101
NOTES
ILLEGAL CONFINEMENT:
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO
SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DURING
TIMES OF EMERGENCY
E
LI
P
ALOMARES
∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil liberties during war and national emergency are often redefined to
strike a balance between safeguarding individual freedoms and furthering
America’s national interests. Freedom of speech, for example, is frequently
subjected to restrictions when our nation is at war.
1
In times of conflict,
such restrictions are tolerable even though the United States Constitution,
unlike the constitutions of other countries, does not have a “state of
emergency” clause or a provision that suspends constitutional rights. The
only liberty explicitly mentioned in the Constitution that can be suspended
is the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is the process
by which a court determines whether an imprisoned individual has been
legally detained.
2
The Constitution provides that “the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”
3
∗
J.D. Candidate, University of Southern California Law School, 2003. B.A., University of
California, Los Angeles, 2000. “Trust in the Lord with all your heart, and lean not on your own
understanding; in all your ways acknowledge Him, and He shall direct your paths.” (Proverbs 3:5-6).
The author wishes to thank Professor Ronald Garet for his assistance as faculty advisor as well as
Professor Edwin “Rip” Smith for his input and guidance. Thank you also to the members of the
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal for their help in editing this note. Most importantly,
thanks to my parents Enrique and Sara Palomares for their love and support.
1
E.g.
, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right.”).
2
E.g., E
RIC
M. F
REEDMAN
, H
ABEAS
C
ORPUS
: R
ETHINKING THE
G
REAT
W
RIT
OF
L
IBERTY
1,
(2001).
3
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (hereinafter this clause will be referred to as the “suspension
clause”).
102 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
Many saw the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 as an act of war
on the United States of America. Terrorists used airplanes as missiles to
strike the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and the World Trade Center in
New York. The unimaginable destruction caused by these acts exposed the
United States’ vulnerability to terrorism on its own soil. In response, the
Bush Administration both proposed and adopted strong measures to protect
the safety of Americans. One week following the attacks, the
Administration announced new rules that would allow the indefinite
detainment of immigrants during times of emergency.
4
In addressing
concerns over the potential erosion of civil liberties, Attorney General John
Ashcroft promised, “We’re going to do everything we can to harmonize the
constitutional rights of individuals with every legal capacity we can muster
to also protect the safety and security of individuals.”
5
Although concerned
over homeland security, members of Congress spanning the political
spectrum also worried that the Administration’s proposed law enforcement
powers, aimed at preventing further terrorist attacks, might excessively
infringe on civil liberties.
6
Additional concerns arose when President Bush
signed an executive order on November 13, 2001, creating military
tribunals as an optional venue to try foreigners charged with terrorism.
7
The American Civil Liberties Union, law professors, and experts in
military law criticized the creation and use of military tribunals on grounds
that they would facilitate racial profiling and depart from the principles of
American criminal justice.
8
Although the federal government’s powers traditionally expand during
wartime, a liberality often treated with deference by the courts,
9
the United
States Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue of which branch of
government, the executive or legislative, has the power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. Thus, the power struggle between Congress and the
President over the power to shape wartime policy continues, as it has
throughout this nation’s history. During the early part of the Cold War, the
President dominated the area of foreign policy, largely because Congress’
knowledge of foreign affairs was viewed as inferior.
10
Will the current war
on terrorism bring a similar surge of presidential power? Did the Founding
Fathers envision such executive branch supremacy when they included the
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in the Constitution?
The purpose of this Note is to emphasize that during times of war,
presidential authority must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that it is being
4
Philip Shenon & Robin Toner, U.S. Widens Policy on Detaining Suspects; Troubled Airlines Get
Federal Aid Pledge
, N.Y. T
IMES
, Sept. 19, 2001, at A1.
5
Id.
6
See
Robin Toner,
Bush Law-Enforcement Plan Troubles Both Right and Left
, N.Y. T
IMES
, Sept.
28, 2001, at A1.
7
Elisabeth Bumiller & David Johnston, Bush May Subject Terror Suspects to Military Trials, N.Y.
T
IMES
, Nov. 14, 2001, at A1, B8.
8
Id. at B8.
9
William Glaberson, Government Has Power to Curb Some Freedoms, N.Y. T
IMES
, Sept. 19,
2001, at B7.
10
See A
RTHUR
M. S
CHLESINGER
, J
R
., T
HE
I
MPERIAL
P
RESIDENCY
127 (1973).
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 103
exercised consistently with the Constitution. Presidents often cite the
actions of their predecessors to justify their policy choices. Reliance on
often questionable historical precedents can lead to unwarranted
expansions of presidential authority, especially when the President is acting
as Commander in Chief. Through the examination of the writ of habeas
corpus suspension during the Civil War, this Note aims to determine
whether the President is legally entitled to such authority, as well as to
discuss the consequences of exercising such authority. This Note will also
explore Congress’ constitutional role during war and national emergency.
Although instances may arise in which national security demands the
President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, this Note posits that under
no circumstances should the President unilaterally do so. Sanctioning such
presidential authority is contrary to the Framers’ intent, violates the spirit
of checks and balances established in the Constitution, and contradicts
democratic principles. This Note will further demonstrate that the
President’s authority to “repel sudden attacks” should not legally justify
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, even when congressional approval
would be impracticable. Additionally, this Note will examine how
President Bush’s executive order creating military tribunals that effectively
limit a defendant’s right to appeal a conviction may not violate the
suspension clause. Moreover, the Bush Administration should, as a matter
of principle, recognize that the detainees confined in Camp X-ray in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba have a legal right to the writ of habeas corpus.
Finally, this Note will suggest the roles that Congress and the public should
play in checking executive authority in times of war.
Part II of the Note details the purpose, historical origin, and operation
of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as the adoption of the suspension
clause into the Constitution. This section argues that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that Congress, and not the President, should have the
power to implement the suspension clause. Part III outlines the
circumstances surrounding some of President Abraham Lincoln’s
suspensions of the writ. Other than Lincoln’s first suspension, subsequent
suspensions of the writ were aimed more at prosecuting the war than
protecting the public safety. Hence, the only justification for presidential
suspension of the writ, if any, should be for an act of civil disobedience.
Part IV evaluates changes in presidential authority since September 11 and
considers whether the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended with
respect to the detainees in Guantánamo Bay and under the rules for the
proposed military tribunals. In conclusion, Part V suggests how the war on
terrorism can be fought while striking a proper balance between protecting
national security and civil liberties by emphasizing governmental actions
that seek legitimacy.
104 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
II. WHAT IS THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS?
A. H
ABEAS
C
ORPUS
: D
EFINITION AND
P
URPOSE
Habeas corpus literally means, “[t]hat you have the body.”
11
It is a
“writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure
that the party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.”
12
The purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is not to compensate a prisoner for an alleged
injustice, nor to punish the police officer or judge whose actions led to the
proceeding.
13
Rather, its purpose is to ensure the legality of the detention.
14
Since a prisoner’s ultimate objective is release, the writ of habeas corpus is
a viable means for prisoners to assert their substantive rights.
15
The American legal system adopted the writ of habeas corpus from
English common law, albeit with some changes, but its basic purpose
remains the same.
16
In England, conflicts often arose between Parliament
and the King regarding who should be responsible for effectuating the
writ’s advancement.
17
The King had used the writ to compel individuals to
appear before the courts.
18
Parliament saw this use of the King’s power as
a potential instrument to restrict an individual’s personal freedom.
19
In
response, Parliament passed the Petition of Right, which abolished the
King’s power to imprison individuals without showing cause.
20
In doing
so, Parliament helped transform the writ into a protection of personal
freedom.
21
Thus, the historical development of the writ in England reflects
an assumption that the Executive could not be trusted with protecting
individual rights.
This tension between the executive and legislative branches over the
purpose of the writ is central to the question of whether the President or
Congress should have the power to suspend the writ. Ultimately, two
questions should be answered. First, is recognizing a constitutional basis
for the President to suspend the writ a repressive restriction on personal
freedom or an effective tool for the protection of the public safety? This
question relates to what will likely happen in practice when the Executive
unilaterally decides when to exercise the power to suspend the writ.
Second, who should have the constitutional authority to suspend the writ,
the President or Congress? Constitutional principles are necessary for
guidance in order to answer this question. This Note will attempt to answer
both of these questions.
11
B
LACK
’
S
L
AW
D
ICTIONARY
715 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999).
12
Id.
13
W
ILLIAM
F. D
UKER
, A C
ONSTITUTIONAL
H
ISTORY OF
H
ABEAS
3 ( 1980).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 6.
17
Id. at 44.
18
Id. at 62.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 45.
21
See id. at 62.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 105
B. H
OW THE
W
RIT OF
H
ABEAS
C
ORPUS
O
PERATES
The writ mentioned in the suspension clause is officially known as the
writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, and is used in all cases of illegal
confinement.
22
The operation of this writ has three basic characteristics.
First, the writ must be directed at the person detaining the individual
claiming the privilege.
23
Second, it commands the detainer to produce the
body of the prisoner at a designated time and place.
24
Third, it commands
the detainer to state the day and cause of the prisoner’s capture and
detention and to comply with the judge’s decision.
25
This particular writ is
an appropriate remedy to determine if any person has been legally detained
and to ascertain the cause of the confinement.
26
If there are insufficient
grounds to detain the person, the party is entitled to immediate discharge.
27
C. A
DOPTION OF THE
S
USPENSION
C
LAUSE
Even before the federal constitution was adopted, every state in the
Union secured the writ of habeas corpus either by common law or state
constitutional law.
28
At the time of the Constitution’s drafting, the Framers
assumed that the states would adequately safeguard individual liberties.
29
Therefore, in writing the suspension clause, the Framers were concerned
that the federal government would interfere with the states’ remedy.
30
In
the debate over the suspension clause, the Framers focused mainly on the
power of suspension.
31
Opponents of the suspension clause argued against
granting the federal government the power to suspend the writ because
human nature inherently seeks power.
32
They further argued that the
granting of such power would require that governmental actions be
carefully scrutinized to prevent abuse.
33
An outright ban on the suspension
of the writ was defeated because even the supporters of the clause
recognized that there might be circumstances where its suspension might
be appropriate.
34
The most interesting aspect of the debate over the suspension clause is
the Framers’ assumption that if the power to suspend the writ were granted
to the federal government, it would be given to Congress. One of the
Framers, Charles Pinckney from South Carolina, proposed that the writ not
22
J
OSEPH
S
TORY
, 3 C
OMMENTARIES ON THE
C
ONSTITUTION OF THE
U
NITED
S
TATES
§ 1333, at 206
(1833).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id
.
28
D
UKER
,
supra
note 13, at 129
.
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
See F
REEDMAN
, supra note 2, at 14.
32
Id. at 17.
33
See id.
34
See id.
106 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
“be suspended by the legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing
occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding [twelve] months.”
35
Edward Rutledge, on the other hand, believed that a universal suspension
throughout the Union would be unnecessary because the states could use
their power to suspend the writ and deal effectively with emergencies.
36
The states that agreed with Rutledge’s position voted for a provision that
would completely deny Congress the power to suspend the writ.
37
A
compromise approach offered by Robert Morris provided that the privilege
should not be suspended except “where . . . the public Safety may require .
. .” and also provided that the power to suspend would be derived from
Congress’ power to call for the militia to suppress rebellion and repel
invasion.
38
Given this, it follows that the Framers’ intent was that
Congress could suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but only
if it was necessary and proper and the public safety required it.
39
The manner in which public safety was to be protected was an
important question facing the States. As evinced in the Articles of
Confederation, Americans were more concerned with questions of control
than with moral implications of military professionalism, and, thus, would
support a standing army if it was raised and supported by the states.
40
Supporters of the Articles believed “[t]he localized militia also provided a
check against any abuse of the government’s coercive powers.”
41
George
Washington and Alexander Hamilton, however, believed that “a
decentralized military establishment left the nation vulnerable to foreign
attack and domestic discord.”
42
The Constitution reflects a compromise of
these two positions. Congress can summon the militia but only “to execute
the laws of the Union [and] suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”
43
When Congress does call out the militia, the states still retain control over
training the militia and appointing its officers.
44
It may seem odd today that the states at the time of the Constitution’s
framing believed Congress to be inadequate to represent their interests and
feared entrusting it with control over the Republic’s armies.
45
Anti-
Federalists argued that society’s law enforcement depended on either
citizen support or military coercion.
46
History provided countless examples
of government officials misusing armies without regard to the people’s
35
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
36
D
UKER
, supra note 13, at 130.
37
See id.
38
Id.
at 131.
39
See id.
40
See
L
AWRENCE
D
ELBERT
C
RESS
, C
ITIZENS IN
A
RMS
: T
HE
A
RMY AND THE
M
ILITIA IN
A
MERICAN
S
OCIETY TO THE
W
AR OF
1812, at 95 (1982).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
44
C
RESS
, supra note 40, at 97.
45
See id. at 99.
46
Id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 107
will.
47
But the states, according to the Anti-Federalists, did not depend on
coercion because representation within the states ensured that laws
conformed to the public will.
48
Given the important role the Constitution
defined for Congress in times of emergency, one could reasonably assume
that when public safety required suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
Congress would have power to authorize it. The President’s role during
emergencies, however, lacked clear definition. But if the states had feared
entrusting Congress with protecting the public safety because it might not
represent their interests, then a fortiori they feared such power in the
President’s hands. These assumptions regarding congressional and
presidential authority in times of national emergency were later challenged
during the Civil War and are being challenged again in the current war on
terrorism.
III. LINCOLN’S SUSPENSIONS OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A. T
HE
E
FFECT OF A
N
ATIO NAL
C
RISIS ON A
P
RESIDENT
: A
BRAHAM
L
INCOLN AND
G
EORGE
W. B
USH
Abraham Lincoln was elected President at a time when the country was
bitterly divided over the issue of extending slavery into the territories. In
the 1860 presidential election, Lincoln won only forty percent of the
national popular vote.
49
In ten southern states, he did not receive a single
popular vote.
50
Southerners perceived his election as a threat to the right of
slaveholders to take slaves into the territories.
51
Shortly after the election,
South Carolina’s senators resigned from Congress and the state legislature
considered seceding from the Union.
52
By the time of Lincoln’s
inauguration, several southern states had seceded and border states like
Maryland also considered secession. The need to keep border states from
seceding tremendously affected Lincoln’s decisions on protecting the
nation’s capital and preserving the Union.
Like Lincoln, President George W. Bush was elected at a time when
our nation was bitterly divided. The 2000 presidential election was so
close that a machine recount of votes was conducted in Florida. The
winner of Florida’s twenty-five electoral votes would become President. A
legal dispute between Bush and then-Vice President Al Gore arose over
whether a manual recount could be conducted under Florida law. The
United State Supreme Court eventually resolved the conflict in Bush v.
Gore
53
after a manual recount had already begun. Seven Justices believed
47
Id.
at 101.
48
See id.
at 99.
49
J
AMES
M. M
C
P
HERSON
, B
AT T L E
C
RY OF
F
REEDOM
: T
HE
C
IVIL
W
AR
E
RA
232 (1988).
50
W
ILLIAM
H. R
EHNQUIST
, A
LL THE LAWS
B
UT
O
NE
: C
IVIL
L
IBERTIES IN
W
ARTIME
3–4 (1998).
In fact, some southern states did not include Lincoln on their presidential ballots. Id.
51
See M
C
P
HERSON
, supra note 49, at 241.
52
R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 4.
53
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
108 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
that the recount had constitutional problems and five Justices felt that
continuing the recount would violate the Florida election code.
54
The
decision effectively gave the presidency to Bush. Even after the Court
ended the legal battle, some Americans felt that Bush was not a
“legitimate” president because he lost the popular vote. Unlike Lincoln’s
election, Bush did not face any resignations from Congress after his
election, although Republicans did lose control of the Senate to Democrats
when one of its members, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont, became an
Independent.
55
A national crisis can transform a weak President into a strong one. The
threat of secession constantly plagued the nation in the antebellum period.
Lincoln responded to the outbreak of the Civil War by taking strong
measures to preserve the Union. Likewise, in the post-Cold War era, the
threat of terrorist attacks at home and abroad was a well-known concern.
The September 11 attacks presented Bush with the opportunity to expand
executive authority. Lincoln and Bush, like many other wartime presidents,
stretched constitutional executive powers to their limit. Lincoln, however,
is the only President to have explicitly suspended the writ of habeas corpus,
although some may argue that Bush may have functionally suspended it in
his executive order creating military tribunals. In creating these tribunals,
Bush relied on the historical precedents of Lincoln and other Presidents.
Therefore, reevaluating historical precedents is important in determining
whether they should be regarded as constitutional precedents.
In analyzing why and under what circumstances Lincoln suspended the
writ, the ultimate question is whether his actions can be legally justified
under the Constitution. The best argument for such a legal justification lies
within the President’s implied power to repel sudden attacks combined with
Congressional acquiescence to those suspensions. This section will argue
that, although Lincoln’s first suspension of the writ can be morally justified
as a reasonable tool to preserve the Union, his actions should not be legally
justified under the Constitution and consequently should not be considered
as legal precedent for a presidential suspension of the writ unilaterally. At
best, Lincoln’s first suspension should be defended as an act of civil
disobedience. After this first suspension, the examples of suspensions
discussed below will demonstrate why allowing the President to
unilaterally suspend the writ based on war powers authority is problematic.
In practice, Lincoln acted as if war powers during a rebellion trumped any
limitations placed by the Judiciary and Congress on such powers. Lincoln
suspended the writ during a rebellion that was caused, in part, by the
South’s belief that he would infringe on slaveholders’ rights. Given this
reason for the rebellion, was it not dangerous for Lincoln to have sole
possession of power to suspend the writ?
56
54
See id. at 111.
55
Jill Zuckman, Democrats Take Senate: Bipartisanship is Byword After Jefford’s Jump, C
HI
.
T
RIB
., June 6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4080726.
56
See F
REEDMAN
, supra note 2, at 17 (analogous argument made by opponents to the adoption of
a suspension clause that would give Congress the power to suspend the writ: “The Congress will
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 109
B. T
HE
C
ONNECTION
B
ETWEEN
W
AR
P
OWERS AND THE
S
USPENSION OF
THE
W
RIT
Lincoln took office March 4, 1861 hoping to preserve the Union
despite the secession of several southern states.
57
Immediately after his
inauguration he faced a difficult decision regarding the diminishing
supplies in Fort Sumter, located off the South Carolina coast, and
eventually decided to resupply the fort with provisions only.
58
In doing so,
he challenged the South to choose peace or war, and by firing on the supply
boats, the South became the aggressor.
59
On April 15, 1861, one day after
surrendering Fort Sumter, Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for the
militias of various states to suppress the rebellion.
60
While many states in
the North enthusiastically responded to Lincoln’s call for troops, the
southern states and border states that had not seceded disputed the
President’s constitutional authority to call for troops.
61
The Constitution does not give the President explicit authority to
unilaterally summon the militia in time of invasion or rebellion to protect
the public safety. This lack of explicit authority created a situation where
critics questioned Lincoln’s authority to activate troops when there was
little time for debate. Yet, Lincoln’s call for troops was not
unconstitutional. The history, framing, and ratification of the Constitution
implicitly suggest that the President has the unilateral authority to repel a
sudden attack.
62
An early draft of the Constitution gave Congress the
power to “make war,” which drafters amended in favor of the language
“declare war” because the legislature might be too slow to react in an
emergency.
63
This change in language implicitly left the President with the
power to repel sudden attacks.
64
Therefore, the power to repel sudden
attacks represents an emergency measure a President can take to protect
American interests at home and abroad.
65
But, in repelling sudden attacks, does the President have the power to
make a “defensive war”?
66
In other words, does repelling a sudden attack
suspend the writ of habeas corpus in case of rebellion; but if this rebellion was only a resistance to
usurpation, who will be the Judge? the usurper.”).
57
See M
C
P
HERSON
, supra note 49, at 236 (map showing southern secession; the states that
seceded from the Union before the fall of Fort Sumter were South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida,
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas; the states that seceded after the fall of Fort Sumter were
Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee).
58
See id. at 272.
59
See id. at 273.
60
See
Abraham Lincoln,
Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress
(April 15, 1861),
in
4 C
OLLECTED WORKS OF
A
BRAHAM
L
INCOLN
332 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter Lincoln, 4
C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
].
61
See
R
EHNQUIST
,
supra
note 50, at 17
62
P
ETER
R
AV E N
-H
ANSEN
, T
HE
U.S. C
ONSTITUTION AND THE
P
OWER TO GO TO
W
AR
: H
ISTORICAL
AND
C
URRENT
P
ERSPECTIVES
35 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994).
63
See L
OUIS
F
ISHER
, P
RESIDENTIAL
W
AR
P
OWER
6 (1995).
64
See id.
65
See id. at 7.
66
R
AV E N
-H
ANSEN
, supra note 62, at 35.
110 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
include the power to make a preemptive strike against the enemy in order
to defend the nation? This question has particular importance in the current
war on terrorism because one reason the United States took military action
in Afghanistan was to prevent future attacks by the Al Qaeda terrorist
group. In reference to the threat of future attacks, President Bush said in
his 2002 State of the Union Address, “I will not wait on events, while
dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The
United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous
regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”
67
The
President also stated that American intelligence believed that thousands of
terrorists trained by Al Qaeda were spread throughout the world and were
“like ticking time bombs—set to go off without any warning.”
68
If United States intelligence agents became aware of an imminent
attack that threatened national security, a military response authorized by
the President to prevent the attack without congressional approval would be
an example of “repelling a sudden attack.” This implied power raises some
difficult questions in unusual, but entirely plausible, circumstances. What
if the most effective means to foil a terrorist attack required apprehension
of those suspected before carrying out the attacks? What if those
considered possible suspects were only defined by race or general
appearance? What if apprehension was required of individuals who merely
had knowledge that attacks would be carried out? Should the President
have constitutional authority to unilaterally suspend the writ of habeas
corpus to thwart a threatened attack? These are the questions to be
answered.
C. L
INCOLN
’
S
F
IRST
S
USPENSION OF THE
W
RIT OF
H
ABEAS
C
ORPUS
1. Incidents that Triggered the First Suspension
Lincoln first suspended the writ of habeas corpus after the Baltimore
riots in April of 1861. Of the border states that had not seceded from the
Union, Maryland was crucial to the preservation of the Union because it
enclosed Washington, D.C. on three sides, with Virginia, which had already
seceded, on the fourth side.
69
Maryland had a large secessionist minority
and Southern-Rights Democrats controlled its legislature.
70
Maryland
Governor Thomas H. Hicks, on the other hand, sympathized with the
Union.
71
On April 19, 1861 the 6th Massachusetts Regiment, the first to
respond to Lincoln’s call for troops, had to pass through Baltimore on its
way to Washington without the benefit of a rail line.
72
A violent mob
greeted the soldiers and attacked them with bricks, stones, and pistols, to
67
David E. Sanger,
Bush, Focusing on Terrorism, Says Secure U.S. is Top Priority
, N.Y. T
IMES
,
Jan. 30, 2002, at A1.
68
Id. at A21.
69
See M
C
P
HERSON
, supra note 49, at 284–85.
70
Id. at 285.
71
R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 20.
72
M
C
P
HERSON
, supra note 49, at 285.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 111
which they responded by firing into the crowd.
73
When the soldiers finally
arrived at the station, four soldiers and twelve civilians were dead and the
bridges and railroads were destroyed to prevent more troop movement.
74
The riots resulted in the nation’s capital being cut off from the North, with
rumors of an impending attack by Virginia.
75
2. Legal and Historical Precedent for Suspending the Writ
These perilous circumstances caused Lincoln to consider suspending
the writ of habeas corpus. Yet, Lincoln had no precedent suggesting that,
as President during a rebellion, he had the authority to do. In
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, originally
published in 1833, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story stated:
Hitherto no suspension of the writ has ever been authorized by congress
since the establishment of the constitution. It would seem, as the power is
given to congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of
rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge, whether exigency had arisen,
must exclusively belong to that body.
76
Story concluded that only Congress could suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, but did not provide a legal basis for his assumption. His
conclusion, rather, was based on President Jefferson’s assertion that he
could not conceive of a situation where the President should suspend the
writ even during insurrection or rebellion.
77
Furthermore, the Jefferson
Administration and Congress during the Bollman Affair
78
considered
suspending the writ and assumed that the Legislature had exclusive
authority to do so.
79
The bill to suspend the writ passed in the Senate, but
was rejected in the House.
80
In short, it may have been so obvious to
Justice Story that Congress had the exclusive power to suspend the writ
that he felt it needless to explain why.
Without a historical precedent for the presidential suspension of the
writ, Lincoln acted with caution. According to his Secretary of State,
William H. Seward, the writ of habeas corpus “had not been suspended
because of Mr. Lincoln’s extreme reluctance at that period to assume such a
responsibility. Those to whom he looked for advice, almost to a man,
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
See id. at 286.
76
S
TORY
, supra note 22, at 209.
77
See id.
at 209 n.1.
78
After his first term, Jefferson removed Aaron Burr from the second-term ticket for Vice
President. Burr was facing murder charges for killing Alexander Hamilton in a duel. He fled to the
Western Territories where he plotted to separate some of the country’s newly acquired territories from
the Union. Burr and his co-conspirators, Samuel Swartwout and Dr. Erick Bollman, were seized by the
United States Army commander in New Orleans, who transported them to Baltimore in defiance of
writs of habeas corpus issued by federal judges. The prisoners applied to the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. F
REEDMAN
, supra note 2, at 20–21.
79
See D
UKER
, supra note 13, at 142.
80
S
TORY
, supra note 22, at 209 n.1.
112 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
opposed this action.”
81
Lincoln’s hesitation suggests that he was not only
concerned with the lack of precedent, but also with creating a dangerous
precedent. The situation in Maryland made his initial hesitation to suspend
the writ a closer call. On April 26, 1861, the Maryland governor called a
special session of the Legislature, and many feared the Legislature would
vote to secede from the Union.
82
Lincoln could have arrested the Maryland
legislators before they voted on secession but chose not to, reserving such
action only if necessary. He argued that the Maryland legislators had the
right to assemble, and arresting them would only delay the inevitable.
83
Maryland’s legislature, however, did not consider the secession ordinance.
Meanwhile, troops finally arrived in Washington, and two days later,
Lincoln suspended the writ for the first time, even though the worst dangers
appeared over.
84
Not everyone, however, believed the capital was free from danger.
General-in-Chief Winfield Scott believed that an attack on the capital
would occur.
85
In response, on April 27 Lincoln sent the following order to
General Scott:
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the
United States. If at any point on or the vicinity of the military line which
is now [or which shall be] used between the city of Philadelphia and the
city of Washington . . . you find resistance which renders it necessary to
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you personally or
through the officer in command [at the point where] resistance occurs, are
authorized to suspend that writ.
86
Evaluating whether Lincoln’s first suspension of the writ was proper is
difficult because the Union itself was threatened, which makes it easy to
sympathize with his decision. The hindsight knowledge that the Union was
indeed preserved also seems to justify his actions. Nevertheless, Lincoln’s
actions must be carefully analyzed to determine whether they should be
deemed constitutional.
Approximately one month after the suspension of the writ, troops under
Captain Samuel Yohe arrested John Merryman, a farmer, state legislator,
and a lieutenant in a secessionist cavalry unit and imprisoned him at Fort
McHenry, Maryland.
87
He was arrested for burning bridges and ripping
down telephone wires.
88
Generally, those arrested in the border states
during 1861 were kept in Fort Lafayette, New York
89
and imprisoned in a
81
R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 23.
82
See
M
ARK
E. N
EELY
, J
R
. T
HE
F
ATE OF
L
IBERTY
: A
BRAHAM
L
INCOLN AND
C
IVIL
L
IBERTIES
6
(Oxford University Press 1991).
83
See
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
,
supra
note 60, at 344 (to Winfield Scott).
84
See
N
EELY
,
supra
note 82,
at 8.
85
See id.
86
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
, supra note 60, at 347 (to Winfield Scott).
87
R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 26.
88
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, 15 C
ARDOZO
L. R
EV
. 81, 90 (1993).
89
R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 50.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 113
chamber with anywhere from ten to forty other inmates.
90
Shortly after his
arrest Merryman obtained counsel to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
91
He also visited with family and friends.
92
Thus, at least some detained
prisoners likely were not held incommunicado. Given that the North was a
potential asylum for Confederate sympathizers like Merryman, suspending
the writ became an effective tool to silence those interfering with the
Administration’s policies.
93
Lincoln demonstrated that he was willing to
sacrifice an individual’s privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to fulfill
what he believed to be his duty as Commander in Chief.
The Constitution states: “The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”
94
With
respect to initiating war, the Constitution explicitly gave Congress the
power to declare war
95
and implicitly gave the President the authority to
unilaterally initiate war only to repel sudden attacks.
96
The Constitution,
however, does not define what powers the President can exercise as
Commander in Chief. Thus, an argument can be made that Lincoln’s first
unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was constitutionally
justifiable under the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.
According to this argument, the President could only suspend the writ to
repel a sudden attack. However, providing a legal justification that would
sanction the President’s unilateral suspension of the writ under these
circumstances opens the door for abuses by future Presidents. Therefore,
Lincoln’s first suspension of the writ violated the Constitution but was
morally justified because it may have contributed to preserving the Union.
It is reasonable to conclude that Lincoln’s initial suspension of the writ
was necessary to prevent the capital from falling into Confederate hands.
In his book, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties,
Professor Mark E. Neely, Jr. argues:
The purpose of the initial suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is clear
from the circumstances of its issuance: to keep the military reinforcement
route to the nation’s capital. It is equally clear that political
provocation—the meeting of the Democratic-dominated Maryland
legislature—did not cause Lincoln to give Scott the historic
authorization.
97
One day before Lincoln sent the order suspending the writ, General
Scott had already drafted an order warning that an attack on the capital was
90
Id.
91
Id.
at 26.
92
Id. at 38–39.
93
See J
ACOB
K. J
AV I T Z
, W
HO
M
AKES
W
AR
: T
HE
P
RESIDENT
V
ERSUS
C
ONGRESS
121 (1973).
94
U.S. C
ONST
. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
95
See U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
96
See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
97
N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 9.
114 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
possible at any moment.
98
Therefore, General Scott could have used the
suspension of the writ to defend Washington and protect public safety.
Despite the apparent necessity of suspending the writ to protect the
capital, Lincoln’s failure to publicly declare its suspension may have hurt
its effectiveness in protecting public safety. Perhaps Lincoln believed that
publicly declaring the suspension would have angered the masses,
complicating the task of putting down the rebellion. Because the courts
and other civil authorities were not notified, however, their compliance
with the order was difficult. For example, on May 2, 1861, a Maryland
judge, William F. Giles, was unaware of the President’s order when he
issued a writ of habeas corpus for the release of a minor who had enlisted
in the army without parental consent.
99
The officer refused to obey the
order, acting entirely on his own authority.
100
When Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney became aware the President had suspended the writ of habeas
corpus, he informed the Democratic press outside Maryland.
101
Because
Lincoln was not more forthcoming, he provided the press with more
reason to criticize his actions, and angered the Judiciary that was supposed
to assist him in keeping prisoners detained.
D. T
HE
S
USPENSION
C
LAUSE AND THE
T
HREE
B
RANCHES OF
G
OVERNMENT
1. Judicial Supremacy to Interpret the Law?
The judiciary addressed the legality of Lincoln’s suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus in Ex parte Merryman.
102
Merryman’s lawyer
successfully petitioned for the writ directly to Chief Justice Taney, then
sitting on the federal Circuit Court of Maryland.
103
On May 26, the Chief
Justice, who was circuit riding as a federal court judge, issued the writ as a
Supreme Court justice from chambers.
104
The writ was directed at General
George Cadwalader, the commanding officer where Merryman was
imprisoned.
105
The following day, General Cadwalader sent a messenger to
inform the Chief Justice that he would not produce Merryman because of
Lincoln’s order suspending the writ of habeas corpus, but requested the
case’s postponement until he received further instructions from the
President.
106
Taney responded by holding the general in contempt, and on
May 28, he made his ruling from the bench.
107
98
See id.
at 8.
99
Id.
at 8–9.
100
See id.
at 8.
101
Id.
102
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
103
See Paulsen, supra note 88, at 90.
104
See N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 10.
105
Paulsen, supra note 88, at 90–91.
106
Id. at 91.
107
See id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 115
In his written opinion, Taney concluded that Lincoln lacked
constitutional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
108
He based his
conclusion on several grounds. First, President Jefferson believed that the
President possessed no power to suspend the writ.
109
Second, Taney
reasoned that the location of the suspension clause in Article I, which deals
with congressional powers, meant that Congress should have the sole
power to suspend the writ.
110
Third, Taney relied on Blackstone’s
Commentaries, which indicated that in England only Parliament could
suspend the writ, and on Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States, which asserted that Congress had the sole power to
suspend the writ.
111
Finally, he relied on Chief Justice Marshall’s statement
in Ex parte Bollman,
112
that “[i]f at any time the public safety should
require the suspension of the powers vested by [the Judiciary Act of 1789]
in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so.”
113
Taney also concluded that where life, liberty, or property of a private
citizen is concerned, the President only possesses the power prescribed in
Article II, section 3—to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
114
Furthermore, he asserted that the President could not authorize the
execution of the laws either himself or through agents or officers, civil or
military, independent of judicial or legislative authority.
115
According to
Taney, the courts possessed the authority to define the President’s duty to
faithfully execute the laws, and to command that the execution of laws
conform to the interpretation of the law by the courts.
116
This latter
assertion of judicial supremacy, i.e., that the courts can tell the President
what he must do, went further than Chief Justice Marshall’s view on
judicial supremacy in Marbury v. Madison.
117
Although Taney may have
gone too far in defining judicial authority, there is no doubt the President
should enforce the judiciary’s final judgment, even if there is disagreement
over the interpretation.
118
At the conclusion of the opinion, Taney
reminded Lincoln of his duty to faithfully execute the laws.
119
Taney provided strong support for the argument that only Congress has
the authority to suspend the writ. The location of the suspension clause in
the legislative article follows the section enumerating legislative powers
and supports the conclusion that it was designed to limit congressional
108
See Ex parte Merryman
, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861).
109
See id. at 148.
110
See id.
111
See id. at 151–52
112
4 Cranch 75 (1807).
113
Id.
at 101.
114
Ex parte Merryman
, 17 F. Cas. at 149.
115
Id
.
116
See Paulsen, supra note 88, at 93.
117
See id. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall declared, “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803).
118
See Paulsen, supra note 88, at 95.
119
See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153.
116 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
power.
120
Also, as argued above, the Framers probably intended that only
Congress should possess the power to suspend the writ if public safety
required it.
121
Yet, Taney’s opinion did not settle the matter entirely. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist argued, “Taney read [the powers of the
President] narrowly, thereby ruling out any express or implied authority the
President might have in this area under his ‘war powers.’”
122
In other
words, Taney did not explicitly address the thorny issue of whether
Lincoln’s first suspension of the writ was justified under the President’s
implied power to repel sudden attacks.
Despite the judicial opinion, Taney’s response to Lincoln’s suspension
of the writ is problematic. He ignored the general’s request for
postponement and made his ruling without the benefit of hearing the
government’s argument.
123
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, “the
judicial process is quintessentially a deliberative one . . . a judge may have
instinctive or preliminary reactions against the position of one side in a
case, before ever hearing argument from counsel. But one of the purposes
of argument is to allow such a side to try to persuade the judge that his
preliminary or instinctive reaction is mistaken.”
124
Taney’s quick ruling
without the benefit of oral argument foreclosed the opportunity for a more
democratic resolution of the important issue of presidential authority to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution.
125
Although in
the end Taney might not have changed his mind, a resolution after hearing
the government’s position would have legitimized his ruling. As it stood,
Taney’s quick opinion made it easier for Lincoln to disregard the ruling.
2. Lincoln’s Interpretation of the Suspension Clause
Although Taney had made the ruling, Lincoln had to enforce it. He
could have appealed Taney’s Merryman decision to the United States
Supreme Court but chose not to pursue it.
126
Perhaps Lincoln did not want
the circuit court decision to then gain the force of a Supreme Court
decision, which would have made it the law of the land.
127
Furthermore,
the Supreme Court likely would have upheld the circuit court decision
given that of the six active members, four of them—Taney, Wayne, Grier,
and Catron—had joined the principal portion of Taney’s Dred Scott opinion
and the two dissenters were no longer on the Court.
128
Additionally, many
legal scholars in the North agreed with Taney’s opinion that the President
120
See D
UKER
, supra note 13, at 131.
121
See
supra
notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
122
R
EHNQUIST
,
supra
note 50, at 36.
123
See id.
at 40.
124
Id.
at 40–41.
125
See id. at 41.
126
See id. at 44. Rehnquist notes that circuit court opinions, like Taney’s in Ex parte Merryman,
were ordinarily reviewable by the Supreme Court but that “there were significant procedural obstacles
to such an appeal as the law stood then.” Id.
127
See id.
128
See id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 117
did not possess the authority to suspend the writ.
129
On the other hand,
some prominent legal scholars defended Lincoln’s actions. They included
Joel Parker and Theophilus Parsons, two Harvard Law School professors;
Horace Binney, the patriarch of the American bar; and Reverdy Johnson,
the most respected constitutional lawyer in Congress.
130
Nevertheless,
instead of appealing the decision through judicial channels, Lincoln took
his appeal to Congress and the people.
131
Lincoln delayed convening Congress from April 12, 1861 to July 4,
1861, when Fort Sumter was attacked.
132
During the antebellum period,
Congress customarily convened in December after the new President took
office in March.
133
This gave the new administration time to set its agenda
before Congress began its deliberations.
134
When Congress had come into
session early in a new administration, history indicated that the
Administration’s agenda would take a disastrous course.
135
By delaying the
convocation of Congress, Lincoln avoided the possibility that Congress
would stop him from taking measures he deemed necessary to preserve the
Union.
136
During this delay, Lincoln acted as if he was the legislature.
137
On July 4, 1861, in a message to Congress in special session, Lincoln
informed the nation he had authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus in “proper cases.”
138
Although he had delayed convening Congress,
he said that he trusted that Congress would ratify the measures dictated.
139
In his message to Congress, Lincoln presented two possible arguments
in defense of his suspension of the writ. He stated rhetorically: “[A]re all
the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces,
lest that one be violated?”
140
This “necessity defense” implies that the
government would collapse if the President could not suspend the writ,
regardless of Taney’s order.
141
In other words, the Constitution would be
useless without an intact nation.
142
Lincoln presented a second argument in
the alternative. He stated:
It was not believed that any law was violated . . . the Constitution itself, is
silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the [suspension
129
See id. at 45.
130
P
HILLIP
S
HAW
P
ALUDAN
, A P
EOPLE
’
S
C
ONTEST
:
T
HE
U
NION
& C
IVIL
W
AR
1861–1865, at
29
(1996).
131
See Paulsen, supra note 88, at 94.
132
See
S
CHLESINGER
,
supra
note 10, at 58.
133
See J
AV I T Z
, supra note 93, at 118.
134
See id.
135
See id.
136
See
S
CHLESINGER
,
supra
note 10, at 58.
137
See id.
(besides suspending the writ of habeas corpus, Lincoln took actions that clearly
belonged only to Congress such as assembling the militia, enlarging the army and navy beyond their
authorized strength, and instituting a naval blockade).
138
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
, supra note 60, at 429 (Message to Congress in Special
Session).
139
See id.
140
Id. at 430.
141
See Paulsen, supra note 88, at 95.
142
See S
CHLESINGER
, supra note 10, at 59.
118 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
clause] was made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed that in
every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be
called together; the very assembling of which of which might be
prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.
143
To support his position, Lincoln noted that the suspension clause did
not explicitly mention who could assert the power and relied on his implicit
authority to repel sudden attacks. Lincoln not only provided these two
arguments in his message but also promised Congress that the Attorney
General would provide a more extended argument.
144
Attorney General Edward Bates provided that argument on July 5,
1861.
145
Unlike Lincoln, who did not explicitly reference Taney’s opinion
in Merryman, Bates did address the issue of whether the President was
justified in refusing to obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by a judge.
146
He stated: “Our fathers, having divided the government into co-ordinate
departments . . . left [them] by design . . . each independent and free, to act
out its own granted powers, without any ordained or legal superior
possessing the power to revise and reverse its action.”
147
Bates suggested
that Lincoln could disregard Taney’s order and interpretation of the
suspension clause, most likely basing this conclusion on Madison’s
Federalist No. 49.
148
Arguably, Madison’s conclusions were superseded by
Chief Justice Marshall’s declaration in Marbury v. Madison
149
that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what
the law is.”
150
Thus, Lincoln’s defiance of Taney’s order probably breached
the Constitution.
Lincoln’s defiance of Merryman reveals the potential for a President to
abuse executive power by disobeying court orders intended to protect
against arbitrary arrests and detentions—the substantive rights the writ of
habeas corpus was designed to preserve. Given this potential for abuse,
Bates’s argument defending Lincoln’s defiance of Taney’s order must be
rejected. That leaves Lincoln’s two arguments defending executive
authority to unilaterally suspend the writ: his first argument, a “necessity
defense” and his second argument a “war powers defense.” In his speech,
Lincoln expressly rejected reliance on the necessity defense, i.e., that he
violated any law to preserve the Constitution. Instead, he argued that his
actions were consistent with presidential war powers during a rebellion.
An argument can be made that Lincoln’s first suspension of the writ
was legally justified under the President’s implied power to repel sudden
attacks. Under this argument, Congress has power to suspend the writ
143
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
,
supra
note 60, at 430–31 (Message to Congress in Special
Session).
144
See id
. at 431.
145
10 Op. Att’y. Gen. 74 (1868).
146
Id. at 75.
147
Id. at 76.
148
See Paulsen, supra note 88, at 96.
149
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
150
Id. at 177.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 119
unless the President asserts this implied power. In theory, this draws a clear
line between presidential and congressional authority with respect to the
suspension clause. In practice, however, the exception will probably
swallow the rule; presidential war powers once asserted are difficult to
limit. Moreover, the Constitution provides more restrictions on Congress’
powers than on the President’s powers. This might suggest that the
Framers provided fewer restrictions on the President because they believed
that the President’s chief responsibility was to enforce laws passed by
Congress. In other words, why restrict powers the President does not
possess? This may explain why the suspension clause does not state who
has the power to authorize the suspension of the writ.
Lincoln asserted his authority as Commander in Chief to quell the
rebellion under the belief that as Commander in Chief he had the power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus when he determined the public safety
required it. The suspensions of the writ described below comported with
the belief that suppressing the rebellion was synonymous with protecting
public safety. The suspension clause, however, has two independent
requirements: 1) that a rebellion or invasion exists and 2) that the writ must
be suspended to protect public safety. Moreover, given that the
Constitution does not provide many limitations on the President’s authority
as Commander in Chief, granting the President the power to suspend the
writ as part of war powers could circumvent the Constitutional checks and
balances designed to prevent abuse of authority. The subsequent
suspensions described below were aimed more at prosecuting the war than
protecting the public safety. While Lincoln seemed to suggest that he was
only relying on his authority as Commander in Chief, his actions are more
consistent with Bates’s argument that the President can disregard another
branch’s interpretation of the law.
On May 10, 1861, Lincoln suspended the writ by public proclamation
for a second time in Florida.
151
This suspension is particularly interesting
because Florida seceded from the Union prior to the fall of Fort Sumter.
Theoretically, Lincoln believed that seccession was inherently unlawful and
could only occur through revolution.
152
Based on this theory, Lincoln
suspended the writ in Florida as though the citizens of the seceding states
had waived their rights under the Constitution.
153
This assumption does not
seem unreasonable given the state of war. Thus, suspension of the writ in
Florida was essentially a fait accompli.
154
This was one several acts carried
out without congressional authorization,
155
which significantly impacted
Lincoln’s future behavior. As Professor Neely notes, “Once [Lincoln]
151
See
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
,
supra
note 60, at 364–65 (Proclamation Suspending the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Florida).
152
See id. at 265 (First Inaugural Address—Final Text).
153
See N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 10.
154
See id.
155
Such acts included, inter alia, assembling the militia, enlarging the Army and Navy beyond
their authorized strength, and spending public money without congressional appropriation. See
S
CHLESINGER
, supra note 10, at 58.
120 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
suspended the writ of habeas corpus without suffering dire political
consequences, similar actions grew easier and easier.”
156
Therefore, the
Florida suspension, which evinced Lincoln’s willingness to act unilaterally,
effectively facilitated subsequent unwarranted suspensions.
On June 20, 1861, Lincoln issued another order authorizing General
Scott to “suspend the writ of habeas corpus so far as may relate to Major
Chase, lately of the Engineer Corp of the Army of the United States, now
guilty of treasonable practices against this government.”
157
In neglecting to
provide Major Chase’s first and middle names, Lincoln invited a wrongful
arrest.
158
Certainly Lincoln must have believed at this point what he would
openly admit to later, that suspending the writ could result in the wrongful
arrest of an innocent person.
159
Furthermore, unlike the first suspension,
which was used as a tool to prevent an imminent attack on the capital by
Virginia, this suspension order did not issue in response to a “dangerous
emergency.” The “Major Chase” referred to in the suspension order was
Major William Henry Chase, who had resigned from the Union Army on
October 31, 1856, and in 1861, he became a commissioned colonel and
major general of the Florida state troops.
160
Dealing with treason, not
protection of the public safety, seemed to be the only justification for this
suspension.
Lincoln issued another suspension order on July 2, 1861, two days
before his speech to Congress. At that point, he authorized General Scott
to suspend the writ “at any point, on or in the vicinity of any military line
which is now, or which shall be used between the City of New York and the
city of Washington.”
161
Professor Neely notes:
Lincoln had quickly overcome any initial hesitation to use presidential
power to suspend the writ. The use of the phrase “military line,” for
example, was becoming expansive, if not a little deceptive. At first the
term had described the threatened route to Washington. Now it referred to
no particularly well-described “line” between two places quite far apart
on the map.
162
Unlike the first suspension order, which was narrowly tailored to
protect the capital from imminent attack, this one aimed to stop any
resistance to the Union forces over a broad area.
163
Furthermore, this
suspension was neither directed at an imminent harm nor aimed at
156
N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 10.
157
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
, supra note 60, at 414.
158
See
N
EELY
,
supra
note 82, at 11.
159
Abraham Lincoln, To Eratus Corning and Others (July 12, 1863),
in
6 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS OF
A
BRAHAM
L
INCOLN
263 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (defending his authority to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, Lincoln stated “Or if, as has happened, the executive should suspend the writ, without
ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur
in such cases.”) [hereinafter Lincoln, 6 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
].
160
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
, supra note 60, at 414 n.1 (to Winfield Scott).
161
Id. at 419.
162
N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 11.
163
See id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 121
protecting the public safety. The same can be said about the October 14,
1861 suspension order that extended the military line to Bangor, Maine,
164
even though no record of disturbances in New England existed to justify
this action.
165
Even more disturbing about this latter suspension is that the
original draft of the proclamation was found in Secretary of War William
H. Seward’s papers, written entirely in his hand.
166
Seward later became Lincoln’s Secretary of State, and Lincoln
appointed Edwin M. Stanton, a “war” Democrat, to be his new Secretary of
War.
167
Lincoln chose Stanton, because northern Democrats could identify
with him, and because he was in favor of prosecuting the war against the
Confederacy.
168
Stanton demonstrated this determination in his August 8,
1862 orders.
169
The first order empowered the Secretary of War rather than
the President as the first official to nationally suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.
170
Such delegation of authority contradicted Taney’s opinion in
Merryman, in which he concluded that the President could not authorize
the suspension through agents or officers, civil or military—independent of
judicial or legislative authority.
171
The second order authorized all U.S.
marshals and police chiefs to “arrest and imprison any person or persons
who may be engaged, by act, speech, or writing, in discouraging volunteer
enlistments, or in any way giving aid and comfort to the enemy, or in any
other disloyal practice against the United States.”
172
On September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation activating
portions of the states’ militias to assist the Union with the war.
173
He
ordered that “all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting
militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort
to Rebels . . . shall be subjected to martial law and liable to trial and
punishment by Courts of Martial or Military Commission.”
174
He then
suspended the writ of habeas corpus “in respect to all persons arrested, or
164
See
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
,
supra
note 60, at 554.
165
See
R
EHNQUIST
,
supra
note 50, at 48.
166
Id. William Seward reportedly remarked to the British Minister, “My Lord, I can touch a bell
on my right hand and order the imprisonment of a citizen of Ohio; I can touch a bell again and order the
imprisonment of a citizen of New York; and no power on earth, except that of a President, can release
them. Can the Queen of England do so much?” S
CHLESINGER
,
supra
note 10, at 58–59.
167
See R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 57.
168
See id.
169
Professor Neely notes, “[T]he orders of August 8 had [a] momentous effect on civil liberties in
the United States. The brief period of sweeping and uncoordinated arrests that followed their issuance
constituted the lowest point for civil liberties in the North during the Civil War, the lowest point for
civil liberties in U.S. history to that time, and one of the lowest for civil liberties in U.S. history.”
N
EELY
,
supra
note 82, at 53.
170
See id.
171
See supra
text accompanying note 115. Even assuming arguendo that the President has legal
authority to suspend the writ, it does not follow that the President can constitutionally delegate to a civil
or military officer the discretion to suspend the writ. There are some powers that are beyond delegation
and given the potential abuse of discretion, such authority should rest with an elected official.
172
See N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 53.
173
See Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus (September 24,
1862), in 5 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS OF
A
BRAHAM
L
INCOLN
436, 436–37 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
174
Id. at 437.
122 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned.”
175
This new suspension was powerful because it worked in concert with the
Militia Act passed by Congress on July 17, 1862. The Militia Act
“empowered the secretary of war to draft for nine months the militiamen of
states that failed to upgrade their militias.”
176
Stanton’s orders and
Lincoln’s proclamation meant that those arrested were not only detained,
but were also subjected to martial law and to trial by military
commissions.
177
These military commissions did not provide many of the
procedural safeguards, such as trial by jury, that civilian offenders would
enjoy in a civilian criminal trial.
178
The Militia Act was unpopular in Wisconsin where draft protestors
rioted, destroying property.
179
One of the riot leaders, Nicholas Kemp, was
imprisoned in Camp Randall.
180
His attorney obtained a writ of habeas
corpus from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but Kemp’s custodian cited the
President’s September 24, 1862 proclamation suspending the writ of habeas
corpus.
181
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, faced with the same issues
Taney had faced in Merryman, reached the same conclusion.
182
The three
justices in separate opinions decided not only that the President lacked
authority to suspend the writ, but also that martial law could not prevail in
areas, such as Wisconsin at that time, where there was no insurrection or
combat.
183
The court did not issue an attachment against Kemp’ custodian
out of respect to federal authorities, but decided to wait for the
Administration’s response.
184
This course of action by the Wisconsin court
was typical of other courts under similar circumstances.
185
While courts
courageously checked Lincoln’s authority, their ability to affect policy
change depended on the cooperation of an uncooperative administration.
3. Congress Authorizes the Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Congress finally cooperated with the President on March 3, 1863, when
it passed the Habeas Corpus Act, which suspended the writ of habeas
corpus and eliminated any doubt as to the legality of subsequent
suspensions by Lincoln.
186
The Habeas Corpus Act, however, did not
address whether his suspensions prior to the act were legally justified.
187
In
his July 4 speech, Lincoln stated his trust that Congress would ratify the
175
Id.
176
N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 52.
177
R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 60.
178
See id.
179
See id.
at 62.
180
Id.
181
Id
at 62–63
.
182
Id. at 63.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
See N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 68.
187
See id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 123
measures he had taken on Congress’ behalf.
188
One can argue that
congressional inaction ratified the prior presidential suspensions of the writ
because Congress never protested the suspensions and did not enact
legislation repealing those suspensions.
189
The reality is that Congress is
usually not eager to contravene the President during war, especially when
the same political party controls both the legislative and executive branches
of government.
190
Senator John Sherman of Ohio expressed a prevalent
belief that some of Lincoln’s actions were nonetheless illegal when he
asserted “I am going to vote for that resolution and I am going to vote for it
on the assumption that the different acts of the Administration recited in
this preamble were illegal.”
191
Therefore, the legality of Lincoln’s actions
prior to congressional authorization is still suspect.
In the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, Congress provided limitations on
the President’s power. The statute required that that the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of War supply the area circuit or district judge with a list
of the persons arrested by military authority.
192
Furthermore, in cases
where a grand jury met and did not indict the prisoners, the judge was to
order those prisoners not indicted to be discharged.
193
If the Secretary of
State or Secretary of War failed to send the list of names within twenty
days, and a grand jury met but issued no indictment, then any person or
prisoner could petition for release.
194
There is no record that Lincoln
followed the limitations imposed by Congress.
195
Lincoln’s defiance of Congress’ limitations is exemplified in the arrest
of Clement L. Vallandigham, a Democrat and former Congressman from
Ohio.
196
General Ambrose Burnside arrested Vallandigham because he
spoke at a rally in Columbus, Ohio in defense of the people’s right to
assemble to hear a debate on Lincoln Administration policies.
197
A military
188
See Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
, supra note 60, at 429 (Message to Congress in Special
Session).
189
See
Special Event,
The Impeachment Trial of President Abraham Lincoln
, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 351,
368 (1998) [hereinafter Impeachment Trial].
190
See id.
191
J
AV I T Z
, supra note 93, at 121.
192
An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, 12
Stat. 755, 755 (1863).
193
See id.
194
See id.
at 756.
195
See Impeachment Trial, supra note 189, at 363.
196
See N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 65.
197
See R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 65. Rehnquist notes that:
Vallandigham was not only tried by a military commission, rather than a jury, but the
charge upon which he was tried was that he violated an order issued by Burnside—an order
that forbade the expression of sympathy for the enemy. A criminal trial in a civil court must
be based on a charge that the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by an Act of
Congress (in a federal court), or by an act of a state legislature (in a state court). Burnside’s
order had no such pedigree; it was not even based on an order of the President or the
Secretary of War. It originated with Ambrose Burnside, the commanding general of the
military district of Ohio. Members of the armed forces are naturally accustomed to being
governed by such orders. But Vallandigham was not a soldier; he was a civilian.
Id. at 68.
124 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
commission sentenced him to confinement for the duration of the war, but
Lincoln commuted the sentence to banishment into Confederate lines.
198
The Administration did not give Vallandigham his day in court,
199
and thus,
blatantly disregarded the law’s requirement that prisoners either be released
or tried by a civilian court, if it was in session.
Vallandigham’s arrest led to Democratic protest throughout the North,
which compelled Lincoln to defend his policies.
200
Specifically, Lincoln
formally replied to Erastus Corning, who protested the arrest in a mass
meeting in New York.
201
To the claim that Vallandigham was arrested only
because of his speech at the rally criticizing the Administration and his
violation of the general’s order, Lincoln replied that Vallandigham was
“damaging the military power of the country.”
202
According to Lincoln, he
“was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to
encourage desertions from the army.”
203
In Lincoln’s reply, he admitted
that the possibility of arresting innocent persons was likely to occur when
acting in haste.
204
Additionally, he argued that arrests in areas where there
was no rebellion, i.e., in the North, were justified on grounds that the
Constitution does not say where the writ could be suspended, but only that
it be suspended wherever public safety so required.
205
Lincoln’s defense of the Vallandigham arrest is problematic because
the President failed to explain why Vallandigham’s words deserved
punishment, only that the words had “some effect” on damaging the Army.
The determination to arrest him was probably made because General
Burnside had advance notice of the itinerary and sent spies to take notes on
the speech.
206
Thus, a determination that his words had “some effect” on
the Army was probably premature and pure speculation. Although Lincoln
stated he had to suspend the writ “without ruinous waste of time” to protect
public safety, he did not set a standard to avoid arresting innocent persons.
How likely was it that Vallandigham’s speech in a small county, to fellow
Democratic supporters, would damage the Army? Indeed, Vallandigham
was not even the type of person meant to be arrested under the
Administration’s policy,
207
which had been directed at arresting dangerous
Confederate sympathizers and bridge-burners like John Merryman, not
political activists like Vallandigham.
208
The Vallandigham arrest and
198
Impeachment Trial, supra note 189, at 364.
199
See id.
200
N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 66.
201
Id.
at 67.
202
Lincoln, 6 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
,
supra
note 159, at 266 (To Erastus Corning and Others).
203
Id.
204
Id.
at 263.
205
See id. at 265.
206
See R
EHNQUIST
, supra note 50, at 65. Vallandigham’s motive for making the speech was
probably not for the purpose of damaging the Army. Having just lost the nomination for Governor of
Ohio, he apparently decided that he needed to become a martyr, and had himself arrested. See id.
207
N
EELY
, supra note 82, at 67.
208
See id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 125
Lincoln’s defense of it demonstrated how granting the President authority
to suspend the writ, even with some limitations, can still lead to abuse.
E. C
IVIL
D
ISOBEDIENCE AS A
“D
EFENSE
”
TO
U
NILATERAL
P
RESIDENTIAL
A
UTHORITY TO
S
USPEND THE
W
RIT OF
H
ABEAS
C
ORPUS
A President should only be able to justify unilaterally suspending the
writ of habeas corpus with a “civil disobedience” defense. Implicit in such
a defense is that the action taken is illegal but morally justified under the
circumstances. Henry David Thoreau advocated the idea of civil
disobedience in his essay “Resistance to Civil Government” first published
in Aesthetic Papers in 1849.
209
The idea of civil disobedience was popular
in the North after the Compromise of 1850 required all citizens to aid in the
return of fugitive slaves.
210
While Thoreau’s idea of civil disobedience was
associated with passive resistance, John Brown also used it to incite a slave
insurrection.
211
Lincoln could have relied on a civil disobedience argument
to justify suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In his July 4 speech,
Lincoln hinted at such a defense when he stated, “are all the laws, but one,
to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be
violated?”
212
But Lincoln rejected this defense and believed his use of
emergency powers was constitutional because of the crisis’s unprecedented
nature.
Lincoln could have argued that because secession was not only illegal,
but also morally wrong, he was justified in suspending the writ to prevent
the capital from falling. Throughout his First Inaugural Speech, Lincoln
addressed the legality and morality of southern secession and of civil war.
He stated: “But if destruction of the Union . . . be lawfully possible, the
Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital
element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that no State, upon its
own mere motion, can lawfully get out the Union.”
213
Towards the end of
his inaugural speech he emphasized the moral consequences of southern
secession:
In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the
momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail
you
. You
can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. You have
no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while
I
shall have
the most solemn one to “preserve, protect and defend” it.
214
Thus, at the time of his inaugural speech Lincoln believed secession
was illegal and that starting a civil war would violate the heavenly oath to
preserve the Union.
209
See Thoreau and Civil Disobedience
,
at
http://www.walden.org//thoreau/overview/thoreau_
cd.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2002).
210
See id.
211
See id.
212
Lincoln, 4 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
, supra note 60, at 430 (Message to Congress in Special
Session).
213
Id. at 265 (First Inaugural Address—Final Text).
214
Id. at 271.
126 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
A civil disobedience defense differs from a “necessity” defense.
President Jefferson formulated a necessity defense based on “[John]
Locke’s idea that ‘the laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our
country when in danger’ must override written law, lest the end be absurdly
sacrificed to the means.”
215
Civil disobedience, for purposes of this Note,
is the violation of a law that causes a minor injustice, relatively speaking, in
order to promote a higher objective that cannot be reasonably achieved
without violating the law. Unlike a necessity defense, a civil disobedience
defense implies a more careful weighing of interests and a moral
justification. Admittedly, it is difficult to distinguish between a civil
disobedience defense and a necessity defense. Neither defense should be
considered as legal precedent. Arthur Schlesinger writes that the Founding
Fathers may have believed that a crisis might justify unconstitutional
actions to save the Constitution, but they did not want to legitimize such
actions because “the legal order would be better preserved if departures
from it were frankly identified as such than if they were anointed with a
factitious legality and thereby enabled to serve as constitutional precedents
for future action.”
216
Lincoln’s first suspension can at best be seen as an act of civil
disobedience. At the time he considered suspending the writ, he grappled
with whether he had the authority to do so, and wrestled with the
implications of doing so. He felt morally obligated to uphold his oath to
preserve the Union against southern aggression. Lincoln reasonably
believed that but for the suspension of the writ, more northern troops would
have failed to reach the capital, and an attack by Virginia would have
resulted in the loss of the capital and, ultimately, the Union, unlike the
suspensions described above where Lincoln had other options. He could
have appealed Taney’s decision in Merryman; he could have requested
congressional approval for suspending the writ in his July 4 speech before
Congress; he could have followed the limitations placed by Congress in the
Habeas Corpus Act. Therefore, while the first suspension can be morally
justified as an act of civil disobedience, the other suspensions were at best
pragmatic moves to facilitate the Union’s war effort. These other
suspensions show that Lincoln failed to uphold his oath by disregarding the
checks and balances enshrined in the Constitution.
Although we can thank Lincoln for suspending the writ and declare his
first suspension morally justified and the others simply illegal, we are left
with an important question: Is the Constitution different during wartime,
making unconstitutional actions in times of peace constitutional in times of
war? The Constitution certainly makes the distinction between war and
peace by providing for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during
times of rebellion or invasion. But even the suspension clause limits its
invocation to situations where protecting public safety is required, and it
215
S
CHLESINGER
, supra note 10, at 60.
216
Id. at 9.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 127
only allows for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Lincoln
considered the possibility that he had abused his power:
If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in
believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of
rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety requires them, which would not be
constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public Safety
does not require them.
217
Lincoln’s belief was not wrong given the explicit distinction made in
the text of the suspension clause, but by disregarding judicial decrees and
congressional limitations, he failed in his constitutional stewardship.
Constitutional stewardship requires that presidents realize that
Congress—and not an emergency—creates power. The Constitution
provides that the President shall recommend to Congress “such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”
218
Lincoln’s belief that as
President during an emergency he possessed “inherent powers” to address
an emergency contradicts the Framers’ vision. But the Framers could not
have envisioned the risks of a nuclear or terrorist attack as this nation has
faced in the modern era. President Harry S. Truman believed the President
had inherent powers to avert a national catastrophe. In Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
219
the Truman Administration argued that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, could seize most of the nation’s steel
mills to prevent labor disputes from stopping steel production.
220
According to the Administration, a work stoppage would have jeopardized
national security because steel production was indispensable to all weapons
and other materials.
221
The Court held that Congress, and not the President,
had the power to authorize the seizure of the steel mills.
222
Moreover, the
Court noted that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue the order must
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself,” and
Congress had not authorized the seizure.
223
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson discussed the wisdom of
recognizing presidential emergency powers under the Constitution. He
suggested that the Founding Fathers had omitted emergency powers from
the Constitution, except for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
because they knew that emergencies would create pressures for
authoritative action.
224
After evaluating emergency powers in other
nations, Justice Jackson stated, “This contemporary foreign experience may
be inconclusive as to the wisdom of lodging emergency powers somewhere
in a modern government. But it suggests that emergency powers are
consistent with free government only when their control is lodged
217
Lincoln, 6 C
OLLECTED
W
ORKS
,
supra
note 159, at 267 (To Erastus Corning and Others).
218
U.S. C
ONST
. art. II, § 3.
219
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
220
See id. at 582.
221
Id. at 583.
222
See id. at 587.
223
Id. at 585.
224
See id. at 649–50 (Jackson, J., concurring).
128 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them.”
225
If Justice
Jackson’s arguments on emergency powers extend to cover the writ of
habeas corpus, they suggest that democracy demands that Congress possess
the power to authorize the suspension of the writ.
IV. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Are we seeing resurgence in presidential dominance where Congress
and the courts are reluctant to check presidential authority? During the
early part of the Cold War, the Presidency reached a dominant position
compared to Congress in the area of foreign policy. This was due in part
because in the fight against communism, “[t]he menace of unexpected
crisis hung over the world, demanding . . . the concentration within
government of the means of instant decision and response.”
226
With
Congress largely incompetent in foreign relations, President Truman
benefited from “bipartisan foreign policy” in his fight to preserve
democracy in a world threatened by communism.
227
President Bush has
also benefited from “bipartisan foreign policy,” as Congress has generally
supported his actions in the war on terrorism. Will this current war provide
unique circumstances where the President might again decide to
unilaterally suspend the writ of habeas corpus? Does the appeal provision
in the military tribunals created by President Bush to try suspected
terrorists captured abroad infringe on the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus? Do the detainees held at Camp X-ray in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
have the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus? These are issues that have
yet to be resolved conclusively.
A. A
NOTHER
O
PPORTUNITY TO
S
USPEND THE
W
RIT OF
H
ABEAS
C
ORPUS
?
Given the real possibility of another attack on the United States like the
one experienced on September 11, a President might have to consider
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Since September 11,
there have been warnings indicating the possibility of an imminent attack.
On February 11, 2002, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued a
highly specific warning of an imminent attack on the United States or
Yemen.
228
The FBI based its warning on information received from
detainees held in Guantánamo Bay.
229
Unlike previous warnings of
terrorist attacks that were vague and lacked an attached element of time, the
February 11 warning named a possible attacker and his associates and
stated the attack could occur the following day.
230
The alert advised law
enforcement to “stop and detain” any of the named individuals because
225
Id.
at 652.
226
S
CHLESINGER
, supra note 10, at 128.
227
See id.
228
See David Johnston, F.B.I. Issues Alert of Possible Attack on U.S. or Yemen, N.Y. T
IMES
, Feb.
12, 2002, at A1.
229
See id.
230
See id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 129
they were “considered extremely dangerous.”
231
The names of sixteen
people whose whereabouts were unknown were placed on a bulletin issued
to law enforcement.
232
If a President, under circumstances presented by the February 11
warning, chose to suspend the writ it would most certainly be problematic.
Because the whereabouts of those individuals was unknown, the President
would have to suspend the writ nationally to be effective. This could
subject thousands of persons to being stopped, detained, and questioned by
law enforcement. Individuals detained in jails could not petition for the
writ, thus preventing a judge from determining whether or not they had
been confined legally. Innocent people could conceivably be detained for
long periods of time. Under these circumstances, allowing the President to
suspend the writ under his power to repel a sudden attack would be no
different than claiming a suspension out of necessity. Seemingly, a
President could always argue that he suspended the writ because an attack
was “imminent” or because a potential attack needed to be thwarted.
The questions in these circumstances are what is the likelihood the
danger, i.e., the terrorist attack, will occur and what is the appropriate tool
to reduce the likelihood of that danger? These are difficult questions to
answer. The fact that a terrorist attack like the one on September 11 can be
extraordinary seems to justify the use of any means necessary to prevent
harm. On the other hand, taking strong measures to protect public safety
might enhance security for all but at an unreasonable cost to those
considered “potential suspects,” most of whom are innocent. Suspending
the writ of habeas corpus may be a legitimate tool to prevent a terrorist
attack, but will the suspension be used when danger has been exaggerated?
Allowing the President to have the legal authority to unilaterally suspend
the writ with respect to potential suspects will render the writ’s suspension
much easier when danger has been exaggerated. Even more dangerous is a
situation where the President attempts to avoid the political problems of
declaring the suspension of the writ and acts in a way that essentially
suspends the writ without saying so.
B. T
HE
G
UANTÁNAMO
D
ETAINEES AND THE
W
RIT OF
H
ABEAS
C
ORPUS
Arbitrary detentions may have occurred without suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus since September 11. On November 4, 2001, the Los
Angeles Times released an investigation it conducted into 1,147 individuals
detained in the FBI’s criminal investigation of the September 11 attacks.
233
One of those investigated, Tarek Fayad, a dentist trained in his native
Egypt, was taken from his home in California two days after the attack and
231
Id.
232
See id.
233
See Richard A. Serrano, Isolation, Secrecy Veil Most Jailed in Roundup, L.A. T
IMES
, Nov. 4,
2001, at A1.
130 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
held in New York for allegedly overstaying his student visa.
234
The FBI
apparently believed Fayad knew a man imprisoned in Jordan for allegedly
plotting attacks on Western targets.
235
According to the Los Angeles Times,
Fayad has not been held incommunicado; he has been allowed one phone
call per month and has contacted his attorney.
236
Strikingly, the Times
investigation discovered that nearly eight weeks after the attacks, none of
those detained had been charged with conspiracy in connection with the
attacks.
237
Fayad was ultimately charged with violating his visa three
weeks after the Times investigation.
238
His request for bond was rejected
on the grounds that he was a flight risk.
239
Although Fayad’s story is markedly similar to John Merryman’s arrest
and detention under the Lincoln Administration, the tales diverge in two
important ways. First, Fayad’s alleged offense of overstaying his visa
frames him as a less dangerous culprit than Merryman, a man who
destroyed infrastructure. Second, unlike Merryman, Fayad was purportedly
arrested because he was in the United States illegally. This illegal
immigration charge was significant after September 11 in light of Attorney
General John Ashcroft’s revocation of an Immigration and Naturalization
Service rule. The previous rule had required that detainees be charged
within 24 hours of being arrested. The new version of the rule allows the
government to detain an individual in custody for a “reasonable period of
time.”
240
Although the government understandably needs leeway to
determine whether detained immigrants threaten national security,
immigration lawyers worry that a vague standard could lead to the
detention of immigrants without government explanation.
241
It is also
worrisome that visa violations are used as pretexts to detain individuals for
extended periods of time.
In Zadvydas v. Davis,
242
the United States Supreme Court held that the
government cannot indefinitely detain immigrants while awaiting
permission to deport them.
243
However, per Justice Breyer, the Court stated,
“[n]either do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances where
special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with
respect to matters of national security.”
244
Recently, Congress rejected the
Attorney General’s “reasonable period of time” standard through the anti-
234
See Laurie P. Cohen, Egyptian Dentist, Held on Visa Charges, Illustrates Terror Detainees’
Plight, W
ALL
S
T
. J., Nov. 28, 2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29679079.
235
See id.
236
See
Serrano,
supra
note 233, at A1
.
237
See id.
238
See
Cohen,
supra
note 234, at B1.
239
See id.
240
David G. Savage, To Some Immigrants, Justice More an Idea Than a Reality, L.A. T
IMES
, Nov.
4, 2001, at A23.
241
See id.
242
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
243
See id. at 682.
244
Id. at 696.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 131
terrorism bill passed after the September 11 attacks that requires the
government to file charges against detained immigrants within seven days.
At the expiration of the seven-day period, jurisdiction vests in federal
courts to hear claims.
245
Despite the United States Supreme Court’s edicts
that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the
legality of executive detention” and “the basic principles of due process
cannot be waived,”
246
it is unclear whether the government has complied
with the anti-terrorism bill’s limitations on detention.
Even more controversial has been President Bush’s executive order
creating military tribunals to try foreigners charged with terrorism.
According to White House officials, the “[military] tribunals [are]
necessary to protect potential American jurors from the danger of passing
judgment on accused terrorists” and to “prevent the disclosure of
government intelligence methods, which normally would be public in
civilian courts.”
247
Experts in military law, however, noted that the
tribunals created in Bush’s order would severely limit defendants’ rights
because the tribunals do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
do not require strict rules of evidence like those in military and civilian
courts.
248
The original order, in fact, did not firmly establish the rules that
would apply. Perhaps in response to criticism of certain rules in the
original order, the Bush Administration released a new set of rules on
March 20, 2002. The rules now require, inter alia, unanimous verdicts for
death penalty cases, that suspects should be presumed not guilty, and that a
finding of guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
249
The lack of an independent appeals process did survive the revision,
thus preserving the military’s control over the chain of command.
250
Section 4(B)(8) of the original order provides for the “submission of the
record of the trial, including any conviction or sentence, for review and
final decision by me [the President] or by the secretary of defense if so
designated by me [the President] for that purpose.”
251
Does this lack of
independent appellate review of military decisions of military tribunals by
federal courts violate the suspension clause? Michael Ratner, a lawyer at
the Center for Constitutional Rights, stated his desire to challenge the
President’s executive order creating military tribunals on the grounds that
“by trying to limit appeals’ rights, the President had effectively repealed the
constitutional guarantee of the right to bring habeas corpus proceedings.”
252
Ratner is most likely referring to question of whether the limitation on
appeals violates the suspension clause.
245
See
Savage,
supra
note 240, at A23.
246
Id.
247
Bumiller & Johnston,
supra
note 7, at B8.
248
Id.
249
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Government Sets Rules for Military on War Tribunals, N.Y. T
IMES
,
Mar. 21, 2002, at A1.
250
See id.
251
Bumiller & Johnston, supra note 7, at B8.
252
William Glaberson, Groups Gird for Long Legal Fight On New Bush Anti-Terror Powers, N.Y.
T
IMES
, Nov. 30, 2001, at B7.
132 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
The President’s order limiting appeals, however, does not address
whether those tried can challenge the legality of their confinement. The
writ of habeas corpus as included in the suspension clause is directed
specifically at challenging the legality of a prisoner’s confinement. In his
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Justice Story wrote:
In order to understand the meaning of the terms here used [in the
suspension clause], it will be necessary to have recourse to the common
law . . . At the common law there were various writs, called writs of
habeas corpus. But the one spoken of here . . . is used in all cases of
illegal confinement . . . the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.
253
At common law, the writ of habeas corpus cum causa, in conjunction
with the writ of certiorari, was employed in England to rectify unjust
decisions in the lower courts.
254
President Bush’s order, therefore, seems
to limit only the ability of those convicted in the tribunals to file an
independent appeal of their conviction, not their present right to challenge
the legality of their detention.
For the Guantánamo detainees, challenging the legality of their
confinement is of great concern because the President may intend to send
them before these military tribunals. A group referring to themselves as the
“Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors,” filed a petition for the writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of “Persons Held Involuntarily at Guantánamo
Naval Air Base, Cuba.”
255
The petitioners included, among others,
constitutional law expert Erwin Chemerinsky, former Attorney General of
the United States Ramsey Clark, and civil rights attorney Stephen Yagman.
On behalf of the petitioners, Professor Chemerinsky argued that the
detainees
are in custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the
United States, in that they: (1) have been deprived of their liberty without
due process of law, (2) have not been informed of the nature and cause of
the accusations against them and (3) have not been afforded the assistance
of counsel.
256
The petitioners sought a writ
to show cause (1) directing the respondents to “identify by full name and
country of domicile and all other identifying information in their
possession each person held by them within three days,” (2) directing
respondents “to show the true cause(s) of the detention of each person,”
and (3) directing respondents to produce the detainees at a hearing in this
court.
257
On February 21, 2002, the district court, per Judge Matz, dismissed the
writ of habeas corpus petition on three grounds. First, the court ruled that
petitioners did not have standing because they lacked a “significant
253
See S
TORY
, supra note 22, at 206.
254
See D
UKER
, supra note 13, at 27.
255
Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F.Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D.Cal. 2002).
256
Id. at 1038.
257
Id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 133
relationship” with the detainees—“indeed any relationship.”
258
Second, the
court ruled that the federal district court in the Central District of California
lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ because no custodian was within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
259
Lastly, Judge Matz concluded that
the detainees:
[A]re aliens; they were enemy combatants; they were captured in combat;
they were abroad when captured; they are abroad now; since their capture,
they have been under the control of the military; they have not stepped
foot on American soil; and there are no legal or judicial precedents
entitling them to pursue a writ of habeas corpus in American civilian
court.
260
Accordingly, “[n]o federal court would have jurisdiction over
petitioners; claims, so there is no basis to transfer this matter to another
federal district court.”
261
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s dismissal because the petitioners lacked a significant relationship
with the detainees.
262
Judge Matz’s ruling indicates that by imprisoning foreign citizens on
foreign soil, the President has effectively eliminated the possibility the
detainees can claim the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In his order,
Judge Matz stated, “there are sound practical reasons, such as legitimate
security concerns, that make it unwise for this or any court to take the
unprecedented step of conferring such a right on these detainees.”
263
But,
Matz stated at the end of the order that this case did not present the
question of whether the Guantánamo detainees had any rights that the
United States should recognize.
264
Unquestionably, at least some of the
detainees are dangerous individuals who want to commit terrorist acts.
Some of them may be willing to kill themselves and take many American
lives with them. But are all the detainees extremely dangerous?
The Bush Administration should, as a matter of principle, recognize
that the Guantánamo detainees have the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. To determine what rights should be recognized, the Administration
should put itself behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, making a decision
on what type of society is desired before making decisions regarding that
society. Under this theory, most people would likely choose a legal system
in which every person accused of a crime has the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations against them and has a neutral and
detached decision-maker determining whether they have been illegally
detained. It is also likely that there are dangerous individuals detained in
258
Id.
at 1044.
259
See id.
260
Id.
at 1048.
261
Id. at 1039.
262
See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23705 (9th Cir. 2002).
263
Coalition of Clergy, 189 F.Supp. 2d at 1048.
264
See id. at 1050.
134 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
Guantánamo but what if some have been detained illegally? Further, what
if some are American citizens like Louisiana-born Yasser Esam Hamdi?
265
Even assuming arguendo that the Guantánamo detainees have the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution, the
suspension clause renders the privilege less than absolute. A broad
argument can be made that the September 11 attacks constituted an
“invasion” of the United States and that public safety requires that the
privilege of the writ be suspended with respect to the Guantánamo
detainees. If so, the power to authorize such a suspension should rest with
Congress. Because it is considered the “Great Writ of Liberty,” protecting
individuals against wrongful detainment, it should be difficult to suspend.
Given institutional differences between the legislative and the executive
branches, Congress would have a more difficult time authorizing the
suspension of the writ than the President would. But if public safety so
demands its suspension, then Congress should have power to authorize it.
V. CONCLUSION: BALANCING CIVIL LIBERTIES WITH
NATIONAL SECURITY
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is equally important during
this current war on terrorism as it was at the time of the framing of the
Constitution. The protections against the “tyranny of the majority”
enshrined in the Constitution were ideals to which the Founding Fathers
hoped this nation would aspire. Wartime renders such aspirations more
difficult to attain. The question during times of war and emergency is how
do we balance protecting civil liberties with ensuring national security?
David Blunkett, the British Home Secretary stated succinctly, “We can live
in a world with airy-fairy civil liberties and believe the best in everybody—
and then they destroy us.”
266
To prevent society’s destruction during
wartime, a strong President and effective law enforcement are essential.
How to protect civil liberties while promoting the need for strong law
enforcement is a difficult question.
It is difficult to derive lessons from past wars because each new war
brings novel challenges. Who would have thought that planes would be
used as missiles to destroy buildings? In his book The Fate of Liberty:
Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties, Professor Neely concludes:
If a situation were to arise again in the United States when the writ of
habeas corpus were suspended, government would probably be as ill-
prepared to define the legal situation as it was in 1861. The clearest
lesson is that there is no clear lesson in the Civil War—no neat
265
See Adam Liptak, Neil A. Lewis, & Benjamin Weiser, After Sept. 11, a Legal Battle on the
Limits of Civil Liberty, N.Y. T
IMES
, Aug. 4, 2002, at 16.
266
Robin Toner, Civil Liberty vs. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance, N.Y. T
IMES
, Nov. 18,
2001, at B6.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 135
precedents, no ground rules, no map. War and its effect on civil liberties
remain a frightening unknown.
267
Nevertheless, because our Constitution aspires to protect civil liberties,
this generation should more intently aim to realize the Constitution’s ideals
than past generations. Our goal should be that measures taken to ensure
national security should not be so broad as to unreasonably infringe on
individual rights.
First, the Bush Administration should continue its receptivity toward
concerns over civil liberties and not be afraid to make changes in policy
that more closely meet the goals of preventing terrorism and preserving
important rights. President Bush was receptive to criticism regarding the
rules for military tribunals and sought advice from several outside experts,
including a prominent Democratic lawyer.
268
According to Mary Cheh, a
professor of criminal procedure and constitutional law, the Administration
has “given ground on points that are fundamentally important. The
openness and civilian attorney and proof beyond a reasonable doubt—that
combination, even against a different evidentiary standard, is far more
palatable and at the end of the day is with the range of reasonableness.”
269
The President has also declared that some Guantánamo detainees will
receive protective status as provided by the Geneva Convention.
270
These
changes show that public opinion can impact policy when a President is
receptive.
Second, Congress needs to continue to press the President to clearly
define his goals for the war. Members of Congress on the right and on the
left expressed their concerns with the Administration’s proposals to
enhance law enforcement shortly after the attacks.
271
If more is to be done
to protect civil liberties, then the public must inform representatives of their
concerns so that members of Congress may pressure the President. Senate
Majority Leader Tom Daschle was criticized for comments questioning the
President on the war.
272
Senator Daschle told reporters, “I don’t think it
would do anybody any good to second-guess what has been done to date . .
. I think it has been successful . . . I think there is expansion without at least
a clear direction.”
273
Such comments can help the President because they
indicate what the American people are willing to tolerate in war. Lastly,
Congress can pass legislation as a “prior restraint” to executive actions
affecting civil liberties. The earlier Congress acts in time of emergency, the
easier it will be for the legislature to have a hand in shaping policy.
267
N
EELY
,
supra
note 82, at 235.
268
See
Seelye,
supra
note 249, at A15.
269
Id.
270
See
Richard Serrano,
Response to Terror
:
U.S. Will Apply Geneva Rules to Taliban Fighters
Law: Bush's Declaration Still Allows Interrogation of Detainees and Excludes Al Qaeda, L.A. T
IMES
,
Feb. 8, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 2452323.
271
See Toner, supra note 6, at B5.
272
See Todd S. Purdum, Democrats Are Questioning Bush on the Future Conduct of the War, N.Y.
T
IMES
, Mar. 1, 2002, at A1.
273
Id.
136 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:101
Finally, law enforcement officials should be careful in how they use
profiling to determine whom to detain and question in searching for
terrorists
274
because using stereotypes for such purposes can lead to
ineffective law enforcement. Professor Jody Armour describes the impact
of stereotypes:
Under the influence of a stereotype, we tend to see what the stereotype
primes us to see
. If violence is part of the stereotype, we are primed to
construe ambiguous behavior as evincing violence . . . Thus, even if race
marginally increases the probability that an “ambiguous” person is an
assailant, decision makers inevitably exaggerate the weight properly
accorded to this fact.
275
Certain individuals, by virtue of their race, probably deserve closer
scrutiny when trying to determine who will likely be the next terrorist.
Therefore, the need for some profiling may be greater because of the great
harm terrorist attacks have.
But relying solely on an individual’s race, religion, or general
appearance can be ineffective and problematic. Given that when using
stereotypes people have a tendency to overstate the danger of an allegedly
suspicious person, law enforcement should do more work to improve their
ability to assess the danger a suspected individual poses. In addition to
profiling a person’s race, religion, or general appearance, law enforcement
should profile a person’s behavior. If the basis upon which people are
profiled is too narrow, i.e., solely on race, law enforcement could miss a
terrorist, who might be similar to Richard Reid, the alleged “shoe bomber.”
His Anglo name and British passport made it easier for him to board a
plane, but his behavior should have led to his detainment.
276
He traveled
with minimal luggage, he was nervous, he paid approximately $4,000 cash
for a last-minute ticket to Miami, and he had a criminal record.
277
Random
searches may help stop terrorists who do not fit the narrow profile. More
importantly, random searches will send a signal to Middle Easterners that
they are not being singled out. Additionally, law enforcement should be as
polite as possible to those searched to alleviate the intrusiveness of the
experience.
There are no easy answers to challenges that have emerged in this war
on terrorism. There is no doubt that this war on terrorism requires a strong
president and effective law enforcement. A wartime president’s power is
enhanced when policy is formulated in cooperation with Congress. A
president who acts with Congress’ blessing enjoys a strong presumption of
legitimacy not only from the American people, but also from other nations.
While it may be more efficient to act unilaterally during war, the
274
This section is based upon class lecture notes taken from USC Law Professor, Thomas D.
Griffith’s Topics in Criminal Law class, as modified by the author of this text (on file with author).
275
J
ODY
D
AV I D
A
RMOUR
, N
EGROPHOBIA AND
R
EASONABLE
R
ACISM
: T
HE
H
IDDEN
C
OSTS OF
B
EING
B
LACK IN
A
MERICA
41, 41–42 (1997) (emphasis original).
276
See Mark Steyn, Dumb and Dumber; Incompetence of Airport Security Topped by that of Shoe
Suspect Richard Reid, C
HI
. S
UN
-T
IMES
, Dec. 30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7256102.
277
See id.
2002] Presidential Authority to Suspend Habeas Corpus 137
Constitution demands cooperation to protect the public from conflicts that
might affect financial and physical well-being. If a situation arises in the
future where the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus might be
necessary, Congress should authorize its suspension to ensure that the
denial of the privilege does not sweep more broadly than necessary to
protect public safety.
