implementing corrosion control treatment on June 30, 2015

–

approximately fourteen months after the City started using Flint River water that was not treated with

orthophosphate.

The very next day I offered technical assistance to Flint’s Mayor – assistance from

EPA experts on lead and drinking water distribution systems.

The following day, I sent the Mayor

resumes for the two EPA experts so that he could contact them right away.

On July 10, 2015, I directed the EPA Region 5 Office of Public Affairs to issue our first statement

encouraging Flint residents to contact their water utility to request lead testing and providing a link to

information on the EPA website about limiting exposure to lead in tap water.

On July 21, 2015, EPA convinced MDEQ to require the City of Flint to implement corrosion control. This

was a significant milestone – but the problem was not solved. When I asked for a status report, I was

astonished to learn that MDEQ had not yet issued the promised letter directing Flint to implement

corrosion control. I asked my staff to immediately follow up with MDEQ to get the letter issued -- and

to ask both MDEQ and the City of Flint to increase the availability of public information about water

testing and limiting exposure to lead in tap water.

During this briefing, the EPA Region 5 Water Division Director told me that her staff started asking MDEQ to

require Flint to implement corrosion control in late April, when MDEQ first told EPA staff that Flint was not

implementing control. (In February, MDEQ told EPA that Flint had an “Optimized Corrosion Control Program.”)

The Water Division Director also told me that she had scheduled a call with the head of the MDEQ drinking

water program and was optimistic that MDEQ would agree to require Flint to implement corrosion control

during that call. She also said that water testing completed in December indicated that Flint was only slightly

above the lead levels found in systems that EPA deems fully optimized for corrosion control – and that new test

results would be available before the upcoming EPA-MDEQ call.

I had previously been briefed on and closely followed several other drinking water issues in Flint, including

when MDEQ issued a Notice of Violation for Total Trihalomethane exceedances (December 2014) and when

Rep. Kildee requested information on loan forgiveness for the City of Flint’s Drinking Water State Revolving Fund

loans (April 2015).

The Flint Mayor was familiar with this form of technical assistance. In February 2015, I helped the Mayor find

an EPA drinking water expert to work with the City to address Total Trihalomethane violations.

The EPA statement was covered by Flint-area media and links to the EPA information about lead in drinking

water appeared on local media websites. I also sent a copy of the statement to the Mayor right after we

released it.

Page 9 of 12

Finally, on August 17, 2015, MDEQ issued a letter directing the City of Flint to implement corrosion

control. Although MDEQ’s letter failed to convey the urgency that EPA had recommended, on

September 3, 2015, the Flint Mayor stepped forward to announce that the City would implement

corrosion control as soon as possible – and that he would add two EPA experts on lead and water

distribution issues to the Flint Technical Advisory Committee.

On September 15, 2015, I held separate calls with the Flint Mayor and the MDEQ Director to emphasize

the need for expedited implementation of corrosion control and for expanded public information efforts

to help Flint residents take steps to limit lead exposure until corrosion control was effective. Ten days

later, the City (and County) issued a Health Advisory recommending that residents install filters to

remove lead from tap water and to flush their systems before drawing water for drinking or cooking.

On September 27, 2015, I again called the MDEQ Director to stress the need for expedited

implementation of corrosion control, to offer technical assistance and to call for more involvement by

the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (to implement a public information campaign

and to obtain funding for bottled water and pre-mixed formula for low income residents.) During the

next several days, EPA worked closely with MDEQ to develop a “Flint Action Plan” – which the MDEQ

Director predicted would result in implementation of corrosion control in October. The Action Plan was

announced on October 2

and, during the following week, thousands of free water filters were

distributed in Flint and testing of drinking water in schools began.

On October 16, 2015, I announced the creation of an EPA Flint Task Force to provide intensive technical

assistance to MDEQ and the City of Flint to implement corrosion control treatment.

When Task Force

recommendations were not accepted, I intervened with the City and MDEQ – and on October 30, 2015,

MDEQ issued a permit authorizing the City to implement corrosion control treatment in accordance with

a plan designed to restore the protective coating needed to prevent leaching of lead into tap water.

After the EPA Flint Task Force was up and running, I oversaw less of EPA’s day-to-day work in Flint – but

there are several additional items worth mentioning:

On November 10, 2015, I announced that EPA would conduct an audit of the MDEQ Drinking

Water Program to identify actions needed to strengthen the Michigan drinking water program.

A few days earlier, MDEQ declined a similar offer of technical assistance from EPA -- but did tell Region 5 staff

that a public information campaign was being implemented in Flint by the Michigan Department of Health and

Human Services.

On October 16, 2015, Flint began using treated Lake Huron water from the Great Lakes Water Authority,

instead of Flint River Water. The water supplied by the Great Lakes Water Authority required supplementary

corrosion control treatment to restore the protective coating to damaged pipes in Flint.

During November the Task Force continued to work with the City and MDEQ to get the necessary equipment

installed to begin corrosion control treatment (which occurred on December 9

) and to oversee water sampling

to determine the effectiveness of the treatment (which is still ongoing). A complete list of Task Force activities is

available at www.epa.gov/flint/flint-safe-drinking-water-task-force

Page 10 of 12

On December 1, 2015, I called the MDEQ Director to offer EPA Community Involvement

Coordinators to work with MDEQ to expand public information campaigns to ensure that Flint

residents used filters correctly and were taking other steps to minimize exposure to lead in tap

water.

On December 22, 2015, I travelled to Flint to meet with the Mayor to discuss the City and

County Emergency Declaration – that had been issued the previous week. I asked what EPA

could do to help and specifically offered EPA Community Involvement Coordinators to work with

the City to help reach residents who do not have access to the web, who face literacy challenges

or who do not speak English.

During 2015, I also provided several briefings on the Flint water crisis to Members of Congress,

in person and on the phone. Starting in mid-November, I also directed my staff to hold weekly

phone briefings for congressional staff.

During that call I also provided the MDEQ Director with contact information for the Legionella program at the

Centers for Disease Control and requested that he reach out to the MDHHS Director to ask the State

Epidemiologist to work with the Centers for Disease Control and the Genesee County Health Department on the

Legionella issue.

Page 11 of 12

APPENDIX THREE

My E-Mail Exchange With The Flint Mayor (6/30 – 7/2/16)

In early January 2016, several false allegations were published

suggesting that I downplayed concerns raised by

an E.P.A. scientist about lead in Flint tap water.

These allegations focused on the following e-mail exchange

that I had with the Flint Mayor during the summer of 2015:

On June 30, 2015 – the same day that I was first briefed on the Flint corrosion control issue – I received

an e-mail from the Flint Mayor asking about an internal EPA memo that had been obtained by a

reporter.

On July 1, 2015, I sent a reply to the Mayor:

I started by apologizing to the Mayor for taking all day to get back to him. The reason that it

took me all day is that I was out of the office for a medical procedure.

Because I was out of the office and was not familiar with the contents of the document that the

Mayor was asking about, I asked the Region 5 Water Division Director and Deputy Director to

draft my response – which included the following language: “The preliminary draft report

should not have been released outside the agency. When the report has been revised and fully

vetted by EPA management, the findings and recommendations will be shared with the City and

MDEQ will be responsible for following up with the City.”

There were at least three reasons that the document should not have been released outside the

agency:

1. The document contained personally identifiable information (PII) and health

information. In the standard agency vetting process, the Office of Regional Counsel

would redact that information to prepare a document for public release.

2. The document contained enforcement-sensitive information. In the standard agency

vetting process, the proposed compliance review described in the draft would be

redacted.

3. The document was an interim draft that did not include all of the information available

to EPA on the topics covered in the memo. EPA also needed to confirm data reported in

the memo by performing a standard quality assurance/quality control check.

Examples of articles containing the false allegations:

http://www.democracynow.org/2016/1/8/amid_state_fed_cover_up_the

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/flint-lead-water-epa_us_569522a8e4b086bc1cd5373c

http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/12/epa-stayed-silent-flints-tainted-water/78719620

http://flintwaterstudy.org/2016/01/miguel-del-toral-emerges-from-epas-house-arrest-flintwaterstudy-supports-

requested-federal-relief-for-flint/

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/opinion/sunday/fix-flints-water-system-now.html

I did not play any role in “vetting” or “revising” the draft or final version of that memo.

Page 12 of 12

Since I could not provide the draft report in its current form to the Mayor that evening, I instead

offered the Mayor access to two EPA experts on lead and drinking water distribution systems.

Those experts – who work at EPA’s lab in Cincinnati – were available to talk with the Mayor

about the importance of implementing corrosion control and the public health risks posed by

lead in drinking water.

I closed the e-mail by apologizing again for taking all day to reply and “for the manner in which

this matter was handled.” Here I was saying that I was sorry that the Mayor heard about an

issue from a reporter, instead of directly from me. EPA Regional Administrators are taught that

there should be no surprises for elected officials. Ironically, in this case, I was as surprised as the

Mayor – since I started hearing about the lead issue at about the same time he did.

On July 2, 2015, the Mayor e-mailed me again to ask EPA to talk with the reporter who had obtained a

copy of the interim memo. I replied by saying that I was not inclined for EPA staff to have further

communication with the reporter because we needed to focus on finalizing the report. At the time, I

had hoped that a final version of the memo would be able to be released before the reporter filed his

story. In the meantime, I did not want anyone on my staff to get in trouble by commenting on a

document that contained information that we are prohibited from disclosing.

In my July 2

reply to the Mayor I also provided contact information and resumes for the EPA experts on

lead and water distribution systems so that he could reach out to them for information.

My July 2

reply to the Mayor also noted that the interim report obtained by the reporter “was a

preliminary draft and that it would be premature to draw any conclusions based on that draft.” There

are two important points to make about this statement:

1. I do not have the necessary expertise to judge whether it was premature to draw any conclusions

based on the interim report. Here I was conveying the judgment provided to me by EPA Region 5

Water Division senior managers, individuals who do have the necessary expertise to make that

judgment and had reviewed the memo in detail.

2. The final version of the report concluded that the extremely high lead levels highlighted in the

interim report were likely due to physical disturbance of a service line to one residence (which had

since been replaced), rather than lack of corrosion control. The draft interim report did not include

any information about physical disturbance and, consequently, many news articles that were

written about the draft report prematurely jumped to a conclusion: that Flint drinking water

contained “hazardous waste levels” of lead because of the lack of corrosion control treatment.

When the first of these articles was published

the scientist who authored the draft interim report

expressed concern to the EPA Region 5 public affairs office that the article could “unduly alarm the

public.”

At that time, I was particularly concerned about the release of PII/health and enforcement-sensitive

information because I had recently completed the annual training that all EPA employees are required to take to

learn about protecting confidential information and the substantial penalties that apply for failing to do so.

http://www.aclumich.org/article/corrosive-impact-tale-leaded-water-and-one-flint-family%E2%80%99s-toxic-

nightmare

Susan Hedman

Chicago, Illinois

Education

1989 Ph.D. Gaylord Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies

University of Wisconsin – Madison, Wisconsin

Interdisciplinary degree in physical and social sciences and engineering

Concentration: Land Resources

1987 J.D. University of Wisconsin Law School Madison, Wisconsin

1979 M.A. LaFollette Institute of Public Affairs

University of Wisconsin – Madison, Wisconsin

Interdisciplinary degree in public policy and administration

Concentration: Energy Policy

1978 B.A. Ripon College Ripon, Wisconsin

Major: Politics and Government

Employment

5/2010 – 2/2016 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Chicago, Illinois

Region 5 Administrator/Great Lakes National Program Manager

Director of EPA operations in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin

and related work with 35 federally-recognized tribal governments;

EPA Great Lakes National Program Manager:

Chair - Great Lakes Restoration Initiative Regional Working Group

Co-Chair - Bi-National Great Lakes Executive Committee

Commissioner - Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (2014 – 2016)

Chair – Chicago Federal Executive Board (2013 - 2014)

4/2005 – 5/2010 Office of the Illinois Attorney General Chicago, Illinois

Environmental Counsel / Senior Assistant Attorney General

Lead counsel for litigation and legislation relating to environmental protection, energy

efficiency, renewable energy, carbon capture technology and associated consumer issues

2/2004 – 3/2005 State of Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity

Bureau of Energy and Recycling Chicago, Illinois

Senior Policy Advisor: Policy counsel responsible for analyzing and formulating policy

on energy and recycling issues;

4/2000 – 2/2004 United Nations Security Council

United Nations Compensation Commission Geneva, Switzerland

First Legal Officer/Senior Team Leader: Manager of UN legal professionals and

independent scientific and financial experts retained to analyze claims for environmental

damage from the oil fires in Kuwait, releases of oil into the Persian Gulf and

demining/unexploded ordinance recovery arising from the Gulf War

3/1993 - 4/2000 Environmental Law and Policy Center Chicago, Illinois

Staff Attorney: Lead counsel in Clean Air Act enforcement actions, electric power

generation and transmission planning cases and environmental permitting proceedings

before state and federal courts, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state

utility commissions (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin)

1/1992 - 12/1992 Howard & Howard Bloomfield Hills, Michigan

Attorney: Associate in environmental practice group

5/1991 – 12/1991 National Wildlife Federation Great Lakes Center Ann Arbor, Michigan

University of Michigan Law School

Staff Attorney/Clinical Assistant Professor: Worked on Clean Air Act and Clean Water

Act citizen suits for National Wildlife Federation-sponsored law clinic

8/1988 - 5/1991 University of Maryland School of Public Affairs College Park, Maryland

School of Law Baltimore, Maryland

Assistant Professor: Taught environmental policy and law courses

Supervised environmental law clinic cases

Research Director, Center for Global Change: Managed research on methodologies to

quantify and value environmental costs of electric power generation

8/1984 - 6/1988 Northland College Ashland, Wisconsin

Assistant/Associate Professor: Taught environmental policy courses

12/1983 - 7/1984 Radioactive Waste Review Board Ashland, Wisconsin

Public Information Officer: Prepared and implemented public information program for

state agency responsible for high level radioactive waste disposal issues

6/1982 - 8/1983 University of Wisconsin Resource Sociology Group Madison, Wisconsin

Research Assistant: Analyzed data for time-of-day electric rate experiment

8/1981 - 5/1982 Foley & Lardner Madison, Wisconsin

Law Clerk: Researched electric and gas utility matters for litigation team

1/1980 - 7/1981 Wisconsin State Senate Madison, Wisconsin

Legislative Aide: Analyzed and drafted legislation on electric and gas utility matters for

Senate Committee on Energy and Utilities

5/1978 – 9/1978 Office of Congressman David Obey Washington, D.C.

6/1974 – 8/1974 Legislative Aide/Intern: Assigned to work on appropriations and budget issues

Professional Licenses

State Bar of Wisconsin

State Bar of Michigan

State Bar of Illinois