MOVING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR NON- PROLIFERATION AND

www.ctbto.org

ctbto Magazine issue 16 | May 2011

ctbto

SpectruM

COMPREHENSIVE

NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN

TREATY: SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOgY

8 to 10 June 2011

Hofburg Palace

Vienna, Austria

A scientific conference

Addressing the

following themes:

1 The Earth as

a complex system

2 Understanding the nuclear

explosion source

3 Advances in sensors,

networks, and observational

technologies

4 Advances in computing,

processing, and visualization

for veriﬁcation applications

5 Creating knowledge through

partnerships, training and

information/communication

technology

speciAl session

The 11 March Japanese

event and its aftermath

For more information please see

www.ctbto.org

ctbto spectrum issue 16 may 2011

sWitzerLanD’s PresiDent anD

Minister of foreign affairs

Micheline Calmy-Rey

moving forward

on nuclear non-

proliferation

and disarmament

Her royaL HigHness

Princess Sumaya

bint El Hassan of Jordan

safeguarding

the arab

renaissance

neW zeaLanD’s Minister for

DisarMaMent anD arMs controL

Georgina te Heuheu

the end of

nuclear testing

is within

our reach

The Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

bans all nuclear explosions on Earth.

It opened for signature

on 24 September 1996 in New York.

As of October 2010, 182 countries had signed the Treaty and

153 had ratiﬁed it. Of the 44 nuclear capable States which

must ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force, the so-called

Annex 2 countries, 35 have done so to date while nine have

yet to ratify: China, the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and

the United States. On 3 May 2010, Indonesia stated that it had

initiated the CTBT ratiﬁcation process.

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-

Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) consists of the States

Signatories and the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

The main tasks of the CTBTO are to promote signatures

and ratiﬁcations and to establish a global veriﬁcation regime

capable of detecting nuclear explosions underground,

underwater and in the atmosphere.

The regime must be operational when the Treaty enters

into force. It will consist of 337 monitoring facilities

supported by an International Data Centre and

on-site inspection measures.

COVER IMAGE:

Pattreeya Thapanapaha

investigates a problem with

the VSAT link of the Global

Communications Infrastructure,

Vienna. Austria.

Photo: Marianne Weiss

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:

Annika Thunborg,

Spokesperson and Chief of Public Information

PREPARED, COORDINATED AND EDITED BY:

Denise Brettschneider

CTBTO STAFF CONTRIBUTORS:

Slava Bereza, John Coyne, Emmy Duran,

Florian Egerer, Awoba Macheiner, Reiko Matsuda,

Pablo Mehlhorn, Mika Nikkinen, Vasileios Savvidis,

Spiro Spiliopoulos, Robert Werzi, Samil Yalciner

EXTERNAL CONTRIBUTORS:

Rob DeBirk, the Healthy Environment

Alliance of Utah

LAYOUT:

Todd Vincent

ART DIRECTION:

Michael Balgavy

DISTRIBUTION:

Pablo Mehlhorn

Photographs and illustrations are at the courtesy of the authors

and the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

PLEASE VISIT WWW.CTBTO.ORG

YOUR RESOURCE

FOR STOPPING NUCLEAR TESTING

If you wish to subscribe to the

ONLINE VERSION OF THE CTBTO SPECTRUM

please visit the ‘email-alert’ area at www.ctbto.org

DISCLAIMER:

The views expressed in articles by external contributors do

not necessarily reﬂect the positions and policies of the CTBTO

Preparatory Commission.

The boundaries and presentation of material on maps do not

imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the Provisional

Technical Secretariat concerning the legal status of any country,

territory, city or area or its authorities, or concerning the

delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

PUBLISHED BY:

Public Information

Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

Vienna International Centre

P.O. Box 1200

1400 Vienna, Austria

T +43 1 26030 6200

F +43 1 26030 5823

E info@ctbto.org

I www.ctbto.org

CTBTO Spectrum – ISSN: 1680-533X

Printed in Austria, May 2011

on Munken Lynx Paper

wood and acid-free,

certiﬁed by the Forest Stewardship Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

CTBTO Spokesperson Annika Thunborg

TREATY STATUS

CTBT signatures and ratiﬁcations (as of 16 May 2011)

QUOTES

VOICES

Moving forward on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. A view from Switzerland

by Micheline Calmy-Rey, President of the Swiss Confederation and Minister of Foreign Affairs

Safeguarding the Arab Renaissance

by Her Royal Highness Princess Sumaya bint El Hassan of Jordan

The end of nuclear testing is within our reach

by Georgina te Heuheu, New Zealand's Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control

Weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament: Scope for Synergy?

by Alyson J.K. Bailes, University of Iceland

STATION STATUS

Certiﬁed International Monitoring System facilities (as of 16 May 2011)

VERIFICATION SCIENCE

Global radiation monitoring in the wake of the Fukushima disaster

by Kirsten Haupt and Thomas Mützelburg

Beacons in the nuclear night: Maintaining the health of the International Monitoring System

by Peter Rickwood

Making sense of it all: Three data analysts talk about the challenges

and rewards of working at the International Data Centre

by Denise Brettschneider

A New Link in the Data Chain: The Congo’s National Data Centre is a model for the region

by Misrak Fisseha

INTERVIEW

Portugal and the CTBTO: Going forward together – The importance of putting facility agreements in place

Interview with João Gomes Cravinho, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal

by Lisa Tabassi and Fanny Tonos Paniagua

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

EDITORIAL

ANNIKA THUNBORG

CTBTO SPOKESPERSON

From 11 March and over the ensuing

weeks, scientists at the Preparatory

Commission for the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

(CTBTO) worked around the clock. When

the devastating magnitude 9.0

earthquake struck northern Japan,

CTBTO data contributed to rapid tsunami

warning alerts and tracked the dispersal

of radioactivity from the damaged

Fukushima plant around the world.

The global alarm system of the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty (CTBT) is being set up to scan

the world for any sign of a nuclear

explosion. In the process of detecting

the needle in the haystack – the

nuclear test – the system registers

over 30,000 events a year. This

information can be used for a wide

range of civil purposes, from

enhancing our understanding of the

Earth to following volcanic ash clouds

and the movement of whales.

Our veriﬁcation regime

demonstrates the synergy between

making the world secure from nuclear

weapons and promoting human

welfare and development.

Several articles in this issue of

CTBTO Spectrum touch upon this

point. They focus on the CTBTO’s

contribution to mitigating the disasters

in Japan, on our dedicated data

analysts who distinguish between

earthquakes and explosions, on the

committed chief who leads the team

that ensures the smooth running of

the CTBT monitoring system, on the

National Data Centre in the Republic

of Congo as a model for the Central

African region, and on why the

Portuguese State Secretary believes

that a facility agreement is one of the

best tools for building up the

veriﬁcation regime.

International security expert

Alyson Bailes discusses the need for a

related kind of synergy: the one between

weapons of mass destruction and

conventional arms – a topic we will

revisit in a later edition of Spectrum. She

also expresses her hope that future

generations of women will want to focus

on this subject. I echo her sentiments

and trust that in the very near future,

women all over the world will be given

the same opportunities and support as

men to become politicians, diplomats

and experts on non-proliferation and

disarmament as well as scientists and

technical experts in the veriﬁcation

sciences. Remember that you will receive

a warm welcome at the CTBTO!

In the wake of the Fukushima

disaster, it has become even more

important to focus on the nexus between

nuclear safety and nuclear security, and

on the need to put in place layer upon

layer of mutually reinforcing

international, regional and bilateral

non-proliferation and disarmament

arrangements in order to build a safer

and more secure world. UN Secretary

General Ban Ki-moon has recently

highlighted this nexus as part of his

ﬁve-point strategy to improve nuclear

safety. In her article “Safeguarding the

Arab Renaissance”, Princess Sumaya of

Jordan underlines the necessity of

connecting these dots in the Arab world.

We usually associate the CTBT

with peace and security: it is a core

element of nuclear non-proliferation,

a catalyst for nuclear disarmament,

and part and parcel of a nuclear-

weapon-free world. It also prevents

further health and environmental

damage caused by nuclear explosions.

And it can serve as a conﬁdence – and

security-building measure. The

President of Switzerland Micheline

Calmy-Rey and the New Zealand

Disarmament Minister Georgina te

Heuheu elaborate eloquently on these

aspects in their respective articles.

But it is also important to

remember that the CTBT is crucial in

connection with the development of

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Whatever impact the Fukushima

disaster has on the predicted nuclear

renaissance it is a fact that more and

more States are mastering the nuclear

fuel cycle. The decision between using

nuclear energy for peaceful or for

weapons purposes will become more a

political and legal issue rather than

one of technology and know-how. The

CTBT provides the last and clearly

visible barrier between permitted and

prohibited activities – a legal line that

needs to be drawn clearly and

irrevocably.

The CTBTO’s global nature with

its equal and democratic distribution

of data proved to be an important

asset for governments, organizations

and people all over the world during

the Fukushima disaster. The CTBT,

which is equally non-discriminatory

with the same rights and obligations

for all its members, sets a new legal

and veriﬁcation standard for nuclear

weapons, thus making a great

contribution towards creating a safer

and more secure world.

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

STATUS OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS

AS OF 16 MAY 2011

AFGHANISTAN

ALGERIA

ANGOLA

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

ARGENTINA

ARMENIA

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRIA

AZERBAIJAN

BAHAMAS

BAHRAIN

BANGLADESH

BARBADOS

BELIZE

BENIN

BHUTAN

BOLIVIA

BOTSWANA

BRAZIL

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

BULGARIA

BURKINA FASO

BURUNDI

CAMBODIA

CAMEROON

CANADA

CAPE VERDE

CENTRAL

AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

CHAD

CHILE

CHINA

COLOMBIA

COMOROS

CONGO

COSTA RICA

CTE D'IVOIRE

CUBA

CYPRUS

CZECH REPUBLIC

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE`S

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC

OF THE

CONGO

DJIBOUTI

DOMINICA

DOMINICAN

REPUBLIC

ECUADOR

EGYPT

EL SALVADOR

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

ERITREA

ESTONIA

ETHIOPIA

FIJI

FINLAND

FRANCE

GABON

GAMBIA

GEORGIA

GERMANY

GHANA

GREECE

GRENADA

GUATEMALA

GUINEA

GUINEA-BISSAU

GUYANA

HAITI

HONDURAS

HUNGARY

ICELAND

INDIA

INDONESIA

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF IRAN

IRAQ

ISRAEL

ITALY

JAMAICA

JAPAN

JORDAN

KAZAKHSTAN

KENYA

KIRIBATI

KUWAIT

KYRGYZSTAN

LAO PEOPLE'S

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

LEBANON

LESOTHO

LIBERIA

LIBYAN

ARAB

JAMAHIRIYA

MADAGASCAR

MALAWI

MALAYSIA

MALDIVES

MALI

MAURITANIA

MAURITIUS

MEXICO

MONGOLIA

MOROCCO

MOZAMBIQUE

MYANMAR

NAMIBIA

NEPAL

NETHERLANDS

NEW ZEALAND

NICARAGUA

NIGER

NIGERIA

NORWAY

OMAN

PAKISTAN

PANAMA

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

PARAGUAY

PERU

PHILIPPINES

POLAND

PORTUGAL

QATAR

REPUBLIC

OF KOREA

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

ROMANIA

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

RWANDA

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

SAINT LUCIA

SAINT VINCENT AND

THE GRENADINES

SAMOA

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

SAUDI ARABIA

SENEGAL

SEYCHELLES

SIERRA LEONE

SINGAPORE

SOLOMON ISLANDS

SOMALIA

SOUTH AFRICA

SPAIN

SRI LANKA

SUDAN

SURINAME

SWAZILAND

SWEDEN

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

TAJIKISTAN

THAILAND

TOGO

TONGA

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO

TUNISIA

TURKEY

TURKMENISTAN

UGANDA

UKRAINE

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED REPUBLIC

OF TANZANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

URUGUAY

UZBEKISTAN

VANUATU

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC

OF VENEZUELA

VIET NAM

YEMEN

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

TIMOR-LESTE

COOK ISLANDS

MARSHALL ISLANDS

FEDERATED STATES

OF MICRONESIA

NAURU

NIUE

PALAU

TUVALU

SIGNATORY STATES RATIFYING STATES NON-SIGNATORY STATES

TOTAL STATES: 195 182 153 13

ANNEX 2 STATES: 44 41 35 3

●

FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION VISIT WWW.CTBTO.ORG/MAP

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CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

QUOTES

“Universal ratification of the

test ban treaty would be a step

toward creating a truly global

community of nations, in which

all share the responsibility for

humankind’s future."

PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

NEW YORK TIMES OP-ED,

28 DECEMBER 2010

“Once again we encourage

all countries which have not

yet done so to sign and ratify

this Treaty [CTBT]. Unilateral

moratoriums on nuclear tests

are useful, but they cannot

substitute for enshrining

this key obligation for global

security in the international

law."

SERGEI LAVROV

RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER,

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT,

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND,

1 MARCH 2011

“The United States and China

underlined their commitment to the

eventual realization of a world without

nuclear weapons and the need to

strengthen the international nuclear

non-proliferation regime to address

the threats of nuclear proliferation

and nuclear terrorism. In this regard,

both sides support early entry into

force of the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)…”

U.S. – CHINA

JOINT STATEMENT

19 JANUARY 2011

“In 2011, as a result of the

shared commitment between

the Government and Parliament,

Indonesia, Insha-Allah, will complete

the ratiﬁcation process and will

encourage various parties to do the

same so that the CTBT treaty will

soon enter into force.”

MARTY NATALEGAWA

INDONESIA’S FOREIGN MINISTER,

ANNUAL PRESS STATEMENT,

JAKARTA, INDONESIA, 7 JANUARY 2011

“Ratiﬁcation of the CTBT

represents an essential step on

the path toward a world without

nuclear weapons. We believe

that the national security of the

United States, and all states,

will be enhanced when the test

ban enters into force.”

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER

U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL,

VILNIUS UNIVERSITY,

LITHUANIA, 9 FEBRUARY 2011

"We call on China, the United

States, Egypt, Iran, Israel and

Indonesia to ratify, and on India,

Pakistan and North Korea to sign and

ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty, that has already been ratified

by 153 nations, so that the Treaty can

be brought into full legal force."

NOBEL PEACE LAUREATES,

FINAL DECLARATION,

11th WORLD SUMMIT, HIROSHIMA,

JAPAN, 14 NOVEMBER 2010

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

Moving forward

on nuclear

non-proliferation

and disarmament

A view from Switzerland

BY MICHELINE CALMY-REY,

PRESIDENT OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION

AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SWITZERLAND

On 5 February 2011, the U.S. Secretary

of State, Hillary Clinton, and the

Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov,

exchanged the instruments of ratiﬁcation

of the New START on the sidelines of the

Munich Security Conference, ofﬁcially

bringing the New START into force. This

was an important step towards President

Barack Obama's visionary goal – spelled

out in Prague in April 2009 – of a

nuclear-weapon-free world.

SERIOUS CHALLENGES REMAIN

BEFORE A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-

FREE WORLD CAN BE REALIZED

On the other hand, without denying this

positive development, we have to face

the fact that serious challenges remain on

the road to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

From a broader point of view, Switzerland

remains convinced that one cannot expect

full commitment to the disarmament

process – as well as more concrete

progress – before the international

community can be convinced that:

 nuclear weapons are not the

appropriate means to meet the

current security challenges, which

include terrorism, organized crime,

migration, the misuse of information

technology, and ﬁnancial market

instability or climate change;

 nuclear weapons constitute

an existential threat to the

world in themselves. Their very

existence makes them attractive

to proliferators, whether States

or non-State actors, and as a

consequence increases instability

rather than stability; and that

 credible long-term security policies

must be based on universal,

non-discriminatory and legally-

binding instruments. In the current

situation, however, the world is

encumbered with a haves and

have-nots approach to nuclear

disarmament.

Just because today the ball seems

to be in the court of the nuclear weapon

States, must the non-nuclear weapon

States give up on the objective of a world

without nuclear weapons? Is nuclear

disarmament an issue for nuclear weapon

States alone? The answer is clearly "no".

We all are stakeholders in our planet’s

survival, and we all have the right – and

the obligation – to get involved in the

nuclear disarmament process.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE

IMMORAL AND ILLEGAL

At the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, I

denounced nuclear weapons as immoral

and illegal. They are fundamentally

VOICES

»Since a nuclear

war would threaten

the very survival of

humankind, a debate

should be launched

on the legitimacy of

the use of nuclear

weapons regardless

of the legitimacy of

the motive of defence

that can be invoked. «

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

immoral because they cause massive

and indiscriminate destruction in terms

of human lives, material resources and

consequences for the environment.

They are illegal by their very nature

with regard to international

humanitarian law. Their use

violates without exception all

fundamental principles and rules

of international humanitarian

law. Since a nuclear war would

threaten the very survival of

humankind, a debate should

be launched on the legitimacy

of the use of nuclear weapons

regardless of the legitimacy of

the motive of defence that can be

invoked. We must examine the

question regarding the point at

which the rights of States must

yield to the interests of humanity.

Switzerland, the depositary

of the Geneva Conventions,

feels a special responsibility to bring

the humanitarian perspective back

to the heart of the debate on nuclear

disarmament. To this end, Switzerland

has initiated a study on the subject

of delegitimizing nuclear weapons,

and it has successfully worked for the

inclusion of a reference to international

humanitarian law in the ﬁnal document

of the last NPT Review Conference.

Switzerland intends to remain actively

engaged in this humanitarian approach.

As a State that gives high priority

to strengthening international peace,

and as one convinced of the importance

of the multilateral framework in this

respect, Switzerland has also recently

developed a range of activities as

intermediate steps in promoting the

vision of a world without nuclear

weapons. Together with Chile, Malaysia,

New Zealand and Nigeria, Switzerland

has tabled proposals to reduce the alert

levels of nuclear weapons. The fact that

hundreds of nuclear weapons remain

on a high alert level, ready to be ﬁred

within minutes, poses a speciﬁc and

unacceptable threat. These levels of

alert do not make any sense some 20

years after the end of the Cold War.

They do not correspond to the current

international situation. Switzerland has

thus sponsored a UN General Assembly

resolution on "de-alerting" nuclear

weapons, which was adopted by an

overwhelming majority of States at the

2010 UN General Assembly. Switzerland

will remain active on this issue.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference

also agreed on a comprehensive action

plan on nuclear disarmament, which

includes concrete steps towards the

total elimination of nuclear weapons.

It must now be our aim to ensure

that these commitments are fulﬁlled.

Their implementation must be closely

monitored and the irreversibility of the

steps taken must be ensured.

One of these commitments is

related to the entry into force of the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

(CTBT). Switzerland was among the

ﬁrst States to sign and ratify the CTBT.

In addition, in 2003 a Swiss seismic

station was inaugurated as part of the

International Monitoring System to

verify compliance with the Treaty.

SWITZERLAND’S UNWAVERING

SUPPORT FOR THE CTBT

Switzerland’s full support for the

objectives of the CTBT is not only

related to the fact that the Treaty bans

all nuclear tests, anytime, anywhere and

in any form. The CTBT is also intended

to constrain the qualitative development

of nuclear weapons. By limiting the

development of more advanced types of

nuclear weapons, the CTBT prevents the

proliferation of nuclear weapons in all

its aspects. Since the conclusion of the

negotiations on such a treaty was one

of the objectives adopted by the 1995

NPT Review and Extension Conference,

the CTBT also constitutes a guarantee for

maintaining the fundamental commitment

to nuclear disarmament given by the

nuclear weapon States. Furthermore,

with the establishment of a wide-ranging

monitoring system, the Preparatory

Commission for the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

(CTBTO) provides the international

community with a tremendous

conﬁdence-building measure. Last, but

not least, if it enters into force, the CTBT

will prevent further potential health and

environmental damage caused by nuclear

test explosions.

Switzerland will thus continue to

spare no effort to promote the entry

into force of the CTBT. In this context,

Switzerland will support the organization

of a special segment focusing on nuclear

disarmament at the upcoming 125th

International Parliamentary Union

Assembly, due to take place in Bern in

October 2011.

It is also important to identify other

areas where additional efforts are needed.

In this context, Switzerland underlines

the ﬁeld of nuclear doctrines, where the

logic of nuclear deterrence has hardly

evolved since the Cold War. Switzerland

is convinced that a future and sustainable

concept of security must be widened to

include not only military and strategic

aspects but also the economic, energy,

»By limiting the

development of more

advanced types of

nuclear weapons,

the CTBT prevents

the proliferation of

nuclear weapons

in all its aspects. «

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

Auxiliary seismic station

AS102, Davos, Switzerland

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

MICHELINE CALMY-REY

is President of the Swiss

Confederation, an ofﬁce she held once

before in 2007. Ms Calmy-Rey has

been a member of the Swiss Federal

Council since 2003 as Head of the

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

She pursues an active foreign policy

marked by a commitment to promoting

peace, respect for international law

and human rights, and the ﬁght against

poverty. Previously, Ms Calmy-Rey

was a member of the Geneva Cantonal

Government.

environmental, development and

humanitarian dimensions. Nuclear

weapons will never be eliminated if

one does not envisage a future without

them. A debate is urgently needed

on security without nuclear weapons.

Switzerland will also be active on these

issues during the coming years in order to

contribute to the new NPT review process,

which will begin in 2012.

Looking at the renewed disarmament

efforts as well as the challenges ahead,

Switzerland cannot but conclude that

there is no alternative to outlawing the

use of nuclear weapons and gradually

and systematically getting rid of them.

The Five-Point Plan of the UN Secretary

General of October 2008 sets out how

we could proceed towards the outlawing

of nuclear weapons. Switzerland

supports this plan. It has the advantage

of ﬂexibility. It does not preclude the

ultimate grand design of a Nuclear

Weapons Convention and it does not

preclude a step-by-step approach.

Nuclear disarmament is not a

matter of idealism. It is a matter of

reason and responsibility. And it is not

an illusion either. The real illusion is to

believe that some States can continue

to rely on such weapons and prevent

their proliferation. Nuclear disarmament

is also a matter of conviction and of

creativity, the one stimulating the other.

Convinced that the total elimination

of nuclear weapons is a noble goal,

Switzerland will continue to contribute

constructively and concretely towards

the achievement of this objective.

Micheline Calmy-Rey speaking at

the 2010 NPT Review Conference,

New York, 3 May 2010.

UN Photo/Evan Schneider

»If it enters into force, the CTBT will prevent

further potential health and environmental

damage caused by nuclear test explosions.«

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

VOICES

Safeguarding

the Arab

Renaissance

BY HER ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCESS

SUMAYA BINT EL HASSAN OF JORDAN

The Arab world is on the

move. Overwhelming poverty,

unemployment and frustration have

led to the toppling of old monoliths

of repression as Arabs unite in their

desire to build a better future. There

is fear and there is uncertainty, but

there is also a distinct absence of

ideology in the chants of the hopeful.

The fact is, employment, opportunity

and dignity will not emerge from

proﬂigate political jockeying, but

from committed investment in

science, innovation and enterprise.

The energy that will ignite our region

is fuel for progress, not anger at the

other. Much of that energy looks

likely to be nuclear.

The recent disaster at Japan’s

Fukushima nuclear power plant has

prompted a renewed focus on nuclear

safety around the world. Events at

Fukushima have emphasised the need

to tighten safety and to learn from

the failings of older facilities. In the

Arab world, calls have already been

made for proposed nuclear projects

to make safety an intrinsic part of

the design and ongoing management

culture of future facilities. Fukushima

has taught us that disasters, no matter

how unlikely they seem at the design

stage, must be anticipated and planned

for. Regular audits and comprehensive

emergency contingency plans must

become a feature of all projects in the

Middle East.

With the help of the

International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) and the Preparatory

Commission for the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

(CTBTO), we in Jordan are ready to

help shape our nuclear renaissance

safely and securely, with a full

commitment to non-proliferation and

disarmament in our region.

ADDRESSING JORDAN’S

ENERGY NEEDS

The greater Middle East is rumbling

with an unprecedented hunger for

more energy and more reliability in

supply. Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and

Saudi Arabia are just some of the

States that have declared an interest

in developing peaceful nuclear

technology to meet future energy

needs safely and securely. This is

an inevitable part of our region’s

progress away from fossil fuels and

from their destructive environmental

and political implications. But in our

fractured neighbourhood, a need for

energy security seems to sit with a

deep fear of having nuclear capable

neighbours. This should not be the

case. The nuclear agenda in our

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

region has ﬂipped from military

to socio-economic in most right-

thinking administrations, while a

raft of international agreements

and protocols have enmeshed

most governments in a peaceful,

regional nuclear structure. Measures

such as the IAEA Safeguards

on peaceful nuclear activities,

Additional Protocol measures, the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile

Material Cut-Off Treaty will change

the landscape with the cooperation

of most regional actors. We must

ensure that the stragglers follow

suit and that public perceptions are

informed and encouraged by the

possibilities of peaceful and safe

nuclear development.

THE CTBT: CENTRAL TO

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL

DISARMAMENT AND NON-

PROLIFERATION EFFORTS

At El Hassan Science City (EHSC), our

relationship with the CTBTO is greatly

valued. The CTBTO’s commitment to

promoting peaceful development in

our region, and around the world,

is founded on monitoring activities

and strengthened by its facilitation

of dialogue and discussion. The value

of trust in multinational engagement

cannot be overstated, particularly in our

region where national social contracts

are being renegotiated and an evermore

sophisticated population is looking

for hope beyond politics. The CTBTO’s

work greatly enhances cooperative

possibilities for nations in transition and

for economies on the verge of drawing

down their dormant human capital.

Jordan is an ardent supporter

of the CTBT and of the efforts of

the CTBTO to ensure that testing of

nuclear weapons is banned in all its

forms. We are proud to give a home

to the CTBTO auxiliary seismic station

at Tel Alasfar, which has been in

operation since 2002, and we believe

that the organization is central to

global and regional disarmament

and non-proliferation efforts. As

a signatory since 1996, Jordan has

many scientists and policymakers who

have learnt much from the cultural

framework of CTBT institutions. More

recently, our strategic decision to adopt

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

has added impetus to our efforts in the

area of international monitoring and

disarmament diplomacy. We believe

that the CTBT and other multilateral

treaties should be a basic component

of the moral obligations and

responsibilities of countries seeking to

develop peaceful nuclear technologies,

or those already in possession of

them. It is in this environment that

the Kingdom is seeking to go nuclear.

Energy is of great concern to all

Jordanians as we import a staggering

95 percent of our energy requirements,

at a cost of over 20 percent of the

nation’s gross domestic product.

The process of engagement with

the public on nuclear issues is still at

an early stage but our intentions are

clear. Work has recently begun on a

White Paper that will illustrate the

beneﬁts of peaceful nuclear energy

in the Kingdom. The wide-ranging

document will bed its position in the

immense energy/water challenge

that faces us and will include lessons

learnt from Fukushima. The document

will highlight the many factors and

components of Jordan’s nuclear energy

programme and will place the nuclear

initiative in the context of planned

energy diversiﬁcation, electricity

generation and demand, water scarcity

and resources, the environment, job

creation and capacity building. Of

course, it will also take note of the

ever-changing geopolitical environment

that deﬁnes our region for many in

the West. Issues that hold as much

importance for us will also be covered,

including the regulatory environment,

international obligations and the

potential beneﬁts to an informed nation

that embraces the nuclear option.

BRIDGING THE DIVIDE

BETWEEN POLICYMAKERS AND

SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES

The Jordan Atomic Energy Commission

is also beginning a process of

engagement with the general public

to measure perceptions of nuclear

energy and of Jordan’s ﬂedging nuclear

programme in particular. This is a

process from which we can all beneﬁt.

At EHSC, we believe it is vital for the

CTBTO to build partnerships not only

with Member States but also within

Member States, with civil society

organizations and the wider public.

We are honoured to provide a link that

makes this possible. Our expertise can

only help in bridging the divide between

policymakers and scientiﬁc communities,

and in making this new nuclear age a

peaceful and prosperous one.

USEFULNESS OF CTBT

MONITORING DATA

The Jordanian National Data Centre

(NDC) in Amman is a key component of

our efforts to promote peace through

scientiﬁc know-how. Currently based at

the Jordan Seismological Observatory,

we hope that the CTBTO will help us

to expand the usefulness of this data

repository and the utility of its unique

expertise. As a ﬁrst step to expanding

our community engagement, we hope to

establish sub-NDCs at several Jordanian

universities to maximize the beneﬁts to

be derived from the data provided by

the International Monitoring System

Safeguarding

the Arab

Renaissance

»We in Jordan are

ready to help shape our

nuclear renaissance

safely and securely,

with a full commitment

to non-proliferation

and disarmament

in our region.«

»Another key goal

of our cooperation

with the CTBTO is

the expansion of

Treaty acceptance

in the region.«

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

(IMS) and the International Data

Centre at the CTBTO. Encouraging

universities to use data provided by

the CTBTO's facilities would greatly aid

the process of broadening civil society

involvement in the monitoring process.

Another key goal of our

cooperation with the CTBTO is the

expansion of Treaty acceptance in the

region. To aid this process, we are keen

to establish a Regional Data Centre

in Jordan. We believe that such a

centre would beneﬁt our cooperative

work in several ways. Firstly, it would

encourage and facilitate researchers

from neighbouring countries and

help preparations to implement

the veriﬁcation regime beyond our

borders. Secondly, it would provide

a valuable platform for the use of

underappreciated scientiﬁc data in

other countries. We have gained

valuable experience by establishing

and expanding the ﬁrst NDC in the

Middle East, with the cooperation of

the CTBTO, and we have developed

rare technical expertise that should be

shared with our fellow Arabs. Jordan

is an ideal candidate for the role for

many other reasons, not least because

of our central location and our open

borders. It is my hope that a Regional

Data Centre would eventually lead to

the establishment of a Middle East

Training Centre, further enhancing

opportunities for Jordanian and Arab

involvement in international nuclear

and energy organizations.

USING IMS DATA TO HELP

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

A vital step to expanding Jordan’s

contribution to CTBT goals is our

proposal to establish sub-NDCs at

some of our top science universities,

including Princess Sumaya University

for Technology, Yarmuk University,

and the Jordan University of Science

and Technology. Setting up sub-NDCs

at universities would increase

the use of invaluable IMS data to

aid scientiﬁc research in ﬁelds as

diverse as seismology, geology, the

environment and Information and

Communication Technologies (ICT).

The Arab world remains far behind

the rest of the planet when it comes to

nuclear energy. As the count of nuclear

reactors on the globe races beyond 450,

we Arabs have yet to inaugurate a single

one. But the discussion is well under

way. Before Fukushima, the nuclear

renaissance that had sparked debate

in Russia, India, China and many more

diverse and energy-thirsty nations,

had also hit the Arab world. Like many

countries that have emerged from shaky

economic and political transitions,

the Arab States will need help and

investment to make goals a reality under

a shared commitment to safety and

security. The rewards for us are ones

that the West will share: development,

stability and the global contribution to

peace and sustainability of a people with

ambitions, optimism and the energy to

build new societies.

Aerial image of El

Hassan Science City

in Amman, Jordan.

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCESS

SUMAYA BINT EL HASSAN

is President of the Royal Scientiﬁc

Society, Chair of the Board of

Trustees of Princess Sumaya

University for Technology and

founder of El Hassan Science City.

Princess Sumaya is an advocate of

science as a catalyst for change in the

Arab World. She champions scientiﬁc

excellence in education, research and

innovation to promote sustainable

development in Jordan and the

region. The Princess is committed to

maximizing human potential through

education and opportunity.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty (CTBT) is a vital element

in today’s multilateral framework

for nuclear disarmament and

non-proliferation. Its entry into force

would be a major step towards a world

free of nuclear weapons – which must

be our ultimate destination. But this

year is the ﬁfteenth since the Treaty

was opened for signature, and it is yet

to enter into force.

New Zealand has always been

a strong advocate of the Treaty. New

Zealand signed the Treaty just three

days after it was opened for signature

on 27 September 1996 and each year in

the United Nations General Assembly

takes turns with Australia and Mexico

to run a resolution in support of the

Treaty. New Zealand also hosts six

monitoring stations which form part of

the veriﬁcation system on its territory,

as well as one of ten currently certiﬁed

radionuclide laboratories.

NEW ZEALAND’S DECADES-

LONG STRUGGLE TO MAKE

THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE

These actions are consistent with New

Zealand’s long history of opposing nuclear

weapons and nuclear testing.

New Zealanders have worked

for decades for the complete cessation

of nuclear testing around the world.

Since the 1950s, when nuclear weapons

ﬁrst started being tested in our region,

successive New Zealand governments

have contributed to global and regional

efforts to stop testing. Those efforts have

included taking direct action, such as the

dispatching of New Zealand warships to

the testing grounds of the Paciﬁc, and

pursuing more traditional diplomatic and

legal initiatives.

In the ﬁve decades following World

War II, at least 285 atmospheric and

underground tests were carried out in

the Paciﬁc. Although far from the world’s

heavily populated metropolitan regions,

the chosen sites were not empty. They

were inhabited by small and vulnerable

communities, some of which were exposed

to environmental and health effects that

The end

of nuclear

testing

is within

our reach

BY GEORGINA TE HEUHEU,

NEW ZEALAND'S MINISTER FOR

DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

VOICES

remain to this day. Nuclear testing in

the Paciﬁc strengthened New Zealand’s

resolve that nuclear weapons provided

no solution to the problems of the world

and that they had no place in our region.

It inspired the creation of the South

Paciﬁc Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone by the

Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985, and New

Zealand’s own nuclear-free legislation in

1987, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,

Disarmament and Arms Control Act, both

of which occupy a special place in our

national identity.

»… an effective and

veriﬁable CTBT is an

essential step on the

road to a nuclear-

weapon-free world.

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

IMPORTANCE OF A UNIVERSAL

AND VERIFIABLE BAN

ON NUCLEAR TESTS

Like many other countries, however,

New Zealand was convinced that the

most effective way to achieve an end

to nuclear testing would be through a

universal and veriﬁable global ban. The

negotiation of the CTBT in 1996 was a

very positive step in that direction. At the

heart of the Treaty is the recognition that

banning nuclear tests effectively places

a qualitative cap on the development

and improvement of nuclear weapons. In

short, an effective and veriﬁable CTBT is

an essential step on the road to a nuclear-

weapon-free world.

While the opening of the CTBT for

signature in September 1996 was the

culmination of many years of technical,

scientiﬁc and diplomatic work, the next

two challenges – pulling together the

necessary ratiﬁcations for entry into force

and building the Treaty’s veriﬁcation

system – were only just beginning.

Substantial progress has been made

on both goals. The CTBT has now been

signed by 182 States and ratiﬁed by

153. Approximately 85 percent of the

International Monitoring System (IMS)

stations have been installed, of which

almost 80 percent have been certiﬁed and

are fully operational. The International

Data Centre continues to provide Member

States with essential products (such as raw

data and data analysis results) and services

using an ever-increasing stream of data

from the IMS. Work is also underway to

develop the necessary framework for the

ﬁnal veriﬁcation measure included in the

Treaty, an on-site inspection (OSI).

The global progress that has been

made reﬂects a near-universal recognition

and acceptance of the objectives of

the Treaty, and has contributed to the

global moratorium on nuclear testing.

But it is not enough. As we have seen

as recently as 2009 when North Korea

conducted a nuclear test, a norm against

nuclear testing which has a moral rather

than a legal force cannot be relied upon

to prevent a breach, and a veriﬁcation

regime that is not complete cannot

provide an adequate response.

PROMOTING THE CTBT’S

ENTRY INTO FORCE

There have been many initiatives since

1996 to promote the entry into force of

the Treaty, including the biennial Article

XIV (Entry into Force) conferences and

the annual resolutions of the United

Nations General Assembly. The CTBT

also features prominently on the agenda

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) Review Conferences, with the

2010 Conference reafﬁrming the essential

role of the Treaty within the nuclear

disarmament and non-proliferation

regime. And with the help of the

Government of Kazakhstan, 2010 also

saw the inauguration of an international

day against nuclear testing on 29 August.

These initiatives have had some

success. The number of ratiﬁcations

continues to grow, with recent additions

from the Paciﬁc region such as the

Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea

further contributing to the universalization

of the Treaty. Positive signals from among

the remaining Annex II States are also

signiﬁcant, and New Zealand warmly

welcomes the public commitments from

Indonesia and the United States to move

forward on ratiﬁcation.

There can, however, be no substitute

for entry into force of the Treaty and for

the completion of the veriﬁcation regime.

Fifteen years after the CTBT’s negotiation,

there can no longer be any arguments

that a global ban on nuclear testing is

not feasible or cannot be veriﬁed. If

we – as individual countries and as an

international community – are serious

»Fifteen years after the CTBT’s

negotiation, there can no longer

be any arguments that a global

ban on nuclear testing is not

feasible or cannot be veriﬁed.«

The Licorne test, Moruroa

Atoll, southern Paciﬁc

Ocean, 3 July 1970.

AFP Getty Images.

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

about ending nuclear testing and paving

the way towards a nuclear-weapon-free

world, there can be no better way of

demonstrating our commitment to that

ideal than by signing and ratifying the

CTBT and seeing it enter into force.

STATES THAT HAVE NOT YET

SIGNED OR RATIFIED THE CTBT

SHOULD DO SO IMMEDIATELY

In this regard the nine remaining Annex 2

States bear a special responsibility for the

CTBT’s entry into force. At the same time

that New Zealand looks to those States

to take immediate steps to sign and ratify

the Treaty, we will take every opportunity

to encourage other remaining States,

including those in the Paciﬁc, to ratify the

Treaty, and support the efforts of those

moving towards this goal.

We, the international community,

must also continue to work

collectively towards a veriﬁcation

regime to monitor Treaty compliance

that will be operational at entry into

force. This will require the support

of all Member States. Adequate

resources and political support are

also indispensible, whether in the

form of technical expertise, budgetary

contributions or the construction of

monitoring stations.

CTBT MEMBERSHIP

OFFERS A NUMBER OF

ADDITIONAL BENEFITS

The beneﬁts to States from CTBT

membership are far greater than

the costs. The products of the IMS

network are an increasingly important

global scientiﬁc resource, as shown

in particular by the work now being

done in the ﬁeld of tsunami early

warnings. In addition, all States hosting

monitoring stations own and operate

those stations and receive technical

and ﬁnancial assistance to ensure

their continued operation. For many

States, the Preparatory Commission for

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty Organization (CTBTO) provides

capacity building assistance through

technical workshops and training.

However, what New Zealand

values most about being part of the

CTBT is contributing to the movement

towards a great global good: the end

of nuclear testing for all time. This is

an essential step towards the ultimate

goal of eliminating nuclear weapons

and the threat they pose to life on

earth. New Zealand would like to

see the CTBT enter into force sooner

rather than later and calls on all States

yet to sign and ratify the Treaty to do

so without further delay.

GEORGINA TE HEUHEU

is New Zealand’s Minister for

Disarmament and Arms Control,

Minister for Courts, Minister of Paciﬁc

Island Affairs and Associate Minister of

Maori Affairs. Mrs te Heuheu was the

ﬁrst Maori woman to be admitted to the

High Court of New Zealand as a

Barrister and Solicitor. She went on to

practise law in Wellington and Rotorua

before entering Parliament in 1996. She

became only the second Maori woman

appointed to a New Zealand Cabinet in

1998. From 1998 to 1999, Mrs te

Heuheu was New Zealand’s Minister for

Courts, Minister of Women’s Affairs,

Associate Minister for Treaty of

Waitangi Negotiations and Associate

Minister of Health.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Air sampler at

radionuclide station

RN47, Kaitaia,

New Zealand

Map showing the South Paciﬁc

Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

Courtesy of Nuclear Threat

Initiative (NTI).

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

LEGALITY ISSUES AND

THE USE OF DIFFERENT

TYPES OF WEAPONS

The most obvious contrasts between

mass-destruction weapons and others

are in terms of legality and use. Owning

and trading in most conventional arms is

legal, in contrast to the formal prohibition

of chemical and biological weapons,

and of nuclear weapons other than for

ﬁve States under the provisions of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Conventional weapons are used every day

throughout the world, for hunting and

personal protection, internal conﬂict and

policing purposes as well as inter-State

war. Countries that have developed nuclear

weapons would all claim – whether we

believe them or not – that they have them

in order not to use them, i.e. for deterrence

and only secondly for defence. Moreover,

no way has yet been found to use such

weapons for practical purposes of local

warfare, crisis management or internal

order, though defence planners have

sometimes toyed with inventions – like

neutron bombs or ‘mini-nukes’ – whose

apparent ‘useability’ would risk eroding

the nuclear taboo.

Even so, there are ways in which

the two weaponry challenges are

interlinked or run parallel. Nuclear

weapons, and chemical and biological

ones if used in a context of warfare,

require conventional weapons – missiles,

drones, aircraft or submarines – to

During my career both as an ofﬁcial

and a researcher, I have spent

more or less equal time and effort

dealing with the issues of Weapons

of Mass Destruction (WMD) and

with conventional arms control and

armament policy. In retrospect I realize

it is uncommon to combine these two

interests, perhaps especially for a

woman. While female pioneers like Alva

Myrdal were equally concerned about

all arms and destructive techniques, in

modern times we tend to ﬁnd women

most prominently engaged on WMD

issues on the one hand, and issues of

inhumane conventional weaponry and

small arms on the other. This is perhaps

not surprising given the particular

ethical and humanitarian issues that

both those topics raise, and the way

they both relate to a gender discourse

(the huge majority of small arms users

are men). It is also noteworthy how few

women work on the supply side of the

arms business, in the defence industry

and on arms collaboration policy.

Some might say this is to

women’s credit: but it is a pity

if it strengthens the tendency in

the arms control establishment to

draw hard frontiers – and maintain

separate career tracks – between

WMD-related issues and those of

conventional disarmament. For one

thing, technological advances are

threatening to dissolve that barrier

by introducing non-nuclear, –

chemical or – biological techniques

that could have the same massive

and indiscriminate impact as existing

WMD. For another, the struggle

to reduce arms and end conﬂicts is

always in need of fresh ideas; and

some might conceivably emerge

from thinking about contrasts and

comparisons between the two ﬁelds,

notably in terms of the challenges

they pose for control and the

possible solutions. This article will try

to do just that, though necessarily in

very broad terms – and offering more

questions than answers.

Weapons of mass

destruction and

conventional

disarmament:

Scope

for Synergy?

VOICES

BY ALYSON J.K. BAILES,

UNIVERSITY OF

ICELAND

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

deliver them. Missiles have become a

central but peculiarly intractable issue

of arms control precisely because they

can carry multiple payloads, plus having

‘peaceful’ uses in space exploration.

Technologies like precision guidance have

similar across-the-board applications.

In policy terms, the two kinds of

capability become fatefully intertwined

when nuclear capacity is seen as offsetting

a conventional force deﬁcit, or as a way of

protecting territories so small, remote and

close to the enemy that their defensibility

may otherwise be in doubt. Such thinking

has been found on both sides of the

NATO/Warsaw Pact (now, NATO/Russia)

or the India/Pakistan relationship, and it

may also be a motive for smaller States

facing regional isolation. Among the grave

risks of such ‘nuclear dependence’ is that it

gives any conventional clash the potential

of escalating into WMD use that would

be fateful not just for the targets, but for

the users and the world. The 21st century

concern about terrorists or other non-State

groups gaining ‘asymmetrical’ advantages

by acquiring WMD techniques also has

conventional parallels: vide the worldwide

effort to stop terrorists getting MANPADs

that can be used inter alia to attack top

political targets.

MOST CONVENTIONAL ARMS

ARE PRODUCED, TRADED AND

OWNED BY LARGE STATES

Even the more abstract, symbolic purposes

that nuclear status is often seen as

serving, linked as it is to permanent UN

Security Council membership and regional

leadership, are not completely alien to

the conventional ﬁeld. The great bulk of

conventional arms are produced, traded

and owned by large States

that are not at

war, lack major internal conﬂicts and face

relatively low risks of armed violence all

round. This may partly be explained by

economic motives (arms sales, employment

in the defence industry, keeping a

technological edge) and by the post-Cold

War increase in military interventions

overseas. Yet the sheer size of arsenals,

including many weapons systems ill-ﬁtted

to modern expeditionary purposes,

suggests that less tangible factors like

generalized deterrence, self-assertion and

status-building must be at play.

These connections are not just

intellectually intriguing, but matter for

anyone aiming to monitor, curb and

eventually eliminate the tools of violence.

Regional enmities and aggressive national

policies may all too easily break out

through the conventional channel if the

nuclear route is suppressed, and vice

versa. Conversely, the kind of progress

in trust and cooperation that allows

WMD to be cut back or eliminated also

helps reduce excess conventional arms

build-up, and at best ends with nations

using their weapons cooperatively as in

joint peace missions – like Europeans

in East and West after the Cold War.

One kind of arms control should never

be made hostage to the other, not least

because the most urgent weapons-related

risks for peace and humanity will differ

objectively from region to region and case

to case. But it is legitimate to ask if they

could inform and reinforce each other

better than at present.

PROGRESS IN CONVENTIONAL

ARMS CONTROL

At ﬁrst sight, it is the contrasts between

the two ﬁelds that stand out in this respect

_______________

[1] Man-portable air defence systems.

[2] The top ﬁve weapons producers are the United

States, Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom

and France; the top exporters are the United

States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia

(facts from the Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org).

Titan 2- the largest

intercontinental ballistic missile

ever built by the United States.

Courtesy of Kingdafy

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

too. Conventional arms control has made

most progress hitherto through regional

deals that cut levels, improve transparency

and/or constrain forces’ behaviour; with

global provisions reserved for inhumane

weapons that in practice matter less for

winning wars. Negotiated nuclear cuts

have also been limited to the U.S./Russian

relationship, while nuclear – or WMD-free

zones provide an important regional

dimension; but the most fundamental

instruments of WMD control are still the

global ones – including the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This

makes sense not just because WMD are an

issue for all humanity, but also because the

threat of proliferation and break-out looms

so large in this ﬁeld and demands global

treatment in an age of worldwide trade,

travel and technology diffusion.

At the technical level, meanwhile,

the issue of testing is less germane to

conventional weapons dangers – except,

tellingly, for missiles – than for nuclear

restraint. It is also hard to think of

techniques that could be applied to it in

the same global style as they can be for

purposes of monitoring nuclear breakout,

like seismic monitoring or the emissions

monitoring linked with a ﬁssile materials

cut-off. This does not of course mean

that the veriﬁcation machinery being

established by the Preparatory Commission

for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty Organization (CTBTO) could not

be put to good use in other ﬁelds of

security governance and science

. Nor is

it saying that the CTBTO’s high standards

in terms of non-discrimination and

comprehensiveness, with equal rights

and obligations for all Member States,

would not be desirable as a model for

conventional disarmament or indeed

for quantitative nuclear reductions. It is

just that it has so far proved beyond the

reach of practical politics to transplant

such approaches to other than ‘inhumane’

weapons.

CALLS FOR AN ARMS

TRADE TREATY

The parallels that do exist in control

approaches can be seen above all in

the ‘dual-use’ dilemma. Just as WMD

policy seeks to build ﬁrewalls between

non-weapon-related nuclear, chemical and

biological activities and their destructive

applications, conventional disarmers must

ﬁnd ways to stop ‘leakage’ from, and

misapplication of, personal gun ownership

and the national arsenals needed for

minimum defence and peace missions. The

conventional task is on a different scale

because of the ubiquity and huge economic

weight of the arms trade: yet this merely

underlines the importance of the current

United Nations drive for an Arms Trade

Treaty that would regulate and restrain

transfers globally – and on a universal and

equal basis – for the ﬁrst time in history.

Also crucial for curbing both WMD and

conventional proliferation are mundane

measures like safety of stocks, export

controls, tracing technologies and detection

of illegal transfer routes. Finally, unwanted

weapons and materials of both kinds must

be destroyed without endangering people

or the environment. Cooperation on such

tasks, in regional groupings or between big

powers, has double value in both ﬁelds for

its conﬁdence-building effects.

The ultimate challenge in each

realm of disarmament is to ﬁnd political

solutions that unite States of different

regions, persuasions and levels of

development. The ultimate obstacles are

the human attitudes of ‘Mine are OK,

yours not,’ ‘I’m not going ﬁrst,’ and ‘I

prefer the risks of arms racing to those

of reduction.’ Women can fall into those

mental traps too, but should not. My

fondest wish is that more of them in the

new generation will work on the whole

range of issues outlined above.

_______________

[3] Such possibilities are discussed on the

CTBTO website at http://www.ctbto.org/

veriﬁcation-regime/potential-civil-and-

scientiﬁc-applicationsof-ctbt-veriﬁcation-data-

and-technologies/.

Russian SA-6 GAINFUL is a two stage,

solid-fuel, low-altitude surface-to-air

missile. Photo courtesy of

weapons.technology.youngester.com

»… the most fundamental

instruments of WMD

control are still the global

ones – including the

Comprehensive Nuclear-

Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).«

ALYSON BAILES

is currently teaching security studies

at the University of Iceland and the

College of Europe at Bruges, after a

career spent mainly in the British

Diplomatic Service. From 2002 to

2007, she was Director of the

Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (SIPRI) and also

served on the Weapons of Mass

Destruction Commission headed by

Dr Hans Blix. In June 2010 she was a

keynote speaker on conventional

arms control at the Annual Security

Review Conference of the

Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) .

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

STATUS OF CERTIFIED IMS FACILITIES

AS OF 16 MAY 2011

MORE GOOGLE MAP

FEATURES

Various new interactive features have

recently been added to all the world maps

on our website, including:

PDF MAP CREATOR

which allows you to create a printable

colour version of the signature/ratiﬁcation

maps on a global and regional basis.

PDF REPORTS

which provides a comprehensive

breakdown of the map that was selected

VISIT ONLINE:

www.ctbto.org/map

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

Global radiation

monitoring in

the wake of the

Fukushima disaster

BY K IRSTEN HAUPT AND

THOMAS MÜTZELBURG

VERIFICATION SCIENCE

Since the double disaster of the 9.0

magnitude earthquake and tsunami

that affected hundreds of thousands

of people and seriously damaged the

Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan

on 11 March 2011, minute traces of

radioactive emissions from Fukushima

have spread across the entire globe.

By mid-April, most of the radionuclide

stations of the International Monitoring

System (IMS) had detected radioactive

particles and noble gases from the

Fukushima accident. The IMS is a global

network that will comprise 337 facilities

when complete. Sixty-three of the 80

planned IMS radionuclide stations are

already operational and able to detect

airborne radioactivity.

SPREADING ACROSS

THE ENTIRE GLOBE

The ﬁrst analysis results of the monitoring

data became available a few days after the

accident. A clear picture quickly emerged.

Initial detections of radioactive materials

were made on 12 March at the Takasaki

monitoring station in Japan, just 300 km

away from the troubled power plant. The

dispersion of the radioactive isotopes

could then be followed to eastern Russia

on 14 March and to the west coast of the

United States two days later.

Nine days after the accident, the

radioactive cloud had crossed Northern

America. Three days later, when a station

in Iceland picked up radioactive materials,

it was clear that the cloud had reached

Europe. By day 15, traces from the

accident in Fukushima were detectable

all across the northern hemisphere. For

the ﬁrst four weeks, the radioactive

materials remained conﬁned to the

northern hemisphere, with the equator

initially acting as a dividing line between

the northern and southern air masses. By

13 April, radioactivity had spread to the

southern hemisphere of the Asia-Paciﬁc

region and had been detected at stations

located in Australia, Fiji, Malaysia and

Papua New Guinea.

UNPARALLELED SENSITIVITY

The monitoring system of the

Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Organization (CTBTO) can detect a range

of radioactive isotopes, among them

iodine-131 and caesium-137. Looking

at the ratios between the various

radioactive isotopes enables the source

of the emission to be identiﬁed. In the

case of the current readings, ﬁndings

clearly indicate radionuclide releases

from a damaged nuclear power plant,

which is consistent with the recent

accident at Fukushima in Japan. By 13

April, the average level of radioactivity

picked up by the stations worldwide

continued to decline, which is also due to

the relatively short half-lives of iodine-

131 (8 days) and xenon-133 (5.2 days).

The CTBTO’s radionuclide stations

are designed to register minuscule

amounts of radioactive particles and

noble gases – down to a number of a few

atoms. The system’s sensitivity is second-

to-none – it can detect a concentration

of 0.1 g of radioactive xenon evenly

distributed within the entire atmosphere

of the Earth. A rooftop detector at the

CTBTO’s headquarters in Vienna still

catches traces of emissions from the 1986

Chernobyl disaster.

BENEFITS FOR DISASTER

MITIGATION EFFORTS

The IMS is being built to ensure

compliance with the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which

bans all nuclear explosions. CTBTO

monitoring data and technologies,

however, offer a host of additional

beneﬁts, particularly in relation to

disaster mitigation. One of these beneﬁts

is already in place – the contribution of

data to tsunami warning efforts. In 2006,

Member States mandated the CTBTO

to provide seismic and hydroacoustic

monitoring data to a number of tsunami

warning centres in the Indo-Paciﬁc

region. Data were also made available

to Japan when it was hit by the massive

earthquake on 11 March. Tragically, tens

of thousands of people were killed by

the tsunami; but many were saved due

Fukushima Daiichi

power plant: a regional

dispersion simulation

(Austrian Meteorological

Service ZAMG)

to the rapid alerts. According to Japanese

authorities, CTBTO data helped them

to issue tsunami warnings within a few

minutes, thus allowing many people to

escape to higher ground. CTBTO data

also helped other countries in the region,

such as Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia,

the Philippines and the United States,

to issue timely tsunami warnings, even

though the wave turned out to have lost

its devastating power by the time it had

reached these countries’ shores.

ENHANCED COOPERATION

WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS

Following an initiative by United Nations

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, relevant

international organizations agreed on

25 March 2011 to enhance cooperation

to help mitigate the consequences of

the nuclear disaster in Japan. These

organizations include the CTBTO, the

International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), the World Meteorological

Organization (WMO), the UN Development

Programme (UNDP), the World Health

Organization (WHO) and the UN Ofﬁce for

Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

The CTBTO contributes to this effort

by providing information on the detection

of radioactive isotopes from its worldwide

monitoring network. The CTBTO can also

assist in predicting the global dispersion

of radioactive material by using its

atmospheric transport modelling (ATM)

tool, which has been developed in

cooperation with the WMO. This method

allows for the calculation of the dispersion

of a given radionuclide emission, using

meteorological data. This calculation can

be performed as back tracking in order

to identify the area where a radionuclide

may have been released, calculated

from the station where it was observed.

In the case of Fukushima, where the

point of release was known, the CTBTO

applied forward ATM to predict where

radionuclides would travel in the future.

Although the emissions were

initially based on estimates only, they

proved to be 95 percent correct as the

radionuclides mostly reached the stations

within hours of the time predicted. With

information made available later by the

IAEA on the release level of radioactive

substances at the Fukushima power plant

– the so-called source term – the CTBTO

has been able to quantify and reﬁne its

global dispersion predictions.

RADIOACTIVITY OUTSIDE

OF JAPAN BELOW

HARMFUL LEVELS

The present event has understandably

given rise to concerns about manmade

radiation. In particular, atmospheric

nuclear testing in the 1950s and

1960s caused widespread fallout,

resulting in radiation-related diseases

and deaths and rendering vast areas

uninhabitable to this day. These nuclear

tests had the most direct impact on

the immediate region. The danger from

fallout decreases with distance, as

radioactive particles are dispersed into

the atmosphere or washed out through

precipitation. A number of radioactive

isotopes also have a limited half-life of

a few days or weeks, which reduces the

overall radioactivity with time. Other

radioactive substances though, such

as plutonium, linger for thousands of

years. The locations where over 1,500

underground nuclear tests were carried

out worldwide are highly contaminated

and have had to be completely fenced

off to limit the danger to humans.

The cumulative effects of the nuclear

explosions resulted in much higher levels

of radioactivity than were observed after

the Chernobyl disaster. Radioactive isotopes

could be traced in the baby teeth of children

born even at great distances from the test

sites in these decades. By comparison, the

levels detected at stations outside Japan up

until May 2011 have been far below levels

that could cause harm to humans and the

environment. The levels are comparable

to natural background radiation, such

as cosmic radiation and radiation from

the environment on Earth, and are lower

than those from manmade sources, such

as medical applications or nuclear power

plants (under normal operations) or isotope

production facilities.

KIRSTEN HAUPT

is a historian who has been working

for CTBTO Public Information since

2005. Prior to this, she worked for

13 years in the ﬁeld of public

information in peacekeeping

missions in Cambodia and in the

former Yugoslavia.

THOMAS MÜTZELBURG

joined CTBTO Public Information in

April 2011. Prior to this, he worked

for the German Foreign Ofﬁce in

Berlin and Vienna from 2005 on

CTBT-related issues.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Simulation of dispersion of radioactivity. Courtesy of the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

Shouting voices, a ﬂaming brand, and

one after the other the beacons burst

into ﬂames sending the signal from

hilltop to hilltop.

Beacons have offered protection

by raising the alarm against danger for

more than two thousand years. They’ve

dispatched the signal about impending

invasions and borne the message that

led to the defeat of navies. The light of a

beacon, the lighthouse on a treacherous

shore, has guided sailors to safety.

Today a network of beacons

girds the planet, monitoring the land,

sea and air for the dangers of nuclear

explosions. It employs advanced

technologies, yet its purpose is

fundamentally the same as its hilltop

predecessors: it offers vigilance and

the means to warn of danger.

TSUNAMI WARNING IN 2011

In March 2011 the International

Monitoring System (IMS) registered

the huge earthquake off the coast of

Japan, ﬂashing messages to tsunami

warning centres. Then sensors that

sniff the air started tracking radiation

in the atmosphere from the damaged

Fukushima nuclear reactors.

The requirement of a lighthouse

keeper was to ensure that there would

always be a beam of light ﬂashing

from the lighthouse. Enshrined in

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty (CTBT) is a performance

requirement just as rigid. There is

only a two per cent allowance for

failure by land and sea facilities in

reporting data. In other words, the

system has to meet a 98 per cent

standard for making data available to

the International Data Centre (IDC) in

Vienna. Atmospheric monitoring has

to meet a 95 percent criterion.

Ensuring maintenance and logistical

support for the system to meet these

requirements is the task of a group of

some 25 women and men (regular and

temporary staff) headed by Natalie

Brely at the Vienna headquarters of

the Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Organization (CTBTO).

It sounds straightforward. But

access to stations in remote locations

such as Antarctica is limited to a

few months every year. Logistical

challenges for other isolated facilities

also require extensive planning. And,

the more mundane task of avoiding

delays to delivery of equipment at

States’ customs posts may be just as

challenging.

CTBTO LIGHTHOUSE

KEEPERS

“We have to ensure that the woman

or man running a CTBTO facility has

all the necessary tools, equipment

and knowledge to attempt to avoid

problems or be able to ﬁx them as

fast as possible. The bottom line

Beacons in

the nuclear

night

Maintaining the health

of the International

Monitoring System

VERIFICATION SCIENCE

BY PETER

RICKWOOD

Natalie Brely, Chief of the Monitoring Support Facilities

Section at the International Monitoring System Division.

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

is that a station can be down for

no more than seven days, which

requires us to detect, troubleshoot,

identify and repair a failure as fast

as possible. It is important that the

station is brought back to operation

as soon as possible,” Brely said.

As of the end of February 2011,

there were nearly 1,000 women

and men in 84 countries, the CTBTO

equivalent of lighthouse keepers,

operating its monitoring facilities.

“Each station, when it’s built, is

provisioned with spare parts, manuals

and tools in order to be able to react

in the event of a break down,” Brely

said. “When a station is certiﬁed,

which means that it meets Treaty

requirements and is capable of being

part of the monitoring system, we

have a snapshot of all its components

and an environment which allows us

to adapt the support and supply chain

structure in an optimal manner.”

Some parts, such as computers

and digitizers, have a life

expectancy of three to 10 years,

said Brely. A seismometer may have

a 20 year life expectancy. “Good

engineering attempts to ensure that

all these components are designed

in a modular fashion. If a part

breaks down, you replace it with a

new one.”

STAYING AHEAD OF THE

SYSTEM’S NEEDS

Which, loosely translated, means

that Brely and her team must

remain in continuous motion to stay

ahead of the huge system’s routine

maintenance needs and replacement

of parts. That doesn’t take into

account the unforeseen, emergencies

and catastrophic failures, “but we

do try to plan for these as best as

possible” she says with a smile.

And when facilities are located

in the middle of deserts, on remote

islands, or close to the Earth’s poles,

keeping them running becomes even

more of a challenge.

From an investment of 1 billion

USD over the last 15 years, engineers

have installed a system of monitors,

some in the world’s most desolate

places, to detect any evidence of

nuclear explosions. This system is the

veriﬁcation arm of the Treaty.

By the end of 2011, 280 of

337 facilities when the system is

complete, will have been certiﬁed.

The cost of operating and sustaining

the network in 2011 will be nearly 30

million USD.

Data are collected round the

clock by a planet-wide stethoscope,

amplifying sounds from the Earth

to determine if any of them could

be a nuclear explosion. Seismic

and infrasound facilities monitor

underground, and the Earth’s

atmosphere and hydroacoustic

stations listen for sounds in the

oceans. Radionuclide facilities sniff

the atmosphere for evidence of

radioactive particles and gases.

A DELUGE OF DATA

Every year IMS facilities log about

30,000 events. In the deluge of

data dispatched to the CTBTO

headquarters in Vienna by satellite,

these are the signals that could

indicate a nuclear explosion.

The information is provided

in a form known as waveform data.

To the uninitiated it appears to

be indecipherable squiggles. The

squiggles, however, are the language

in which the electronic record of

seismic, infrasound and hydroacoustic

monitoring data are expressed.

On a daily basis ten gigabytes of

such data are transmitted by satellite

to the CTBTO’s headquarters. Under

the terms of the Treaty, all of its 182

Member States have equal rights to

make use of the data. “This is the

beauty of this Treaty,” says Brely.

“No matter if a country hosts one,

none or many monitoring facilities, all

Member States have equal rights to

all the data.”

The numbers belie the fact that

the monitoring system is not only the

sum of its technologies and facilities but

also the operators serving it, Brely says.

The response is to have a policy

of forward investment, she explains,

one that makes every effort to ensure

station operators have all the tools,

knowledge and equipment they need.

“We need to make sure that

all the operators understand their

role and each one recognizes the

importance and value of the system.

Only by accomplishing that will we

be able to really ensure that the

monitoring system and the CTBT in

its entirety will be sustainable and

reliable for years to come.”

Brely, a Canadian born mother

of four children, honed her skills

to manage support of the CTBTO

monitoring facilities from 20 years

experience in maintenance and

logistics in the Canadian armed forces.

“It taught me the indisputable value

of the power of a team and the reality

that it’s only as strong as its weakest

link,” she said.

REGIONAL DEPOTS

To ensure swift delivery of services,

the CTBTO is setting up regional

depots, providing supplies and

technical support in a timely manner.

Still, Brely and her team are

mission control for the network, on

standby to support its operators and

their stations, prepared to send out

a breakdown crew when there is no

alternative.

“If the station operator can’t ﬁx

a problem, we’ll send a maintenance

team,” Brely said. However, the

service comes with a condition.

“One of our objectives is that a

maintenance team won’t travel twice

to a station for the same problem. The

station operator will need to be part

of the repair mission so that she/he

learn and can do it herself/himself

the next time around.”

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

SELF-RELIANCE

Self-reliance becomes even more

of an issue for Brely regarding the

120 auxiliary stations in the system,

which provide information only upon

request. Under Treaty terms, they are

the responsibility of the countries in

which they are located.

The CTBTO can provide remote

technical support and training for

their operators, but otherwise Brely

is limited to using moral suasion to

ensure these operators and the host

countries play their important role in

the system.

“Our responsibility is limited to

providing remote technical support,

documentation and training. I can

identify someone who needs more

training but that is all I can do.

The host country has to ﬁgure out

how to do it by itself. It has to fund

operations and maintenance – national

implementation has been a huge issue

that we are addressing.”

Auxiliary stations have a vital role

to play in ensuring compliance with the

Treaty. They are required to help narrow

the focus in an area suspected to have

been the site of a concealed nuclear

explosion. Then, after entry into force,

the ultimate tool at the Treaty’s disposal

can be used, feet on the ground – an

on-site inspection to provide further

evidence that a test has taken place.

BUILDING OWNERSHIP

“We’re continually trying to enhance

local understanding, to create the

sense of ownership that’s required.

This is a joint venture – we can’t do

it alone, we want the countries with

auxiliary stations to take pride in

them and encourage their operators

to be proud as well. They need to

put into place the necessary support

structure to allow their operators to

fulﬁll their role,” Brely said.

“The station operator is our

ambassador, our ﬁrst line of defense.

If the operators of auxiliary stations

as well as all other CTBTO stations

aren’t treated properly, they won’t be

part of the solution.”

More than two thousand years

ago in the Han Dynasty, beacons were

a feature of China’s Great Wall. In 290

B.C. Ptolemy erected a 100-metre

high lighthouse at the entrance to the

harbour of Alexandria, which became

one of the Seven Wonders of the

classical world. In Iran in the Middle

Ages large minaret lighthouses were

erected beside the sea route at the

mouth of the Persian Gulf.

Following the fall of the Roman

Empire no new lighthouses were

constructed in Europe until after the end

of the so-called Dark Ages. Since 1945,

nuclear weapons have imposed their

own darkness from the threat that their

use risked immolation of the planet.

The CTBT and its monitoring

system represent a beacon for a new

direction away from such dangers.

Historians of the future may well

view its veriﬁcation network as the

ﬁrst signs of safety emerging from the

perils of an era of nuclear weapons.

PETER RICKWOOD

worked for most of his career as

a journalist before joining the

International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) as a press ofﬁcer

in 2001 where he worked for

eight years. He has been

working for CTBTO Public

Information since October 2009.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Natalie Brely meets with Ilse

Adonis (centre) from the South

African Permanent Mission

and Rael Sheti (left) from the

IMS, to discuss the timely and

cost free customs clearance of

IMS equipment in South Africa.

Photo: Pablo Mehlhorn

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

Employment opportunities for women

The Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is

currently establishing a global

veriﬁcation regime to monitor

compliance with the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Great progress

has been made since 1996 thanks to the

extensive skills and experience of the

CTBTO’s international workforce.

As we strive to reach our goal to

end all nuclear explosions once and

for all, we welcome applications

from suitably qualiﬁed individuals

committed to helping us achieve

this objective. Qualiﬁed women

candidates are highly encouraged to

apply. Exciting opportunities exist for

professionals in a range of disciplines,

and we are particularly interested in

candidates with strong scientiﬁc and

technical backgrounds.

Our strength lies in the

quality Of Our peOple.

Visit our website now for more

information. www.ctbto.org

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

CTBTO

(as of 02/05/11)

UNIDO (Vienna)

(as of 02/05/11)

OPCW

(as of 31/07/10)

IAEA

(as of 02/05/11)

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Professional

General Service

Total

Male

Female

Male

Female

OSCE

(as of 02/05/11)

32%

68%

40%

60% 71% 77% 77%

29%

23% 23%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

CTBTO

(as of 02/05/11)

UNIDO (Vienna)

(as of 02/05/11)

OPCW

(as of 31/07/10)

IAEA

(as of 02/05/11)

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Professional

General Service

Total

Male

Female

Male

Female

OSCE

(as of 02/05/11)

32%

68%

40%

60% 71% 77% 77%

29%

23% 23%

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

OPCW – Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

UNIDO – United Nations Industrial Development Organization

At the beginning of February 2011, seven of the 37 senior management

staff at the CTBTO were women. Back row – left to right: Natalie Brely,

Lisa Tabassi, Regina Kusuma, Grace Okungu, Silvia Alamo. Front row – left

to right: Hongmei Deng and Annika Thunborg.

Celebrating International Women's Day at the CTBTO, 8 March 2011.

PROPORTION OF PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AT

VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

PROPORTION OF REGULAR STAFF MEMBERS

AT THE CTBTO BY GENDER AS OF MAY 2011

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

Every day the global network of monitoring

stations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-

Ban Treaty (CTBT) transmits around 10 gigabytes

of data to the International Data Centre (IDC)

in Vienna. This vast amount of data needs to be

reviewed by a team of highly trained analysts in

order to help determine whether an ambiguous

event has taken place and whether such an

event may have been a nuclear explosion.

IDC analysts review an average

of 30,000 waveform events a

year, the majority of which

are earthquakes, and analyze

approximately 20,000 radionuclide

spectra. Analyzing the data

requires great technical expertise

combined with considerable

experience and careful judgment.

Of the 25 current analysts at the

IDC, nine are women (temporary and

regular staff) from a diverse range of

countries, reﬂecting the commitment

of the Preparatory Commission for

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-

Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to

ensuring a wide and well-balanced

geographical distribution of staff.

I ﬁrst came to the Preparatory

Commission for the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

(CTBTO) in 2001 to participate in a

training course for analysts at the

International Data Centre (IDC). After

completing the course, I was offered

a position as an associate analyst at

the IDC where I remained for seven

years. In 2008, I had a complete

change of scenery when I moved to

London to work for a company in the

oil and gas industry. Although I had

an interesting job there, I missed the

international environment that I had

become used to in Vienna and the

work being carried out by the CTBTO.

GEOPHYSICIST MARCELA VILLARROEL

IS PROUD OF HER WORK, HELPING TO MAKE THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE

»The magnitude

9.0 earthquake that

struck Japan on

11 March was the

fourth largest ever

recorded and our

workload increased

by 600 percent in

the period directly

afterwards.«

Making

sense

of it all

Three data analysts

talk about the

challenges and

rewards of working

at the International

Data Centre

BY DENISE

BRETTSCHNEIDER

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

By banning nuclear explosions in all

environments, the CTBT is helping to

make the world a more secure place. I

am deeply committed to the goals of

the CTBT, so when I was offered the

opportunity to return to the IDC as

a lead analyst in August 2010, I was

very happy.

As a geophysicist, working as a

waveform data analyst at the CTBTO is

a unique and challenging experience:

monitoring data are collected by more

than 240 waveform stations worldwide

and transmitted daily to the IDC in

Vienna for analysis. No organization

anywhere else in the world carries out

similar work on this scale!

In order to perform interactive

waveform analysis with a high degree

of conﬁdence, it’s essential to have a

strong geophysical background and

many years of experience. It’s really

important that you’re familiar with each

one of the monitoring stations that

are part of the IMS network as well as

the global seismicity. This is because

data collected at the stations will look

different depending on a number of

factors such as the source location,

distance to the station, local structure

around the station etc…and you need

to understand all of this to be able to

build valid events with minimum error.

Considering that we cover the whole

world and that we have a huge number

of stations to look at, it means that

it may take several years before you

become a good analyst.

An average of 160 events are

recorded every day, which the team

of analysts here at the IDC will

check and decide to validate so that

they can either be included in the

Reviewed Event Bulletin or discarded

as bogus events.

You never know what’s going to

happen next in terms of seismicity. The

magnitude 9.0 earthquake that struck

Japan on 11 March was the fourth

largest ever recorded and our workload

increased by 600 percent in the period

directly afterwards. Working as an

analyst at the IDC can be stressful but I

like the atmosphere within my team. We

all support each other and we all work

towards the same objective.

When I look around, I consider

myself very lucky to be able to carry

out technical work in an organization

that provides women with equal

opportunities. Vienna is also a nice

and secure city to live in and I

love the cultural diversity and the

possibility of communicating in the

many different languages spoken

here. All in all I’m very proud to be

part of the CTBTO family.

»Monitoring data are

collected by more

than 240 waveform

stations worldwide

and transmitted

daily to the IDC in

Vienna for analysis.

No organization

anywhere else in

the world carries

out similar work

on this scale!«

Seismogram of the 11

March 2011 earthquake

recorded at the IMS

seismic station Mawson

in the Antarctic.

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

I come from Zimbabwe where there

are not that many women with PhDs

in geophysics – people used to joke

that I must be the only woman in the

country to hold a PhD in Seismology.

After completing my studies, I became

a lecturer in the department of Physics

at the University of Zimbabwe as well

as a visiting lecturer in Geophysics at

the University of the Witwatersrand in

Johannesburg, South Africa. My previous

jobs were very different to my current

position at the CTBTO. As a lecturer I

used to teach and conduct research. Now

I analyze waveform data, lots of it!

It all started in 1999 in Washington

DC when a colleague mentioned that she

was applying to become an analyst at the

CTBTO in Vienna. A couple of years later,

looking for a career change, I contacted my

friend who had been hired by the CTBTO

upon completion of the International Data

Centre (IDC) analysts’ training course.

She advised me to apply and I joined the

organization in May 2007.

As a data analyst, I have to make

sure that Member States receive a

reviewed bulletin of all the events that

have been detected by CTBT monitoring

stations – an REB – within 10 days. So

my job is challenging in that we are

constantly chasing deadlines: we have

SEISMOLOGIST JANE GORE

FINDS HERSELF AT THE CUTTING EDGE OF DATA ANALYSIS

AFTER A CHANGE OF CAREER AND LOCATION

to produce a high quality data bulletin

for Member States in a timely manner

which can mean working very long

hours and at weekends, if necessary.

When Japan's massive earthquake

struck the north-east coast of the country

on 11 March and triggered a huge tsunami,

the number of events we included that

day in the REB increased to 816. And

the following day there were 840 events.

Considering that the average daily ﬁgure is

160 events, it meant that we had to work

round the clock to make sure that Member

States received the REB.

Even prior to 11 March, this year

had been exceptionally busy. By the end

of February we had already analyzed

the equivalent of about one-third of

the events normally analyzed in a

whole working year! This was due to a

particularly high number of events –

mainly earthquakes – occurring after the

Christmas break.

One of the most memorable days since

I’ve been here was 25 May 2009. At 5 in the

morning, my phone suddenly rang. It was

the ofﬁce. Some of my colleagues at the IDC

had been following monitoring data which

had been arriving in Vienna and indicated

that there was a suspicious event located

in the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea, which could be a nuclear explosion.

I was among the group of analysts who

performed the initial analysis of the event.

This event was well recorded by IMS stations

around the world: 61 IMS seismic stations

detected signals, with 59 of these stations

contributing to the location of the event.

It’s very rewarding to work for an

organization which is committed to making

the world a safer place by banning all

nuclear explosions. I also enjoy the cultural

diversity and the opportunity to meet people

from every corner of the globe. It has been

interesting to learn how other people relate to

issues and solve problems.

»By the end of

February we had

already analyzed

the equivalent of

about one-third

of the events

normally analyzed

in a whole

working year! «

Spectrum acquired

from the IMS

radionuclide noble

gas station in

Reunion in the

Indian Ocean.

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

_______________

[1] Fission products are usually radioactive.

Activation products are materials made

radioactive by neutron activation.

PHYSICIST CARLA PIRES

IS PART OF THE TEAM THAT HELPS DEVELOP

RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT CAPABILITIES

Before I joined the IDC, I worked

mainly in the ﬁeld of radiological

protection and nuclear safety. After

graduating in Physics in 1998, I

spent three and a half years working

in an environmental laboratory at

the Instituto Tecnológico e Nuclear

in Portugal. I also gained valuable

knowledge in 2001 at the Radiation

and Nuclear Safety Authority in

Finland, such as learning about sample

analysis and the type of software used

in the laboratory. Then in June 2002, I

was fortunate enough to be offered a

position as an associate analyst in the

Radionuclide Monitoring Unit of the

IDC at the CTBTO.

Being an analyst has been a great

opportunity to increase my knowledge

in the ﬁeld of gamma spectroscopy

and related issues. The work is very

different to my previous jobs as I’m

far away from measuring systems.

In 2003 I became responsible for

testing new International Monitoring

System (IMS) radionuclide particulate

stations. This work has been

fascinating and has allowed me to

familiarize myself with radionuclide

systems being used in a number of

countries around the world. I’ve

gained a wealth of knowledge and

experience about the different

types of spectra acquired by various

detection systems and have learned

more about the telltale signs of

malfunctioning devices.

In July 2008, I was promoted

to radionuclide lead analyst and

in 2010 I started reviewing the

radionuclide noble gas spectra from

gamma and beta-gamma systems. My

job mainly involves identifying the

radiation emitters responsible for the

peaks observed in the radionuclide

spectra. I also helped test the ﬁrst

radionuclide noble gas station that

was certiﬁed in August last year

and I’m part of the team that tests

radionuclide software and contributes

to its improvement.

Over the last eight years, I’ve

sometimes had to work very late or

over the weekend as there are constant

deadlines to be met. For example,

the other evening I left work at 20:00

because I needed to ﬁnish checking

the data sent by one of the IMS

radionuclide laboratories, the eleventh

laboratory due for certiﬁcation this

year. These laboratories provide

independent analysis of radionuclide

particulate samples – only samples

with speciﬁc radionuclides are sent

there for repeat measurements to

conﬁrm the presence of ﬁssion and/

or activation radionuclides

. When

the devastating tsunami disabled the

emergency generators required to cool

the reactors at the Fukushima nuclear

power plant in Japan on 11 March, I

had to cancel my trip to the laboratory

and the testing of the radionuclide

software was postponed.

The development of the global

monitoring system informs people

all over the world about radionuclide

measurement capabilities in other

countries. I’m honoured to be part of a

team that has helped create a database

of worldwide information. We have

gained knowledge and experience

which is possible thanks to the Treaty,

CTBTO staff and the National Data

Centres. I hope in the future more

studies are conducted with our data to

increase our expertise.

DENISE BRETTSCHNEIDER

has been working for CTBTO Public

Information since May 2008. She

has a number of years of editorial

experience working for

international organizations in

Nairobi, Kenya, including the

United Nations Educational,

Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The IDC categorizes samples measured by

IMS facilities based on the radionuclides

detected into the following levels:

LEVEL 1:

Only radionuclides from natural sources

detected.

LEVEL 2:

Radionuclides from natural sources

detected at anomalous concentrations.

LEVEL 3:

Radionuclides from manmade sources

detected that are frequently observed

by that particular station (e.g. from

hospitals).

LEVEL 4:

One type of radionuclide that is relevant to

CTBT veriﬁcation detected.

LEVEL 5:

More than one type of radionuclide

detected that are relevant to CTBT

veriﬁcation of which one is a ﬁssion

product (such as Cs-137, I-131, Ba-140,

La-140 or Te-132).

RADIONUCLIDE

LEVELS

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

TWO MAIN TYPES OF DATA:

WAVEFORM AND RADIONUCLIDE

Three of the technologies employed by

the IMS - seismology, hydroacoustics and

infrasound – are called waveform. Waveform

stations monitor and record the movement

of energy that is generated by certain events

and propagates as seismic waves or acoustic

waves through the Earth, the oceans or the

atmosphere. As of 16 May 2011, almost 80

percent of these stations were operational

and sending data to the IDC. Waveform

data can help identify the location of an

event and determine whether it was natural

or manmade. Natural phenomena include

earthquakes, submarine volcanic eruptions,

meteorites, explosive volcanoes and storms,

while manmade events can include mining

and chemical explosions, aircraft, re-entering

space debris, oil exploration, and military

exercises.

The fourth technology employed by the

IMS is radionuclide monitoring, which can

conﬁrm whether an event detected and located

by the other technologies is indicative of a

nuclear test. Radionuclide stations measure the

abundance of radionuclides in the air. These

include radioactive particles and noble gases

such as xenon. As of 16 May 2011, 75 percent

of the radionuclide stations were operational.

Each radionuclide monitoring station sends

a preliminary gamma ray spectrum to the

IDC every two hours. The ﬁnal spectrum

which undergoes analysis at the IDC is a

two-dimensional plot showing the type and

number of radionuclides observed in a sample

obtained from a ﬁlter that has been exposed to

air for about 24 hours.

DATA PRODUCTS FOR

MEMBER STATES

A number of products containing

information about events recorded by

IMS facilities are made available to CTBTO

Member States in the form of automatically

generated lists of all the events that have

been detected followed by more reﬁned lists

that have undergone meticulous analysis.

1. S T ANDARD EVENT LISTS AND

AUTOMATIC RADIONUCLIDE REPORTS

The ﬁrst data processing occurs as soon as

waveform data arrive at the IDC, resulting in

the production of Standard Event Lists (SELs).

These lists are generated automatically every

20 minutes throughout the year by specially

designed computer programmes. SELs include

location estimates for events formed from

signals recorded at IMS waveform stations.

Improvements to the initial bulletin

are made as more data arrive in Vienna and

are processed. The IDC issues three SELs at

different time intervals in order to provide

progressively improved location estimates.

The ﬁrst list – SEL1 – is issued within two

hours of ‘real time’, followed by SEL2 after

about four hours and SEL3 after six hours.

The initial processing of radionuclide

data is also automatic and the results are listed

in the Automatic Radionuclide Report. After

automatic analysis, the results are reﬁned by

IDC analysts during interactive review.

2. R EVIEWED EVENT BULLETIN AND REVIEWED

RADIONUCLIDE REPORT

In order to provide reliable and

comprehensive information to Member

States, every single event listed in SEL3

is reviewed by IDC analysts. During this

process, analysts discard just over one-third

of the automatically produced events. The

conﬁrmed and corrected events and signal

measurements at each station that detected

an event are listed in the Reviewed Event

Bulletin (REB). The REB is produced daily and

contains an average of 160 events.

Radionuclide data take much longer to

be collected and analyzed so data analysis

takes place on a different timescale. After

reviewing the Automatic Radionuclide

Report, analysts produce the Reviewed

Radionuclide Report.

3. S T ANDARD SCREENED EVENT BULLETIN

The next bulletin is the result of an automatic

screening process in which natural events

such as earthquakes are discarded and

manmade events remain. The Standard

Screened Event Bulletin thus contains

all events that are considered potentially

suspicious in the CTBT veriﬁcation context.

The ﬁndings of the screening

process for radionuclide data are

presented in the Standard Screened

Radionuclide Event Bulletin.

ANALYZING DATA AT THE INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE

SOME OF THE KEY

RADIONUCLIDES

BARIUM-140 (Ba-140)

has a half-life of 12.8 days. The

half-life is the time for half of the

radionuclide's material to decay. Ba-

140 decays into lanthanum-140 (La-

140), which has a half life of 1.7 days.

By analyzing the activity ratio of

these two radionuclides, the time of a

nuclear explosion can be established.

CAESIUM-134 (Cs-134)

has a half-life of 2.1 years. Only a

small amount of Cs-134 is produced by

nuclear weapon testing but it

accumulates in nuclear reactors. It can

therefore be used to distinguish

between releases from nuclear weapon

testing and nuclear power plants.

CAESIUM-137 (Cs-137):

has a half-life of 30.1 years. This is the

most common radioactive form of

caesium and is produced by nuclear

ﬁssion. Cs-137 is one of the major

radionuclides in spent nuclear fuel and

radioactive wastes associated with the

operation of nuclear reactors and fuel

reprocessing plants. Large amounts of

Cs-137 and other radioactive isotopes

were released into the environment by

atmospheric nuclear weapon tests

between 1945 and 1980. Cs-137 did not

occur in nature before nuclear weapon

testing began.

IODINE-131 (I-131):

has a half-life of 8.0 days. I-131 is a

radioactive isotope released into the

environment mostly in gaseous form

as a result of the atmospheric testing

of nuclear weapons and accidents

that have occurred at nuclear power

plants (e.g. the Chernobyl nuclear

power plant in 1986 and the

Fukushima power plant in March

2011). It was a signiﬁcant contributor

to the effects on human health from

atmospheric nuclear weapon testing

and from the Chernobyl disaster.

TELLURIUM-132 (Te-132):

has a half life of 76 hours. It is

produced by nuclear ﬁssion and is

released in gaseous form in hot

conditions after a nuclear power plant

accident or nuclear test. It decays to

iodine-132 (I-132), which has a half-

life of 2.3 hours. I-132 contributes

signiﬁcantly to the effects on human

health during the ﬁrst few days after

the nuclear reaction has stopped.

XENON-133 (Xe-133):

has a half-life of 5.2 days. It does not

occur in nature but is released from

nuclear power plants and nuclear

weapon testing. As a noble gas,

xenon-133 does not react with other

materials and only poses a very small

risk to human health when released

into the atmosphere.

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

Over recent months, I’ve been

responsible for organizing and

conducting follow-up technical visits

to National Data Centres (NDCs) in

North and West Africa, as part of

the Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty Organization's (CTBTO) Capacity

Building Project in Africa. The project

provides technical assistance to Member

States on the continent so that they can

participate fully in and contribute to the

implementation of the monitoring and

veriﬁcation system of the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) .

The project includes Member States

which have yet to ratify the Treaty. One

of the countries covered is the Republic

of the Congo in Central Africa. With an

area of 342,000 sq km (which is slightly

smaller than Germany), it’s one of the most

urbanized countries on the continent with

around 85 percent of its estimated 3.7

million population living in the main cities.

In October 2010, I travelled to the

capital, Brazzaville, in the southeast

of the country to carry out a technical

visit. The purpose was twofold:

ﬁrstly, to provide selected personnel

at the Ministry of Defence with the

skills necessary to establish and

improve their NDC capabilities; and

secondly, to coordinate a two-day

NDC Sub-Regional Development

Workshop designed to enhance

awareness of the CTBT and provide a

forum for the exchange of experiences

and expertise related to establishing

an NDC. The visit was of particular

importance because it was the ﬁrst

time that Congo had participated

in any training course or workshop

organized by the CTBTO. The Director

of the International Data Centre (IDC)

Division, Lassina Zerbo, played a key

role in facilitating the activities when

he previously travelled to Congo to

meet with the national authorities.

IMPORTANCE OF HIGH-

LEVEL SUPPORT

My colleague, Mario Villagran,

ﬂew to Brazzaville a week before

me in order to install the necessary

Capacity Building System equipment

at the NDC. When I arrived in Congo

on 6 October, my ﬁrst assignment

was to meet with the Minister of

Defence, Charles Zacharie Bowao,

and representatives from the national

authorities. It’s imperative to secure

high-level backing for the training

activities to succeed. Since many

countries in sub-Saharan Africa are

confronted with a number of pressing

issues related to development,

health and education, they need to

understand why the CTBT is important.

The fact that Congo signed the

CTBT on 11 February 1997 means

that it has access to all monitoring

data and analysis reports as well

as to technical training courses

offered by the CTBTO. During

my discussions with the Minister,

I explained that in addition to

the veriﬁcation regime’s primary

purpose of Treaty veriﬁcation,

CTBT monitoring data offer a range

of potential civil and scientiﬁc

beneﬁts which can contribute to

sustainable development, knowledge

expansion and human welfare. In

A New Link in

the Data Chain

The Congo’s National

Data Centre is a model

for the region

BY MISRAK FISSEHA

Misrak Fisseha trains an NDC

analyst during the two-week

Middle East and South Asia

training course, December 2010

Photo: Pablo Mehlhorn

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

the case of Congo, for example,

data could be used to help improve

aviation safety by detecting volcanic

explosions, for contributing to

climate change research, or for

maritime surveillance, which could

be useful in view of Congo’s short

Atlantic coastline. I also stressed how

the planned workshop would be a

signiﬁcant event for the whole of the

Central African sub-region.

The Minister was clearly

convinced of the importance of

the CTBT and the capacity building

activities as he provided the necessary

support and concluded our discussion

by saying: “La connaissance n’a pas

de prix. C’est l'ignorance qui nous

coûte cher.” [Knowledge has no price.

It’s ignorance that costs us a lot.]

MAXIMUM INTERACTION

DURING INTENSIVE TRAINING

Having secured the full backing of

the Minister of Defence, I was able

to proceed with the NDC training

activity on 6 October. This was a

ﬁve-day intensive programme for

ﬁve personnel from the Ministry of

Defence and the NDC manager. We

restricted the number of participants

in order to ensure maximum retention

and interaction. Operating an NDC

requires years of experience so

intensive training provides personnel

with the necessary basics for the

day-to-day operation of an NDC

and the use of the Capacity Building

System, as well as the routine use of

monitoring data and analysis reports.

OVERCOMING

INFRASTRUCTURAL

CHALLENGES

During my stay, I had to contend with

a few infrastructural problems. For

example, internet access is limited in

Congo and there are intermittent power

cuts. We overcame these problems by

downloading seven gigabytes of data

prior to the course so that it could be

saved for training purposes. When I

arrived at the Ministry, there were only

two computers available for the course.

For efﬁcient training, each participant

needs their own computer so one of my

ﬁrst tasks was to organize additional

computers for all trainees, which was

made possible with the assistance of

the Ministry of Defence.

Congo’s NDC, which was built

from scratch, became operational during

my visit, making it the ﬁrst country in

the Central African sub-region to have a

fully established NDC.

The training went extremely

well. Participants learned how to use

monitoring data and analysis reports

and how to operate the NDC-in-a-box

software. I also informed trainees

about the CTBTO, the Treaty and the

veriﬁcation regime and participants

acquired a basic understanding about

how the International Monitoring

System and IDC operate, and the

fundamentals of the four veriﬁcation

technologies used to verify compliance

with the CTBT (seismology, infrasound,

hydroacoustics and radionuclide

monitoring).

In order to strengthen the training

skills of the participants, I copied all of

the presentations, e-learning modules

etc. on to the local disk so that it can

be used as a knowledge repository for

ALGERIA

ANGOLA

BENIN

BOTSWANA

BURKINA FASO

BURUNDI

CAMEROON

CENTRAL

AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

CHAD

COMOROS

CONGO

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC

OF THE

CONGO

DJIBOUTI

EGYPT

EQUATORIAL

GUINEA

ERITREA

ETHIOPIA

GABON

GAMBIA

GHANA

GUINEA

GUINEA-BISSAU

KENYA

LESOTHO

LIBERIA

LIBYAN

ARAB

JAMAHIRIYA

MADAGASCAR

MALAWI

MALI

MAURITANIA

MOROCCO

MOZAMBIQUE

NAMIBIA

NIGER

NIGERIA

RWANDA

SAO TOME

AND PRINCIPE

SENEGAL

SIERRA LEONE

SOMALIA

SOUTH AFRICA

SUDAN

SWAZILAND

TOGO

TUNISIA

UGANDA

UNITED REPUBLIC

OF TANZANIA

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

NATIONAL DATA CENTRES IN AFRICA

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

A total of 23 countries in Africa (in green)

hosted a National Data Centre as of 16 May 2011.

the Congo-NDC staff. The trainees can

continue to practice using the materials

at hand like e-learning courses in their

own time. The participants were able

to derive maximum beneﬁt from the

training since the programme was

tailored to address the basic set of skills

and was conducted in French, which is

the ofﬁcial language of Congo.

It was a very rewarding

experience that was made possible

through the total commitment and

support of the IDC Director and

our Congo counterparts, including

the Ministry of Defence. This

allowed us to set up an NDC and

carry out essential training in a

relatively short period of time,

despite the challenges.

UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY

FOR PARTICIPANTS TO

SHARE EXPERIENCES

Upon completion of the NDC

training course, I helped coordinate

a regional NDC workshop. This

event was supported by the

Ministry of Defense and took place

at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

from 14 to 15 October. It was

attended by 44 participants from six

countries in the region: Benin, Chad,

Central African Republic, Congo,

Democratic Republic of Congo and

Gabon, as well as CTBTO staff. Of

these countries, Chad and Congo

still need to ratify the Treaty and

the beneﬁts of ratiﬁcation were

highlighted during the workshop.

Another aim of the workshop was

to inform participants about the

potential civil and scientiﬁc uses

of monitoring data, and to foster

cooperation between the CTBTO and

representatives from the region.

It was the ﬁrst workshop of its

kind to be conducted in French and

provided a unique opportunity for

participants to exchange experiences

and expertise related to the

establishment and operation of NDCs.

The CONGO-NDC trainees

were also able to demonstrate

their newly acquired skills to fellow

participants. The Congo-NDC became

ofﬁcially operational after the

opening ceremony.

A MODEL FOR

CENTRAL AFRICA

By the time my technical

visit ended, it was clear that the

Congo-NDC could be used as a model

for other beneﬁciary Member States

covered by the Capacity Building

Project for Central Africa wishing to

establish NDCs. Both the training, the

workshop and Congo-CTBTO relations

received considerable media attention.

The challenge for other States

in the region will be to replicate the

success of the Congo-NDC, which

is now engaged in a long term

commitment with the CTBTO. In order

to ensure the NDC’s sustainability and

the increased use of CTBT monitoring

data, bulletins and analyses, it is

expected that this partnership will be

consolidated by the experience gained

by NDC staff and further training

courses. It will also be important in

the future to provide venues for the

exchange of experiences with other

institutions for both bilateral and

regional cooperation.

Misrak Fisseha (sitting) attends a high level meeting with

the Minister of Defence, Charles Zacharie Bowao (head

of the table), and his cabinet, 6 October 2010.

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

MISRAK FISSEHA

works in Capacity Building and

Training at the International Data

Centre Division at the CTBTO. Under

the Capacity Building Project, her

work mainly involves extensive

travelling to countries in North and

West Africa to train National Data

Centre staff, sharing the knowledge

and expertise that she has

accumulated over the decade she has

worked for the CTBTO.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

ACCESSING MONITORING

DATA, BULLETINS

AND ANALYSES

One of the unique features of the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty (CTBT) is the real time

provision of information directly

to participating States. Member

States have open, equal, timely

and convenient access to all

monitoring data, bulletins and

analyses (these products are

described on page 28). Currently,

the Preparatory Commission for

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-

Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

provides such products to 120

Member States and over 1,200

scientiﬁc and academic users. In

addition to test-ban veriﬁcation,

the data and analyses can offer

civil and scientiﬁc beneﬁts such

as for tsunami warnings and

radiation monitoring. (For more

information, please see

www.ctbto.org).

DESIGNATING A

NATIONAL AUTHORITY

The CTBT requires each Member

State to designate a national

authority to liaise with the CTBTO

and other Member States. The

national authority can facilitate

the establishment and operation

of a National Data Centre (NDC)

to manage the exchange of data

with the International Data Centre

(IDC) in Vienna.

THE ROLE OF THE

NATIONAL DATA

CENTRE (NDC)

An NDC is an organization with

technical competence in the

CTBT veriﬁcation technologies

working under the guidance of a

national authority.

The NDC provides technical

advice to the national authority.

Monitoring experts at the NDC

review and reﬁne the analysis

results provided by the IDC,

leading to the identiﬁcation of

ambiguous events. Based on these

results, each Member State makes

its own national assessment and

ﬁnal judgment regarding the

nature of an event, in accordance

with the Treaty.

The relationship between

the IDC and the NDC is a two

way process. A Member State

can request the IDC to provide

technical assistance to develop

the NDC’s capability to receive,

process and analyze monitoring

data. At the same time, NDCs

are required to provide feedback

to improve the quality of data

bulletins and analyses and thus

support the work of the CTBTO.

NDC TRAINING

ACTIVITIES AND

THE CAPACITY

BUILDING PROJECT

Training sessions especially

designed for NDC technical staff

and station operators are offered

to support the functions and

operation of NDCs.

One of the courses offered

by the IDC is the two-week NDC

training course, which aims to:

1. Provide sufﬁcient knowledge

and assistance related to

the establishment and

strengthening of NDCs.

2. Train participants in the

retrieval and analysis

methods of monitoring

data and IDC bulletins and

analyses.

3. Show participants how to

install and use the NDC-in-

a-box software, which the

IDC has developed to enable

NDCs to receive, process and

analyze monitoring data.

Courses and workshops are

organized around the world on a

regional basis and are open to all

Member States. Such activities

also provide a venue for

regional bilateral or multilateral

cooperation. More information

about upcoming activities is

available at www.ctbto.org.

To help Member States

fulﬁl their veriﬁcation

responsibilities, the CTBTO

launched a capacity building

project in 2008 in cooperation

with the European Union

to help beneﬁciary States

strengthen their NDC

capabilities.

NDC FOLLOW UP

TECHNICAL VISITS

Visiting NDCs for ﬁve working

days to provide on-the-job

training is one part of the

technical assistance provided

by the CTBTO to Member

States. Interaction with the

national authorities during

the follow-up visit helps the

CTBTO to understand the

current needs, interests and

perceptions of the State.

The usage of data can be

subsequently reviewed to

assess how the NDC is building

upon the knowledge acquired

during the visit. Member States

appreciate this type of training

as it is customized to address

the particular needs and

interests of the NDC in its own

working environment.

BACKGROUND

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

On 17 February 2011, Portugal

became the 40th State to conclude

a facility agreement with the

Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

After signing the agreement on

behalf of the Government of Portugal,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

and Cooperation, João Gomes Cravinho,

spoke to Lisa Tabassi and Fanny Tonos

Paniagua from the CTBTO Legal Services.

Could you describe Portugal’s

participation in the activities of the

CTBTO?

Portugal has always been a strong

supporter of the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

and has been very active within

the CTBTO. It is a member of the

Conference on Disarmament, where

the Treaty was negotiated. It has

three stations in its territory, all

of them located in Azores, thus

making Portugal one of the few

Member States hosting International

CTBTO. With the agreement we have

now signed, numerous problems that

could have arisen in the development

of the post-certiﬁcation activities of

the stations, namely bureaucratic ones,

will be waived. We consider that there

is still a long way to go regarding the

remaining 49 States that have not yet

signed a facility agreement and we

commend the CTBTO for its work so

far and fully endorse its continuation.

With this agreement, relations between

Portugal and the CTBTO, which were

already excellent, will be sustained and

developed. The facility agreement will

ensure that our National Data Centre

(NDC) will be able to accomplish its

task as well, namely sending monitoring

data to the International Data Centre

(IDC) in Vienna and receiving data and

analyses from the IDC.

There has been remarkable progress in

the build-up of the IMS since the Treaty

opened for signature in September 1996.

Of the planned 337 IMS facilities, 264

are already operational and sending

data to the IDC. At the same time,

however, challenges remain.

Monitoring System (IMS) facilities

in the middle of the North Atlantic.

Portugal always participates in the

meetings of different groups of

the CTBTO, including, at present,

the Advisory Group

. Portugal is

represented at the CTBTO by highly

qualiﬁed professionals who act

entirely independently. We are always

available to cooperate with the CTBTO,

as our participation in different

workshops has proved. Moreover,

being a Member of the European

Union we are also responsible for

the approval of signiﬁcant voluntary

contributions to the CTBTO.

How do you think the conclusion of

this facility agreement will further

improve collaboration between

Portugal and the CTBTO?

From the very beginning, we have been

in favour of this kind of agreement

which facilitates the development of

good relations between Portugal and the

INTERVIEW

Portugal and

the CTBTO:

Going forward

together

The importance

of putting facility

agreements in place

_______________

[1] The Advisory Group advises the CTBTO and its

subsidiary bodies on ﬁnancial, budgetary and

associated administrative issues.

Portugal's Secretary of State João Gomes Cravinho (left) and Tibor

Tóth, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, after signing the facility

agreement, Vienna, Austria, 17 February 2011.

Photo: Pablo Mehlhorn

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

»The facility

agreements are

one of the best

tools to make sure

that States comply

with their legal,

administrative

and technical

obligations

regarding the

stations.«

WHAT IS A FACILITY AGREEMENT?

• A legal arrangement between the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and each Member State that hosts an

International Monitoring System (IMS) facility. The IMS is a global network of facilities

being established by the CTBTO to monitor underground, the oceans and the atmosphere

for evidence of a nuclear explosion.

• By signing facility agreements, Member States agree to cooperate with the CTBTO in

establishing, testing, operating, upgrading and maintaining IMS facilities, even before the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has entered into force.

WHY ARE THEY IMPORTANT?

Facility agreements help to address the following issues:

• Political aspects:

By representing the formal commitment of a Member State to host the facility and

cooperate with the CTBTO during the preparatory phase, the facility agreement helps to

secure the collaboration of all relevant institutions at the national level for the installation

and operation of the stations.

• Legal aspects:

The CTBT stipulates that while IMS stations are owned and operated by the hosting State,

they are under the authority of the CTBTO (meaning that they must adhere to regulations

laid out in the CTBT and developed further by the CTBTO). Issues such as ownership

transfer, the conclusion of subsidiary arrangements with local operators, and granting

the necessary privileges and immunities to the CTBTO and its ofﬁcials are provided for in

facility agreements.

• Technological aspects:

In order for the IMS to operate reliably, all facilities have to work in accordance with the

requirements and procedures agreed on by the Treaty negotiators for the respective

veriﬁcation technologies (seismology, infrasound, hydroacoustics and radionuclide

monitoring). Under facility agreements the host State undertakes to test, operate and

maintain the facility, as well as to provide utilities and transmit monitoring data to the

International Data Centre (IDC) at the CTBTO’s headquarters in Vienna, in accordance with

requirements and procedures.

• O perational aspects:

Facility agreements help ensure coordination between the CTBTO and countries hosting

IMS facilities with regard to technical visits by CTBTO staff, access to the station, the

cooperation of local entities, assistance with imports and exports, notiﬁcation and solving

of problems, and the physical security of the facility.

HOW MANY FACILITY AGREEMENTS NEED TO BE SIGNED?

A facility agreement needs to be concluded with each of the 89 States hosting IMS facilities.

FACILITY AGREEMENTS

Do you consider that further progress in

the conclusion of facility agreements

with other hosting States would support

the work of the CTBTO in building up

the veriﬁcation regime and preparing

for entry into force of the CTBT?

Undoubtedly. The facility agreements

are one the best tools to make

sure that States comply with their

legal, administrative and technical

obligations regarding the stations.

However, that does not mean they

will be enough to solve every

problem. The reference to the

operational manuals in the facility

agreements reﬂects a successful

attempt to make all of the principles

and measures stated in the Treaty a

coherent and efﬁcient system for the

implementation of the Treaty.

What are your Government’s views on

the role of the CTBT and its veriﬁcation

regime for the maintenance of

international peace and security?

The veriﬁcation regime of the CTBT

is an extremely important element to

make sure that the world can react in

time to an event that may endanger

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

BRAZIL

EGYPT

ETHIOPIA

FIJI

IRIBATI

LIBYAN

ARA

JAMAHIRIYA

AGASCAR

MADA

PUA NEW GUINEA

A NEW

AMO

SOLOMON ISLANDS

NISIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERIC

AUSTRALI

ANADA

NAMIBIA

NEW ZEALAND

W ZE

MAN

PHILIPPINES

RUSS

IAN FEDERATI

SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRIC

OOK ISLAND

PALA

international peace and security. We

must always bear in mind that the

system has four components: the IMS,

a consultation and clariﬁcation process,

on-site inspections and conﬁdence-

building measures – which are equally

important and they all deserve the same

attention by the CTBTO. In the case of

facility agreements, we consider that,

apart from the advantages for the IMS,

they are also a conﬁdence-building

measure, both for the State that signs

it and for other Member States, as they

serve as an example and clearly deﬁne

rules and procedures. It is, however,

mandatory that States fulﬁll their

obligations arising from both the CTBT

and the facility agreement.

Is there a role for Portugal in the

Portuguese speaking world to encourage

States that have signed but not ratiﬁed

the Treaty to take the next step?

The CPLP – Comunidade de Países de

Língua Portuguesa – is an organization

that has been enlarging its scope

because of the very good relations

between its members. Defense is

nowadays an area that also concerns

CPLP. Within this context, but also

bilaterally with its members, Portugal

has always been supportive of all

measures to enhance peace and security.

We shall make extra efforts to help

those States that have not ﬁnalized the

procedures for Treaty ratiﬁcation and we

offer our collaboration to the CTBTO to

accomplish this goal.

JOÃO GOMES CRAVINHO

has been the Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal since

2009. Prior to this he served as Assistant

Professor at the Faculty of Economy,

Coimbra University, Portugal. He has

published extensively in Portuguese and

foreign journals. Dr Cravinho has also

worked in the area of Development

Cooperation. He has served as President

of the Institute for Portuguese

Cooperation and as a consultant to

national and international institutions

(European Commission and World Bank).

LISA TABASSI

joined Legal Services at the

CTBTO in 2007 and was

appointed Chief in 2010. Prior to

this, she worked for 14 years in

the Ofﬁce of the Legal Adviser of

the Organisation for the

Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons. She has also worked

for law ﬁrms in the United States

and Iran and for the Iran-United

States Claims Tribunal in The

Hague, the Netherlands.

FANNY TONOS PANIAGUA

has worked for Legal

Services at the CTBTO

since September 2010.

Prior to this, she worked

for 10 years in the

diplomatic service of the

Dominican Republic

where she specialized in

public international law

and national

implementation of

multilateral treaties.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

The 40 countries in green indicate those that have signed a facility agreement with the CTBTO. The 49 countries in orange indicate those that have yet to sign facility agreements (as of May 2011).

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

WORD CLOUD

This word cloud depicts the frequency

with which words have been mentioned

in the articles featured in this edition of

Spectrum: the larger the font, the more

common the word.

Created using wordle (www.wordle.net)

CTBTO SPECTRUM 16 | MAY 2011

The Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

bans all nuclear explosions.

It opened for signature

on 24 September 1996 in New York.

As of May 2011, 182 countries had signed the Treaty and 153

had ratiﬁed it. Of the 44 nuclear capable States which must

ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force, the so-called Annex

2 countries, 35 have done so to date while nine have yet to

ratify: China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and

the United States. On 3 May 2010, Indonesia stated that it had

initiated the CTBT ratiﬁcation process.

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-

Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) consists of the States

Signatories and the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

The main tasks of the CTBTO are to promote signatures

and ratiﬁcations and to establish a global veriﬁcation regime

capable of detecting nuclear explosions underground,

underwater and in the atmosphere.

The regime must be operational when the Treaty enters

into force. It will consist of 337 monitoring facilities

supported by an International Data Centre and

on-site inspection measures. As of 16 May 2011 almost

80 percent of the facilities at the International Monitoring

System (IMS) were operational.

cover image:

Pattreeya Thapanapaha from the

Network and Systems Support

Section at the IMS carries out

maintenance work on the VSAT

link of the Global Communications

Infrastructure, Vienna. Austria.

Photo: Marianne Weiss

editor-in-chief:

Annika Thunborg,

Spokesperson and Chief of Public Information

prepared, coordinated and edited by:

Denise Brettschneider

ctbto contributors:

Slava Bereza, John Coyne, Emmy Duran,

Florian Egerer, Jun Hee Lee, Angela Leuker,

Awoba Macheiner, Reiko Matsuda,

Pablo Mehlhorn, Mika Nikkinen, Vasileios Savvidis,

Spiro Spiliopoulos, Victoria Swisher, Robert Werzi,

Samil Yalciner

layout:

Todd Vincent

distribution:

Pablo Mehlhorn

Photographs and illustrations are at the courtesy of the authors

and the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

please visit www.ctbto.org

your resource

for stopping nuclear testing

If you wish to subscribe to the

online version of the ctbto spectrum

please visit the ‘email-alert’ area at www.ctbto.org

disclaimer:

The views expressed in articles by external contributors do

not necessarily reﬂect the positions and policies of the CTBTO

Preparatory Commission.

The boundaries and presentation of material on maps do not

imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the Provisional

Technical Secretariat concerning the legal status of any country,

territory, city or area or its authorities, or concerning the

delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

published by:

Public Information

Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

Vienna International Centre

P.O. Box 1200

1400 Vienna, Austria

t +43 1 26030 6200

f +43 1 26030 5823

e info@ctbto.org

i www.ctbto.org

CTBTO Spectrum – ISSN: 1680-533X

Printed in Austria, May 2011

on Munken Lynx Paper

wood and acid-free,

certiﬁed by the Forest Stewardship Council

WWW.CTBTO.ORG

CTBTO MAGAZINE ISSUE 16 | MAY 2011

CTBTO

SPECTRUM

COMPREHENSIVE

NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN

TREATY: SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY

8 to 10 June 2011

Hofburg Palace

Vienna, Austria

A SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

ADDRESSING THE

FOLLOWING THEMES:

1 The Earth as

a complex system

2 Understanding the nuclear

explosion source

3 Advances in sensors,

networks, and observational

technologies

4 Advances in computing,

processing, and visualization

for veriﬁcation applications

5 Creating knowledge through

partnerships, training and

information/communication

technology

10 JUNE FROM 14:00 TO 16:00

SPECIAL SESSION

The 11 March Japanese

event and its aftermath

For more information please see

WWW.CTBTO.ORG

CTBTO SPECTRUM ISSUE 16 MAY 2011

SWITZWELAND’S PRESIDENT AND

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Micheline Calmy-Rey

MOVING FORWARD

ON NUCLEAR NON-

PROLIFERATION

AND DISARMAMENT

HER ROYAL

HIGHNESS PRINCESS

Sumaya bint El Hassan

SAFEGUARDING

THE ARAB

RESISTANCE

NEW ZEALANDS'S

FOREIGN MINISTER

Georgina te Heuheu QSO

THE END OF

NUCLEAR TESTING

IS WITHIN

OUR REACH