Nuclear Energy Meets Climate Change

NUCLEAR

ENERGY MEETS

CLIMATE CHANGE

REVITALIZING NUCLEAR

ENERGY TO DECARBONIZE

ELECTRICITY IN THE

UNITED STATES

October 2021

Zakaria Hsain,

Alissa C. Johnson,

Erin K. Reagan

STATUS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Nuclear energy is an important component of the

U.S. clean energy portfolio. Across the nation, 94

commercial nuclear reactors produce more than 50%

of all emissions-free electricity (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission 2020a). As the U.S. prepares to meet the

goal proposed by President Biden of 100% emissions-

free electricity by 2035 (Waldman 2021), the future

contribution of nuclear energy is contested. Reaching

this ambitious goal, however, may require not only

massive investments in grid-scale energy storage and

renewable energy generation (e.g., solar, wind), but also

the expansion of nuclear energy capacity.

Construction of new nuclear plants has recently seen

a surge in many parts of the world, most notably in

China where nuclear capacity grew by more than 400%

NUCLEAR ENERGY MEETS CLIMATE CHANGE

REVITALIZING NUCLEAR ENERGY TO DECARBONIZE ELECTRICITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Zakaria Hsain, Alissa C. Johnson, Erin K. Reagan October 2021 kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu

TABLE 1: NUCLEAR ENERGY DATA FOR THE U.S. AND SELECT COUNTRIES

Country

Nuclear

Capacity

in 2009 (GW)

Share of

Electricity

Generation

in 2009 (%)

Share of

Electricity

Generation

in 2020 (%)

Cumulative

Capacity

Addition

2010–2020 (GW)

Cumulative

Capacity

Retirement

2010–2020 (GW)

Capacity Under

Construction

(GW)

United States 100.75 20.2 19.7 1.17 8.37 2.23

France 63.26 75.2 70.6 0 0.46 1.63

Japan 46.82 29.2 5.1 0 15.50 2.65

Russia 21.74 17.8 20.6 8.36 2.25 3.46

Germany 20.48 26.1 11.3 0 12.38 0

South Korea 17.70 34.8 29.6 6.58 1.24 5.36

Canada 12.57 14.8 14.6 1.51 0.63 0

United Kingdom 10.14 17.9 14.5 0 0.92 3.26

China 8.44 1.9 4.9 38.59 0 15.97

India 4.00 2.2 3.3 2.24 0 4.19

Nuclear energy capacity in 2009, the share of nuclear energy in electricity generation in 2009 and 2020, cumulative capacity addition and retirement between 2010 and 2020, and capacity

currently under construction.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency

2 kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu

between 2010 and 2020, with an additional 16 GW of

capacity set to be connected to the grid in the next few

years (Table 1). In contrast, Japan and Germany have

sharply reduced their nuclear capacity by 33% and 60%

respectively in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima

accident (Table 1).

The U.S. has seen a slow decline in nuclear capacity

in the past decade, as shown in Table 1, and is set to

lose even more capacity in the coming decade as more

reactors shut down without replacement (Figure 1).

Five reactors have closed between 2019 and 2021,

while only two are under construction (International

Atomic Energy Agency 2021). This decline in nuclear

capacity is occurring while demand for electricity

continues to increase in the U.S., particularly from the

transportation sector (Figure 1).

The decline of U.S. nuclear capacity can be attributed to

two major causes—both price-related.

CONSTRUCTION COSTS

Nuclear reactor construction projects have faced rising

costs despite a low interest rate environment, which has

discouraged private investment. The overnight cost of

projects initiated between 1970 and 1986 exceeded

budget by 241% on average. More recently, two 1.1 GW

reactors in South Carolina would have entered service

in 2020 if they were not canceled due to delays and

billions of dollars in cost overruns (Cunningham and

Polson 2017).

Enhanced regulatory scrutiny after the 1979 Three Mile

Island accident has contributed to the cost increases

due to inspection disruptions, design changes, and

additional spending on safety features. Reactors

under construction during the accident took 2.2 times

longer to complete and were 2.8 times more expensive

compared to reactors completed before the accident

(Lovering, Yip, and Nordhaus 2016).

Regulatory scrutiny, however, is not the dominant

contributor to the overall increase in costs. By examining

the construction cost of the largest reactor component,

the containment structure, a recent analysis (Eash-

Gates et al. 2020) revealed that signiﬁcant cost

increases occurred between 1976 and 2017 mainly

because material use increased (due to design changes)

and labor productivity declined (due to construction

management and supply deﬁciencies). Only 30% of

these cost increases could be directly attributed to

safety-related spending.

COMPETITION

The second major cause of stagnating U.S. nuclear

capacity is overwhelming competition from natural gas

power plants. Technological advances in hydraulic

fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling have allowed

the extraction of enormous shale gas reserves that were

previously inaccessible (Elliott and Santiago 2019). The

increased U.S. production of natural gas, which reached

an all-time high of 34 trillion cubic feet in 2019 (U.S.

Energy Information Administration 2019), has driven down

prices, thus making natural gas a more attractive energy

source relative to nuclear energy. The use of natural

gas has been further buoyed by favorable provisions in

the U.S. tax code (e.g. drilling costs deduction) and the

absence of taxes on carbon emissions (Environmental

and Energy Study Institute 2019).

FIGURE 1: PAST AND PROJECTED NUCLEAR ENERGY CAPACITY

(IN GIGAWATTS) AND TOTAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION

(IN TERAWATT-HOURS) IN THE U.S. BETWEEN 1957 AND 2040

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

Nuclear Energy Meets Climate Change: Revitalizing Nuclear Energy to Decarbonize Electricity in the United States 3

Using data on the capital cost of various energy

technologies (see the appendix), we estimate that natural

gas power plants currently generate the cheapest

electricity in most of the U.S. while nuclear energy is

the least expensive energy source in limited parts of the

Midwest region (Figure 2).

In this era of low natural gas prices, nuclear reactors

are becoming too unproﬁtable to operate. In fact, 21

reactors, accounting for almost a quarter of total nuclear

energy capacity, are at risk of closing (Clemmer et al.

2018). If these reactors are closed and replaced by

natural gas plants, annual carbon dioxide emissions

would increase by about 80 million metric tons (U.S.

Energy Information Administration 2020d), thus

jeopardizing progress towards the full decarbonization

of the electric grid by 2035.

NUCLEAR IN THE ENERGY TRANSITION

Currently, about 60% of U.S. electricity is produced

through the combustion of coal and natural gas (U.S.

Energy Information Administration 2020e). The U.S. has

committed in 2021 to substitute fossil fuels in electricity

generation with emissions-free energy sources such as

solar, wind, hydropower, and nuclear energy by 2035

(Waldman 2021).

While wind and solar energy are economically

competitive with fossil fuels in many parts of the country

(Figure 2), their ability to generate electricity depends

on the weather and time of day. As a result, wind and

solar photovoltaics only operate at 40% and 30% of

their maximum generating capacity in a given year

(U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020c).

FIGURE 2: U.S. MAINLAND MAP SHOWING THE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY WHICH PRODUCES THE LEAST EXPENSIVE ELECTRICITY IN EACH COUNTY

ASSUMING NO CARBON PRICE

◼ Natural Gas ◼ Coal ◼ Solar PV ◼ Wind ◼ Nuclear

Nuclear technology is represented by the AP1000 Westinghouse large-scale pressurized water reactor (PWR).

4 kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu

On the other hand, nuclear plants consistently operate at

over 90% of their maximum capacity on average, higher

than natural gas plants which operate at 60% capacity on

average (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020c).

In addition, nuclear energy has a high power density, as it

requires, per unit of power generation, 36 times less land

area than solar energy and 130 times less land area than

wind energy (van Zalk and Behrens 2018).

In a zero-emissions grid with no nuclear energy, solar

and wind farms would, in 2050, span over 1 million

km2, or an area roughly the size of Arkansas, Iowa,

Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and West

Virginia combined (E. Larson et al. 2020), which could

complicate the siting of new energy projects and

exacerbate conﬂicts over land use (Mai et al. 2021). In

contrast, if nuclear energy is signiﬁcantly expanded, an

area slightly smaller than West Virginia and Nebraska

combined (about 250,000 km2) would be required for

electricity generation (E. Larson et al. 2020). Therefore,

nuclear energy may be needed to transition the U.S. to a

100% emissions-free grid while ensuring grid reliability

and minimizing land use.

Many, however, see nuclear plants as too unsafe to

contribute to the transition to a clean grid despite their

excellent safety record compared to fossil fuel plants.

Since the ﬁrst U.S. nuclear plant opened in 1958, there

has been only one major incident, a partial meltdown at

Three Mile Island in 1979. This incident was met with

public uproar, though it did not lead to any adverse

health consequences because, thanks to redundant

safety features, radiation was successfully contained

(Chapin et al. 2002; World Nuclear Association 2019).

Overall, the death toll of U.S. nuclear plants, 21 in total,

has been limited to workplace accidents such as falls and

electrocutions (Environmental Progress 2021). U.S. fossil

fuel plants, on the other hand, cause between 23,000

and 94,000 premature deaths annually due to particulate

matter pollution (Caiazzo et al. 2013). Coal power plants,

in particular, produce substantial amounts of highly

radioactive ash (Hvistendahl 2007). By comparison,

nuclear plants release negligible levels of radiation during

their normal operations, due to strict monitoring and

regulation (R. Rhodes 2018; Davis 2018).

Nonetheless, one issue that elicits legitimate concerns

and may impede the expansion of nuclear capacity is the

disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The U.S. has yet to settle

on a long-term solution to this issue, which protects

environmental and human safety, ensures secure

storage, and minimizes costs.

Currently, spent nuclear fuel rods are stored in dozens

of sites across 34 states, mostly near or within nuclear

plants (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2020b).

The spent fuel is stored either in water pools, or in

sealed dry casks that provide radiation shielding and

secure storage for at least 100 years (Conca 2020;

Chapin et al. 2002). This fragmented system of spent

fuel storage, though it does not pose any signiﬁcant

safety risks, places ﬁnancial and logistical burdens on

nuclear plant operators, sometimes long after a plant

is decommissioned.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) collected billions

of dollars in fees over 30 years from nuclear plant

operators, with the promise that their spent fuel would

be collected and stored in a permanent geological

repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. However, the

Yucca Mountain site, despite its technical and safety

merits, never materialized due to stiff political opposition

(Dixon 2013; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

2014). Two other proposed repositories in New Mexico

and Texas are also facing legal and political hurdles

(Bryan 2021; Douglas 2021). As a result, the DOE

is now liable for $35 to $50 billion in refunds and

damages to nuclear plant operators, with the bill rising

each year that a permanent repository is not available

(Dixon 2013). By comparison, collecting, encapsulating,

and storing all spent fuel in Yucca Mountain may cost

as little as $20 billion (in 2020 dollars) once the site is

open (OECD 1993).

The example of other nations that have found success

in establishing permanent geological repositories

shows that the challenge resides not in technical

considerations, but rather in politics and community

engagement. Finland, for instance, saw early and

sustained engagement with the communities that lived

close to the candidate repository sites. This engagement

built trust and assuaged concerns, so that when it

came time for the ﬁnal selection one municipality even

Nuclear Energy Meets Climate Change: Revitalizing Nuclear Energy to Decarbonize Electricity in the United States 5

volunteered to host the repository if all other candidate

sites were taken out of consideration (Fountain 2017).

In addition to establishing a permanent geological

repository, scaling up reprocessing can further improve

the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

Reprocessing involves the separation of uranium

in the spent fuel from the ﬁssion products (e.g.,

cesium, strontium) and the transuranic elements (e.g.,

neptunium, americium, plutonium). The uranium can

be incorporated into new fuel rods or used in other

applications. The ﬁssion products and transuranic

elements can be isolated for future use or concentrated

and encapsulated for long-term storage.

Reprocessing not only reduces the quantity of

radioactive material that requires storage in a geological

repository, but also ensures efﬁcient use of available

uranium reserves. Though widely used in France, the

United Kingdom, and Russia, the reprocessing of spent

fuel has not been performed in the U.S. in decades even

though a federal ban on the practice was lifted in 1981

(World Nuclear Association 2020a).

Since about 80% of the uranium used in U.S.

nuclear plants is imported (U.S. Energy Information

Administration 2020a), reprocessing would also reduce

reliance on foreign uranium mines, which expose

many marginalized communities around the world to

environmental and health hazards (Dewar, Harvey, and

Vakil 2013; Nuclear Free Future Foundation et al. 2020).

In addition to the issue of spent fuel and radioactive

waste, there is also a growing concern about the

aging state of many operational reactors. Out of 94

U.S. commercial reactors, 47 are more than 40 years

old and four are more than 50 years old (U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission 2020a). These reactors require

increased maintenance and many of their control rooms

are still equipped with analog systems that afford limited

functionality and access to information compared to

state-of-the-art digital systems.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses

reactors for 40 years initially, then extends licenses

for 20 years at a time. To obtain a license renewal, the

NRC requires the remediation of safety issues and the

establishment of a monitoring and maintenance program

(Gormley, Sinkiewicz, and Wolfe 2020). But beyond

compliance with NRC regulations, many operators

have little incentive to engage in costly innovation or

modernization programs. In response, Congress passed

legislation in 2019 that instructs the NRC to establish by

2027 an updated regulatory framework that encourages

greater innovation within the nuclear industry (Nuclear

Energy Innovation and Modernization Act 2019).

For over 60 years, U.S. nuclear plants have produced

reliable emissions-free energy while maintaining a strong

safety record. As a substitute to fossil fuels for baseload

power generation, nuclear energy would signiﬁcantly

reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and could provide

valuable ancillary services such as district heating and

hydrogen production. Coupled with a rapid increase

in the capacity of renewables and energy storage,

expanding nuclear energy could be a viable pathway to

rapidly decarbonize the grid by 2035.

Achieving this expansion, however, might be derailed

by an aging infrastructure and the lack of a cost-

effective system for the management and disposal of

spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive waste. These

issues should be addressed so that nuclear energy can

safely and effectively contribute to full decarbonization

of the electric grid.

EXPANDING NUCLEAR CAPACITY

A Princeton University report estimates that, in a

scenario where renewable energy and nuclear energy

are both used to decarbonize the grid, about 260 GW of

nuclear capacity would need to be constructed by 2050

(E. Larson et al. 2020). Small modular reactors (SMRs),

which generate 300 MW or less compared to around

1,000 MW for standard reactors, could provide a less

capital-intensive and more ﬂexible means to increase

nuclear capacity, and replace many aging reactors

currently in operation.

Safety concerns have, however, been raised about

SMRs due to their small containment structures, the

lack of some active safety features, and the potential

6 kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu

for interactions between adjacent reactors during an

accident (Lyman 2013). On the other hand, these SMRs

are designed with many safety improvements compared

to existing large-scale reactors such as passive

safety features that do not require human interaction,

emergency power, or mechanical pumps (Cho 2019;

Conca 2018; World Nuclear Association 2020b).

Multiple companies are working to develop,

demonstrate, and gain regulatory approval for their

SMR designs. A notable example is NuScale, which

developed a light-water SMR that can modulate its

power output, with a maximum capacity of 72 MW

(Ingersoll et al. 2015). After receiving NRC approval

for its SMR design in 2020 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission 2020a), NuScale is poised to start the

construction of a nuclear plant with twelve 60-MW

SMRs in Idaho (World Nuclear News 2020).

Another SMR design under development is a hybrid

plant that integrates an advanced sodium fast reactor

(SFR) with a molten salt energy storage system (Patel

2020). In a future electric grid with a high share of

renewable sources, both of these SMR designs are

valuable because they can modulate their output in

response to grid ﬂuctuations, thus ensuring reliable and

ﬂexible generation (Ingersoll et al. 2015; Patel 2020).

With rising construction costs a major obstacle to

expanding nuclear capacity, SMRs promise to be

signiﬁcantly cheaper and easier to build than large-scale

reactors. Each NuScale SMR is entirely fabricated in a

factory then installed on-site, which would help reduce

its cost as production is scaled up. Hence, a NuScale

SMR plant is expected to cost about $3850 (in 2020

dollars) per kilowatt (Black, Aydogan, and Koerner

2019), compared to about $6000 per kilowatt for a

large-scale 1-GW reactor (U.S. Energy Information

Administration 2020b).

If a $52/ton price (in 2020 dollars) were placed on

carbon dioxide emissions, as recommended by a

consortium of federal agencies (U.S. Interagency

Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases

2016), nuclear plants with costs comparable to the

large-scale reactor would be competitive only in limited

areas of the U.S. East and Midwest (Figure 3a). In

comparison, a nuclear SMR plant would produce the

least expensive electricity in almost all the U.S. (Figure

2b), and could, thus, effectively compete with natural

gas and renewable energy.

To accelerate the deployment of SMRs to the grid, the

Department of Energy has provided support which

has been critical in enabling SMR developers to clear

technological and regulatory hurdles (World Nuclear

Association 2020b; NuScale Power 2020). In ﬁscal

year 2020, Congress appropriated $230 million to the

demonstration of advanced reactors and $100 million

to support the design and licensing of SMRs (U.S.

Senate Appropriations Committee 2020). This support

was continued into 2021 (S.4049: National Defense

Authorization Act 2020).

But while SMRs might require at least another decade

to be deployed at scale, upgrading operational reactors

can be a quicker and more cost-effective method to

increase nuclear capacity. Since half of U.S. commercial

reactors are more than 40 years old, supporting the

replacement of aging components and upgrade of

control rooms and safety mechanisms can allow many

reactors to safely remain in operation for decades to

come (Voosen 2009).

This support can also allow a reactor operator to seek

NRC approval for a “power uprate,” whereby the reactor

is reconﬁgured to produce a higher power output

(Trehan 2004). As a result, nuclear capacity can be

increased, up to safe operation limits (IAEA 2004), while

avoiding the logistical and ﬁnancial burdens of building

new reactors. Power uprates have been used in the U.S.

since 1996 to add over 6.7 GW of capacity, and could

enable at least another 6.5 GW to be added in the next

few years (A. Larson 2019; Trehan 2004).

Power uprates, however, might not be sufﬁcient.

Decarbonizing the grid might require a massive

expansion in nuclear capacity, as recommended by

the Princeton University report, which will be fraught

with challenges. The federal government is uniquely

positioned to tackle these challenges because it not

only can spend without ﬁnancial constraints (unlike state

governments and the private sector), but can also use

ﬁscal and legal tools to fully employ human and material

resources while avoiding supply bottlenecks and

inﬂationary pressures (Nersisyan and Wray 2021).

Nuclear Energy Meets Climate Change: Revitalizing Nuclear Energy to Decarbonize Electricity in the United States 7

FIGURE 3: U.S. MAINLAND MAPS SHOWING THE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY WHICH PRODUCES THE LEAST EXPENSIVE ELECTRICITY IN EACH COUNTY

ASSUMING A $52/TON CARBON PRICE

◼ Natural Gas ◼ Coal ◼ Solar PV ◼ Wind ◼ Nuclear

(a) With large-scale PWR (AP1000 Westinghouse)

(b) With NuScale SMR

Nuclear technology is represented by (a) the AP1000 Westinghouse pressurized water reactor (PWR) and (b) the NuScale small modular reactor (SMR).

8 kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu

Various policy options are available to provide this

federal investment. One option would establish a fund

under the U.S. Department of Energy that provides

ﬁnancing for utilities interested in upgrading or

constructing nuclear reactors. This ﬁnancing can take

the form of grants or low-interest loans as appropriate

for the risk and scale of each project, with preferential

terms given to cooperatives and publicly owned utilities.

Another option would fund the expansion of nuclear

capacity via ﬁve regional power marketing administrations

(PMAs) (Bruenig 2019). These include the four PMAs that

Congress created to sell federally owned hydropower

and achieve rural electriﬁcation (Campbell 2019), in

addition to a new PMA that covers U.S. territory not

covered by the others (Figure 4). The ﬁve PMAs would

be provided with the ﬁnancing and legal mandate

necessary to signiﬁcantly expand zero-emissions energy

capacity including nuclear energy, as well as build

transmission infrastructure to support this expansion.

FIGURE 4: U.S. TERRITORY COVERED BY EACH POWER MARKETING ADMINISTRATION

BPA: Bonneville Power Association; WAPA: Western Area Power Administration; SWPA: Southwestern Power Administration; SEPA: Southeastern Power Administration. PMAs sell

electricity from power generation facilities owned by three federal agencies (CORPS: Army Corps of Engineers; RECLAMATION: Bureau of Reclamation; IBWC: International Boundary

and Water Commission).

Source: Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Corps ◼ Reclamation IBWC

Nuclear Energy Meets Climate Change: Revitalizing Nuclear Energy to Decarbonize Electricity in the United States 9

MARKET INCENTIVES FOR

EMISSIONS-FREE ENERGY

In addition to direct federal investment, providing market

incentives to emissions-free generators commensurate

with the carbon emissions they prevent, is an effective

means to accelerate the decarbonization of the electric

grid and encourage private investment in nuclear energy

and other clean energy technologies.

One mechanism to provide such incentives is a direct

tax on fossil fuel plants for each ton of carbon emissions.

This tax would increase the cost of electricity generated

from fossil fuels, thus giving emissions-free generators

a sustained market advantage. A carbon tax policy is

transparent and simple to design and enforce, but it

has garnered timid political support partly due to its

regressive effects (Gleckman 2021).

Another mechanism to incentivize emissions-free

generation is a technology-neutral clean energy standard

(CES) program, which compels utilities to source a

predetermined share of their electricity from emissions-

free producers. This share is enforced either through

regulations or through a market-based system in which

a limited number of emissions allowances are issued

either for free or via an auction, and are subsequently

traded between utilities to meet their clean generation

targets (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2019).

A well-designed CES program increases the share of

clean electricity at predictable rates with the goal of

reaching 100% emissions-free electricity at a predeﬁned

year, while preventing disruptions in energy markets and

ensuring that retail electricity prices remain affordable.

While complex and opaque compared to a carbon tax,

CES programs have enjoyed wide adoption at the state

and local levels: thirty states and the District of Columbia

have some form of CES in place (Barbose 2019; Center

for Climate and Energy Solutions 2021). These programs

have preserved several at-risk nuclear plants. For

instance, CES programs in New York and Illinois have

prevented the closure of six reactors, totaling about 5.7

GW of capacity (Nuclear Energy Institute 2018; U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2019).

Since many states have no carbon pricing policies

in place or very timid decarbonization targets, a

federal CES would provide much-needed certainty

and consistency in the path to full decarbonization by

2035, while allowing more ambitious states such as

California, Maine, and New York to set an even faster

decarbonization pace (Barbose 2019).

A bill was introduced in 2019 to establish a technology-

neutral market-based federal CES that would achieve

full grid decarbonization by 2050, though it never

received a vote (H.R.2597: Clean Energy Standard

Act 2019). The provisions of this bill would avoid the

retirement of 43 GW of nuclear capacity, while only

raising average electricity rates by 4% (Picciano,

Rennert, and Shawhan 2019). President Biden has

endorsed a more ambitious version of this bill, aiming for

full decarbonization by 2035, as part of his multi-trillion

dollar infrastructure spending plan (McDonnell 2021).

CONCLUSION

The signs of climate change are already abundantly

clear in the U.S.; from droughts and ﬁres in Western

states to violent storms along the East Coast. Nuclear

energy, due to its safety, reliability, small land footprint,

and zero carbon emissions, can effectively contribute to

decarbonizing electricity generation, though it faces rising

capital costs and competition from natural gas plants.

Continuous investment in the development and

demonstration of small modular reactors, direct

federal investment in the construction of new reactors

and the modernization of existing reactors, and the

provision of market incentives through carbon taxation

or a clean energy standard would, combined, enable a

much-needed increase in U.S. nuclear energy capacity.

There is still hope that coupling the continued growth in

renewable energy with an increase in nuclear capacity

would allow the U.S. to phase out fossil fuel plants in

time to effectively mitigate the most catastrophic

effects of climate change.

10 kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu

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APPENDIX

To generate the maps shown in Figures 2 and 3, we

used an online tool provided by the Energy Institute in the

University of Texas at Austin (Energy Institute–UT Austin

2020). The tool produces a map of the mainland United

States, with each county colored according to the energy

technology which generates the least expensive electricity

within it. The cost of various technologies is compared

based on their levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) which

is calculated using overnight capital cost, fuel price,

plant lifetime, and discount rate (10 %), as well as other

operating costs that vary by geographical location and

energy technology (J. D. Rhodes et al. 2017).

We obtained estimates of the overnight capital cost for

all energy technologies from the U.S. Energy Information

Administration (U.S. Energy Information Administration

2020b), with the exception of estimates for the nuclear

SMR which were obtained from a recent economic

analysis (Black, Aydogan, and Koerner 2019).

TABLE A1: DATA USED TO ESTIMATE LEVELIZED COST OF

ELECTRICITY UNDER VARIOUS SCENARIOS.

Energy Technology

Overnight

Capital

Cost

($ per kW)

Fuel Price

($ per billion

Btu)

Plant

Lifetime

(years)

Nuclear (2 x AP1000

PWR Plant)

6,041 0.70 50

Nuclear (12 x

NuScale SMR Plant)

3,850 0.70 50

Wind (200 MW

Onshore Pant)

1,265 0 25

Solar Photovoltaics

(Utility)

1,313 0 25

Natural Gas (H-Class

Turbine, Combined

Cycle with No

Carbon Capture)

1,084 5.07 35

Coal (Ultra-

Supercritical with

No Carbon Capture)

3,676 2.16 40

Nuclear Energy Meets Climate Change: Revitalizing Nuclear Energy to Decarbonize Electricity in the United States 12

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to Angela Pachon, Dr. James R. Hines

Jr., Dr. Shannon Wolfman, Jake Hoffman, and Stephen

Mell for their valuable comments. We also thank Lindsey

Samahon for copyediting.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Zakaria Hsain is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department

of Mechanical Engineering and Applied Mechanics at

the University of Pennsylvania, with a research focus on

nature-inspired functionalities in metallic materials such

as morphing and self-healing. He is also member of the

Penn Science Policy and Diplomacy Group.

Alissa C. Johnson is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department

of Mechanical Engineering and Applied Mechanics at

the University of Pennsylvania, with a research focus on

battery architectures and multifunctional energy storage

systems. She earned both her bachelor’s and master’s

degrees in mechanical engineering from the University

of Pennsylvania.

Erin K. Reagan is a Ph.D. candidate in the Cell and

Molecular Biology Graduate Group at the University of

Pennsylvania, researching mRNA vaccine design for

infectious disease. She is also president of the Penn

Science Policy and Diplomacy group.

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Philadelphia, PA 19104

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