The Personnel
Requirements
and Costs of New
Military Space
Organizations
MAY 2019
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
Notes
e years referred to in this report are federal scal years, which run from October1 to
September30 and are designated by the calendar year in which they end.
All costs are expressed in 2020dollars. Costs for years before 2020have been adjusted
for ination with the gross domestic product price index from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
www.cbo.gov/publication/55178
Contents
Summary 1
What Has CBO Analyzed? 1
How Much Would New Space Organizations IncreaseCosts? 1
How Much Might the Administration’s ProposalIncrease Costs? 2
Types of Military Organizations 2
Military Departments 2
Military Services 2
Combatant Commands 3
Development and Acquisition Agencies 3
Policy Directorates 3
Establishing New Space Organizations 3
Recent History 3
Steps in Establishing a New Space Organization 4
Arguments For and Against Establishing NewSpaceOrganizations 4
Estimated Costs of the Policy Options 5
A New Military Department 5
A New Military Service 6
A New Combatant Command 7
A New Development and Acquisition Agency 7
A New Policy Directorate 7
e Administration’s Proposal 7
Appendix: How CBO Estimated the Personnel Requirements and Costs of the Policy Options 9
List of Tables and Figures 16
About This Document 17
The Personnel Requirements and
Costs of New Military Space Organizations
Summary
e U.S. military conducts many operations that involve
space. Such operations consist mostly of launching,
operating, and maintaining satellites that are used for
various purposes, such as communicating, observing
the weather, and monitoring other countries’ missile
launches. e Congressional Budget Oce estimates that
about 23,000full-time positions within the Department
of Defense (DoD) are dedicated to performing space
activities or to supporting those who do—excluding space
activities in the intelligence agencies. At the moment,
93percent of those positions are in the Department of
the Air Force.
e Administration has proposed changing that arrange-
ment by creating what it calls a space force—an indepen-
dent military service within the Department of the Air
Force. e Administration has also proposed two more
space organizations in its budget proposal for scal year
2020: a new combatant command and a new agency that
would be responsible for the development and acquisition
of space systems. Furthermore, the Administration has
proposed creating a civilian Under Secretary for Space
who would supervise the space service, report to the
Secretary of the Air Force, and perhaps make policy about
space.
What Has CBO Analyzed?
In this report, CBO examines ve types of space organi-
zations that DoD could create, including the three that
the Administration has proposed:
•
A new military service within a new military
department that would be analogous to the
Department of the Army and that would organize,
train, and equip space forces;
•
A new military service that would exist within the
Department of the Air Force, much as the Marine
Corps exists within the Department of the Navy, and
that would likewise organize, train, and equip space
forces;
•
A new combatant command that would be structured
like the military’s Cyber Command and that would
employ space capabilities in peacetime and during
conicts;
•
A new agency that would be focused on developing
and acquiring space systems and that would be
analogous to the Missile Defense Agency; and
•
A new directorate that would make policy about
space and that would be analogous to the oce of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
CBO estimated the number of new personnel that each
of those ve organizational options would require for
overhead and management, the annual costs that those
new personnel would entail, and the onetime startup
and transition costs of each option. e estimates in this
report are for illustrative policy options; they do not rep-
resent cost estimates for any particular piece of legislation.
CBO focused on how much the options would increase
costs, not how much each option would cost in total.
Some current positions in DoD would simply be trans-
ferred to a new space organization and thus would not
increase DoD’s total costs. Also, because it is unclear how
much new capability DoD or the Congress might decide
to add to a new organization, CBO’s analysis does not
account for any new capabilities; it includes only the cost
of new administrative structures. In addition, the analysis
incorporates the assumption that intelligence agencies’
space capabilities, which are substantial, would not be
transferred to a new space organization. And it incor-
porates the assumption that positions transferred from
existing services to a new organization would not be lled
again by the existing services; if they were, costs would
increase.
How Much Would New Space Organizations
IncreaseCosts?
Annual costs for new personnel would be much larger
for some of the options than for others (see Table 1). For
2 The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions may 2019
example, CBO estimates that a new military department
would require 5,400 to 7,800new personnel for over-
head and management and increase DoD’s annual costs
by $1.1billion to $1.5billion. A new service within the
Department of the Air Force would be slightly smaller,
requiring 4,100 to 6,800such personnel and increas-
ing annual costs by $820million to $1.3billion. A
new policy directorate, by contrast, would require just
40 to 300new personnel and increase DoD’s annual
costs by $10million to $60million. e options would
also incur onetime startup and transition costs, mostly
for building new facilities to house the new organiza-
tions. CBO estimates that those costs would amount to
between $1billion and $3billion for a new department
or service.
How Much Might the Administration’s
ProposalIncrease Costs?
e Administration has provided few details about what
the three organizations that it has proposed would look
like or how large they would be. For 2020, the initial
year of creating those organizations, it has requested
$306million and 827positions, and it has also stated
that it plans to have the new organizations fully running
within ve years. If the organizations were the same
size as the ones that CBO examines in this report, the
Administration’s proposal would, when fully imple-
mented, require 5,700 to 9,700new positions for
overhead and management, increase DoD’s annual costs
by $1.1billion to $1.9billion, and incur onetime costs
of $1.8billion to $4.7billion, CBO estimates (see the
second, third, and fourth columns of Table 1). Adding
any new capabilities would increase those costs.
Types of Military Organizations
DoD might be reorganized in various ways to increase
its focus on space; this report considers ve. A reorga-
nization might result in a new military department, a
new military service, a new combatant command, a new
development and acquisition agency, or a new policy
directorate. Or it might result in some combination of
those structures, as the Administration has proposed.
Military Departments
DoD contains three military departments: the
Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force. eir role, as
established by title 10 of the U.S. Code, is to provide
personnel and equipment to commanders during con-
icts or peacetime.
1
Each department is led by a civilian
secretary, who is responsible for administering, recruit-
ing, training, and preparing forces; formulating policies;
conducting research and development programs; and
acquiring weapons and other capabilities.
Military Services
ere are four military services in DoD: the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps. It is therefore dicult to
distinguish the role of a service from the role of a depart-
ment, because three of those four services exist within
departments that bear the same names and most of the
1. 10U.S.C. §§7001–10001 (2018).
Table 1 .
Additional Overhead and Management Personnel and Costs for New Space Organizations
New Department New Service
New Combatant
Command
New Development
and Acquisition
Agency
New Policy
Directorate
Number of Additional Personnel (FTEs)
a
5,400 to 7,800 4,100 to 6,800 400 to 600 1,200 to 2,300 40 to 300
Additional Costs (Millions of 2020 dollars)
Annual 1,080 to 1,540 820 to 1,340 80 to 120 240 to 460 10 to 60
Onetime
b
1,400 to 3,240 1,100 to 3,040 520 to 1,060 220 to 560 Less than 10
Source: Congressional Budget Oce.
These estimates incorporate the assumption that the new space organizations would not have new capabilities.
FTE = full-time-equivalent position.
a. Estimates include active-duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel, as well as government-employed civilians, but not contractor employees.
b. Onetime costs consist of service-to-service transfer bonuses, organizational start-up costs, and new infrastructure costs.
3may 2019 The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
same responsibilities. e exception is the Marine Corps,
which is part of the Department of the Navy.
Each of the four services is led by a service chief—a
four-star general ocer who reports to the corresponding
department’s secretary. e service chiefs are the Chief of
Sta of the Army, the Chief of Sta of the Air Force, the
Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. Each of the service chiefs also serves as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Sta.
Like a department, a military service has specic respon-
sibilities under title 10 of the U.S. Code to organize,
train, equip, prepare, and maintain forces. e service
then provides those forces and capabilities to combatant
commands. Also like a military department, a military
service is responsible for recruiting personnel, formulat-
ing policies, conducting research and development, and
acquiring weapons and other capabilities.
Combatant Commands
e role of a combatant command, as established
under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, is to apply forces to con-
duct military operations during a conict or peacetime.
Combatant commands are responsible for operations
in particular geographic or functional areas. ey are
supported by the military services and other combat-
ant commands. During the Iraq War, for example, one
combatant command, Transportation Command, used
airlift aircraft provided by the Air Force to move forces to
Iraq to support a second combatant command, Central
Command, which is responsible for running military
operations in the Middle East.
In general, combatant commanders, who are four-star
general ocers, are not responsible for organizing,
training, or equipping forces; those responsibilities lie
with the departments and services. However, Special
Operations Command and Cyber Command have taken
on some of those roles, blurring the traditional line
between combatant commands on the one hand and
departments and services on the other.
2
Development and Acquisition Agencies
e purpose of development and acquisition agencies is
to develop new systems that will be used by the military.
2. ose two combatant commands received special authority from
10U.S.C. §167(e) (2019).
Such agencies exist at various organizational levels. For
example, the Missile Defense Agency, which develops
missile-defense systems, is not part of any of the three
military departments or four services. Rather, it exists
within DoD as what is called a defensewide agency, and
its commander reports to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering. An example more closely
related to space is the Space and Missile Systems Center,
which is part of the Air Force.
Development and acquisition agencies do not conduct
oensive or defensive operations; that is the responsi-
bility of combatant commands. Nor do they organize,
train, or equip forces; that is the responsibility of the
military departments and services.
Policy Directorates
Policy directorates are agencies that establish policy
in certain areas. For example, the Oce of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, or OUSD(I),
makes policy related to intelligence and counterintelli-
gence in the military. Another example is the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment,
and Energy, or SAF/IE, whose oce makes policy and
provides guidance and oversight on all matters pertaining
to Air Force installations.
Policy directorates have several organizational features in
common with development and acquisition agencies. For
one, they may exist either as an oce within the Oce
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), as the OUSD(I)
does, or within one of the military departments or
services, as the SAF/IE does. Also, they do not conduct
combat operations or prepare forces.
Establishing New Space Organizations
If the Administration’s proposal to establish a new
military service within the Department of the Air Force
was adopted, both the Congress and DoD would have
to take various steps. ere are arguments in favor of the
Administration’s proposal and also arguments against it.
Recent History
In 2017, the House Armed Services Committee pro-
posed to establish a new military service within the
Department of the Air Force that would be dedicated
4 The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions may 2019
tospace operations.
3
at proposal was not enacted
intolaw.
In the summer of 2018, the Administration proposed
creating a new military department to oversee military
operations in space. at fall, the Air Force released an
initial proposal for such a department. Under that pro-
posal, the new department would have been an indepen-
dent entity whose personnel were separated from the Air
Force, much as the Air Force itself was separated from
the Army after the Second World War.
In March2019, the Administration advanced a dierent
proposal. In its proposed budget for scal year 2020,
it called for the creation of three military organizations
dedicated to space: an independent service within the
Department of the Air Force, including a new Under
Secretary for Space; a combatant command; and a devel-
opment agency. e Administration proposed setting up
those organizations over the next ve years but did not
provide details. It requested, however, that the Congress
authorize 827positions and $306million for scal year
2020 to begin the process of creating the new organi-
zations.
4
e Administration also estimated that there
would be 15,000personnel in the new space service, but
it provided no further information, such as how many of
those positions would be operating forces and how many
would support those forces.
Steps in Establishing a New Space Organization
Lawmakers would need to take various actions before
any new space organization could be fully established.
If the organization was a new department or service,
the Congress would need to change laws governing the
structure of the military forces, in particular the law
that authorizes the current military departments and
services.
5
e Congress would also need to appropriate
enough funding to establish a new department or service,
conrm high-ranking military ocers and civilians to
serve in it, and authorize the transfer of forces to it from
existing military services.
3. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,
H.R.2810, 115th Cong. (2017).
4. Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief
Financial Ocer, Defense Budget Overview (March2019),
https://go.usa.gov/xmrGC (PDF, 4.0MB).
5. 10U.S.C. §9011 (2019).
Implementing a new space combatant command, space
development agency, or policy directorate would also
require the Congress to act. ough DoD could establish
those entities without the enactment of legislation, the
Congress would have to conrm high-ranking military
ocers and civilians, provide funding, and possibly
approve other changes.
Once the Congress had taken those steps, a new space
organization would take time to establish. At rst there
would be a transition period so that the military would
not lose its ability to carry out space operations. A provi-
sional headquarters would probably be established early
in the transition. During the transition, the Air Force
would gradually transfer responsibility and personnel
to the new organization. And even after the new orga-
nization assumed full responsibility, it would continue
to evolve, especially if the Congress chose to increase
investments and operations in space signicantly.
Arguments For and Against Establishing
NewSpaceOrganizations
A long-standing argument for a separate space
organization—and especially for a new service or
department—is that the lack of senior advocates for all
space operations hinders the development of space-based
capabilities and resources.
6
Like all activities in DoD,
operations in space and space systems must compete for
resources with other operations and weapon systems.
And as the Government Accountability Oce has noted,
“there is no single individual, oce, or entity in place
that provides oversight for the overall space program
acquisition structure.”
7
At one point, DoD had des-
ignated the Secretary of the Air Force to oversee space
programs, but even then, that secretary did not have
authority over organizations outside the Air Force that
were also involved with space. Supporters argue that cre-
ating new space organizations would provide that focus
and high-level support.
A related argument is that even within the Air Force,
the focus is on air, not space, and that resources for
space have suered as a consequence. Proponents of that
6. See Center for Security Policy, “Space Power: What Is at Stake,
What Will It Take” (January9, 2001), http://tinyurl.com/
ayeg7kn.
7. Government Accountability Oce, Space Acquisitions: Challenges
Facing DOD as It Changes Approaches to Space Acquisitions, GAO-
16-471T (March2016), www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-471T.
5may 2019 The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
argument point out that although funding for pro-
curement decreased for both aircraft and space during
years of budget declines, such funding grew much more
quickly foraircraft than for space during periods of
budget increases.
8
Some advocates also argue that a space
force would better prepare the United States to engage in
oensive operations in space, which might be necessary
in the future.
Also, some advocates of a space service or department
note that ocers specializing in space have few opportu-
nities, and no dedicated career path, to become generals
(or the equivalent).
9
A separate service or department
could provide a more stable and attractive career path for
such ocers. It might also create more expertise in the
community of civilians specializing in space. As a result,
members of a space service or department might think
in new and better ways about defense problems, focusing
on space more than the military currently does.
Critics of a space service or department voice a number
of arguments. One is that it might only increase over-
head costs and bureaucracy.
10
Another is that creating
a constituency for space systems and warfare could lead
to the development of weapons and doctrines that are
unnecessary and could even endanger the nation.
11
Critics also suggest that the United States has not
demonstrated the need to conduct oensive operations
in space, which undermines the argument for a sepa-
rate service made by some proponents.
12
Furthermore,
critics argue that the benets of such an organization are
unclear and that a comprehensive plan with clear objec-
tives should be provided before the creation of any new
space organization.
13
Critics of a new development and
8. See Todd Harrison, “Why We Need a Space Force” (Center
for Strategic and International Studies, October3, 2018),
http://tinyurl.com/yyxzvkxb.
9. Ibid.
10. See Kaitlyn Johnson, “Why a Space Force Can Wait” (Center
for Strategic and International Studies, October3, 2018),
http://tinyurl.com/y2rpnvne.
11. See Scott Bixby, “Experts Worry President Trump’s ‘Space
Force’ Could Lead to a Space War,” Daily Beast (July27, 2018),
http://tinyurl.com/y8rdcvb5.
12. See Everett Carl Dolman, “Has the Air Force Been a Good
Steward for Space?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol.11, no.2
(Summer 2017), http://tinyurl.com/y4fupnoo.
13. See Kaitlyn Johnson, “Why a Space Force Can Wait” (Center
for Strategic and International Studies, October3, 2018),
http://tinyurl.com/y2rpnvne.
acquisition agency have similar concerns, arguing that
such an agency would duplicate the Air Force’s current
capabilities.
Estimated Costs of the Policy Options
For this analysis, CBO focused on the additional costs of
creating and maintaining ve dierent kinds of space orga-
nizations. at is, the estimates are not estimates of total
spending for those organizations; they are estimates of how
much more it would cost to create and maintain such orga-
nizations than the federal government currently spends.
CBO also estimated the total number of personnel
that each kind of space organization would have. ose
estimates cannot be translated into estimates of total
costs, because personnel would be only one component
of spending for a space organization. Other costs would
include acquisition costs, which CBO did not estimate.
CBO’s estimates of the additional costs of establishing a
space organization focus on overhead and management
costs and do not include the cost of adding new capabil-
ities. In that sense, CBO’s estimates probably represent
the lower end of the range of possible costs. In addition,
CBO expects that intelligence agencies’ space capabili-
ties, which are substantial, would not be transferred to a
new space organization.
e options are generally not mutually exclusive.
e government could, for instance, create both a
space service and a space combatant command, as the
Administration has proposed. e only two options that
are mutually exclusive are a new space service in a new
military department and a new space service in an exist-
ing military department; DoD would presumably not
create both organizations.
Finally, the estimates in this report are for illustrative
policy options; they do not represent cost estimates for
any particular piece of legislation. For more detail about
the methods that CBO used to make these estimates, see
the appendix.
A New Military Department
CBO estimates that a new military department for
DoD’s space activities would require 5,400 to 7,800new
overhead and management positions, including a new
civilian secretary of the department, a new military
service chief, and their support sta (see Table 1 on
page 2). ose new positions would increase DoD’s
6 The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions may 2019
costs by $1.1billion to $1.5billion a year. In addition,
CBO estimates, establishing a new military department
would incur onetime costs of $1.4billion to $3.2billion,
mostly for new oce facilities.
Furthermore, approximately 22,900positions would
need to be transferred from existing military services to
the new department (see Figure 1). All told, the new
department would therefore have between 28,300 and
30,700positions.
A New Military Service
If a space organization was instead formed as a new mili-
tary service within an existing department—presumably
the Department of the Air Force—the cost would be
slightly smaller. CBO estimates that a new military ser-
vice would need 4,100 to 6,800new overhead and man-
agement positions, which would increase DoD’s costs by
$820million to $1.3billion a year. e onetime costs
would be $1.1billion to $3.0billion, CBO estimates.
As with a new military department, approximately
22,900positions would be transferred from existing
military services. In total, the new service would have
27,000 to 29,700positions.
For several reasons, a new service would require fewer
personnel than a new department would. For one thing,
a new service would not need its own secretary or the
sta that would support the secretary; instead, the
Secretary of the Air Force would oversee it, much as the
Secretary of the Navy oversees both the Navy and the
Marine Corps. e new military service would have only
a new service chief, who would report to the Secretary of
the Air Force.
Also, a new service could make use of some of the exist-
ing department’s support functions. For instance, the
new service could rely on the Air Force to provide it with
ocers, the way most ocer candidates for the Marine
Corps are brought through the Navy’s training programs.
e Air Force could also provide medical support, as the
Navy does for the Marines. It is also possible that the Air
Force could provide base operations and basic training,
although the Navy does not provide those two support
functions for the Marines.
Whether it was part of a new department or an existing
one, the new service would be responsible for developing
doctrine to execute missions in space and for conducting
operations in space to support combatant commanders.
If DoD created a new combatant command, a space
service would provide it with forces and capabilities. If
Figure 1 .
Number of Personnel in a New Military Department or Service
Full-Time-Equivalent Positions
Additional Overhead
and Management
Current Support
Personnel
Current Operating
Forces
10,800
12,100
10,800
12,100
5,400
10,800
12,100
7,800
10,800
12,100
4,100
10,800
12,100
6,800
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
Current Department
(Low estimate)
Department
(High estimate)
Service
(Low estimate)
Service
(High estimate)
Source: Congressional Budget Oce, using data from the Department of Defense.
These estimates incorporate the assumption that the new space organizations would not have new capabilities. The estimates include active-duty,
National Guard, and reserve personnel, as well as government-employed civilians, but not contractor employees.
In CBO’s estimates, a new
military department or service
would consist of the 22,900
positions currently performing
space-related activities
plus new overhead and
management positions.
7may 2019 The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
not, the space service would provide support to existing
combatant commands.
e Administration included this option in its
2020budget proposal. e proposal calls for a new mili-
tary service under the Department of the Air Force with
about 15,000personnel, most of whom would be trans-
ferred from elsewhere in DoD. e proposal requests
funds only to create an initial headquarters. DoD has
indicated that it plans to have the new service fully oper-
ational in ve years, and it has asked the Congress to give
it authority to transfer positions and funding from the
existing services during the transition period.
A New Combatant Command
DoD could also create a new combatant command
for space operations. CBO estimates that such a com-
mand would require 400 to 600additional personnel
and would increase DoD’s costs by $80million to
$120million a year. CBO estimates that the onetime
start-up and construction costs would be $500million to
$1.1billion.
A new combatant command would be responsible for
the command and control of space assets and capabili-
ties to meet national security objectives. Currently, U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has those respon-
sibilities. Creating a new combatant command would
be similar to the Administration’s separation of Cyber
Command from STRATCOM to make it a separate
combatant command in August2017.
e Administration has already started to create a
new space combatant command, but it will need the
Congress to authorize and appropriate funding and
approve a commander.
14
DoD has not provided any
estimates of the size of the command.
A New Development and Acquisition Agency
CBO estimates that a new development and acquisition
agency for space would require 1,200 to 2,300additional
personnel and would increase DoD’s costs by $240mil-
lion to $460million a year. e estimated onetime costs
would be $220million to $560million.
14. See Donald J. Trump, President of the United States,
memorandum to James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense
(December18, 2018), https://go.usa.gov/xmrGj.
A new development and acquisition agency would
develop, test, procure, and eld space systems. Because
it would have no role in organizing and training forces
or using them in operations, it could exist within the Air
Force, a new military service, OSD, or the Joint Sta
(which is the headquarters sta under the Joint Chiefs
of Sta), or it could be a defensewide agency, like the
Missile Defense Agency.
DoD has already started to create a defensewide space
development agency, but it will need Congressional
approval for funding. Presumably the agency would
coordinate with the space activities of the Air Force’s
Space and Missile Center, which currently oversees the
Air Force’s work on space systems, and with other devel-
opment agencies.
A New Policy Directorate
CBO estimates that a new policy directorate would
require 40 to 300additional personnel, who would
increase DoD’s costs by $10million to $60million
a year. e new onetime costs would be less than
$10million.
A policy directorate would cost less than a develop-
ment and acquisition agency because it would not have
authority over acquisition, testing, or elding; it would
therefore have considerably fewer people. It would be
responsible only for establishing policy and providing
guidance to secretaries and service chiefs. A new policy
directorate could be part of the Air Force, a new military
service, OSD, or the Joint Sta.
e Administration has not explicitly proposed a space
policy directorate. However, in its budget request for
2020, it has proposed an under secretary within the
Department of the Air Force who would be responsible
for the overall supervision of space matters. It is unclear
how large that under secretary’s oce would be; it might
be the size of the policy directorate that CBO has exam-
ined, or it might be smaller.
The Administration’s Proposal
e Administration has proposed creating three new
space organizations: a military service, a separate com-
batant command, and a development and acquisition
agency within OSD. In its budget request for 2020,
the Administration has asked the Congress for the
authority that it would need to establish those organi-
zations, as well as funding in 2020 to begin the process
8 The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions may 2019
of creating them. But it has provided few details about
what the organizations would look like or how large they
would be. For 2020, it has requested $306million and
827positions.
If the organizations, once fully established, were about
the same size as the ones that CBO examines in this
report, the Administration’s proposal would require
5,700 to 9,700new positions, increase DoD’s annual
costs by $1.1billion to $1.9billion, and incur onetime
costs of $1.8billion to $4.7billion, CBO estimates.
ose estimates are the sum of the amounts projected for
each of the three new organizations.
Appendix: How CBO Estimated the Personnel
Requirements and Costs of the Policy Options
is appendix provides details about how the
Congressional Budget Oce made the estimates for per-
sonnel and costs that it used in this report. CBO made
ve sets of estimates:
•
e number of positions in current operating forces
that involve space activities,
•
e number of positions that currently provide
support to those operating forces,
•
e number of additional overhead and management
positions that would be needed to support each of the
ve new space organizations that CBO examined,
•
e annual costs of those additional positions for
each new organization, and
•
e onetime costs of creating each of the
organizations.
e rst two sets of estimates are for current forces and
contribute only indirectly to CBO’s estimates of addi-
tional personnel and costs. CBO has provided them
for informational purposes, in part because there is
little public information on how many people in the
Department of Defense (DoD) are currently involved in
space activities.
Positions in Current Operating Forces
To estimate the number of positions that involve space
activities in current operating forces, CBO used data
from DoD’s Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for
scal year 2020, searching for all active-duty, National
Guard, reserve, and civilian positions identied as
performing space operations. Not all of those positions
are full time, so CBO converted the numbers into
full-time-equivalent positions (FTEs).
CBO found that there were about 10,800full-time-
equivalent personnel identied in the FYDP as
performing space operations. e agency expects that all
of those personnel would be transferred into a new space
organization if it was organized as a department or as a
service—but because those positions already exist, costs
would not rise.
Positions That Currently Provide Support
Estimating the number of personnel who currently
support space operating forces was less straightforward,
because the FYDP does not identify all of those support
positions. So CBO used a dierent approach. First, it
identied the number of support personnel in each of
eight functions, such as base operations, in the four exist-
ing military services (see Table A-1). For example, the
number of FTEs in base operations ranges from about
24,200in the Marine Corps to 42,400in the Air Force.
CBO calculated the ratios of support personnel in each
function to the total number of operating personnel in
each military service. CBO then found the minimum,
maximum, and average ratio in each function (see Table
A-2 on page 11). For example, the ratio of support
personnel for base operations to operating forces ranged
from a minimum of 8percent (for the Army) to a
maximum of 18percent (for the Marine Corps). Finally,
CBO applied those ratios for each support function to
the current number of space operating forces—that is,
the 10,800described above—to estimate how many
positions currently support those operating forces (see
Table A-3 on page 12). For base operations, CBO
multiplied the minimum, average, and maximum
ratios by 10,800 to get 863, 1,489, and 1,941FTEs,
respectively.
e resulting estimate of all support personnel ranged
from a minimum of about 4,900 to a maximum of about
13,300; the average was about 9,100, which CBO used
for its calculations. Of those 9,100positions, about
6,300 are identied by DoD in the FYDP as support-
ing space-related activities today (see Table A-4 on page
13). And of those 6,300positions, about 52percent
10 may 2019
are in acquisition, 34percent are in management, and
14percent are in training.
In most categories, DoD identied many fewer support
personnel as space-related than the average department-
wide ratios would suggest are actually supporting space
operating forces. However, in two categories, acquisition
and management, DoD identied more space support
personnel than those ratios would suggest. So to arrive
at its estimate of the total number of positions that are
supporting space operating forces today (about 12,100),
CBO took the number of positions that DoD identied
in those two categories and used the departmentwide
ratios to calculate the number of positions in the other
six categories (see the right-hand column in Table A-4 on
page 13).
If a new military department was formed for space
activities, all 12,100 of those support personnel would
presumably be transferred to it. But because the positions
already exist, costs would not rise.
Similarly, if a new military service was formed,
CBO estimated that the same number of support
personnel—12,100—would be transferred to it, also
without raising costs. at total might overstate the
number of positions that would be transferred to the
new service if it relied on its parent department to pro-
vide some of those support functions. But in either case,
DoD’s overall costs would not be aected, because those
positions would still exist within the parent military
department.
For a new combatant command, CBO used a dierent
approach to estimate the number of personnel who cur-
rently provide support to operating forces and would be
transferred. Because an organization exists today within
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) that provides
many of the functions of a new space command but on
a smaller scale, CBO assumed that the space support
personnel currently assigned to STRATCOM—about
600positions—would be transferred to the new com-
batant command and not add to annual costs. (All new
positions created for the combatant command would
add to annual costs, as this report explains below.)
CBO’s estimate for a space development and acquisi-
tion agency incorporated the assumption that the space
acquisition agencies that exist in each service today
would remain in place and that the new agency would
be an overarching one that oversaw all of DoD’s space
acquisitions. (at approach would be similar to the
one that DoD used when it created the Missile Defense
Agency.) All of the positions in the new agency would
therefore be new and would add to annual costs, as this
report explains below.
e oce of a principal space adviser exists today in
the Department of the Air Force. CBO assumes that it
would remain in place if a new policy directorate was
established under the Secretary of Defense or the Joint
Sta. In that case, all the positions in the new policy
directorate would be new. If instead the new policy
directorate was established within the Department of the
Air Force, the positions in the oce of the Air Force’s
space adviser would presumably be transferred to the
new directorate, reducing the number of new positions.
Additional Positions for
OverheadandManagement
CBO estimated the number of additional positions—
positions that are not in the military or DoD’s civilian
Table A-1 .
DoD’s Projections of Operating Forces
and Support Positions in 2020
Full-Time-Equivalent Positions
Army Navy
Marine
Corps Air Force
Operating Forces 483,508 272,091 134,081 268,238
Support Positions
Base Operations 38,721 36,530 24,161 42,440
Command 7,015 6,975 1,041 8,524
Acquisition 27,523 59,111 2,327 34,527
Logistics 39,588 39,683 3,712 37531.8
Management 47,285 29,884 8,171 50,076
Medical 15,760 23,034 1 23,840
Personnel 30,624 24,298 12,048 16,592
Training
94,471 55,191 39,283 69,028
Subtotal 300,986 274,706 90,744 282,560
Total 784,494 546,797 224,825 550,798
Source: Congressional Budget Oce, using data from the Department of
Defense.
Estimates include active-duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel, as
well as government-employed civilians, but not contractor employees.
DoD = Department of Defense.
The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
11APPENDIX
workforce today—that the ve options would require for
overhead and management. Unlike the previous two sets
of estimates, the estimates of new positions contribute to
CBO’s estimates of the additional costs of a new space
organization.
CBO’s estimates incorporate the assumption that a new
space organization would continue DoD’s current space
activities. Any new capabilities that were added to a new
space organization would entail more personnel and
costs.
To determine the number of personnel needed for over-
head and management functions, CBO reviewed those
functions in DoD’s existing departments, services, and
other organizations. e functions that CBO identied
were the following:
•
A secretary (for a military department), a service
chief (for a military service), a commander (for a
combatant command), a civilian director (for a
development and acquisition agency or a policy
directorate), and the support sta associated with
each of their oces;
•
Headquarters sta to support the secretary, chief,
commander, or director (for all ve options);
•
Sta who would be assigned to the Joint Sta to
meet the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
(for a department or a service);
•
Sta who would be assigned to each of the existing
combatant commands, also to comply with the law
(for a department or a service);
•
Sta to recruit personnel and provide training (for a
department or a service); and
•
Sta to provide a range of other management and
support services, such as nancial management and
personnel management (for a department or service).
CBO estimated the additional resources needed in
each of those dierent categories for each option; some
requirements applied only to certain options (see Table
A-5 on page 14).
A New Military Department or Service
Most of the functions for a new department with a new
embedded service would be the same as those for a new
service within an existing department, although the
number of positions assigned to each function might
vary. e exception is that only a new department would
have a secretariat.
CBO found that although the number of positions
assigned to overhead and management functions varies
by service, there does not appear to be any correlation
between the size of a service and the size of its overhead
and management sta for some functions. For example,
the size of headquarters sta varies little among the Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, even though the Marine
Corps is only one-third the size of the other services (see
Table A-6 on page 15). Similarly, the law requires ser-
vices to assign personnel to the Joint Sta and to provide
sta to each of the DoD’s combatant commands. So a
service that was small, as a space service would probably
be, would probably still have a sta for overhead and
management that was larger than the size of the service
would suggest.
By CBO’s estimates, a new department would be led by
a new secretary with a sta of 50 to 65 (see Table A-5
on page 14). at estimate is based on ndings by
the Government Accountability Oce (GAO) about
Table A-2 .
Ratio of Support Positions, by Function,
to All Operating Forces
Percent
Minimum
Among
Services
Average
Among
Services
Maximum
Among
Services
Base Operations 8.0 13.8 18.0
Command 0.8 2.0 3.2
Acquisition 1.7 10.5 21.7
Logistics 2.8 9.9 14.6
Management 6.1 11.4 18.7
Medical 0 5.2 8.9
Personnel 6.2 7.6 9.0
Training 19.5 23.7 29.3
Source: Congressional Budget Oce, using data from the Department of
Defense.
Ratios were calculated with full-time-equivalent positions for active-
duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel, as well as government-
employed civilians, but not contractor employees.
The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
12 may 2019
the size of secretaries’ stas.
1
GAO found that the size of
secretaries’ oces in existing departments ranged from
49positions in the Navy to 65in the Army.
A new service would also require a new service chief,
whether that service was in a new or an existing depart-
ment. e chief would have a sta of between 100 and
150, CBO estimates. at estimate is also based on
GAO’s ndings about the size of the service chiefs’ stas.
e number of management headquarters sta for a new
department would be between 2,200 and 3,400posi-
tions, CBO estimates; for a new service, it would be
between 1,000 and 2,600positions. ose estimates
too are based on GAO’s analyses, which focused on
the Oce of the Secretary for each department and
the service headquarters sta that supports each service
chief. (For example, the Army Sta supports the Chief
of Sta of the Army, and the Air Sta supports the Chief
of Sta of the Air Force.) e number of management
1. Government Accountability Oce, Defense Headquarters: DOD
Needs to Reassess Personnel Requirements for the Oce of Secretary of
Defense, Joint Sta, and Military Service Secretariats, GAO-15-10
(January2015), www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-10. DoD has
undertaken several initiatives since that report was released, but
budget documents for 2019suggest that military departments’
headquarters are still about the same size.
headquarters personnel for departments ranges from
2,200in the Department of the Navy to 3,400in the
Department of the Army, GAO found; for services, it
ranges from 1,000 for the Navy to 2,600 for the Marine
Corps.
ere would be little to no dierence between a
department and a service in the number of positions
assigned to the Joint Sta, the combatant commands,
and recruiting and training, in CBO’s judgment. CBO
estimates that 30 to 40people from a new department
or a new service would be assigned to the Joint Sta. To
arrive at that estimate, CBO multiplied its estimate of
the number of military personnel in a space department
(between 17,400 and 18,900positions) by the fraction
of DoD’s active-duty force that the services provide to
the Joint Sta (0.2percent). CBO derived that fraction
using the size of the Joint Sta in 2013 (2,570), which
was reported by GAO, and the size of DoD’s active-duty
force in 2013 (1.4million).
CBO also estimates that a new department or service
would have to assign 50 to 100positions to each of
10combatant commands in DoD, for a total of 500
to 1,000positions—an estimate that is based on the
average number of positions assigned for the same pur-
pose by existing military services. And CBO estimates
that the recruiting and training functions would need
2,000 to 2,200positions in a department and 1,900 to
2,100positions in a service. at estimate is based on the
average share of active-duty forces that existing services
allocate to those activities (about 11percent), which
CBO applied to its estimates of the number of active-
duty positions in a new department or a new service.
Other management and support sta would number
550 to 900positions in a department or a service, CBO
estimates. ose estimates are based on the share of sta
that the existing departments and services devote to such
functions as nancial management, personnel manage-
ment, installation management, and communications,
as reported in the services’ budget books for 2019 and as
indicated by various other data.
Also, if a new service was created within an existing
department, it might need fewer overhead and manage-
ment sta than CBO has estimated if the department’s
two services shared some functions. Or the opposite
could occur. e Marine Corps provides an example
of both phenomena: It has just as large a management
Table A-3 .
Estimated Number of Positions Currently
Supporting Space Operating Forces
Full-Time-Equivalent Positions
Based on the
Minimum
Ratio Among
Services
Based on the
Average
Ratio Among
Services
Based on the
Maximum
Ratio Among
Services
Base Operations 863 1,489 1,941
Command 84 215 342
Acquisition 187 1,132 2,341
Logistics 298 1,065 1,571
Management 657 1,226 2,011
Medical 0 555 958
Personnel 666 820 968
Training 2,105 2,555 3,157
Total 4,860 9,056 13,289
Source: Congressional Budget Oce, using data from the Department of
Defense.
Estimates include active-duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel, as
well as government-employed civilians, but not contractor employees.
The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
13APPENDIX
headquarters sta as any other service does, perhaps
because that sta must perform some of the functions
of a secretariat, and yet it has proportionally the smallest
recruiting and training sta, because the Navy provides
some training for many of its ocer candidates and new
ocers.
Furthermore, if a new service was created within an exist-
ing department, there would probably be some growth
in the secretariat of the existing department, because it
would now oversee and create policy for two military ser-
vices. (at growth is not included in CBO’s estimate.)
For example, the Administration’s proposal to double the
number of Air Force under secretaries by creating a new
Under Secretary for Space would require an increase in
sta to support that under secretary.
A New Combatant Command
CBO estimates that a new combatant command would
need 420 to 640new positions to sta its commander’s
oce and management headquarters. ose positions
would be in addition to the roughly 600space support
personnel who are currently assigned to STRATCOM
and would probably be transferred to the new combat-
ant command (but would not add to annual costs). e
combatant command would not need any of the other
functions that CBO identied.
CBO’s estimate is based on the size of U.S. Space
Command before it was eliminated in 2002 and its rem-
nants moved to STRATCOM. U.S. Space Command
varied in size over the years, ranging from about
1,000positions to about 1,200. CBO constructed its
estimates by subtracting the 600personnel engaged in
space activities in STRATCOM today.
A New Development and Acquisition Agency
CBO estimates that a new development and acquisi-
tion agency for space would have a headquarters sta of
1,200 to 2,300positions. Because the agency would be
new, all of those positions would be new and would add
to DoD’s annual costs. e high end of CBO’s estimate
is based on the size of the Missile Defense Agency, as
reported in DoD’s budget justication books for 2019.
e low end reects an agency that is half that size.
A New Policy Directorate
CBO estimates that a new policy directorate would
have roughly 40 to 300positions. All of them would be
new because there is no such organization today. CBO’s
estimates are based on an examination of similar orga-
nizations within DoD. e high end of CBO’s estimate
is similar to the number of positions in the Oce of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. e low end
is similar to the number of positions in several smaller
policy organizations in DoD.
Annual Costs of the Additional Positions for
Overhead and Management
To estimate the cost of the additional positions that
would be necessary for each option, CBO multiplied the
number of those positions by $198,600 (see Table A-5).
at dollar amount is CBO’s estimate of the average
cost of adding an FTE in 2020dollars. e estimate was
developed by dividing the Air Force’s total operation and
support funding, including Defense Health Program
costs for military personnel, by the number of FTEs
Table A-4 .
CBO’s and DoD’s Estimates of the
Number of Positions Currently
Supporting Space Operating Forces
Full-Time-Equivalent Positions
Estimate Based
on Average
Service Ratios
Number
Identified
by DoD
Number Not
Identified
by DoD
Estimate
of Total
Positions
Base Operations 1,489 0 1,489 1,489
Command 215 0 215 215
Acquisition 1,132 3,243 0 3,243
Logistics 1,065 0 1,065 1,065
Management 1,226 2,162 0 2,162
Medical 555 0 555 555
Personnel 820 8 812 820
Training 2,555 872 1,683 2,555
Total 9,056 6,285 5,818 12,103
Source: Congressional Budget Oce, using data from the Department of
Defense.
The first column shows the number of positions calculated on the basis
of departmentwide average ratios for each category (see TableA-3).
The second column shows the number identified by DoD. For most
categories, DoD identified fewer personnel than the ratios would
suggest, but for two, it identified more. So for those two categories, CBO
used DoD’s numbers as its final estimates, which are shown in the right-
hand column. For the remaining categories, CBO used the calculations
that were based on departmentwide average ratios.
Estimates include active-duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel, as
well as government-employed civilians, but not contractor employees.
DoD = Department of Defense.
The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
14 may 2019
identied in the FYDP for scal year 2020. CBO’s esti-
mate reects the Air Force’s full cost per FTE—including
all direct costs for pay and benets, as well as the opera-
tion and maintenance funding that supports each FTE.
2
It is higher than the estimate of $175,000made by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, which
excludes Defense Health Program costs.
3
Although DoD’s personnel data (and therefore CBO’s
estimates of additional positions) do not include contrac-
tors, the costs of contractors are incorporated in CBO’s
estimate because those costs are included in the opera-
tion and maintenance funding that CBO used in making
its estimate. If the ratio of contractors to FTEs in space
activities was greater than the Air Force average, costs
could be higher than CBO estimated.
2. CBO used the Air Force’s cost per FTE because the great
majority of personnel involved in space activities today are Air
Force personnel.
3. See Todd Harrison, “How Much Will the Space Force Cost?”
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, November2018),
http://tinyurl.com/y5s3mytp.
Onetime Costs
Creating new organizations would have some onetime
costs. CBO identied three types of onetime costs:
start-up costs for such items as signs, uniforms, and
stationery; transfer bonuses that a new service may have
to pay to encourage current personnel in other services
to join; and construction costs for new buildings and
facilities. CBO estimates that total onetime costs could
range from a few million dollars to $3.2billion.
Start-Up Costs
Depending on the size of the organization, start-up costs
could range from $1million to $100million, excluding
uniforms, CBO estimated. ose ranges are based on the
Air Force’s operation and maintenance budget requests
to create U.S. Cyber Command, which totaled about
$50million. Start-up costs would be lower for a smaller
organization, such as a policy directorate, and higher for
a larger one, such as a service or department.
In addition, CBO estimates that developing and stocking
at least two types of uniforms for the military person-
nel in a new department or service would cost roughly
Table A-5 .
CBO’s Estimates of Additional Overhead and Management
Personnel and Costs for New Space Organizations
New Department New Service
New Combatant
Command
New Development
and Acquisition
Agency
New Policy
Directorate
Number of Additional Personnel (FTEs)
a
Secretary or Director 50 to 65 0 0 5 to 15 3 to 5
Chief or Commander 100 to 150 100 to 150 20 to 40 0 0
Management Headquarters Sta 2,200 to 3,400 1,000 to 2,600 400 to 600 1,200 to 2,300 40 to 300
Joint Sta 30 to 40 30 to 40 0 0 0
Combatant Command Component 500 to 1,000 500 to 1,000 0 0 0
Recruiting and Training 2,000 to 2,200 1,900 to 2,100 0 0 0
Other Management and Support 550 to 900 550 to 900 0 0 0
Total 5,400 to 7,800 4,100 to 6,800 420 to 640 1,205 to 2,315 43 to 305
Additional Costs (Millions of 2020 dollars)
Annual 1,080 to 1,540 820 to 1,340 80 to 120 240 to 460 10 to 60
Onetime
b
1,400 to 3,240 1,100 to 3,040 520 to 1,060 220 to 560 1 to 5
Source: Congressional Budget Oce.
These estimates incorporate the assumption that the new space organizations would not have new capabilities.
FTE = full-time-equivalent position.
a. Estimates include active-duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel, as well as government-employed civilians, but not contractor employees.
b. Onetime costs consist of service-to-service transfer bonuses, organizational start-up costs, and new infrastructure costs.
The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
15APPENDIX
$200million. at estimate is based on the recent
experiences of the existing services when developing new
uniforms.
Transfer Bonuses
DoD would probably pay transfer bonuses if a new space
organization was formed as a military department or as a
military service. In the other cases, personnel could sim-
ply be ordered to move as part of the regular assignment
process. DoD has asked the Congress for the authority
to order personnel to transfer to a new department or
service, but the department is likely to oer bonuses rst
to encourage people to move voluntarily, much as it does
to encourage people to stay in the military (or to encour-
age them to leave during a drawdown). Involuntary
transfers would probably increase the number of people
who left when their term was up, which would require
the new service to recruit more people and could impair
its functioning.
CBO estimates that bonuses would amount to between
$50million and $140million. at estimate is based
on two further estimates: that the average bonus would
equal $10,000, which reects DoD’s experience with
service-to-service transfer bonuses in 2006; and that
5,300 to 14,100military personnel would receive those
bonuses. e high end of that range reects a scenario
in which all transferred military personnel get bonuses;
the low end reects a scenario in which only the mili-
tary personnel that support space operating forces do.
Civilians typically do not receive transfer bonuses.
New Buildings and Facilities
To estimate the construction cost of new buildings and
facilities to house a space organization, CBO examined
recent construction for other defense and government
organizations. For a new department, service, or devel-
opment and acquisition agency, CBO concluded that
the costs would come to about $200,000per FTE in the
new organization. Construction costs would range from
$1.1billion to $2.8billion for a new military department
and from $800million to $2.6billion for a new service,
CBO estimates. e low ends of those ranges incorpo-
rate the assumption that the new facilities would house
all of the new personnel (and use CBO’s lower estimate
of the number of new positions for a department or a
service). e high ends incorporate the assumption that
the new facilities would house all of the new personnel
(and use CBO’s higher estimate of the number of new
positions) and half of the 12,100support personnel that
would transfer to the new department or service. For a
new development and acquisition agency, CBO estimates
that construction costs would range from $200million to
$500million because all of the positions would be new.
CBO’s estimate of the cost of facilities for a new combatant
command is based on recent construction costs for com-
batant commands—specically, about $500million for the
newly established U.S. Cyber Command and more than
$1billion for a new headquarters building at U.S. Strategic
Command. CBO did not estimate construction costs for
a space policy directorate, because it assumed that such a
small organization would be housed in existing space.
Other Onetime Costs
Other onetime or start-up costs—such as the cost of
developing or buying new information technology sys-
tems, management systems, or supply chains—could add
to the cost of establishing a space organization. CBO did
not account for those costs because they are dicult to
anticipate. Instead, the agency’s estimates incorporate the
assumption that new space organizations would rely on
existing systems or on systems that are not more expen-
sive than those funded in typical operation and mainte-
nance budgets.
Table A-6 .
Number of Headquarters Personnel
Authorized for 2013
Military Civilian Total
Memorandum:
Total Size of
Service in 2013
Oce of the Secretary
of Defense 552 2,094 2,646 n.a.
Joint Sta 1,455 1,117 2,572 n.a.
Army 997 2,642 3,639 1,371,268
Navy 1,035 1,341 2,376 591,905
Marines 1,303 1,281 2,584 246,573
Air Force 1,458 1,131 2,589 685,089
Sources: Government Accountability Oce; each service’s budget
materials for fiscal year 2013.
Estimates include active-duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel, as
well as government-employed civilians, but not contractor employees.
n.a. = not applicable.
The Personnel requiremenTs and CosTs of new miliTary sPaCe organizaTions
List of Tables and Figures
Figure
1. Number of Personnel in a New Military Department or Service 6
Tables
1. Additional Overhead and Management Personnel and Costs for New
Space Organizations 2
A-1. DoD’s Projections of Operating Forces and Support Positions in 2020 10
A-2. Ratio of Support Positions, by Function, to All Operating Forces 11
A-3. Estimated Number of Positions Currently Supporting Space Operating Forces 12
A-4. CBO’s and DoD’s Estimates of the Number of Positions Currently
Supporting Space Operating Forces 13
A-5. CBO’s Estimates of Additional Overhead and Management Personnel
and Costs for New Space Organizations 14
A-6. Number of Headquarters Personnel Authorized for 2013 15
About This Document
is Congressional Budget Oce report was prepared at the request of the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to
provide objective, impartial analysis, the report makes no recommendations.
Jason Coleman (a visiting fellow at CBO from the Air Force), Adam Talaber, and F. Matthew
Woodward prepared the report with guidance from David Mosher and Edward G. Keating.
Sebastien Gay, Ray Hall, Deborah Kilroe, T. J. McGrath (formerly of CBO), David Newman,
and Matt Schmit of CBO assisted in the research. e report has substantially beneted
from Jason Coleman’s detailed knowledge, and because of his association with the Air Force,
CBO sought additional internal and external review of the report to ensure its objectivity.
Kory Fierstine of CNA, Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Margaux Hoar of CNA, Steve Jacques of Velos Consulting, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings
Institution, and Lara Robillard of CBO provided helpful comments. (e assistance of external
reviewers implies no responsibility for the nal product, which rests solely with CBO.)
Jerey Kling and Robert Sunshine reviewed the report, and Benjamin Plotinsky edited it.
RobertRebach prepared it for publication and drew the cover illustration. An electronic version is
available on CBO’s website (www.cbo.gov/publication/55178).
CBO continually seeks feedback to make its work as useful as possible. Please send any feedback
to [email protected]v.
Keith Hall
Director
May2019
