58 RutgersBusinessReview Spring2024
Sheinvs.Uniqlo:
WilltheWinnerTakeitAll?
RohitKumar
IndianInstituteofManagementRanchi,India
ShubhMajumdarr
IndianInstituteofManagementRanchi,India
Abstract
Alothaschangedinthebusinessofmakingfashionableclothesduringthelast
two centuries. The world has witnessed a handfulof fast fashion companies
capturing majority of the market share
and continuously winning, some of
whomareasyoungasfifteenyearsold.Thishasbeenmadepossibleduetothe
way these companies have designed and deployed their business strategy,
especiallythechoicesarounddifferentaspectsoftheirbusinessmodel.Butwill
thewinnertakeitallapplicableinthefastfashion business?Usingsecondary
datafromoversevendecades andadoptingthebusinessmodelframework,we
compare and contrast the strategies of the two fastestgrowing fashion
retailersintheworldtoday.
Introduction
Thebusinessoftellingcustomerswhatkindofclotheswouldsuitthem
datesbackabouttwocenturies.Itwasin1826whenCharlesFrederick,one
ofthefirstfashiondesignersintheworld,setuphisfashionhouseinParis.
1
Duringthisperiod,anopportunitywasprovidedtothecustomersto“make
to order” designer dresses and made Paris the “Fashion Capital of the
WesternWorld.”
2
Alothaschangedoverthelasttwocenturies.Forexample,
countries like Spain, Sweden, the US, Japan, and China have become the
majorsuppliersoffastfashiongarmentsacrosstheworldandthecompanies
born in these countries i.e., Zara, H&M, Gap, Fast Retailing (Uniqlo), and
Shien respectively have captured the majority market share and dominate
themarketplace.
3
Theincreasedfocusonexperiences,lessinfluencerdriven
consumption,sustainability, andadoptionof technologyincluding AIhave
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 59
alsobeenthekeytrendsanddriversforgrowthandprofitability.
4,5
Thereis
aracetobethemarketleaderandthetwocompaniesthathavebeenmaking
newsrecentlyare Shein fromChinaandUniqlofrom Japan.Inthis article,
wetakeadeepdivetostudythesetwocompaniesfromastrategicpositioning
andbusinessmodelstandpoint.Weraiseaninterestingquestionaboutwho
iswinningandwhy.Whatarethekeycomponentsoftheirbusinessmodel
triangle? In what ways the business models of these two companies are
different?Finally, we raisethequestion‐willthewinnertakesitall inthe
fastfashionbusiness?
WhatisaWinnerTakeAllMarket?
Awinnertakeallmarketisaphenomenonwhereasmallnumberof
companiestendtodominatetheindustry.Thecoreprincipleisthattheone
whowinsgetsitallandthattooattheexpenseofthelosers.
6
Awinnertake
allmarketisalsoseenasazerosumgame.
7
Thisgameisevidentinathletics.
For example, an Olympic gold medalist takes away all the fame and
recognitionevenifsheisjustmicrosecondsaheadofherclosestcompetitor.
Similarly,inpolitics,thewinningpartydecideswhomtoselectandrejectin
local bodies, and most of the time the opposition party has no say. In the
business world, this phenomenon is quite frequent and evident when one
company receives the majority of available profits in a given market (for
example, companies like Apple, Google, Amazon, Walmart, Facebook,
Microsoft, etc.). Under the winnertakeall market economy, there is an
unequal distribution of resources and the winning company gain
extraordinary power to influence outcomes and has market control.
8
Top
performers tend to get exponential payoff and with the newer technology,
they are able to leverage better and create a feedback loop that reinforces
theirdominanceleadingtowhatispopularlyknownasthe“Mattheweffect”
(therichgetricherandthepoorgetpoorer).TheMattheweffectisderived
fromaverseintheNewTestament(Matthew25:29)thattranslatetothose
who are successful are most likely to be given the special opportunities that
leadtofurthersuccess,andthosewhoaren’tsuccessfularemostlikelytobe
deprivedofthem.”Thisisfoundtobetruenotonlyforindividualswherethere
isevidenceofaccumulativeadvantagebutalsoforfirms,whoformulateand
executestrategiestowinandtobesuccessful.
9,10

TheGlobalFashionIndustryanditsValueChain
The global fashion industry has progressed from the traditional four
seasons of the year: summer, spring, winter, and fall, to having fiftytwo
"microseasons"oronenew"collection"everyweek.
11
Thistransformationis
duetomultiplereasons.Forexample,theemergenceofglobalcompetitors
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
60 RutgersBusinessReview Spring2024
likeInditex(Spain),H&M(Sweden),Uniqlo(Japan),andmostrecentlyShein
(China),crossborder intermediation,technologicaladvances inthesupply
chain,socialmediapenetration,lowprices,andtheevergrowingdemandof
the “fast fashion” segment among customers, which is expected to further
fuel growth to $39.84 billion by 2025.
12
This high attentionseeking buyer
drivenindustryisalsogrowingatanimpressiveCAGRof21.9%,evenduring
thepandemic.
13
Thefastfashionmarketisexpectedtogrowto$184.96billion
in2027ataCAGRof10.7%.
14

Thecompetitionforbrandawarenessandquickturnaroundtime among
leadingglobal brands suchasInditex and H&M has beenintense.With its
iconic brand Zara, Inditex has historically dominated the market
capitalization of the apparel market, whereas H&M is charting more
sustainable growth and future prospects.
15
However, with the rise of Asian
giantslikeFRG'sUniqlo,whichrecentlyclaimedthetitleof“thewo rld's most
valuable retailer,” and China's mysterious Shein, which aced as “the most
downloaded”newapplicationintheUS,providesaclearindicationthatthe
competitivebattleisfarfromover.
16,17
OnlytimewilltelliftheChinesebrand
willbeabletoovertaketheJapanesebrand,bothintheirhomecountryand
globally.Acursorylookat bothSheinandUniqlosuggeststhatstrategically
they have positioned themselves quite differently and seem to be the two
different sides of the same fastfashion coin. However, to investigate this
further and arrive at an informed conclusion, we closely examine the fast
fashionglobalvaluechaindata,understandthecompetitivelandscape,and
unravel the competing brands' business models and strategic milestones
achieved over the last decade. In doing so, we also attempt to identify the
secretrecipefortheirsuccess.
Fashion,likefastfashion,hasitsownlifecycle.Thelat t er hasashorter
life cycle because it follows trends and is quickly consumed.
18
The general
cycle of innovation, general acceptance, and trends decline happens much
fasterthaninotherfashioncycles.FashionCycleslike“classic”haveahighly
longacceptanceperiodandareadoptedbythemassesinthelongrun,but
“fad,” on the contrary, is shortlived and is adopted by relatively few. Fast
fashion gets placed between “fad” and “moderate” fashion cycles.
19
It is
adoptedbyamoresignificantmassthanthefadcyclebutsignificantlylower
when compared to the moderate fashion cycle (see Figure 1). Thus, as the
trends are shortlived and the competition is high, the brands in the fast
fashion industry try to maintain a competitive advantage over others by
scramblingforresourcesfor“quickresponsetime”sothatproductsfromthe
ideation stage can be quickly brought to stores while the trend is at peak
alongwhilemaintainingalowcost.
20
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 61
Figure1.TheFashionCyclesandGrowthStages
Fashion brands have used a variety of global sourcing strategies, which
generally fall between the extremes of complete vertical integration and
outsourcing.
21
In theformer, companiescarry out production,logisticsand
sourcing, and sales and branding to end customers via their internal
verticallyintegratedsupplychain.Theuseofexternalsuppliersisminimalas
mostprocessesarehandledinhouse,whichallowsregularqualitychecks.In
comparison, the latter strategy involves using contracts and external
partners. The production takes place in emerging markets, where a
significantcostadvantageisgained.Thelowvalueadditionproductionwork
involveslaborintensiveworksuchassewing,andknittingisoutsourcedto
developingcountries.
22

The logistics and sourcing segment, which includes downstream
activities, like distributing final products from production houses to
warehousesvia different channels, is handled via the overseas retail office.
The most valueadditive segment, i.e., design, sales, and branding, is
performed inhouse. The apparel global value chain comprises tangible,
increasing valueadded, and intangible activities.
23
All these value chain
activities and the strategic choices made by the different global brands to
competeintheglobalfastfashionindustry,forexample‐adoptingpractices
like just intime and quick response, have made the supply management
system lean and responsive. This has led to a significant reduction in lead
timeandhasalso resulted inextensiveandcomplexapparel supply chains
across the globe. These strategic choices have helped the brands achieve
economiesofscaleandfulfillglobaldemand.
Time
Number
of
Fashion
Adopters
ClassicCycle
ModerateFashionCycle
FastFashionCycle
FadCycle
FastFashionfitsinbetweenthefad
andmoderatefashion
Growth Stage Maturity Stage
Decline Stage
Introduction Stage
PeakofPo
p
ularit
y
PeakofPopularity
PeakofPopularity
PeakofPopularity
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
62 RutgersBusinessReview Spring2024
CompetitiveAdvantage,StrategicPositioning,andKeyResources
From a competitive standpoint, the top three aspects for gaining
competitiveadvantagearerelatedtoeitherofferingquickresponseservices
(initially developed by Zara and later followed by H&M and others) or
reducingthecosttoincreaseaffordability(asevidentinthecaseofH&M),or
to focus on quality across the valuechain(e.g., The Gap).
24,25
Out of these
threehistoricstrategic choicestocompetein thefast fashionindustry, the
rising Asian giant Uniqlo has adopted a more nuanced strategic option of
valueinnovation that requires simultaneously working towards reducing
costandsimultaneouslyimprovingqualityparameters.
26,27
Thus,offeringits
customers unique and highquality fashion clothes at an affordable and
competitive price. However, on the contrary, Shein has focused on
technologyandquickresponsetimebyusingrealtimedataandbroughtits
product ideation to store time down to just 57 days with low prices to
increase affordability.
28
Our data analysis suggests that Shien offers 27.5
timesmoreproductofferingstoitscustomersthanUniqlo.Therefore,speed
tomarket,higherproductofferings,andlowerpricesarekeydifferentiators
of Shein, whereas high quality and innovation have been significant
differentiators for Uniqlo. Thus, different brands have charted a very
differentpathforprofitabilityintheFastFashionindustry.Thecomparison
offinancialperformance,productportfolio,keycapabil i ties(withrespectto
thenumberofstores,inhousedesigners,geographicalspread,distribution
channel, workforce, fashion transparency index, average monthly website
visits),use of different technologies and social media presence (Instagram,
TikTok,YouTube,andTwitter)providesomeinterestinginsightsaboutthe
resourcesandcapabilitiesofthemajorfastfashionbrandsintheworld(see
Table1).
In the next section, we take a closer look at both companies from a
business model perspective. Within the two business models, we examine
andcompare thedifferentelements(who,what,how,andvalue),anddraw
meaningfulinsightsandkeytakeawaysfromastrategicstandpoint.Wealso,
highlight and examine the strategic milestones of the two brands since
inception.
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 63
Table 1.The Comparison of Key Strategic Performance and Capabilities of
Shein,H&M,Zara,andUniqlo(asof2022)
Sr.
No.
KeyStrategic
Parameters
Brands
Shein H&M
Inditex
(Zara)
FRG
(Uniqlo)
A
FinancialPerformance
1
Typeof
compan
y
Private
Public
Public
Public
2
Revenue($Billion)
23.00*
22.54
34.19
16.59
B
ProductPortfolio
3
CustomerSegment
GenerationZ
Conscious
Progressives(1830)
CarpeDiems
(1830)
(1834)
4
Product
offeringsat
retailer'shomewebsite
165,000+
20,000+
9,000+
6,000+
C
KeyCapabilities
5
TotalBrick&Mortar
stores
1
3,875
2,314**
2394
6
NumberofInhouse
designers
800+
250+
700+
not
disclosed
7
GeographicalSpread(no.
ofcountries)
150+
77
94
25
8
Distribution OnlyOnline OmniChannel OmniChannel OmniChannel
9
Workforce
25000+
106,522
164,997
57,576
10
FashionTransparency
Index2023score
(Transparencyofthe
company)
7
71
50
51
11
AverageMonthly
Websitevisit(2020)
59.49
112.06
85.13
57.88
D
Technology&
Innovation
12
UseofDifferent
Technology
GoogleTrend
Finder,Real
timeSCM
software
Forecastingvia
WorthGlobal
StylesNetwork
Automationin
the
distribution
center
RFID,Big
Data,IoT
E
SocialMediaPresence
13
Instagramfollowers
(millions)
52.30
38.30
60.90
under10.0
(1)
14
InstagramInfluencer
mentions(1000s)
57.20
46.10
66.40
undisclose
d
15
TikTokfollowers
(millions)
8.40
0.36
9.20
under
1
(2)
16
TikTokuserlikes
(millions)
61.60
1.10
34.50
under
1
(3)
17
YouTube
subscribers
(1,000s)
562
447
114
under100
(4)
18
Twitter/Xfollowers
(millions)
0.62
8.00
1.40
under2.0
(5)
*EstimatedviatheWallStreetJournal(WSJ.com),asnoannualreportsarepublished.**Totalfigureincludesonly
ZARA and ZARA homes stores.
(1)
summation of different count rywise Uniqlo Instagram page followers.
(2)
summation of different countrywise Uniqlo TikTok followers.
(3)
summation of different countrywise Uniqlo
TikTokuserlikes.
(4)
summationofdifferentcountrywiseYouTubeChannelsubscribers.
(5)
summationofdifferent
countrywise Uniqlotwitter / X page followers. Source: Compiledfromdifferentsou rces,includingthecompany's
annualreports,librarydata,reviews,andwebsite.
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
64 RutgersBusinessReview Spring2024
China’sShein:ARealTimeRetailer
Shein, also known as “TikTok forecommerce,” traces its roots back to
October2008amidtheglobalfinancialcrash.
29
Itstartedas“NanjingDianwei
InformationTechnologyCo”undertheleadershipofthefounderandpresent
CEO,Mr.ChrisXu,anSEOandbrandmarketingexpertworkingpriorforan
online marketing company in Nanjing, China. Chris discovered a potential
businessopportunityinthecrossborderecommerceindustryforwedding
dresses. Along with geographical closeness to “Suzhou,” Asia's largest
wholesale and retail distribution bridal city, he shifted his focus for the
ventureentirelytothedropshippingbusiness.
30
Forthenextthreeyears,the
companycontinuedsourcingitsproductsfromChina'swholesalemarketto
overseasshoppers.
31
Theyear2012changedthedirectionandfuturegrowth
ofthebusiness withthedomainregistrationofsheinside.com(renamedto
shein.comin2015).Withafocusonbuildingacrossborderwomen’sglobal
brand,Chrishadtoquittheweddingdressbusinesssegment.
32
Shein was also one of the first companies to focus on social media
marketing,collaboratingwithfashionbloggersforgiveawaysandpromoting
itsproductsonplatformssuchasInstagram,Facebook,andPinterest.
33
The
companyhititsfirstbottleneckbytheendof2014,i.e.,theinabilitytostock
itemsduetoalackofsupplychain,despiteclockingrevenueupwardsof3‐
4.5millionUSDpermonth.Withhightrafficandsalesvolume,theyhadno
timetolaunchnewpr oducts,andtheoldproductshadalreadygotsoldout.
Senior management claims that this resulted in a poor purchasing
experience, a low return rate, and increased marketing expenses.
34
Thus,
foundercumCEOthensolvedtheproblembysettingupShein’sownsupply
chainandalsoassembled800designerswithaprimaryfocustodesignand
prototype for ultrafast production.
32,35
As it moved its supply chain
operationscenterfromGuangzhoutoPanyu(aglobalapparelmanufacturing
hub) in 2015, almost all partner factories relocated.
36
With the rebranding
andleanerwebsite,itsfootprintreachedtheMiddleEasternmarkets,andthe
sales skyrocketed. The loyal suppliers received 7.7 million USD orders or
moreeachyearandachievedlargescaleprofitability.Thesalescontinuedto
climb and, by 2017, reached a massive 1.5 billion USD, a 2.5 times growth
comparedtothepreviousyear.
Shein's success can partly be attributed to the USChina Tariff War.
Duringthetradewar,China'staxcodedramaticallyreducedthecostforits
local companies and suppliers. Also, waiving export taxesfor directto
consumer companies as retaliation from the Chinese administration
immenselybenefitedShein.Itwasshippingitsproductstowarehousesinthe
US dutyfree for under $800 from 2016 onwards.
37,38
The 2020 COVID19
pandemicbecameaboonforSheinasitgrewexponentiallyinrevenueand
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 65
applicationdownloads.IteventoppledAmazonandbecamethe'mostnewly
downloaded' shopping application in the U.S.
17
(see Figure 2). Also, the
hashtag#Sheingarneredover6.2billionviewsonTikTok.
39
However,Shein
has been under heavy criticism and accused of copying designs by
independentdesignersandhasfailedtomakelegallyrequireddisclosuresin
the UK and Australia.
40,41
Its recently launched "Shein X 100k Challenge"
realityshowis alsobeingtermedarebranding gimmick forthe brand.
42
In
2022,thefirminasurprisingmove,openeditsfirstbrick andmortarlocation
inTokyo,Japan,bring itin directcompetitionwithUni qlo.
43
In 2023amid
stiffcompetition,thefirmfurtherraised$2billioninitslatestfundinground,
withplans of building itsmanufacturinghubs in MexicoandBrazil,which
wouldshortenshippingtimeandcutdistributioncost.
44
Figure2.ShoppingAppsDownloads(in1000s)intheGooglePlayStorein
theUSinJuly2021
Source:StatistaLeading shoppingapplicationinGooglePlayStoreintheUSinJuly
2021bynumberofdownloads
Shein’sBusinessModelTriangle
Thebrandwiththetaglineof “Shein,Shineout”hasregistereda250%
yearonyear increase in revenues.
45
Such phenomenal growth can be
attributedtoits customer'soverconsumptionandthebusiness'sassetlight
(consumertomanufacturer) business model, where it serves itscustomers
in different geographies via its online store operations directly via its
manufacturers.
46,47
The finer aspects of the business model are further
explainedviathemagictrianglebusinessmodel(hereafterreferredtoasthe
businessmodeltriangle),whichfocusesonfourcentraldimensions:thewho,
thewhat,thehow,andthevalue.
48
229.4
261.61
350.17
382.72
456.93
496.78
505.37
513.54
614.04
818.84
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Sam'sClub
Nike
OfferUp
Alibaba
Wish
ebay
Walmart
Shop
Amazon
Shein
Numberofappdownloadsinthousands
ShoppingApplications
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
66 RutgersBusinessReview Spring2024
Who: The brand, despite being based in China, primarily targets
consumermarketsinAmerica,Europe,theMiddleEast,andAustralia.Itsells
avarietyofclothingand homeaccessoriesbutprimarilycaterstothedemand
ofthefemalesoftheGenZcustomersegment,whichpossesslimitedbuying
powerandextensivesocialmedia usage.
49
Thebrandis also trendyamong
individualsandhouseholdswithlowerincomesintheUnitedStates.
50

What:Sheinoffersawidevarietyoflowcostproducts,focusingprimarily
on womenswear followed by kid’s wear and menswear. It understands the
everchangingdemandandthuschasesdifferenttrendsdailybyreleasinga
localfashionportfoliowithanaverageof3,000newdesignseveryday,about
20,000 every week, and about 170,000 SKUs of women's clothing and
accessories instead of representing a specific style as a fashion brand.
51,52
Shein's share of plussize garments in its range also outperforms its
competitors, indicating that it is aware of the opportunities in the size
inclusive market. It also sells pet wear, homeware, beauty products, and
stationeryinadditiontofashion.
53
How:Thehuge portfolioreleased dailyonShein'splatformismanaged
due to its highly automated consumertomanufacturer (C2M) process. It
employs realtime design testing to monitor and follow different trends
closely.ItintegratesanalyticaltoolslikeGoogleTrendFindertofindrising
trendsandsearchvolumesofdifferentcolors,fabrics,andstylesindifferent
geographies.
54
It then combines its user's inapp and onsite user behavior
withitsbackendsystemstoforecastfuturedemandforparticulardesignsor
trends and adjusts the inventory in real time.
55
The production houses are
located strategically in Guangzhou, the world's largest fabric market with
large builtin Chinesestyle industrial concentration complexes.
56
The
suppliersarelocatedwithinatwohourdrivefromShein'sheadquartersand
convert the design to production in seven days, much faster than industry
standards.
57
The team constantly performs A/B testing (also called split
testing, wherein the two versions are tested to figure out the better
performing variation) on different products with a minimum batch of 100
pieces,unlikeZara,whoseminimumproductionvolumeis500.
58
Thisallows
it to produce a wide variety of small quantity products and massproduce
onlythesuccessfulproductsthathitthetrendandcustomer'sdemand.This
approachprovidestheproductionteamwithrealtimedataandreducesits
riskoffailureandtheinventorystockingperiod.
Shein's marketing team heavily advertises on YouTube and Facebook,
which has placed the brand at an alltime high in Google clothing
searches.
59,66
Influencer marketing via key opinion consumers helps create
content,suchasTikTokhashtag#sheinhaulswhichhasover4.5billionviews,
or share discount codes by giving them free clothes or shop credits. This
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RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 67
approach has helped the brand reach out to new customers and save high
costs.
60,61
To maintain constant engagement with its customers, Shein
gamifiestheirpurchaseexperiencebyrewardingthemforcumulative daily
logins, playing its inapp minigames, participating in outfit competitions,
andwritingreviews.
62
Thesetacticstakeretailtainment(i.e.,theuseofsound,
ambiance, emotion, and activity to get customers interested in the
merchandiseandinthemoodtobuy)astepfurther,
63
astheysignificantly
boostretention,firstpartydatacollection,andsaleconversion.
64
Value: Shein mainly uses two valuecreation methods: low cost and
differentiation via trends and gamification. This has helped it gain a
substantial competitive advantage in foreign markets, contributing to
profitability and growth.
65
By virtue of low cost, wholesale Chinese
manufacturing,supplychain,andlaboradvantagescannotbeignored.The
lowpricewithtrendydesignshashelpedcracktheinternationalmarketand
winthefavorofmiddleandlowerlevelconsumersdespitewellestablished
competitors. The brand has also focused on a differentiation strategy by
producing various design portfolios and its gamification purchase
experience. It encourages users to turn into the brand's key opinion
consumers or microinfluencers, thus developing more UserGenerated
Content(UGC),whichbuildstrustandtemptsnewusersfurthertotrytheir
products.
66
This indeed helps further establish its foothold in the
internationalfastfashionindustry.Further,itscompletealienationfromthe
physicalretailstoreshashelpedeliminatephysicalretailandoperationscosts
andthuskeptthebusinessassetlight.Thishasalsohelpedthebrandfocus
andupgradeitslogistics,warehousing,anddigitalpresence.
66
Over the last decade, Shein has achieved multiple strategic milestones
(seeFigure3).ItexpandeditsfootprinttoSpainwithintwoyears.Itacquired
Rowme to expand and acquire new product categories and built its own
supplychainwithinfiveyearsofitsexistence.Itrebrandeditselfandshifted
operations from Guangzhou to Panyu in 2015. Interestingly, all of the
factories that worked with Shein also relocated with it to Panyu. This was
quite unusual for factories, but it worked because Shein garnered a
reputation for timely payment, something of a rarity in China.
67
In 2016,
Shien entered the Middle East and by 2017 its revenue reached $1.5 Billion
within a span of three years the revenue crossed $10 Billion. In 2021 Shien
announced the firstever Shien X 100K Challenge that provided an
opportunityforemergingdesignerstowinagrandprizeof$100,000.Through
thecompetition,Sheinhaspartneredwithover3000designersandlaunched
more than 25,000 original creations. It has further ventured into physical
store in Japan and popup stores around global fashion capitals. In 2023,
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
68 RutgersBusinessRevie w Spring2024
Sheinfurtherexpandeditsoffering,withtheonethirdacquisitionofSparc
Group,whichowns“Forever21.”

Figure3.Shein’sKeyStrategicMilestones
Source: Compiled from different sources, including the company's annual reports, library data, reviews, and the
company'swebsite.
Japan’sUniqlo:TowardsDietFastFashion
Uniqlo has a rich history that dates back to March of 1949, with the
establishment of “Ogori Shoji” in Japan's Yamaguchi prefecture as the first
men'sclothingstore.Withtheonsetofthe“JapaneseEconomicMiracle”over
thefollowingdecades,
68
theJapanesebusinessesprospered,and“OgoriShoji”
alsoexpandedto22outlets.
69
In1985,underTadashiYanai'sleadership,an
offshoot of the parent company named “Unique Clothing Warehouse”
openeditsdoorinHiroshima.Ridingonmomentumandexcellentresponse,
alargeroadsideoutlet withgreatpublicity wassoon openedinYamaguchi
prefecture for catering to bulk buying and customers arriving by car.
70
To
transform and turn Japanese retail into a brisker business, the parent
companywas renamedFast RetailingCo. Ltd.
71
In 1994,thecompany went
public, and in 1999 its shares got promoted to the first section (for large
companies)of theTokyoStockExchange. Duringthisperiod,theJapanese
economysuffered a significanteconomic crisis,whichled totheclosure of
multiplebusinesses.However,thecompanycouldsustainandcutdownits
prices as its production houses had already shifted to China in 1993, years
before the recession.
72
With the launch of its iconic ¥1,900 or (about $15)
fleecejacketproductline,whichwaslessthantheaverage$40 Japanesemen's
shirtand onefifthofother Japaneseretailers'price,thesalesskyrocketed.
73
Theproductlineturned out to be a massive hit as it was low on price but
high on quality. At the height of the demand, the company offered 51
different color shades of fleejackets. Due to the successful campaign, the
brandcouldalsobreach$2billioninsalesforthefirsttime.
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 69
ThecompanysoonshifteditsheadquarterstoTokyoin2000andstarted
transformingitsstoresintolargeformatstores.Thestoresstartedgenerating
sizablesalesinheavyfootfallareasandspaciousfacilities.Thebrandturned
tointernationalexpansiontocontinueitsgrowthtrajectoryastheJapanese
apparelmarketwasnearitssaturationpoint,anditexperiencedafallinsales
in the recent financial quarters. Thus, in late 2002, Uniqlo expanded its
footprinttoChina,withtwolargeretailoutletsinShanghai.Metwithstrong
demand,thestorecountgrewexponentiallyandsurpassedtheJapanesestore
countin2020.
74
ItsubsequentlyexpandedtoothermajormarketsintheUS,
Europe, and major South Asian countries. Fast Retailing also acquired
strategic foreign brands like J Brand, Princess Tam Tam, Comptoir des
Cotonniers,andTheorytostrengthenitsmarketpositionindifferent global
markets.
75
Tomaintainqualitycontrol,Uniqlostationsatextileprofessional
teamateachpartnerfactorycalledTakumi”tooverseeproductionandlend
their expertise with sewing and material production techniques.
76
To
respondadequately toglobal refugeerequirements,the companyformeda
globalpartnershipwiththeUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees
(UNHCR) in 2011.
77
Thus as a part of the partnership in 2019 during the
COVID19 crisis, Uniqlo donated 3 million masks to refugee families via
UNHCR.
78
Inthesameyear,UniqloalsoexpandedtoIndiawithmegastores
in the bustling cities New Delhi, Lucknow and Chandigarh. The strategic
expansion experienced overwhelming demand among Indian customers,
whichsoaredsalesaswellascatapulteditsIndianoperationstoprofitability
within 3 years of establishment.
79
In 2021, Uniqlo further partnered with
Doraemon as its global sustainability ambassador and launched product
madefrom100%recycledpolyesterfibers.
80
In2023,thefirmachievedrecord
profits,withresurgenceinbothdomesticandinternationaldemands,which
hasenabledstoreandmanufacturingexpansioninNorthAmericaandIndia
respectively.
81
Uniqlo’sBusinessModelTriangle
Uniqlo has charted a different course than its competition. The brand's
business model focuses on the customer at its center and plans its design,
production,andsaleswherequalityandinnovationareprioritized.Themore
nuancedaspectsofthisarefurtherexplainedviathemagictrianglebusiness
model that helps bring the technologists and business people on the same
pageastheyfocusonfourcentraldimensions:thewho,thewhat,thehow,
andthevalue.
Who:Withthetagline“Madeforall,”thebrandpositionsitsprivatelabel
offeringas casualandtrend wearfor allage groups,i.e.,men,women,and
children.
82
The emphasis on the quality, durability, and affordability of its
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
70 RutgersBusinessReview Spring2024
products indicates excellent value for its customers. This is further
demonstratedbytheproductionofformalinfreebabyproducts(formalin
a garment adhesive that might cause rashes and allergies in babies) and
machinewashresistant(15times)merinowoolproducts.
83,84
Thus,allowing
evenworkingclass,middleclass,andupperclasssegmentstobeunder its
purview.
85
ThebrandunlikeSheincaterstocustomerdemandfromitshome
country i.e., Japan where it offers “photo booth” and “coffee” services to
enhancethecustomerstoreexperienceandkeyinternationalmarketssuch
astheUnitedStatesandEurope,with"3Dfit"featuresdesignedtomeetthe
clothingneedsoflocalobesepeople.
86,87
What:Unlikeitscompetitors,Uniqloforegoessellingthehottest,flash
inthepan trends and instead focuses on value innovation and releases a
limited number of its privatelabel SKUs via its flagship stores and e
commerce channels yearround. It combines its products with technology
andminimalisticdesignstodistinguishitselfbyprovidingfunctionality,ease,
and usefulness complemented via various color choices. Popular and
functional clothing lines like AIRism, Heattech, Blocktech, and Kando are
prime and bestselling examples of fabric innovation.
88
It has also timely
introducedlimited collections viacollaboration withfamousdesigners like
JilSandersandJW Anderson,further increasingitspopularityand reach.
89
Uniqloalsooffersaccessoriesthataremarketedbypracticability.
How: Uniqlo's product design is centered around functionality and
minimalism;thus,withitsR&Dteamsstationedworldwide,itdoesnotfollow
trends and instead plans production designs a year in advance based on
longevity, customer feedback, and market research, which accounts for
staggering70%.
90,91
Thenthemerchandisingteamtakesforwardtheproduct
creationprocessbydecidingtheproductlineupsandvolumesandmonitors
the increase or decrease in the production during the season. Advanced
production planning and utilizing economies of scale help the material
development team procure highquality materials at a low cost. Thus, the
productionisoutsourcedtoitspartnerindustriesinChinaandotherSouth
Asian countries under its SPA business model, which helps control the
business process and drastically reduces its cost.
92
With a high focus on
quality, it forces competition between its suppliers and potential “partner
factories” to maintain high standards by building advanced production
capacitiesviatechnologicalupgradationandthusrequiresadefectiverateto
bemaxedat0.3%,waymorestringentthantheindustrystandardof23%.
93
The sales division of Uniqlo is a synergy of ecommerce and physical
stores i.e., promoting sales via the latter. It follows the company tagline
"simple made better" and provides a quality instore experience through
wideopenisles,massiveLEDscreens,neatlystackedshelves,andselfservice
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 71
checkouts.Also,thestaff,whichisconsideredanextensionofthebrand,is
rigorously trained in developing an etiquettedriven atmosphere and
provides superior customer service by micromanaging all its
touchpoints.
94
The integration of AIpowered “Uniqlo IQ” assistant with
brickandmortarretailstoreprovidesapersonalizedshoppingexperience.
95
Itmapsthecustomer'sgeographicallocation,showsthenearestUniqloretail
store, and promotes exclusively available in the brickandmortar store.
Specialdigitaltoolssuchas"pricetagscannerfunctions"andthesameday
"Click&Collectservice"havealsobeeninstrumental.
96
Value: Uniqlo's value creation depends upon its low cost and
differentiation via comfortable shopping,
97
practical, qualityformoney
products, its unique store experience, and topnotch customer experience.
UnderitsSPA(SpecialtyStoreRetailerofPrivateLabelApparel) model,the
brand outsources its production to “partner industries,” encompassing all
stages of the business from design to production to final sale. This highly
vertically integrated model allows Uniqlo to have a more significant price
advantageduetoremovingintermediariesandhigherchannelcontrol.
87
It
furtherdeploysateamofexperttextileprofessionals,knownas“Takumi,”to
thepartnerindustriestoprovidetechnicalguidanceandsupervision,aswell
astoimplementstandardizedqualitycontrolacrossproductionbyadhering
to the three quality management system standards of emphasis on
partnership quality, business process quality, and social quality.
87,98
The
ongoing “Ariake Project” offers further digitalization and automation of
Supply Chain Management (SCM) in reducing the “lead time” and helping
generate accurate production volume predictions. The importance of
product availability at the right time and the right place was the utmost
priorityaslateorderedproductsleadtolossofsales.
99
Uniqlohasbeeninexistenceforthelastsevendecades.Infact,itisseven
timesolderthanSheinandhasachievedmultiplestrategicmilestonessince
itsinceptionin1949(seeFigure4).Ittook35yearstosetupitsfirststorein
1985andshifteditsentireproductiontoChinain1993.Itwentpublicin1994
and focused on bringing multiple firsttoworld clothing products through
strategic partnerships and collaboration. For example, in 2003 it launched
Heattechin collaboration withToray Industries. By2009it hadmorethan
2000 stores and in 2017 launched the Ariake project to become a digital
consumer retailing company.
100
In 2021 Uniqlo was crowned as the most
valuableclothingcompany.Itreached $103billioninmarketcap,surpassing
Zara’smarketcapofabout$99billion.
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
72 RutgersBusinessRevie w Spring2024
Figure4.Uniqlo’sKeyStrategicMilestones
Source:Compiledfromdifferentsources,includingthecompany'sannualreports,librarydata,reviews,
andthecompany'swebsite
Discussion:WhoisWinningandWhy?
To answer this question, one needs to define what winning stands for.
Whetheritisbasedonfinancialoutcomes(revenue,growth,marketshare,
wallet share, etc.) or nonfinancial outcomes (e.g., customer satisfaction,
brandimage,mindshare,etc.).Also,toexaminefromwhosestandpointthe
firm is trying to win. Whether it is more from an internal (employees,
investors, shareholders) or external (customer, suppliers, community at
large) standpoint. With the current emphasis on Environment,
Sustainability, and Governance (ESG) measures, it is equally important to
examinehowthesetwocompanie sarefaringtowinthesustainabilitybattle
(impactingthecommunityat large).Bylookingatthegrowthperformance
ofbothUniqloandShein(especiallyduringtheCovid19times)itseemsthat
botharewinninginthefastfashionindustry.However,acloserlookatthe
different aspects of positioning, business model selection, strategy,
technological adoption, focus on ESG, and strategic investments to build
capabilitiessuggestthatbothcompanieshavechosenaverydifferentpathto
success(see Tables2and3). Thedifferentpathsthat thesetwocompanies
have taken across different aspects of running the business will lead to
winninginafewareasandlosinginothers.Thekeyquestionisifthewinner
willtakeitall.Whatdoyouthink?
ClosingRemark
Thecasestudyhighlightsthekeystrategicperformanceandcapabilities
ofthetoptwofastfashionretailchainsoftheworldinadditiontoexplaining
whatawinnertakeallmarketandthevaluechainoftheglobalfastfashion
businessis.Thedeepdiveintothedifferentelementsofthebusinessmodel
triangleofbothShienandUniqloexplainswhythesetwocompaniesarethe
fastestgrowingretailersacrosstheworldandalsouncoversthesecretrecipe
ofstrategicpositioningthatavoidspricewarsanddirectcompetition.Inthe
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 73
end, it raises an important question‐ifthe winner takes it all in the fast
fashionindustry?
Table2.KeyAspectsofBusinessStrategyofSheinvs.Uniqlo
Shein Uniqlo
Customersegment GenerationZ
Clothesforallkindsof
people
Businessmodel
Assetlight
(onlyasanonlineplatform)
Circular
(Omnichannelpresence)
Strategy Metoo Valueinnovation
Technologyadoption Veryhigh High
Focusonsustainability&
environment
Low Veryhigh
Fundingrequirements High Low
Strategicfocus Intangibleactivities
Bothtangibleand
intangible
Quickresponsecapability Fewdays Takesmonths
Source:Compiledbyauthorsbasedonsecondarydata
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
74 RutgersBusinessReview Spring2024
Table3.ComparisonoftheKeyElementsoftheBusinessModel:Uniqlovs.
Shein
Magic
Triangle
Dimension
Key
Elements
UNIQLO
Madeforall
SHEIN
ShineIn,ShineOut
Who
Customer
segment
∙Male&Femalebetweenage
between1840years.
∙Particularlyforwomenunder25,
offersproductsformenand
childrenaswell.
What
Value
propositions
∙Preparesproductdesignsinadvance
(1yearbeforeproduction).
∙Focuson“fabricinnovation”through
constant(e.g.,functio nalclothinglines
likeAIRism,Heattech,Blocktech,and
Kando)R&Dandcollaboration
∙Offerlowcostanddifferentiation
(valueinnovation)viacomfortable
shopping
∙Spotstrendsviauser'srealtime
data.
∙OffersaveryhighSKUof
differentdesignsandbulkorders
itemsinrealtimebasedon
customerpreference.
∙Providesthecustomerwithlow
priceandtrendyclothes,not
focusingonquality.
Value
Revenue
streams
∙Earnsrevenuemainlyviathesaleof
privatelabelclothesviabrickand
mortarandonlinesales.
∙HighRevenuecountries‐China,
SouthEastAsia,andAustralia,trailing
behindintheUS.
∙Earningthroughaccessoriesthatare
marketedbypracticability.
∙Earnsrevenueviathesaleof
onlineproducts.
∙HighRevenuecountriesUS&
MiddleEast.
∙Profitfrompartneringwith
otherbrandsandfeaturingthem
onitsplatform.
Cost
structures
Assetheavymodel(Bothchannels
includingbrickandmortar).
∙PublicLimitedCompany.
Assetlightmodel(Online
Channelonly).
∙PrivateLimitedCompany.
How
Channels
∙O2OModel(OnlinetoOffline
model).
∙IntegratingOnlineandoffline
purchasesforbetterstoreexperience.
∙Onlinemodelonly.
∙Nobrickandmortarstores,
thuslessinvestment.
Customer
relationships
Feedbackisconstantlytakeninto
designandproductiononaweekly
basis.
∙Conductedacustomerfeedback
surveyandachieveda96%satisfaction
response.
Feedbackistakenwhen
controversialdesignsare
promoted.
∙Multiplecasesofusingstolen
designsfromindependent
designers.
Key
resources
Outsourcedentireproductionto
China.
∙Regionaldistributionsystemand
deploymentofTakumi’steamfor
qualityCheck.
ProductioninChina.
∙Shein'ssupplychain
management(SCM)software
Key
activities
Useofadvancedanalyticsforlogistics
&andsupplychain.
∙Marketingvia‐Flyers&Television
Advertisement.
∙Lacksunifiedsocialmediapresence.
∙Relativelyweakersocialmedia
presencecomparedtoShein
HeavyRealTime
Analyticsfor
orderplacementandproduction.
∙ConstantmonitoringofUser
behaviorfortrendfinding.
∙Marketingvia‐RealitySho w,
TikTok,MicroInfluencers,Heavy
dominanceuponTikTok(Social
App.)via#Sheinhauls,andvia
Microinfluencerswhoget1020%
commissiononeachpurchase.
Key
partners
TorayIndustries
ChemicalPartner.
∙AkharaCorporation‐FabricPartner.
Klarna
AlternativePayment
Partner,andSpotii‐BuyNow,
PayLaterPaymentPartner.
∙Syte‐VisualSearchEngine
Partner.
Source:Compiledbyauthorsbasedonsecondarydata
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
RutgersBusinessReview Vol.9,No.1 75
DiscussionQuestions
WhoiswinningintheglobalfastfashionIndustry?Why?
What are the different sources of gaining a competitive advantage in thefast
fashionbusiness?
WhatarethedifferentelementsofShein’sandUniqlo’sbusinessmodels?How
havethesetwocompaniespositionedthemselvesandhowhavetheyinnovated
theirbusinessmodel?
CanSheinovertakeUniqlointermsofmarketshareandoverallrevenueinthe
nextfiveyears?Why?Whynot?
Is the “winnertakesall” applicable in the global fastfashion market? Why?
Whynot?
Authors
Prof.(Dr.)RohitKumariscurrentlyworkingasanAssistantProfessorattheIndian
Institute of Management (IIM), Ranchi. He has a PhD in Strategic Mana gement
from the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), New Delhi and an MBA in
Healthcare Management from the Indian Institute of Health Management
Research (IIHMR), Jaipur. Prof. Kumar completed his executive education at
HarvardBusinessSchool,Boston,USA.Heisauniversityrankholderandhasmore
thantwodecadesofteachingandcorporateexperience.Hehaspublishedmorethan
thirtyfive research papers in peerreviewed journals, nine books, and book
chapters, and has presented more than thirty research papers at national and
internationalconferencesworldwide.HeisalsotheBoGMemberofIIHMRDelhi
and an Accredited Management Teacher (AMT). His research interests include
strategicmanagement,designthinking,businessmodelinnovation,buildingcore
competenciesandentrepreneurship.
email:[email protected]
Mr. Shubh Majumdarr is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in General
Management at the Indian Institute of Management in Ranchi, India. He earned
hisB.TechinElectronicsandCommunicationwithaDistinctiongradefromBirla
Vishvakarma Mahavidyalaya, India. His research interests include strategy,
innovation, energy and communicationrelated topics. He has presented his
research at prestigious conferences held at the Wharton Business School (USA),
Trinity Business School (Ireland) an d IISc (India). His recent journal and case
publications have been published in prestigious journals such as the Journal of
Knowledge Management, Journal of Global Information Management,
ManagementDecision,GlobalKnowle dge,MemoryandCommunication,Employee
Relationsand RutgersBusiness Review.He hashandsonexperience withdiverse
qualitativeandquantitativeresearchmethods. Furthermore,heisproficient with
softwaresuchasSPSS,RProgramming,IBMAmosandbibliometricsoftware.
email:[email protected]
Sheinvs.Uniqlo
76 RutgersBusinessReview Spring2024
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