The Casualties of U.S. Grand Strategy: Korean Exclusion from the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Pacific Pact

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The Casualties of U.S. Grand Strategy: Korean Exclusion from the The Casualties of U.S. Grand Strategy: Korean Exclusion from the

San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Paci<c Pact San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Paci<c Pact

Syrus Jin

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The Casualties of U.S. Grand Strategy:

Korean Exclusion from the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Pacific Pact

By Syrus Jin

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for Honors in History

In the College of Arts and Sciences

Washington University in St. Louis

Advisor: Elizabeth Borgwardt

1 April 2019

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Dedicated to the members of my family: Dad, Mom, Nika, Sean, and Pebble.

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iii

Abstract

From August 1945 to September 1951, the United States had a unique opportunity to

define and frame how it would approach its foreign relations in the Asia-Pacific region. As the

dominant power in the Pacific after World War II and claiming direct authority over vanquished

Japan, the United States had the liberty to design its own post-war vision for the entire region.

Until 1951, American State Department diplomats and government planners, attempted—

ultimately unsuccessfully—to harmonize the competing motivations of lingering World War II

multilateralist idealism and Cold War geopolitics in a postcolonial, postwar world. This thesis

examines U.S.-Korean relations in context of how both sides grappled with the requirements of

addressing a history of colonialism and wartime sacrifice, which came to be overshadowed by

American Cold War-inflected concerns. U.S. policymakers ultimately shelved multilateralist

defense schemes such as the Pacific Pact, which would have been a NATO in Asia. Through a

series of short-term tactical decisions, U.S. diplomats also transformed the San Francisco Peace

Treaty with Japan from a post-war agreement of reconciliation and moral redress into a Cold

War device that would reinstate Japanese strategic advantages, albeit under American control.

Emblematic of this shift was the exclusion of Korea from both the peace treaty itself and its

complementary defense negotiations. State Department officials avoided the responsibility of

resolving persisting wartime issues even while attempting to implement a new postwar vision for

Asia. U.S. diplomats had long-standing racialized assumptions about Korean cultural and

political inferiority which corresponded with Americans’ growing distaste for rehashing the

legacy of Japanese imperialism in Asia. The stark reality was that Cold War geopolitics had left

little room for long-term multilateralist visions for the future. By failing to address Korean

concerns in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its complementary defense structure, the U.S. in

turn generated a postwar design for the Asia-Pacific guided solely by efforts to maximize

American tactical advantages in both diplomatic and military contexts, to its long-term

detriment.

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Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without funding from the Office of

Undergraduate Research at Washington University in St. Louis, which funded my travels to the

Truman Library Archives, the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University, and

the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. During my travels I am thankful to the various

staff members who helped me along the way, including, but not limited to, Randy Sowell and

Jim Armistead at the Truman Archives, and Bilqees Sayed and Daniel Linke at Mudd Library.

There are many people and groups who assisted me in a variety of ways with writing this

thesis. Min Choi gave suggestions for transcribing Korean names and happily took time out of

his day to send information on aspects of Korean history. Sean Jin introduced me to Hemmer and

Katzenstein’s 2002 article and was happy to read through early drafts. Kyra Hamerling-Potts

ensured that I would have a space in my life free from the clutches of writing this thesis. Dr.

Mark Philip Bradley at the University of Chicago helped tackle questions of causality that I did

not even know how to verbalize.

Most of all, I am grateful to the faculty and staff members at Washington University.

They have certainly helped move this project forward in a variety of ways, but, more

importantly, also fostered a spirit of intellectual discovery that has benefited me personally and

academically. Dr. Margaret Garb was one of those individuals who brought so much to the

department and to this cohort of Senior Thesis writers. Dr. Mark Pegg and Dr. Luca Foti both

delivered terrific feedback and challenged me to improve. My second reader, Dr. Lori Watt,

never faltered from treating me as an equal. Beyond her perspectives on Asian colonialism and

Japanese history, her sharp insights and critiques were a crucial factor in my own intellectual

growth and this project’s completion. Finally, Dr. Elizabeth Borgwardt has served as a fantastic

mentor for me throughout this project. From suggestions, to line edits, to her uplifting sense of

humor, to her advice regarding this project and beyond, I am grateful for all that she has done on

my behalf.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………….iv

Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………………….……vi

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1

Chapter 1: Searching between the Margins……………………………………………………...10

I. “Is it Spelt with a C or a K?” ……………………………………………………13

a. A War to Spark American Interest…………………………………………...17

II. The Road to 1950………………………………………………………………...20

Chapter 2: Shutting the Lid to Pandora’s Box…………………………………………………...25

I. San Francisco’s Muddled Legacy………………………………………………..25

II. “The Situation in the West Pacific Will be Grave for a Long Time”……………30

a. New Strategies……………………………………………………………….33

III. The Korean Case: “A Pandora’s Box”…………………………………………...35

a. Moral Redress………………………………………………………………..38

b. One Last Gasp………………………………………………………………..50

IV. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….56

Chapter 3: Multilateral, Multi-problematic…………………..…………………………………..59

I. “Indigenous Momentum” or the Lack Thereof……….………………………….61

II. Coopting the Pact………………………………………………………………...71

a. Towards a NATO in Asia……………………………………………………72

b. The Impact of the War……………………………………………………….75

c. Korean Relations with Japan..……………………………………………….80

III. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….87

Epilogue………………………………………………………………………………………….89

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………...……...93

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Abbreviations

DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States, the State Department-published

historical documents.

KPG – Korean Provisional Government

JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFD – John Foster Dulles

NACP – National Archives at College Park, Maryland

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC – National Security Council

ONAA – Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

PRC – People’s Republic of China

RG – Record Group

ROC – Republic of China

ROK – Republic of Korea (South Korea)

SCAP – Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers

SWNCC – State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

USAMGIK – U.S. Army Military Government in Korea

A Note on Names

The names of individuals from traditionally Confucian, Asian countries are listed in the

way that they were most commonly referred to in U.S. diplomatic documents at the time,

in order to facilitate future scholars who may be searching through archival documents.

(e.g. Syngman Rhee’s surname was Rhee). Consequently, most names appear with the

first name preceding the surname. There are rare exceptions for when documents

regularly listed names with the surname preceding the first name. (e.g. Yoshida Shigeru’s

surname was Yoshida).

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vii

“And yet it seems to me the line between a just peace and an unjust war is very faint indeed.”

“No matter how repulsive the peace, it is still vital to guard it. It may be an immoral peace,

maybe an unjust peace, but I’d take an unjust peace over a just war any day.”

-A dialogue between Arakawa and Goto, from Patlabor 2: The Movie.

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Introduction

John Foster Dulles was a devout Christian, a skilled lawyer, and a fan of old rye whiskey.

Alcohol consumption was sprinkled throughout Dulles’ drafting sessions, meetings with his

staff, and even negotiations with foreign governments. In February 1951, Dulles notably took

offense when, in the middle of a break between negotiating sessions with the Australian

government, his Australian host only offered him orange soda.

Yet those who knew Dulles were

split on their opinions of him. Two different State Department bureaucrats, each of whom

worked with Dulles in different capacities, posthumously assessed the austere cabinet member as

“standoffish, cold, and insular-minded” and “warm, personable, and adaptable,” respectively.

Dulles, or Foster Dulles as his friends called him, experienced firsthand the evolution of

U.S. foreign relations as his country publicly shifted away from an isolationist mantra towards

global commitment. His political career intersected and strongly influenced this arc in American

foreign policy. As a young lawyer he had served as a staffer for the American delegation to the

1919 Paris Peace conference. With his own forays into domestic politics he gained experience

attempting to sell a foreign policy platform to a skeptical public. In the span of four years from

1948 to 1952, Dulles advised the U.S. delegation to the UN, served as special advisor to the State

Department, oversaw the negotiation of the peace treaty with Japan, and became Secretary of

State under the Eisenhower administration. In a retroactive examination, Dulles was a foremost

Spender, Sir Percy (1897-1985) - Australian Ambassador to the United States, John

Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, MC017, Public Policy Papers, Rare Books and Special

Collections, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey.

Butterworth, W. Walton (1903-1975), 1965, JFD Oral History Collection; Allison, John

M. (1905-1978), 1969, JFD Oral History Collection.

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witness and a key shaper of the transformation of Wilsonian internationalism, to Rooseveltian

multilateralism, to Cold War realism.

Dulles did not keep a diary. His various publications may act as clues to aspects of his

worldview, but it is difficult to parse what was surface and what was inner reality. To uncritically

accept all descriptions of who he was would be to deal with mind-bending contradictions: a

Presbyterian Christian with little patience for human rights concerns, a vociferous anti-

Communist who stood by a think tank accused of having Communist ties, a diplomat motivated

to improve upon the mistakes of President Wilson in 1919 but heedless of the loss of Wilsonian

spirit with his own treaty negotiations.

Dulles’ centrality to the story of the 1951 San Francisco

Peace Treaty seemingly plants an enigmatic figure in the way of our scholarship of American

foreign policy in this period. The necessity of a certain amount of speculation about Dulles’

worldview complicates what we may conclude about the influence of this one individual on the

broader set of political or diplomatic results. It is necessary then, to move away from this one

individual as we investigate the events with which he intertwined.

Individuals, especially government officials, are vital agents in diplomatic history. Yet it

is a persistent assumption that they were solely rational actors, insulated from cross-

contamination of broader social and cultural ideas. Often, a preexisting cultural assumption

served to justify, and was justified by, the policy prescriptions that emerged from a rational,

For a discussion of Dulles’ religious influences, see Toulouse, Mark G. The

Transformation of John Foster Dulles. (Mercer University Press: 1985), esp. 3-26 and

Immerman, Richard H. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign

Policy. (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999); Prussen details Dulles’ activities in the Paris

Peace conference. Pruessen, Ronald W. John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York:

MacMillan Publishing, 1982); The think tank in question was the Institute of Pacific Relations,

the editor of which Dulles communicated with on multiple occasions. Letter from Dulles to

Alfred Kohlberg, 7 Dec 1950, Box 48, John Foster Dulles: Selected Correspondence 1891-1960,

RSBC, Princeton Library.

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ostensibly clinical calculation of power. In other words, it is not just the actors—the analysts and

the visiting ambassadors and the generals in their windowless planning rooms—who generated a

historical outcome. The environment in which they worked, lived, and exhaled into, inevitably

shaped the world around them and the world that they envisioned for the future.

What follows is not a biographical study of John Foster Dulles. It is, rather, a study of the

world of decision-making that Dulles inhabited during his years of activity in the Truman

administration. In doing so, it directly reflects on the why of certain decisions leading to the 1951

San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, and how this affected newly-independent states like the

Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States may have possessed what Melvyn Leffler

described as a “preponderance of power” in the world after WWII,

but American grand strategy

was inadequate to cope with lingering questions of reconciliation and redress in the Asia-Pacific.

In particular, the exclusion of the ROK from the San Francisco Peace Treaty and American

defense plans have propelled this study. How American diplomats grappled with Korean issues

exposed the striking transformation of the peace treaty from a postcolonial, postwar document

into a Cold War device. The global priorities of the State Department had little room for

lingering Korean concerns, which American diplomats labeled as obstructionist, unnecessary,

and unimportant. The advent of the Cold War may have ushered in a new era of superpower

rivalry, but it also permitted the United States to prematurely terminate any responsibility of

moderating a conversation on Japan’s imperialist history. The legacy of that imperialism has

persisted and continues to limit the extent of international cooperation that can be achieved in

East Asia.

Leffler, Melvyn. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman

Administration, and the Cold War. (Stanford University Press, 1993).

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There was more to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty than meets the eye. It of course

restored Japanese sovereignty and put a formal termination to World War II in Asia. But the

treaty regime also signaled the beginning of American structural dominance in the Asia-Pacific.

This was symbolized by the way American diplomats handled treaty issues and actualized by the

bilateral security agreements that the U.S. concluded alongside the peace treaty. While the peace

treaty was the outward face of freshly-minted American grand strategy, it nevertheless

emphatically failed to live up to its advertised purposes. The exclusion of the ROK from the

peace treaty process along with the story behind the aborted attempt to create a NATO in Asia,

under the title of a “Pacific Pact,” are the two central issues that motivate and guide this

investigation. Both affairs were the result of a dramatic shift in American foreign policy from

encouraging multilateral cooperation and regional integration to the need for short-term tactical

flexibility, even at the cost of resolving residual wartime disputes.

The exclusion of Korea highlights how American diplomats failed to reconcile the

competing threads of addressing Japan’s wartime past and colonial legacies in Korea with

America’s strategic priorities. The narrative of the Pacific Pact explores how State Department

officials generally viewed Asia as a frontier fraught with uncertainty, and how they shied away

from attempting to create a capacious framework for Asian security—the lack of structure, and

constraints, on American policy would go on to become the defining feature of future American

grand strategy in Asia. In a post-Cold War era, this foundation that originated in 1951 would in

turn become an obstruction as American policymakers sought ways to bind South Korea and

Japan closer together, only to encounter simmering feuds between the two nations.

Lee, Chung Min. Prospects for US-South Korean-Japanese Trilateral Security

Cooperation in an Era of Unprecedented Threats and Evolving Political Forces. The Atlantic

Council, Dec 2018; “U.S. Lawmakers Tout U.S.-Japan-South Korea Alliance as Seoul, Tokyo

Feud.” Reuters. 12 Feb 2019.

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This research builds on past scholarship regarding Korean exclusion and the Pacific Pact.

South Korea did not officially sign the peace treaty with Japan, ostensibly because of American

insistence that the ROK was not an allied power. Some analysts, like the historian Seong-hwa

Cheong, argue that South Korea was not a signatory primarily due to American fear of Soviet

objections and British dislike for Korean President Syngman Rhee. In contrast, social and

cultural historians like John Price argue that American and Japanese racism and Dulles’ dim

view of Korean capacities led to the ROK’s exclusion.

While the first view ignores the

predominant role that the U.S. played as essentially the sole gatekeeper to the peace treaty, the

second credits Dulles with too much power. At the time of the treaty negotiations, Dulles was not

Secretary of State but instead a special ambassador, appointed by then-President Truman and his

Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to execute the treaty negotiations. Dulles had authority over

treaty negotiation, but that authority stemmed from the approval of the State Department and the

vast array of earlier plans that diplomats at the State Department bequeathed to Dulles.

This study takes a different approach. It focuses on analyzing how the evolution of

American perception of Korean issues reflected the competing strains of thought within the

American government, from genuine interest in multilateralism to security-oriented realpolitik.

Longstanding cultural attitudes and ignorance set the stage for continuing American disinterest in

Korean attempts to achieve moral redress for Korea’s colonial past. Korean exclusion was sealed

by departmental concerns about upsetting a careful timeline that prioritized the restoration of

Cheong, Sung-hwa. The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South

Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945-1952. (New York: Greenwood Press,

1991); Price, John. 'Orienting' Canada: Race, Empire and the Transpacific (Vancouver, UBC

Press, 2011).

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Japanese sovereignty. The need for a Cold War grand strategy decisively eliminated the

possibility for a conversation on colonial and wartime questions.

Similarly, historians and international relations scholars have examined the Pacific Pact

and the broader reasons for why there is no NATO-like alliance in Asia. Realist theories have

argued that the U.S. intended to maximize its advantage over its varying Asian partners. Victor

Cha has exemplified this approach, under his “powerplay” theory. David Mahon, instead, argues

that the United States acquiesced to the objections of its other partners in the Asia-Pacific, who

could not abide by a multilateral alliance that would also include a “rehabilitated” Japan.

Constructivist scholars like Peter Katzenstein and Christopher Hemmer have instead emphasized

the lack of cultural affinity stretching across the Pacific and garden-variety racism among white

Americans for the lack of interest in a robust collective defense organization in Asia.

This thesis builds on this work by arguing that the State Department viewed

multilateralism, and a would-be Pacific Pact, as a means to an end. A rapidly changing

geopolitical landscape compounded by the respective frangibility of potential partners

incentivized American planners and diplomats to respond to and develop proposals on short

notice, often choosing the path of least resistance. Within the State Department, the pact was

solely a satisficing tool to ensure the passage of a peace treaty. The stunted nature of the pact

proposal resulted in a short shelf life, as Americans turned away from the difficulty of addressing

internal Asian concerns which would have been necessary via a multilateral alliance. For

Cha, Victor. “The Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia.” International Security,

Vol 34, no. 3, (Winter 2009/2010): 158-196; Mabon, David. “Elusive Agreements: The Pacific

Pact Proposals of 1949-1951.” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 57, no.2, (May 1988): 147-177;

Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein. “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective

Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism.” International Organizations, Vol. 56,

no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575-607.

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American policymakers, Asia was an uncertain, unstable frontier. Rather than expend energy

normalizing relations between Asian nations and Japan, the United States relied on bilateral

alliances to secure its immediate security goals.

Although after World War II the United States had seemingly unlimited leverage over its

partners in the Asia-Pacific region, American diplomats and policymakers failed to resolve the

lingering issues that could reconcile Japan with its neighbors or integrate Korea into a vision for

Asia. Observers at the time also noticed this failing; Marshall Green, an analyst in the office of

Northeast Asian Affairs in the State Department, opined in a memorandum dated from late

October 1949 that there “would seem to be cause for encouraging ties between our two proteges

in Northeast Asia, and cause for doing it now while we retain pretty much of a controlling hand

in the affairs of these two countries.”

This thesis seeks to answer the same questions to which

Green never received a clear response.

The negotiation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the attempt at a multilateral

Pacific Pact were two central processes in the American construction of a geopolitical structure

in Asia. Cold War concerns shaped the broad contours of American grand strategy, but American

diplomats still had to confront keen Korean interests in the outcomes of the treaty and the pact.

Despite the spark of multilateralist fervor in the ending days of World War II, American

diplomats ultimately failed to normalize relations between Japan and Korea. In the end,

American diplomats found no way to weave moral reconciliation into the need to secure

American interests in the context of a crystallizing Cold War. The long-standing racialized

assumptions of Korean cultural and political inferiority by American diplomats corresponded

Original document used underline and is replicated here. “Office Memorandum from

Green to Allison.” 29 October 1949, Box 4037, Folder 794.95/1-145 – 12-3149, Central Decimal

Files 1945-1949, RG 59.

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with their growing distaste for discussing the legacy of Japanese imperialism in Asia. This

exposed the stark reality that Cold War geopolitics left little room for a multilateralist vision for

the future. By failing to address Korean concerns in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its

complementary defense structure, the U.S. in turn generated a postwar design for the Asia-

Pacific guided solely by efforts to maximize American tactical advantages in both diplomatic

and military contexts.

In pursuit of this argument, the thesis is organized into three chapters. Chapter 1 offers

historical context for American ignorance regarding Korea. It then relates that while American

planning slowly germinated and eventually led to the flurry of activity centered around the peace

treaty, Korean issues festered amidst a poorly-managed American occupation of Korea. Chapter

2 focuses on the issue of Korean exclusion from the peace treaty, demonstrating how American

diplomats responded to, analyzed, and addressed (i.e. failed to address) futile Korean efforts to

gain signatory status. The results of the negotiation of the peace treaty led to the creation of the

“San Francisco System” of alliances in Asia. Chapter 3 specifically investigates the evolution of

American security designs, analyzing why Korea never featured in American collective security

plans, and the eventual American decision to only pursue the establishment of bilateral alliances

in Asia.

By September 1951, the United States had assembled the bones for its foreign policy for

the next several decades. American bilateral alliances with Asian countries have lasted to the

present day, along with the absence of multilateral alliances that might facilitate intra-Asian

cooperation. Issues that originated from Japan’s imperialist history have continued to plague the

possibility of greater reconciliation across the Sea of Japan. This study takes a new approach by

not labeling any one individual as the sole culprit nor by assuming that Machiavellian

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calculations motivated the entirety of American decisions. Instead, it examines the institution of

the State Department across time and how its institutional history of addressing Korean issues

inevitably led to the decision to exclude ROK from the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the

abortive-Pacific Pact. Due to how and why those decisions unfolded in the postwar period, U.S.-

Asian and intra-Asian relations have remained shackled by the undiscussed casualties of the past.

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Chapter 1

Searching between the Margins: U.S. Postwar and Occupation Policy

The December 5, 1943 Sunday edition of the The Boston Globe presents a snapshot of

news reporting amid an unfolding global conflict. The headline news, an update on the rolling

American offensive powering towards Rome, dominates much of the front page, as do other

reports of Allied air offensives, bloody fighting on the Pacific island of Tarawa, and the combat

death of a former boxing champion-turned enlisted soldier.

Nestled beneath the photo of

Madame Chiang Kai-shek wearing a fashionable hat while visiting Egypt is a blurb of an article

that discusses the issue of Korean independence after a prospective Japanese defeat.

The article was ostensibly intended to explain the context of the December 1, 1943 Cairo

Declaration between President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), where the three leaders agreed to share the

responsibility of preparing Korea for political independence. But much of the article serves to

acquaint the reader with what and where Korea is. “It is larger than England, Scotland, and

Wales combined, and has a population as big as Spain’s…” Much of the article reads like a

concise encyclopedic entry, with a brief background section that characterizes the erstwhile

peninsular kingdom as isolated and never having modernized prior to annexation by Japan. It

ends by labeling Koreans as unwilling subjects of Japan and, thus, not an enemy people. The

Hartman, Carl. “Giving Korea Her Independence May Be a Ticklish Job.” Daily Boston

Globe, 5 December 1943.

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article characterizes Korea as a passive agent, subject to the whims of Japanese control and

Allied post-war plans, respectively.

The author of the article, Carl Hartman, was a D.C.-based journalist focused on Capitol

Hill and was no one’s idea of a Korea expert.

The emphasis on historical context in pursuit of

understanding the Cairo Declaration is reflective of the average reader’s unfamiliarity with

Korea at the time, but also, perhaps, Hartman’s own necessary background research while

reporting on the December 1 agreement. For the American public, for news reporters, and even

American postwar planners, Korea required an introduction.

The content of The Globe’s Korea article is reflective of Korea’s submerged position in

the American public view prior to 1945. Only Japanese colonial control of Korea afforded the

former “hermit kingdom,” as Hartman labeled it, what attention in mainstream newspapers it did

receive in the 1940s. The absence of a unified Korean government-in-exile that could

convincingly trace itself back to the old ruling monarchy in Korea did not help the cause of

independence. Although specialized non-governmental organizations and isolated American

individuals may have kept themselves abreast of the cause of Korean subjugation, the memories

of Korean independence had grown dimmer in the decades since the time of Japan’s annexation

and the start of World War II. There is an enormous transition from late 1943, when readers of

The Globe might have read about Korea in depth for the first time, to 1950, when thousands of

American soldiers fought to preserve the South Korean state against its northern counterpart.

Korea was not merely an unknown entity to the average American reader; specifics were

lost even on the supposed American experts who struggled to find a place for Korea within their

postwar designs. American rhetoric during the war may have claimed to support Korea in a post-

Hartman also wrote for The Jewish Advocate where he authored a column called

“Capitol Spotlight”, which was a weekly roundup of Capitol Hill news during the war.

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colonial transition, as evidenced by the Cairo Declaration, but it masked the utter absence of

detailed plans. As the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan in August 1945, the State-War-

Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC, pronounced “swink”) attempted to partition Korea into

Soviet and American occupation zones, largely to prevent Soviet expansion in Northeast Asia.

After a late-night drafting session on August 10 and consulting a crude map of Korea, SWNCC

hastily chose the thirty-eighth parallel as the partition line. The Soviet Union promptly accepted

the demarcation, with both countries having the vague understanding that elections would

materialize later and unify the peninsula.

This ad hoc decision formed the basis for the

militarized border between North and South Korea, and closely resembled the eventual border

that settled between the two nations in 1953.

From 1945 to 1948, the American army officers who found themselves administering

southern Korea muddled their way through with marginal successes. Eventually, the U.S. Army

ended its occupation of Korea, leaving the fragile Syngman Rhee government with a handful of

Army advisors and promises of economic aid. The American withdrawal from Korea was not

made in the interests of geopolitics or grand strategy, but rather for the less elegant reason to

save money, men, and resources from a low priority in a time of defense sequesters and a limited

budget.

In the immediate postwar era, American decision-making marginalized Korean issues.

The long years where there was no unified Korean voice in the international scene from 1905 to

1945 resulted in the general American assumption that Korea was neither strategically or

symbolically important. Unlike other Japanese wartime territorial acquisitions, the former colony

was unique in that the sheer length of time since its independence had obliterated the possibility

For a retelling of the drafting session, see Schaller, Michael. The American Occupation

of Japan. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 74-75.

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of American liberators “returning” Korea to its rightful leadership—there was no universally-

accepted government-in-exile to whose leadership Korea could be returned. Korea, instead,

blended into the background as being one of many newly-independent, “politically

inexperienced” states. At a time when Korea’s fate depended on American decision-making, the

country remained on the fringes of American interest and concerns. Until the start of the Korean

War, the only avenue through which the ROK could advocate for itself would be in context of

the negotiation of the peace treaty.

I. “Is it Spelt with a C or a K?”

On November 17, 1905, Korea officially became a Japanese protectorate. The Joseon

dynasty, Korea’s ruling dynastic kingdom since the fourteenth century and traditionally a tribute

state of China, became one of the first victims of Japan’s new imperialist objectives. Japan

asserted both its Great Power ambitions and its status as the most powerful state in East Asia as it

grabbed colonies of its own. Japanese control of Korea was received well among some American

observers. The New York Times, reporting on November 19, ends its dry relaying of events by

stating: “...it is believed that the Korean people will be much better governed in the future [under

Japanese rule].”

The November 18 edition of the Los Angeles Times even more strongly

reflected the pervasiveness of the belief that Korea was an un-modernized, barbaric nation.

“KOREA BALKS AT HER MEDICINE,” the headline blares. “Dose of civilization from Dr.

“Korean Cabinet Gives In, Accepts Japanese Protectorate After Nine Hours’

Discussion.” The New York Times, 19 Nov 1905.

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Japan tastes bad.”

Clearly, the protestations of the Korean Emperor, haplessly marooned under

Japanese house arrest in Seoul, at the loss of his nation’s sovereignty had little weight among the

editors.

Japan annexed Korea outright in 1910. In a time of new imperialism, where the belief

that Western nations still needed to reluctantly bear the burden of uplifting the uncivilized

corners of the world, most observers generally considered Japan’s annexation in a positive light.

Western writers viewed Korea as an anachronism, a remnant of medieval times, but now in the

orbit of modernizing, progressive Japanese influence. The eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia

Britannica, published in 1911, describes the annexation in the following way: “That [the

annexation] constituted a heavy blow to Korea’s independence could not be gainsaid. That it was

inevitable seemed to be equally obvious. For there existed in Korea nearly all the worst abuses of

medieval systems…” The entry then proceeds to list the barbaric nature of Korean law, military,

government, and society as a justification for the nation’s newfound colonial status.

Missionaries often had divided opinions in this era, with some supporting Japan’s moves

to reduce the prevalence of Buddhism in Korea, thus opening space for Christian conversion

efforts.

But others sought to bring the issue of Korean independence to light. Hulbert B.

Homer, a Methodist missionary from Vermont, published several books decrying Japanese

aggression. “The American public has been persistently told that the Korean people are a

"KOREA BALKS AT HER MEDICINE, Dose of Civilization from Dr. Japan Tastes

Bad." Los Angeles Times, 18 Nov 1905.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. “Japan – Foreign Intercourse.” Cambridge:

Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1911.

Griffith, William Elliot. Corea: The Hermit Nation, 9th ed. (New York: AMS Press,

1971), 519. Originally published in 1897.

Jin 15

degenerate...nation, incapable of better things, intellectually inferior, and better off under

Japanese rule than independent. The following pages may in some measure answer these

charges…”

Homer writes in The Passing of Korea (originally published in 1906). Later in the

book, Homer censures the discriminatory legal code in Korea. “Japanese look upon the Koreans

as lawful game, and the latter, having no proper tribunals where they can obtain redress, do not

dare to retaliate.”

Hulbert was a unique figure, motivated by a mixture of Wilsonian idealism

and down-to-earth empathy for the suffering of his fellow man. In the 1950s, the ROK’s attempts

to confront Japan would also be obstructed by the lack of proper tribunals on an international

scale.

However, Korea remained an issue that few talked about. In common with many other

representatives from colonial states, a Korean delegation made its way to the 1919 Paris Peace

Conference but spurred little progress.

For the next three decades, Korea remained hidden from

Western view, only emerging in news reports of Japanese counterinsurgency operations in

Korea, travel guides, and the occasional call for independence by Korean exiles or a lone

Western sympathizer. One author of a 1930 travel guide, H. B. Drake, lamented Western

ignorance of Korea. “‘Is it spelt with a C or a K?’” Drake recounts a question he was asked

before he set off on his travels. But despite his exultations of Korea’s natural beauties and rich

history, Drake himself repeats the oft-quoted line that Korea’s colonial status is for the best, and

Hulbert, Homer B. The Passing of Korea. (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1969), 9.

Originally published 1906.

Ibid., 214.

For a retelling of the efforts of colonial states to obtain representation during the 1919

Paris Peace Conference, please see Manela, Erez. The Wilsonian Moment. (Oxford University

Press, 2009).

Jin 16

that Japan “was conscience-bound to extend to her the benefits of modern progress.” His

depiction of the Korean university students whom he mentored during his travels negotiate the

blurred line between adoring and patronizing, labeling them as unhappy with Japan’s authority

but helpless, mindless, and unintelligent enough to think of an alternative.

Japanese administration of Korea, like many other colonial states, was geared towards

maximizing the flow of assets from the “periphery” (Korea) to the “core” (Japan). Japanese

administrators harnessed Korea’s manpower and natural resources to fuel the empire’s industrial

growth. Bruce Cumings describes Japan’s colonial policy in Korea as “a means of…providing

the wherewithal to mobilize and extract resources on an unprecedented scale.”

Extraction is an

apt term. In order for Japan to “colonize” a formerly-sovereign nation, Korean culture and

language had to be eliminated. Japanese officials exploited existing class divides that originated

from Korea’s previously Confucian, agricultural society in pursuit of maintaining order. Many

aspiring Koreans faced the unsavory choice of collaborating with the Japanese occupier or

having no opportunities for social or economic advancement. Japan’s totalitarian control of

Korea did spark resistance, both violent and nonviolent, which in turn prompted an even greater

increase in the numbers of colonial police and soldiers who sought to root out opposition to

Japanese rule. Nevertheless, within an Asian racial hierarchy, American writers during Korea’s

colonial period consciously placed Korea beneath Japan. Americans were impressed by Japanese

modernization, innovation, and military prowess, and had few qualms about Japan’s

Drake, H.B. Korea of the Japanese. (London: John Lane the Bodley Head Ltd., 1936),

4-5.

Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1981), 10-12.

Jin 17

administration of Korea. So long as Japanese control was framed by both Japanese and American

observers as uplifting for Koreans, Japanese control had few detractors abroad.

a. A War to Spark American Interest

Korea’s relationship with the United States changed dramatically as American relations

with Japan soured. When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, Korea

gained some renewed prominence; American condemnation of Japanese aggression in turned

transformed Korea into a subjugated land in need of liberation from the Japanese imperialist

yoke. Materially, the U.S. was now generating postwar plans for what would happen to Japanese

holdings after a surrender. Korea was now a region for which the U.S. had to incorporate into its

plans by necessity. Beginning in 1943, the Allied Powers agreed on early plans for Korea to

undergo a period of trusteeship—multilateralist “guidance” that would prepare Koreans for

independence—and culminated in the December 1, 1943 declaration by Roosevelt, Churchill,

and Chiang Kai-shek to support Korean independence “in due course.” Although the trusteeship

scheme in retrospect appears belittling, it was nevertheless motivated in the United States by

concepts that American/Allied tutelage would be benevolent, nobly-minded—and crucially—

distinct from past Japanese or Western imperialism.

The lack of contact or consultation between postwar planners and actual Koreans

severely limited the extent of to which American benevolence could translate to effective policy.

During the war, the State Department took care to avoid contact with advocacy efforts by Korean

exile groups and rejected calls for the U.S. to recognize any one as a government-in-exile. The

Korean Provisional Government (KPG), which the ROK lists as its institutional predecessor, was

Jin 18

the most internationally-prominent quasi-government-in-exile.

Founded by independence

activists, the KPG, based in Shanghai, organized assassinations, bombings, and full-on

engagements with Japanese military units. During the war, the KPG organized a small military

detachment, fewer than a thousand soldiers, who served alongside the Kuomintang army in

China. But many of the KPG’s most audacious operations occurred in the early period of

Japanese occupation and had questionable impact beyond establishing an institutional history of

resistance. The KPG was severely limited in terms of its resources which constricted its ability to

“prove” to the State Department that it should receive recognition.

Even as American rhetoric incorporated the call for Korean independence during

the war, the State Department was loath to give recognition to the KPG. It saw the group

as merely an uncredentialed club that survived solely on Chiang Kai-shek’s. On June 5,

1945, the State Department replied to a request by Syngman Rhee, then the KPG’s

“ambassador” to the U.S., for Korea to be represented as an Allied Power at the 1945 San

Francisco Conference. Although previous department replies to KPG lobbying had been

noncommittal, expressing support for the cause of liberation while avoiding comments on

the KPG’s claim to sovereignty, this letter held no such diplomatic reservations:

The United Nations which are represented at the San Francisco Conference all

have legally constituted governing authorities, whereas the “Korean Provisional

Government” and other Korean organizations do not possess the qualifications

requisite for obtaining recognition by the United States as a governing authority.

The “Korean Provisional Government” has never had administrative authority

Bruce Cumings details the efforts of other Korean resistance groups, most notably Kim

Il Sung, future leader of the DPRK, who was a fighter in the Northeast Anti-Japanese United

Army (NAJUA) guerrilla group in Manchuria. The modest successes of the NAJUA led to its

virtual extinction by a Japanese counterinsurgency campaign before 1941. Kim Il Sung retreated

to the Soviet Union and worked closely with Chinese and Soviet communists, rather than

Western-supported governments during World War II. Cumings, Origins of the Korean War Vol.

1, 31-39.

Jin 19

over any part of Korea nor can it be considered representative of the Korean

people of today. Its following even among exile Koreans is limited.

No doubt the State Department could compare the characteristics of the KPG to other

governments-in-exile. The Norwegian government-in-exile included Norway’s ruling family

which was evacuated during the German invasion. The Free French forces were set up by

Charles De Gaulle, a general in the French Army and a government minister. The KPG, instead,

was composed of independence activists and Korean nationalists, none of whom had pre-

annexation government credentials or royal blood. Of course, the State Department would have

been hard-pressed to find any Korean exile group that previously “had administrative authority

over any part of Korea,” given that Japanese colonial control was nearing its forty-year

anniversary. But the lack of other options did not confer international recognition to the KPG. It

remained on the fringes, unable to gain entry or an audience with the Allied policy-makers who

conferred about Korea’s future.

Although the State Department’s concerns about the legitimacy of Korean exile groups is

understandable given that no group had a pedigree that traced back to the dynastic governing

authority of Korea, in blocking off contact between itself and exile groups the department also

removed possibilities for consultation with Korean individuals. Deflecting the interests of

Korean exiles, no matter American suspicions, ensured that American postwar planning

approached Korea without regard to the specific history or makeup of Korea’s domestic interests.

As Korea edged closer towards independence, in step with the march of American marines

island-hopping across the Pacific Ocean towards Japan, American ignorance persisted. As a

result, Korea remained a blank canvas in the minds of many American policymakers: a colonized

Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter referred to as FRUS) 1945, Volume

VI, Document 766.

Jin 20

people in need of independence and introduction to an American-led, free market global system,

but with no distinguishing characteristics that demanded special attention. In the future, as

American diplomats labored to build a comprehensive defensive/diplomatic architecture for

American involvement in Asia, they would have to contend with the harsh truth that Koreans

themselves thought of Korean issues with the utmost importance.

II. The Road to 1950

With the collapse of Japan’s empire, the United States took on the responsibility of

occupying and administering the portion of Korea south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The

insulated nature of American decision-making regarding Korea during the war also carried over

into postwar decisions. Decisions relating to the U.S. Occupation of Japan had stemmed from

years of preparation, planning, and discussion between the various bureaucratic agents in the

U.S. Stemming from necessary wartime preoccupation with Japanese questions, issues like the

status of the Japanese Emperor and the extent to which the Imperial Japanese government

officials would be relied upon while administering the nation were subjected to a series of

conversations that weighed the pros and cons over time. In the end, General MacArthur was

appointed to lead the American occupation authority, the Supreme Commander of the Allied

Powers (SCAP), that would work through the existing Japanese bureaucracy in administering the

occupation, at the very least promoting an image of cooperation rather than overlordship.

In contrast, the War Department designated General John R. Hodge and his unit, the

XXIV Corps, to occupy Korea on August 15, just one day after Japan’s surrender. Hodge,

characterized by one historian as a “combat officer with few political skills” had no preparation

Jin 21

for his newfound role as civil administrator, and the War Department settled on Hodge largely

because the XXIV Corps was the closest Army unit that could be rapidly deployed to Korea in

the event of a collapse of Japan’s colonial structure.

Hodge arrived in Seoul at the head of a

new authority for southern Korea, the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK),

with little understanding of the issues that he would soon have to face.

Much has been written about the often-short-sighted decisions made during USAMGIK’s

tenure in Korea. Hodge had little sympathy or patience for Korean issues, in part stemming from

his belief in Korean ethnic and mental inferiority. One colorful telegram sent from General

Hodge to MacArthur, a few months after the start of the American occupation, cited Hodge’s

frustration that he was forced to deal with “poorly trained, and poorly educated Orientals

strongly affected by 40 years of Jap control, who stubbornly and fanatically hold on to what they

like and dislike,…and with whom it is almost impossible to reason.”

USAMGIK continued to

employ Japanese bureaucrats during the early period of the occupation, and promoted

reactionary policies that undercut the legitimacy of the future ROK government that it sought to

inaugurate. USAMGIK also supported Syngman Rhee, far from the most popular figure among

southern Koreans, largely because occupation officials saw the English-speaking conservative as

the best choice to prevent instability or, even worse, the election of a communist sympathizer.

Cited characterization of General Hodge comes from Schaller, The American

Occupation of Japan, 75; Matray, James I. “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in

Korea, 1945-1948.” Korean Studies Vol. 19 (1995): 17-38.

FRUS 1946, Vol VIII, Document 473.

Buzo, Adrian. Making of Modern Korea, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2017);

Cumings, Origins of the Korea War Vol. 1, esp. 135-209; Matray, 20-22; Hudson, Walter M.

Army Diplomacy: American Military Occupation and Foreign Policy After World War II.

(University Press of Kentucky, 2015).

Jin 22

With little support or assistance from other agencies in the Truman administration, the U.S.

occupation was a confused process of attempting to maintain political and economic stability

while searching for an acceptable figure to whom the responsibility of managing the nation could

be thrust.

As the American occupation came to a close, American material support for the newly-

minted ROK government dwindled. One of the few instances of American support for ROK

issues on an international scale came in December 1948, when the ROK achieved UN

recognition in the form of observer status with the help of John Foster Dulles, who was acting as

an advisor to the American delegation to the UN at the time.

But American support in the UN

did not translate to broader support for Rhee’s government. The Department of the Army was

eager to withdraw from Korea. The initial date for USAMGIK’s withdrawal was September 15,

1948, which the Army reluctantly agreed to delay until March 1949 due to disagreements with

the State Department about the ROK’s stability.

Rhee’s 50,000-man military was far from

equal to the strength of the burgeoning North Korean army. But in 1948, the Truman

administration only asked for $10 billion in defense spending, which would require a 13 percent

reduction in military personnel across the services.

The requirements of an American

The efforts of the ROK to obtain representation in the UN is recounted in the following

interview with Dr. John Chang Myun, who was a Korean diplomat and later briefly served as

Prime Minister during the 1960 democracy movement. Chang, Myun (1899-1966) – Prime

Minister of Korea, 1964, JFD Oral History Collection, 1-6.

Letter from Kenneth Royall, Secretary of the Army, to Dean Acheson, Secretary of

State, 23 Jun 1948, Box 1, Niles Bond Papers, Harry S. Truman Library Archives, Independence,

Missouri; “Memorandum of Conversation between Butterworth and Secretary Acheson,” 5

March 1948, Box 1, Folder “1-2: Document 1-9: Sept 1947 – July 1948”, Niles Bond Papers,

Truman Library.

Leffler, 223.

Jin 23

occupation in Korea drained on Army resources at a time when there was a domestic pressure to

balance the budget.

After the American withdrawal, Korea did feature in some nascent economic revival

plans in the State Department but remained outside the clear boundaries that designated strong

American interests. Newly-minted Secretary of State Dean Acheson, aware of Korea’s historical

role as Japan’s chief source of rice and agricultural surpluses, had some interest in sending aid to

Korea in order to indirectly support Japan’s economic recovery.

However, the lack of

congressional interest in another foreign aid bill, particularly to what seemed a corner of

nowhere, sank Acheson’s proposal. Korean issues returned to its pre-war position at the

periphery of American attention.

In April 1950, less than two months prior to the start of the Korean War, only eleven

Foreign Service Officers and a handful of support staffers served in the American embassy in

Seoul. For a point of comparison, in 2011 over two hundred American Foreign Service Officers

and four hundred other staff members were listed on payroll at the U.S. Embassy in South

Korea.

The small contingent of American diplomats were heavily overworked, to the point that

almost no employee in the embassy was allowed to take local leave due to the workload and

staffing shortage.

The tiny size of the embassy demonstrates the low level of attention the State

McGlothlen, Ronald. Controlling the Waves. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993),

esp. 56-86; Kim, Seung-young. American Diplomacy and Strategy Towards Korea and

Northeast Asia, 1882-1950 and After. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 170-192.

United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Office of

the Inspector General. Inspection of the Embassy Seoul, Republic of Korea: Report Number ISP-

I-11-55A. August 2011. www.stateoig.gov

The inspection report of the U.S. Embassy in the ROK was compiled from October

1949 to late March 1950. The report was mailed to Foggy Bottom on 11 May 1950, about five

weeks before the start of the Korean War. Of interest is the report’s condemnation of four

Jin 24

Department assigned towards events in Korea prior to the start of the Korean War, and Korea’s

minimal level of gravity as a State Department responsibility.

Yet the start of the Korean War as well as the commencement of concrete moves towards

a peace treaty with Japan ensured that the ROK would surge to the forefront of American

concerns. Materially, the State Department would begin paying much closer attention to

telegrams sent from the U.S. Ambassador to Korea. Korea, once a “backwater” deployment, was

the new focus of men, materiel, and diplomatic activity. Ironically, the ROK government’s near-

collapse in the early months of the war also gave it a more prominent position from which to

advocate. Additionally, the concrete moves towards the conclusion of a peace treaty began

nearly simultaneously with the start of the Korean War, adding urgency to American diplomatic

efforts. With the peace treaty and the American need to generate a new grand strategy for the

Asia-Pacific, dusty issues of Korea’s place in America’s postwar vision reemerged. The question

of how to resolve the residual issues from the legacy of Japanese imperialism entered stage left.

With it, came the spotlight that would also illuminate Korea’s attempt to gain both moral redress

and a place in America’s postwar plans.

Korean wives of American embassy staffers, which constituted a “psychological problem…for

the [embassy]” due to their lack of English language skills and feuds with one another. “Foreign

Service Inspection Report on the American Embassy at Seoul,” 11 May 1950, Box 1, Folder

“Pusan, 1950”, Seoul Mission and Embassy Misc. Classified Records 1948-1955, Record Group

84, National Archives at College Park, College Park Maryland. (Hereafter referred to as RG #,

NACP).

Jin 25

Chapter 2

Shutting the Lid to Pandora’s Box: Korea’s Status in the Peace Treaty

I. San Francisco’s Muddled Legacy

On September 8, 1951, delegations from forty-eight nations gathered in the opulent San

Francisco opera house and signed a peace treaty which would formally end the war between the

victorious Allied Powers and Japan. Although the Soviet Union walked out in the middle of the

conference, the treaty nevertheless formally signaled the restoration of Japanese sovereignty.

“The Japan of today is no longer the Japan of yesterday,” Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese Prime

Minister, said before the assembled delegates. “We will not fail your expectations of us as a new

nation, dedicated to peace, democracy and freedom.”

The peace treaty was a coup for the

Truman administration, which had authorized John Foster Dulles to lead the U.S. treaty

negotiating team in June 1950. The treaty reduced Japan’s territories to its home islands and

authorized the seizure of overseas Japanese assets, but—unlike the discredited 1919 Treaty of

Versailles—largely refrained from punitive reparations and further restrictions on sovereignty.

In a nonbinding clause, Japan pledged to “refrain” from the “use of force” in international

disputes going forward. Another article encouraged affected nations seeking reparations to

James Reston. “Yoshida Avers Country Will Not ‘Fail’ Allies in Promoting Points.”

New York Times, 8 Sept 1951.

Jin 26

initiate their own negotiations with the Japanese government.

When a group of Japanese

businessmen visited Nebraska in early 1952, they expressed amazement with their American

host that San Francisco was not at all “the treaty of a conqueror.”

The U.S. would be capping

off six years of a generally successful occupation of Japan, just in time for the United States to

repeatedly petition its former wartime foe to rearm in the face of Soviet machinations in East

Asia.

Yet for all the reasons why the treaty was initially praised for its leniency, the San

Francisco peace is perforated by its controversial legacy. The enduring hostilities of the Cold

War, embodied by the Soviet walkout, permeated the conference and its attendant news

coverage. The September 8, 1951 issue of The New York Times noted uneasily that San

Francisco may have “reconciled” Japan with the Western Allies, but it was “not quite a peace of

reconciliation from the point of view of the great powers.”

Additionally, with a war still raging

on the Korean peninsula—separated from Japan by a strait measuring only 120 miles wide—

American military planners were anxious to ensure that the prosecution of the war would not be

interrupted by the resumption of Japanese sovereignty. Consequently, a security treaty between

Japan and the United States was signed on the same day as the peace treaty, granting the U.S.

exclusive rights to maintain bases and military forces in Japan.

Japan’s sovereignty was

Article 5(a) and 14(a)1 of “Treaty of Peace with Japan,” signing date September 8,

1951, United Nations Treaty Series, registration no. 1832.

Letter from E.N. Thompson to John M. Allison, 24 Jan 1952, Box 4, Folder

“Correspondence 1952”, John M. Allison Papers, Truman Library.

Reston. “Yoshida Avers.”

“Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan,” signing date September 8,

1951.

Jin 27

returned with a bright red asterisk, asserting its subordination to American security interests in

Asia.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty initiated a new political-economic order that not only

defined relations between Japan and the United States, but also America’s place in the Asia-

Pacific. International relations scholar Kent Calder popularized the term “San Francisco System”

to describe this new Pacific order; an order marked by American dominance of geopolitical

matters and continuing unwillingness, or a recurring inability, among nations in the Asia-Pacific

to reconcile with Japan over unaddressed aspects of Japanese wartime imperialism.

One such

aspect of San Francisco’s troubled legacy was the absence of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from

the treaty conference, having been denied an invitation despite repeated attempts to seek

signatory status. The San Francisco Peace Treaty was billed as both a backwards and forwards-

facing instrument that could restore Japanese sovereignty and bookend World War II in the

Historiography on the San Francisco Peace Treaty has largely focused on the

subsequent security system or enduring territorial disputes. Seokwoo Lee. “Territorial Disputes

in East Asia, The San Francisco Peace Treaty Of 1951, and The Legacy of U.S. Security

Interests In East Asia.” In: S. Lee and H. Lee, ed., Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and

International Justice. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 41-70; Kimie Hara. "50 Years from

San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan's Territorial Problems." Pacific

Affairs 74, no. 3 (2001): 361-82; Leszek Buszynski disputes that the San Francisco Treaty was

intended to initiate a comprehensive security structure in Asia due to its Japan-centric focus.

Although Buszynski questions U.S. intentions, the U.S. engineered the ANZUS, U.S.-

Philippines, and U.S-Japan alliances directly because of the treaty process. Japan was the center

of a developing U.S. strategy, and subsequently spawned U.S. commitments elsewhere across

the Pacific. Leszek Buszynski. "The San Francisco System: Contemporary Meaning and

Challenges." Asian Perspective, Vol. 35, no. 3 (September 2011): 315-35; Kent Calder,

“Securing Security Through Prosperity: the San Francisco System in Perspective,” Pacific

Review, Vol. 17, no. 1, (March 2004): 135-157; John Dower, “The San Francisco System: Past,

Present, and Future in U.S.-Japan-China Relations,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 8,

no. 2, (Feb 2014).

Jin 28

Pacific. Korean exclusion raises questions over how effectively the treaty could fulfill either of

these goals and satisfy lingering wartime animosities.

The ROK was not an Allied Power, as it was not a UN-recognized state until 1948 and

the KPG never received recognition during World War II. This lack of credentials was the oft-

quoted reason for Korean exclusion by American diplomats at the time. In July 1951, Dulles,

acting as a special representative of the State Department, informed the stunned Korean

ambassador Yang You-Chan that the ROK would not be a treaty signatory. Dulles offered the

reasoning that only those nations which were participants of the 1942 UN Declaration would

sign a treaty of peace with Japan.

In other words, the ROK was not an “official” Allied Power

and could not be a signatory, regardless of Korea’s moral claim to victimhood at the hands of

Japanese imperialism. However, John Price notes that this reason was flimsy at best, not least

because the newly-independent nations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would all attend and

sign the treaty despite having been part of the French colony of Indochina until after the end of

World War II.

The peace treaty, which supposedly signaled Japan’s rehabilitation in the eyes of

the world, did a remarkable job of eschewing a key victim who would have benefited from “a

peace of reconciliation” with Japan.

The 1942 UN Declaration formalized the Allies in WWII. Forty-seven nations

ultimately signed the declaration between 1942 and 1945. "1942: Declaration of The United

Nations". 2018. UN.Org. Accessed November 12; FRUS 1951, Volume VI, Part 1, Document

633.

Similar observations could be made about other “Asiatic” states that participated, e.g.

the US lobbied hard for Indonesian participation despite Indonesia only becoming an

independent state after the end of World War II. John Price, “Cold War Relic: the 1951 San

Francisco Peace Treaty and the Politics of Memory,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 25, no. 3 (2001):

31-60, esp. 43-44.

Jin 29

Yet to label the ROK’s relation with the San Francisco Peace Treaty as a “complete

exclusion” would be a misnomer. Article 21 included treaty provisions whereby Japan officially

renounced its claims to Korea and assented to Korean appropriation of Japanese properties left

on the peninsula. Through the treaty, Japan promised to adopt favorable maritime, fishing, and

trading relations with the ROK. Dulles summarized Korea’s relationship with the treaty in a

report for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: “[T]he treaty, in many ways, treats Korea

like an Allied Power.”

Significantly, however, the ROK was not included in particular treaty

provisions, including clauses that encouraged Japan to negotiate reparations with former

enemies. The participation of Indochinese states and the ROK having access to some, but not all,

benefits of the treaty underlines the point that the ROK was clearly not denied a place at the table

because of its colonial status during World War II. This raises the question: in the minds of

American policy-makers, what could possibly have informed the criteria that determined

inclusion or exclusion in the peace treaty?

The remainder of this chapter argues that, in American eyes, any concerns related to

satisfying post-war moral claims of victimhood were decisively eclipsed by U.S. grand strategic

interests. The obstacle to Korea’s inclusion as a treaty signatory was not because of its lack of

independent sovereign status during World War II. Korea was excluded because from the time

when American post-war planners began drafting a peace treaty to when the peace treaty was

signed in September 1951, American interests in the Asia-Pacific had become reified along

newfound, Cold War lines. American decisions were informed by cultural assumptions about

Koreans and justified by heightened Cold War tensions wherein the enemy was a monolithic

“Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific,” 19 Jan

1952, Box 7, Folder “Japan Subj. File [1 of 2], Allison Papers, Truman Library.

Jin 30

Communist threat of apocalyptic proportions. Fundamentally, Korean inclusion in the San

Francisco Peace Treaty would have involved confronting the fundamental tension between

American postwar grand strategy and past World War II idealism for a just peace.

In this way, Korea’s tragic history under Japanese control simultaneously gave it the

greatest reason to seek access to the peace treaty negotiations and doomed its self-advocacy from

the start. With the Korean War still raging and a unilateral grand strategy crystallizing, American

diplomats and policy-makers would prioritize expediency above all else.

II. “The Situation in the West Pacific Will be Grave for a Long Time”

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was an American-led enterprise. Early U.S. diplomatic

efforts had involved negotiating through the Far Eastern Commission (FEC)—a body of former

Allied Powers designed to collaborate on postwar issues. However, these efforts ultimately failed

in 1947 as the Chinese Civil War produced two separate “Chinas,” poisoning U.S.-Soviet

cooperation on the commission. Thereafter, the State Department drafted plans based on the

assumption of American domination of treaty negotiations—an assumption to an extent justified

by American perception of their outsized role in the Pacific theater. To this end, John Foster

Dulles, as head of the U.S. negotiating team, traveled to the nations which would sign the treaty

and negotiated with each government individually, essentially crafting a multilateral document

out of a series of bilateral conversations. John Allison, a career State official who served

prominently on Dulles’ team, wrote after the fact that Dulles’ strategy was designed to avoid

Jin 31

Soviet obstructionism.

It should be noted that deploying bilateral means for a multilateral end

also would have enabled Dulles to maximize American leverage, as a dyadic interaction limited

the chances for smaller powers to cooperate with one another against the United States.

It was this context that enabled the United States to act as the primary gatekeeper for

potential signatories to the treaty, although State Department officials remained cognizant of the

interests of other major powers such as Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Even before the de

facto collapse of the Far Eastern Commission in late 1947, a State Department working group

produced a treaty draft earlier that year that included had Korea, along with Indonesia, as

signatories despite neither being Allied powers. An accompanying commentary justified

Indonesian inclusion on the basis of its significant “human and material losses” and its status as a

colony of an Allied Power during the war. In contrast, Korean inclusion was justified by noting

that “as a liberated territory with a decades old resistance movement…and with an important

interest in the treaty, [the ROK government] would doubtless feel entitled to participate, and

would be resentful if the U.S. did not favor its participation.”

The commentary’s language is

compelling. Indonesia was included merely because of its “losses” during the war and its status

“The Negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty and Possible Lessons it has for Today,”

(n.d.), Box 7, Folder “Japan Subj File [2 of 2], Allison Papers, Truman Library; Allison, John M.

(1905-1978), 1969, JFD Oral History Collection, esp. 24-26.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger employed a similar negotiating strategy in 1974

when attempting to resolve Arab-Israeli disputes after the Yom Kippur War. This strategy was

referred to as “shuttle diplomacy”, as Kissinger would shuttle between the affected parties across

borders and even between different hotel suites.

U.S. diplomats produced a June 14, 1951 joint draft of the treaty with a UK diplomatic

team, who themselves were worried about USSR obstructionism. Sung-hwa Cheong. The

Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea, 88-93.

“Commentary on 1947 Treaty,” Box 1, Folder “Commentary on the 1947 Treaty”,

Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, RG 59, NACP.

Jin 32

as an allied colony. The motivation to include Korea, however, stemmed from the belief that the

ROK would be resentful if excluded. Although the commentary does include Korea, it

significantly believed that appeasing the “entitled” attitude of the ROK government was equally,

if not more important than any moral standpoint that Korean wartime sacrifice or suffering under

Japanese rule had earned the ROK a place at the table.

The depiction of Korean interests as perhaps-underserved “entitlement” harmonized with

other existing American generalizations about Korea. American military occupation authorities

in Korea had tended to cooperate with prevailing Japanese colonial bureaucrats in part because

they generally viewed the Japanese as competent, experienced administrators and Koreans as

obstreperous, obnoxiously nationalistic, and politically immature.

The Rhee government was

similarly plagued by the image that their diplomats were nationalistic, to the point of

overstepping the boundaries of the norms of diplomatic behavior. A report dated October 29,

1949 from a Japan-based State Department official advised against encouraging Korean-

Japanese cooperation, citing the Korean ambassador’s “repeated and somewhat-aggressive

attempts to deal directly with Japanese officials” as evidence that the ROK was only interested in

extractive bargaining rather than rapprochement.

Multilateral negotiating with Korea and

Japan, then, was out of the question. Even before the start of the Korean War, the State

Department viewed the ROK government as prone to damaging careful American designs and

motivated by inappropriate levels of undisciplined nationalism. Consequently in the American

view, a Korean delegation could only be involved in the treaty negotiating process on a

Cumings. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1, 137-151.

Report from W.J. Sebald to the Secretary of State, 29 Oct 1949, Box 4037, Central

Decimal Files 1945-1949, RG 59, NACP.

Jin 33

“consultative basis” as the ROK’s exclusion risked causing a troublesome outcry from Seoul and

the Korean public.

Korean attachment to the peace treaty issue ensured that American

diplomats would at least make a performance of hearing out Korean concerns, but without any

expectation of taking those views into account.

a. New Strategies

However, by 1950-51 geopolitical developments and the intensification of Cold War

tensions had changed the American calculus. In particular, American treaty planning for Japan

evolved from a desire to prevent a vengeful resurgence of Japanese militarism (a la post-

Versailles Germany) into a need to establish a friendly and strategically-additive nation to the

American defense perimeter in the Pacific. American occupation authorities were certainly

already perturbed by the possibility of anti-Americanism developing in Japan after either a

prolonged occupation or a punitive peace treaty, but the ideological bent of avoiding historical

mistakes slotted nicely into geopolitical concerns of checking the rise of Communism in Asia

and in Japan.

Japan was a key element of the Truman administration’s policy of containment in Asia.

“[T]he basic U.S. military objective in Japan,” so summarized a State Department assessment of

“Commentary on 1947 Treaty.” Box 1, Folder “Commentary on the 1947 Treaty”,

Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, RG 59, NACP.

John W Dower. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. (New York:

W.W. Norton, 2000), esp. 438-439; Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, 163-168.

Containment was a U.S. foreign policy strategy, originally espoused in George

Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram”, that advocated preventing the spread of Communism globally.

Containment dictated much of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. As a strategy it can be

contrasted with détente, which proposed warmer relations with the Soviet Union, and rollback,

which promoted toppling communist governments.

Jin 34

the merits of a peace treaty, “[is] to ensure that in the event of a U.S.-USSR conflict, Japan is ‘on

our side’ with its resources available to us and denied to the Soviets.”

To that end, the United

States had to fend off internal Communist “subversion”, ensure that Japan reemerged onto the

world stage on the side of the West, prevent the growth of anti-American sentiment, and

optimize American control over Japanese policy.

A proper and speedy peace treaty, supplemented by a security agreement, could

comfortably accomplish those goals and serve the foundation of a new and comprehensive

American defense strategy in Asia. Waiting too long, American occupation and treaty planners

both feared, could prove catastrophic if a Japanese communist movement were augmented by

general Japanese resentment of a prolonged occupation. Rearming Japan, or otherwise building

up Japan economically and politically to be a reliable strategic bulwark in Asia, was already an

American priority in early 1950; these fears were only amplified with the North Korean invasion

of the South in June.

An atmosphere of contingency pervaded the air in Washington. The sense of urgency is

perhaps best expressed by a March 18, 1951 letter from Dulles to General MacArthur, which

Dulles had penned before he entered another round of treaty negotiations: “The United States

and Japan are the only significant sources of power in the Pacific, we actual, they potential...If

“Advantages and Disadvantages of Indefinitely Continued Occupation or Conclusion

of a Peace Settlement”, n.d., surmised to be May 1949, Box 5, Folder “Treaty Draft”, Records

Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan 1945-1951, RG 59, NACP.

For more information about the growth of Japan’s leftist movement during the

occupation see Dower, Embracing Defeat, 268-273.; W. Butterworth notes that the State

Department obtained the Pentagon’s support for a peace treaty by arguing that the sooner a peace

treaty was concluded, the sooner it would be politically feasible for Japan to be rearmed. FRUS

1950, Volume VI, Document 689; FRUS 1950, Volume VI, Document 728.

Jin 35

the United States and Japan fall apart, the situation in the West Pacific will be grave for a long

time.”

The U.S. was now evaluating treaty issues through the far more immediate lens of its

own imminent security concerns, which would directly affect the question of Korean

participation.

III. Pandora’s Box and the Korean Case

In some respects, American consideration of satellite issues tethered to the peace treaty

was only slightly altered by the heightening Cold War. The nature of a peace treaty with Japan

would not only determine Japan’s future, but also shape the American—and by extension, the

free world’s—image in Asia. In a manner that resembled old Rooseveltian ideals of equality and

cooperation among sovereign nations, State Department planners were anxious that a peace

treaty avoided the image of amounting to little more than just another Western imperialist

imposition.

As noted, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos ultimately signed the peace treaty. State

Department reasoning for Indochinese participation was suggestive of American concerns about

the makeup of the signatory states. On August 20, 1951, less than three weeks before the San

Francisco Conference was slated to commence, Secretary of State Dean Acheson received a

memorandum, issued under Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s name, advocating for the

inclusion of the three newly-independent Indochinese states. Previously, invitations had been

delayed over concerns that India, Indonesia, and Burma—all non-aligned states that the U.S. had

been desperately hoping to include in the peace—might themselves refuse to participate in

FRUS 1951, Volume VI, Part 1, Asia and the Pacific, 1951, Document 532.

Jin 36

protest if “French puppets” were allowed in. However, the memorandum referenced new reports

that the three non-aligned states might not participate in the treaty-signing regardless. In view of

the fact “that in the last analysis India, Indonesia and Burma may refuse to sign the Treaty and as

it is believed important for as many Asiatic States as possible to sign,” the memorandum

concluded, “it is considered advisable to issue an invitation to the Associated States as soon as

possible.”

The U.S. accordingly invited Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, which then attended as

treaty signatories. India and Burma refused their invitations, although Indonesia still participated.

Rusk’s August 20 memorandum reveals that it was considered vitally important for

American interests that “as many Asiatic states as possible” participated in the treaty-signing.

His language shows how the State Department was invested in presenting the peace treaty as a

joint document authored by Western and Asian states. It demonstrates that U.S. planners were

doubtlessly conscious of the history of Western involvement in Asia. Earlier that year, the Far

East Division of the State Department argued that Asian historical memory of European

colonialism demanded the exclusion of some European allies from any potential security pact in

Asia. “For example, the participation of the United Kingdom might imply a commitment

regarding Hong Kong that the United States is not prepared to assume,” the memo stated, also

suggesting American wariness about involvement on mainland Asia. “[UK involvement in an

Asian security pact] might also lead to the desire of France or the Netherlands to participate

which would give the arrangement a “colonial” character of unfortunate effect in Asia.”

Concerns about a “colonial” security pact would have translated to concerns regarding the

Emphasis added. Ibid., Document 699.

Emphasis added. “Memorandum for the President,” 6 Jan 1951, Box 3, Folder “Peace

Treaty”, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan 1945-1951, RG 59.

Jin 37

motivations of the peace treaty. The State Department clearly wished to avoid the appearance of

an imposition of Western interests onto Asia. U.S. involvement in Asia needed to be distinct

from European imperialism and to avoid the accompanying negative colonialist implications.

The same concerns applied to American interests related to the peace treaty. In July, a

political advisor for SCAP in Japan sent a telegram to Secretary Acheson, urging that the

Americans avoid any behavior during the conference that might be perceived as belittling or

discriminatory against the Japanese: “We [should] also constantly bear in mind that Japan is an

Asiatic nation and that eyes of Asia will be upon San Francisco and upon [the] manner in which

each and every Asiatic nation, including Japan, is [received] and treated by [the] United States

and other ‘white’ nations.”

In other words, there could be no characteristically “colonial”

behavior during the conference proceedings. Having many “non-white Asian” nations signing a

peace treaty with Japan could plausibly promote the image that this treaty was the product of a

collective, global effort rather than just American power and interests. Additionally, reinstating

Japan as a member of the Asian community would also require the “approval” of other Asian

nations.

“Asianizing” the treaty by increasing non-Western representation, however, raised

additional questions about the role of the ROK. A Korean delegation might have been well-

suited for the conference. For a Western audience, Korea was visibly an “Asiatic” and alien

nation. In the broadest possible terms, Korea could serve the racialized role of another token

foreigner that might legitimize the American-led peace treaty by simply being present in the

conference hall. Its approval of Japan’s reinstatement would, crucially, be approval coming from

an Asian country. Less cynically, Korean participation could fulfill the Rooseveltian vision of

FRUS 1951, Volume VI, Part 1, Asia and the Pacific, 1951, Document 663.

Jin 38

transforming the independence movements of oppressed peoples into sovereign nation-states,

each at least nominally equal to one another in terms of certain legal and institutional criteria.

The peace treaty could have contributed an ember to the wider hearth-fire of what Elizabeth

Borgwardt described as “America’s multilateralist moment” during the waning days of the final

Roosevelt administration, where the U.S. labored to ensure that the weak had at least a voice on

the international stage.

But while maximizing Asian representation at the peace conference was beneficial in

public relations terms, such “Asianization” could not come at the cost of security priorities.

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were ideal signatories: they were visibly Asian and had

comparatively little stake in the provisions of the peace treaty, thus posing no obstructions to

American security designs that were linked to the treaty. Korea may have been an Asiatic state,

but it was most certainly deeply interested in a treaty with Japan and vocal about its concerns.

The transformation of American priorities and the ensuing mismatch with the ROK’s attempt to

find moral redress for its colonial history serves to illuminate why Korea would not be at the

table for a treaty purporting to turn a new leaf in relations between the West and Asia.

a. Moral Redress

Reparations, or the lack thereof, was an essential element of the negotiations leading up

to the peace treaty. Even with the historical lesson of Versailles hanging over the postwar world

in East Asia, forcing Japan to pay an indemnity for its wartime behavior would have likely been

welcomed by many countries. The Potsdam Declaration, the document promulgated by the

Elizabeth Borgwardt. A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights.

(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 286-291.

Jin 39

Allied Powers that outlined the terms of Japan’s unconditional surrender in July 1945, explicitly

mentioned reparations as a strong possibility for what the Japanese could expect.

Regardless of

the non-punitive inclinations of the Roosevelt-era State Department, immediate postwar drafts on

reparations policy still made room for Japanese “compensation” for war damages to Allied

countries and personnel. The ensuing debate about reparations and the role of Korea as a

potential claimant reveals much about the transformation of American considerations regarding

the peace treaty and deeper-held feelings about Korea generally.

Even though the United States had shelved the Morgenthau Plan for postwar Germany—

a draconian plan that would have eliminated Germany’s industrial capacity—similar

deliberations persisted with Japan, framed by the notion that Japan should pay for its wartime

behavior both through the pain of defeat and direct reparations. In October 1945, an American

policy planning team led by businessman Edwin Pauley espoused an early draft of American

policy with regard to the question of reparations. While retribution would not be the aim of

American occupation, reparations in the form of industrial equipment should be delivered to

other Asian economics devastated by the war, thus achieving the dual purpose of limiting

Japan’s war-making capacity and restoring regional economic stability.

In practice, Pauley’s

plans would have essentially amounted to a “pastoralization” of Japan, given the sheer level of

industrial transfers that he recommended. Nevertheless, these postwar policy documents indicate

that strategic and moral reasons for Japanese reparations were not mutually exclusive at first.

State Department planners viewed the postwar devastation in Asia with anxiety. With no

Marshall Plan for Asia or for Europe yet in the books, one of the most direct ways to rebuild the

“Potsdam Declaration: Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender,” 26 July

1945.

FRUS 1945, Volume VI, Document 745.

Jin 40

economies of the Asia-Pacific was through transfers of Japanese resources in the form of

reparations. Korea, facing acute economic turbulence in the aftermath of Japanese colonial

control, would have been an obvious potential recipient.

American policymakers did not ignore Korea during the early phase of reparations

planning in 1945 and 1946. A December 8, 1945 letter from Pauley to General MacArthur and

SCAP mentions Pauley’s recommendations to President Truman that Japanese industrial plants

and equipment in the home islands “formally used to exploit Korea, could be usefully transferred

from Japan to Korea.”

Although the fraught nature of the U.S. Occupation of Japan and Japan’s

fragile postwar stability forestalled Pauley’s recommendations, it is significant that Korea held a

place in America’s reparations plans in late 1945. On February 28, 1946, a telegram from

Secretary of State James Brynes stated that the United States and the Far Eastern Commission

had decided that Japanese assets left in Allied countries would be eventually distributed in the

form of reparations. Brynes explicitly mentions Korea, stating that Japanese assets would be held

“in trust” by the American occupation authorities and eventually turned over to a native

government “as recognition of Korean suffering at the hands of the [Japanese government].”

Despite the fact that there were few to no Korea experts in the State Department, planners still

lumped Korea in with other nations designated “victims” of Japanese control.

In a time concurrent with the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and a global zeitgeist that

victims of militarized aggression should receive redress, it is not surprising that Korea’s history

alone—without any formal lobbying from an internationally-recognized Korean government—

allowed it to have a powerful moral stature in the eyes of American planners. The technicalities

Ibid., Document 747.

FRUS 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East 1946, Document 361.

Jin 41

of the absence of a U.S.-recognized Korean government-in-exile had little bearing on these early

postwar documents.

In the immediate months after the end of the war, American pronouncements indicated no

qualms about Korean eligibility for compensation. Yet, by late 1949, the State Department’s

policy had crystallized in complete opposition to Japanese reparations to Korea. In addition,

many of the documents by State Department officials arguing against Korean inclusion in the

peace treaty (and access to Japanese reparations) repeatedly mentioned that the Korean

Provisional Government, Korea’s government-in-exile, had never been recognized by the United

States during the war, which would remove grounds for Korean status as an Allied Power. What

could account for this change in attitude?

Early American pronouncements about the moral validity of Korean suffering at the

hands of Japanese aggression may have aligned with American rhetoric at the time, but they

failed to address more incisive questions about wartime reparations, their practicality, and

American willingness to address the full scope of Japanese imperialism in Asia. As a result,

empty American rhetoric was porous enough to allow room for changing strategic values and

priorities to entirely change early plans and beliefs about Korea’s place in the postwar order.

Ultimately, the turn away from reparations had its supporters even among idealistic State

Department diplomats, who could accept the wisdom that post bellum punishment was also

amoral, against the spirit of the Atlantic Charter,

and might cause unforeseen, negative

consequences in the future.

Unsurprisingly, the ROK government vociferously demanded reparations from Japan,

and this was a source of concern for State Department planners. At face value, the concept of

The Atlantic Charter was a joint declaration by FDR and Winston Churchill in August

1941, where the two outlined the Allied war aims.

Jin 42

Korean reparations did not directly fit within the accepted idea of war reparations at the time. As

noted, during World War II, the United States had not classified Korea as an Allied Power but

rather as a colony of the Japanese Empire and subject to Japanese sovereignty. Although nations

like the Philippines were not sovereign states when they were invaded by Japan, it was

nevertheless indisputable that the damage caused to Filipino individuals and material assets by

Japan were almost entirely tethered to the results of Japanese behavior during the war. Korea, as

a colony under Japanese control effectively since 1905, instead asked for reparations for what it

depicted as forty years of lost development and prosperity. Addressing the matter of Japanese

reparations to Korea accordingly opened up a different line of questioning. How did its colonial

experience mesh into the American understanding of the parameters of World War II? For the

purposes of the peace treaty, how far back into the conflict in the Asia-Pacific could reparations

apply?

Japanese restitution for damages to, say, an American-owned port in the Philippines

during World War II easily fit within the traditional understanding of war reparations:

compensation for the wartime activities of the designated aggressor. Korea, on the other hand,

presented a far more extensive and complex set of indictments. Korea had been under

internationally-recognized Japanese control for nearly forty years. Korean men had served in the

Japanese military, many as conscripts but others as willing participants in Japanese-led

institutions. Some Korean women endured sexual slavery as “comfort women,” an issue

notorious enough that it persists as a controversy today. Many Korean landowners had been

replaced with Japanese landowners after the 1910 annexation. Beyond individual damages, a

variety of Korean resources from before 1910 had been depleted by 1945. Japan’s colonial

occupation had appropriated cultural objects, gold deposits, bank funds, and land from Korean

Jin 43

ownership.

Simply tabulating Japanese “damages” to Korea was difficult due to the sheer

length of time covered. So too would be verifying the validity of ROK demands.

Determining validity, however, was protean in the pivotal years after the end of World

War II. Given that the Far Eastern Commission had turned into a forum for disagreement rather

than a deliberative body to consult on postwar issues. The ROK and its moral claims and

arguments about its role in the war were largely dependent on American priorities and the

mindsets of key diplomats in the State Department. Although there were almost no objections to

the transfer of ownership of Japanese assets left in Korea to Koreans—after all, the native seizure

of leftover Japanese wartime property overseas was a universal desire among nations in the Asia-

Pacific—the United States cooled towards the idea of reparations on the whole throughout 1947

and 1948.

The occupation in Japan underwent what historians have famously labeled as the

“Reverse Course,” as a group of cabinet members and bureaucratic powerholders in the Truman

administration opposed General MacArthur’s intentions to purge, democratize, and deconstruct

Japan’s traditional corporations (zaibatsu). Rising tensions with the Soviet Union combined with

fears of Japanese economic and political turmoil motivated members of the Truman

administration to promote stability and a softened version of rehabilitation in Japan. As a result,

reparations turned from a notion that American diplomats entertained to a taboo topic. This

geopolitical reality was able to combine with the moral argument about the desirability of

“Participation of the ROK in the Japanese Peace Settlement,” 12 Dec 1949, Box 4,

Folder “DRF 163”, Reports Relating to the Far East 1946-1952, RG 59, NACP. In particular,

Section III, Part A1 “Claims of the Republic of Korea for Restitution and Reparations.”

Jin 44

rehabilitation instead of retribution, leading the U.S. to shift away from supporting

institutionalized reparations.

By January 1947, the U.S. outlined its guidelines for potential reparations claimants, who

were still petitioning the Far Eastern Commission, in the form of a memorandum that circulated

through the State Department. The memorandum reflected American interests in limiting the

extent to which Japan might be held accountable for reparations. In a framing that forebode the

future difficulty of Korean advocacy for involvement in the peace treaty (and access to

reparations), the United States only invited “Belligerents to submit claims for the period of their

actual belligerency” through the FEC. Korea, obviously not an official belligerent during the

war, was left off the attached list of invited nations.

Included, however, were nations that used

to be colonial holdings of Allied Powers and had since gained independence after the war. The

Philippines is listed with its declaration of “belligerency” against Japan listed as December 7,

1941—indicating that the current Philippine sovereign state could retroactively claim to be a

belligerent in the war against Japan since the day that its colonial authority (the United States)

entered the war.

The date of belligerency for every nation listed is after December 7, 1941, which is to be

expected since Japan never officially joined the conflict against the Allied Powers despite its pact

Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, 16; Schaller, Michael “MacArthur’s Japan:

The View from Washington,” Diplomatic History 10, no. 1(Winter 1986): 1-23, esp. 3-5;

Sakamato, Yoshikazu. “The International Context of the Occupation of Japan”, in Democratizing

Japan: The Allied Occupation, ed. Robert E. Ward and Sakamato Yoshikazu (Honolulu:

University of Hawaii Press, 1987): 42-75, esp. 44-46; Schonberger, Howard. “The Japan Lobby

in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952,” Pacific Historical Review Vol. 46, no. 3 (Aug 1977): 327-

359, esp. 329; Schonberger, Howard. “U.S. Policy in Post-War Japan: A Retreat from

Liberalism,” Science & Society Vol. 46, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 39-59.

FRUS 1947, Volume VI, Document 291.

Jin 45

with Germany and Italy until the Pearl Harbor attacks. While official date of belligerency match

up with American guidelines, this generated a few curiosities. For example, the Republic of

China’s date of belligerency is listed as December 9, 1941.

Although the ROC had been

engaged in conflict with Imperial Japan since at least 1937, it was only two days after the attack

on Pearl Harbor that Chiang’s Nationalist government formally declared war on the Axis

Powers. While the guidelines that reparations claims could only derive from actions during the

period of “actual belligerency” might not have had any actual effect on Chinese reparations

claims (ROC officials could just as easily claim that certain damages from the five preceding

years of war all occurred from December 9, 1941 on), the imposition of these formal guidelines

indicates the limits of American understanding and receptiveness to reparations claims

originating from before the American entry into the war.

Regardless of the local history of conflict with Japanese imperialism, the January 1947

memorandum highlights how American planners anxiously sought to re-center postwar issues on

the idea of the outbreak of global conflict with the Axis Powers, regardless of any local history

of conflict with Japan. Wartime reparations could only be just that—compensation for Japanese

actions during World War II alone. In doing so, the United States had found a legal foothold that

could limit how much Japan (and by extension, American foreign aid) would be responsible for

redressing.

Beyond the obvious problems that the January 1947 framing of reparations issues posed

for ROK interests in compensation, there was also greater symbolic significance of the American

insistence that claims needed to be time limited. The broader scope of Japanese aggression in

Asia, and its longstanding policy of colonialism, needed to remain outside the purview of

Ibid., Document 291.

Jin 46

reparations and of a future peace treaty generally. From the American perspective, a peace treaty,

being a multilateral document comprising all belligerents in the war with Japan, could not be

charged with the responsibility of satisfying all complaints with Japanese behavior in the Asia-

Pacific. Doing so was not only practically difficult, but also dangerous to American designs

which required the speedy rehabilitation and retooling of Japanese assets.

But while other nations still had the opportunity to seek reparations claims, albeit only

those damages originating from a limited time frame, Korea received no such accommodations.

Korea was neither a former colony of an Allied Power or a recognized belligerent. It fit none of

the categories the United States had laid out before it. The non-recognition of the KPG during

the war had grave implications for postwar ROK efforts. The ROK was unable to successfully

claim that Koreans had actively suffered on behalf of the Allied war effort whereas many other

reparations claimants could argue on behalf of the sacrifices of their peoples and resources.

American diplomats believed that Korean claims did not stem from a genuine desire to

receive compensation for damages incurred as a war combatant, but rather as an opportunistic,

newly-independent country with a particular grudge against Japan. American reservations were

summarized in a December 12, 1949 report published by the department’s Division of Research

for the Far East:

“While the claim of the Republic of Korea for participation in the Japanese peace

settlement is based on its alleged status as a belligerent during the war and many

of the present officials of the Republic of Korea have considered themselves

belligerents against Japan since the annexation of Korea in 1910, the interests of

Korea in the peace settlement appear to arise more from the consequences of

annexation and forty years of exploitation than from the war itself, which was

merely the incident that separated Korea from Japan.”

Emphasis added. “Participation of the ROK in the Japanese Peace Settlement,” 12 Dec

1949, Box 4, Folder “DRF 163”, Reports Relating to the Far East 1946-1952, RG 59.

Jin 47

The report concluded: “[R]egardless of Korea’s legal status, Korean interests in the Japanese

peace settlement are not derived primarily from belligerency against Japan in World War

II...Instead, Korean interests are derived almost wholly from Japanese imperial rule over Korea

during the period 1910-1945.”

Korea’s claims for war reparations and its signatory aspirations,

the report declared, belonged to a separate conflict—the Japanese Occupation of Korea—whose

sole relation to World War II was that it bore the same termination date.

For American policymakers, Japanese colonialism, or the colonial experience of Korea

more generally, was not a valid point of conversation when discussing postwar policy. The

United States could not be an accessory to what it saw as vengeance, especially when doing so

would damage the most important American asset in Asia—a revitalized, allied, and subordinate

Japan. In other words, America was instituting a new postwar order for Asia, but the State

Department was accepting none of the responsibility for resolving persisting colonial

controversies.

Notably, the December 12 report does not immediately suggest that the United States

dismiss the Korean position out of hand. Instead, a determination of Korea’s status vis-a-vis the

peace settlement would depend on “an estimation of the line of conduct likely to be followed by

the Republic of Korea...”

The report revealed the criteria by which the State Department

evaluated ROK claims that could have garnered Korea signatory status, albeit six months before

the start of the Korean War. In other words, the “line of conduct” of a Korean delegation would

have to be compliant and not an obstruction to American priorities.

Ibid.

Jin 48

The ROK was not the only party involved that saw reparations as an important issue. The

Philippines, too, lobbied heavily for reparations from Japan, which proved to be a point which

the United States had to repeatedly fend off, usually asserting that Japan’s brittle economy had

no ability to pay.

Concerns about burdening Japan with reparations, for both ideological and

strategic reasons, meant that even those nations who had clearly demonstrable claims of damages

stemming directly from the war were nevertheless hard-pressed to find sympathetic American

ears.

It was in this same vein that State Department officials gave the ROK’s claims for

damages short shrift. As the 1949 State Department research report described, “[The ROK’s]

claims appear to be excessive, as currently stated, and also pose a peculiar problem because of

the long time period covered.” The report goes on to conclude that if the U.S. allowed the ROK

to participate in peace negotiations, Korean diplomats would likely demand a punitive treaty, due

to both the Korean public’s anti-Japanese sentiment and the ROK government’s need to appear

more anti-Japanese than the North. Ultimately, the report’s authors advocated that the ROK be

given a consultative, but ultimately meaningless, role in the peace settlement—something that

would allow the United States to shut down any demands for excessive reparations but

nevertheless satisfy the Korean public’s “sensibilities on the question of participation.”

In other

words, to limit the ROK’s role in a peace treaty to the minimum necessary to prevent rampant

anti-Americanism in Korea.

“Memorandum of Conversation between President Quirino and Ambassador Dulles.”

12 Feb 1951, Box 7, Folder “Trip Philippine Papers”, Records Relating to Treaty of Peace with

Japan, RG 59.

“Participation of the ROK in the Japanese Peace Settlement,” 12 Dec 1949, Box 4,

Folder “DRF 163”, Reports Relating to the Far East, 1946-1952, RG 59.

Jin 49

Other American reports worked to diminish sympathy for Korean reparations claims. In

May 1951, only a few months before the San Francisco Conference itself, the Department of

Research for the Far East issued a report outlining the extent of originally-Japanese assets in

southern Korea at the end of the war compared with Korean claims in Japan. After tabulating

pre-war and wartime investment and Japanese-owned property values in Korea, the report

concludes that “Japanese assets in the Republic of Korea alone [excluding assets north of the 38

parallel] were approximately four times larger than any ROK claims against Japan.”

Although

the report does not take into account any value of ROK reparations claims, it serves the purpose

of outlining how much the ROK had supposedly already benefited by appropriating Japanese

assets and property in Korea at the end of the war. It also lends credence to the politically-

charged and controversial assumption that Japanese occupation had also brought the positive

externality of investment and economic development in Korea, altering the conversation from

one of moral redress to that of a monetary exchange.

Of course, beneath the retraction of American willingness was the growing aversion to

reparations generally. Rhetorically, top American policymakers began to emphasize the necessity

of reconciliation rather than retribution. Reparations were dismissed for reasons of strategy and

expediency, but represented a bigger moral question the US did not want to answer. The United

States shuffled the issue of compensation off of the agenda of a multilateral document, instead

separating itself from the matter of negotiating reparations and leaving all claimants to conclude

separate bilateral agreements with Japan. Reparations ran counter to both American ideological

“Comparison of Japanese Assets in Formosa and Korea with Possible Korean and

Formosan Claims in Japan,” 24 May 1951, Box 5, Folder “DRF-DR 229”, Reports Relating to

the Far East, 1946-1952, RG 59.

Jin 50

concerns about avoiding the mistakes of Versailles and its forward-looking interest in rebuilding

Japan as an ally amenable to American grand strategy.

b. One Last Gasp

The changing calculus prompted by a heightening Cold War would have further reduced

Korean chances of participation given the ROK’s rhetoric on the matter of reparations. But an

argument can be made that the Korean War dramatically raised the prominence of the ROK

government—Korea was no longer an Asian backwater; rather, it was part of the new front line

against a monolithic Communist threat. Surely, on the basis of prosecuting the Korean War, the

United States should have a greater incentive to curate positive feelings among the Korean public

and the ROK government towards the West. Additionally, the ROK government might have had

more leverage to argue that Korea deserved a place at the conference, given that it could frame

its losses in the Korean War as casualties in the fight against global communism and thus a

member of America’s “free world” coalition.

Indeed, the ROK government did exactly that, often tying together its interests in a peace

treaty with the American strategy of containment. By emphasizing the dangers of the external

threat of communism, too, Korean diplomats sought to burnish the Korean reputation as scornful

of an exonerating peace treaty, and therefore seek to disabuse Americans of the notion that a

Korean delegation would somehow derail U.S. plans for the peace treaty. In November 1950,

one Korean diplomat met with at least one top ranking American member of SCAP, and stated

that “the war in Korea had convinced his Government that the greatest enemy of both [Japan and

Korea] is communism, and that for this reason his Government is interested in seeing that a

Jin 51

treaty with Japan results in a just and honorable peace.”

Although his American counterpart

equivocated with a diplomatic non-answer, the conversation demonstrates that the Korean

government was not a passive agent after the start of the Korean War, instead finding ways to

frame its advocacy for participation in the peace treaty through different ways that would be

amenable to American sympathies.

Furthermore, the United States did begin to evaluate ROK participation in the peace

treaty on slightly more expanded grounds at the start of 1951. Cheong Sung-hwa argues that the

U.S. did indeed become more receptive towards ROK participation in early 1951. Dulles had

expressed an interest in “building up” the ROK’s international presence and legitimacy. Bringing

Seoul onto a multilateral treaty that symbolized the end of World War II and global

reconciliation would reaffirm the ROK’s status as a valued, accredited member of the

international system, which was important given that the United Nations had technically

intervened in the Korean War on behalf of the ROK.

Although there is little to no evidence that

Korean messaging in late 1950 had any impact on Dulles, both Korean diplomatic rhetoric and

Dulles’ new interests reflected the role that Cold War developments reshaped old assumptions.

Implicit in Dulles’ framing is the American belief that Korea did indeed have a role in

contemporary American designs for Northeast Asia of some kind after the start of the Korean

War. Inclusion on a peace treaty could very well be painless and limited in substance, but

valuable symbolically. The ROK’s international legitimacy in 1951, then, was of enough

importance that Dulles was using it as a criterion for determining signatory status. Subsequently,

“Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Sebald and Kim Yong Joo,” 24

Nov 1950, Box 1, Folder “Attitudes Towards a Japanese Peace Treaty 1950-51”, Misc. Records

Relating to Japan and Korea 1945-1953, RG 59.

Cheong, 80.

Jin 52

the U.S. team initiated discussions to obtain approval for the ROK’s participation in the peace

treaty.

These discussions encountered difficulties with the Japanese government, led by Prime

Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida’s government was concerned about Korean participation, not

for reasons of potential reparations to the ROK, but actually because of what participation would

mean for the legal status of Koreans residing within Japan. Japan feared that the 600,000 ethnic

Koreans residing in Japan would be considered nationals of an Allied power, if the ROK were to

be a treaty signer. The treaty had provided for nationals of Allied powers to be compensated for

any property or wealth in Japan seized during the war. The Koreans living in Japan included both

long-time residents and recent immigrants, but their legal status was now ambiguous and the

ROK government claimed all of them as “Korean nationals.”

The Japanese government was determined to prevent Koreans in Japan from accessing

the treaty compensation clauses for Allied nationals, which was motivated both by Japanese

concerns about having to compensate wartime victims and a long history of Japanese racism and

mistrust towards its Korean minority.

Pieces of an informal discussion between Shirasu Jiro, an

advisor to Yoshida, and a State Department official, who was also a family friend of Shirasu’s,

on May 1, 1950 gives credence to the stipulation that personal attitudes of Japanese towards

Koreans might have later affected treaty negotiations. As the State Department official later

recounted, “[Shirasu] thought that the best way to deal with the 600,000 Koreans still living in

Japan was to deport them to Korea. In his opinion, the Koreans in Japan were almost to a man

Ibid., 74.

Price, “Cold War Relic,” 45.

Jin 53

engaged in illegal or non-gainful pursuits and that it was grossly unfair that the Japanese

government … [had to] assume obligations on behalf of this parasitic group.”

Still, on April 23,

1951, the Japanese government ultimately informed the United States that it would acquiesce in

Korean participation “if it is definitely assured that by the said treaty Korean residents in Japan

will not acquire the status of Allied Powers nationals.”

The most obvious source of obstruction

had been cleared. Why then, after American treaty negotiators met with British diplomats later

that month, did the U.S. inform the ROK on July 3rd that Korea would not be allowed to sign the

treaty after all?

Cheong speculated that British lobbying against the ROK likely played a significant role.

On May 16, John Allison issued a notice to Dulles that the United States, after conferring with

the British ambassador, was now prepared to drop the issue of ROK participation. Instead, a new

clause would be drafted to grant the ROK certain benefits of the treaty.

No records, to my

knowledge, exist of the final meeting between the British and the Americans that tipped the

scales against Korean participation. In the State Department’s published volumes of selected

diplomatic documents, Foreign Relations of the United States, there is merely an editorial note

that “Other reference of this talk has not been found in State Department files.”

The State

“Memorandum of Conversation between Butterworth and Jiro Shirasu,” 1 May 1950,

Box 3, Folder “Peace Treaty”, Records Relating to the Peace Treaty with Japan, RG 59.

“Supplementary Statement to the Conversation of Friday Morning, April 23, 1951.” 23

April 1951, Box 5, Folder “Second Tokyo Trip (April 1951)”, Records Relating to Treaty of

Peace with Japan, RG 59.

Such “certain benefits” are discussed in §1 of this chapter; Allison to Dulles, “Talk

with Sir Oliver Franks Regarding Japanese Peace Treaty,” 16 May 1951, Box 1, Folder

“Canberra Conference”, Records Relating to Treaty of Peace with Japan, RG 59.

FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, Asia and the Pacific, 1951, Document 576.

Jin 54

Department records in the National Archives at College Park, too, have almost no documentation

as to what was said that indicates British reasoning for Korean exclusion or the specific grounds

that led the American team to finally drop the issue.

However little we might know about what the convincing logic was, it is significant that

the United States was prepared to drop the issue of Korean participation after only a handful of

meetings with British negotiators.

Rhee and other ROK leaders had been arguing for Korean signatory status for almost two

years, so it was clear to Washington that this was an emotional issue that mattered deeply to both

the Korean leadership and public. Regardless of British views, the rapidity of U.S. concurrence

indicates that the United States was already inclined to view the Korean case as unimportant in

terms of the broader schedule of priorities and only gave it a second glance when Dulles believed

that inclusion might boost the ROK’s international status. For Dulles and other American

negotiators, Korean participation might have had some merits, but by no means was it a hill

worth dying on.

There were enough issues to make Korean participation in the treaty inconvenient and

problematic. Korean demands for “excessive” reparations, the ambiguous status of the 600,000

Koreans living in Japan and whether they would be eligible for compensation for wartime

mistreatment, compounded by British opposition, all meant that involving the ROK could delay

the peace treaty, which was scheduled for September 1951. The peace treaty effort, a time-

sensitive matter and a vital part of US strategy in Asia, could not be delayed by Korean interests.

The ROK Ambassador to the United States Yang would repeatedly seek reconsideration

for Korea’s case between July and September 1951. His efforts were met with a mixture of

sympathetic but firm refusals and outright scolding for making a fuss. At a July 19 meeting

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between Yang and Dulles, Dulles expressed frustration that Yang had made a press statement in

which the disgruntled ambassador had asserted that Japan was not fully rehabilitated and had not

satisfactorily made amends for its imperialist behavior in Korea. “Mr. Dulles pointed out the

difficulty and delicacy of the position of the United States in its efforts to obtain a reasonable and

satisfactory treaty with Japan...and stressed the importance, in this matter, of Korean

understanding and cooperation.”

In August, Yang met with Assistant Secretary Rusk, making

another pitch to the effect that Korean exclusion would be damaging at a psychological level to

both the ROK government and the Korean people. Rusk brushed off Yang’s points, responding

“that the absence of a Korean delegation should not be considered as a loss of prestige for [the]

ROK, and that it might be wiser for [the] ROK not to make such an issue of the matter…”

The chief attitude that seemed to characterize American responses is “annoyance”, as

American officials had to devote energy to damage control after the decision to exclude the

ROK. Dulles attempted to impress on Yang the importance of a cause larger than Korean issues.

Rusk implied that repeated Korean lobbying was unnecessary squawking for the sake of national

pride. Dismissiveness among American diplomats towards Korean lobbying was clearly still as

prevalent in 1951 as it had been in the late 1940s, and dovetailed with American overall

unreceptiveness to emotional Korean appeals.

As the date of the San Francisco conference drew closer, one State Department official

did submit a proposal to have the ROK attend the conference as an observer, which would not

allow the ROK to sign the treaty but at the very least allow a delegation to be officially

FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, Asia and the Pacific, 1951, Document 647.

“Memorandum of Conversation between Korean Ambassador Yu-Chan Yang and

Dean Rusk.” 16 Aug 1951, Reel 9, Microform C43, US State Dept Special Files Japan 1947-

1956, Files of John Foster Dulles, RG 59.

Jin 56

represented during the conference. The purpose of observer status would seek to smooth over

ROK-Japan relations by diminishing any reason for the ROK to have a “chip in[sic] its

shoulder.” The proposal author went on to say, “From a strictly moral point of view, it would

seem only fair that the Koreans, who have suffered from Japanese oppression for more than 40

years, should be represented in some capacity in San Francisco.” Dulles personally responded to

the proposal with a handwritten note, merely stating: “While from a strictly Korean point of view

I agree with the above, I believe such actions would get us into many difficulties and open a

Pandora’s Box which we would regret.”

The ROK was instead offered a downgraded invitation

of being informal guests to the conference who could receive some assistance in booking their

hotels—an offer to which the ROK did not respond.

Dulles did not elaborate on what he believed was within that proverbial “Pandora’s Box.”

But in an environment imbued with the need to implement American grand strategic plans as

quickly as possible, we may speculate with some confidence that he already decided that Korean

exclusion was the path of least resistance. Interpreted by Dulles, Korean issues and moral claim

to wartime victimhood were insignificant compared to what the U.S. framed as the needs of the

free world.

IV. Conclusion

The narrative of ROK exclusion from the San Francisco Peace Treaty reveals the tension

among varying roles that the peace treaty could have performed. It was a grand strategic device

Johnson to Dulles, “Attendance of Korean Observers at Japanese Peace Conference,”

20 Aug 1951, Reel 10, Microform C43, Files of John Foster Dulles, RG 59.

“Note of a Telephone Conversation between Dulles and Rusk,” 22 Aug 1951. Reel 10,

Microform C43, Files of John Foster Dulles, RG 59.

Jin 57

that ushered in a political-security perimeter in the Pacific, but it also symbolized at least a

modicum of rehabilitation, reconciliation, and redress for the past. It could deliver due attention

to those nations affected by World War II and marginalized by “Allied power” designations.

Additionally, American diplomats were conscious of Asia’s colonial past and had an opportunity

to demonstrate that American leadership would be distinctly different. It is not surprising that the

treaty failed to operate in all of its ideal ways. For the ROK, its moral claims to have a seat at the

table with Japan suited neither American post-war intentions or Cold War strategy.

Korea arguably always had at least a small chance of achieving signatory status on the

peace treaty. State Department planners struggled to fit Korea’s historical experience within the

confines of the American understanding of World War II. American negotiators later latched

onto the conclusion that Korea did not belong among the ranks of Allied powers when Korea’s

claims of victimhood conflicted with the desired course of Japanese rehabilitation. Similarly, the

process of “Asianizing” the peace conference was impersonal and not tailored to the specifics of

individual Asian nations. It was ultimately guided by public relations concerns rather than a

motivation to resolve the root causes of anti-Western and anti-colonialist attitudes in Asia.

Consequently, Korea’s absence did little to delegitimize the U.S.-led venture, given the presence

and tokenized function of other “Asiatic” delegations in the conference hall.

Presented side-by-side, Korean moral claims also paled in comparison to U.S. and other

Western security concerns, at least from the perspective in Washington. Korea had always had an

argument based on its moral right to be involved with the treaty, yet the United States only came

close to inviting the ROK after the start of the Korean War and concerns arose about the ROK

government’s international prestige. The American interest in corralling potential sources for

anti-American sentiment argued in favor of Korean inclusion, but was also subordinate to

Jin 58

security concerns. Longer-held assumptions that the ROK might be obstreperous and muddle the

treaty process came to the fore as Korea proved to be a less-than-ideal participant. Even though

Korean participation in the San Francisco Peace Treaty might have built up the ROK’s

international legitimacy and the occasional American diplomat believed that the ROK had a

moral right to be represented, most American negotiators essentially believed that the strategic

advantage of the peace treaty was far greater than any matter of Korean national pride.

The result was a smoothly-run peace conference that concluded within two days but left

the ROK government and public frustrated and resentful. Japan had formally recognized Korean

independence and assented to the seizure of Japanese assets left in Korea. But Korea had been

denied a chance to address Japan directly about its forty years of colonial status. Basic

diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea would not be established until 1965,

fourteen years after the peace treaty and six years after Dulles had died.

Jin 59

Chapter 3

Multilateral, Multi-problematic

Security arrangements went hand in hand with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. By early

1950, the State Department had already reconceived the peace treaty as part and parcel of its

wider security designs in Northeast Asia. At the same time as they were drafting the peace treaty,

American planners had to conceptualize what the region would look like post-treaty. Scholars

have been interested in the peace treaty for its role in spawning the retroactively-labeled “San

Francisco System,” which itself is defined by the prevalence of bilateral security alliances

between the United States and various countries in the Asia-Pacific. As many American

diplomats and their foreign counterparts simultaneously engaged in discussions related to the

peace treaty and security agreements, it is thus important to examine the nature of the security

arrangements which stemmed from negotiating the peace treaty. The reasons behind the State

Department’s support for a bilateral security architecture in Asia, after rejecting proposals for a

multilateral alliance, in turn reveals new dimensions of American diplomatic decision-making

which coincided and intersected with the peace treaty.

At the start of 1949, the United States had nearly no formal military agreements with

countries based along the western rim of the Pacific Ocean.

The U.S. had had formal alliances

with many nations in the Asia-Pacific during World War II, but with the end of hostilities with

The United States and the Philippines concluded a military bases agreement in 1947,

which gave the U.S. a lease on multiple military bases in the country. However, it would only be

until August 1951 that the two negotiated a mutual defense agreement. Additionally, the U.S.

supported the Republic of China with economic and military assistance but was not obligated by

any formal treaty stipulations until the 1952 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty.

Jin 60

Japan and the lapsing of cooperation through the Far Eastern Commission, the U.S. was afforded

a generous level of flexibility in terms of its policy in the region. Beyond occupation duties in

Japan and the residue of cooperation with many other nations, the United States was informally

bound to events in the region but formally detached. The period of 1949 to 1951 stood as a

critical moment where the United States had the choice regarding how to shape and implement a

comprehensive security structure for the region. In doing so, the U.S. not only evaluated its

capacity and interests in the region, but also its confidence in involvement in Asia as well as its

confidence in Asian partners.

The American emphasis on bilateral alliances and partnerships with countries in the Asia-

Pacific stands in stark contrast to the American reliance on NATO—a multilateral military

alliance—in Europe. Rather than encouraging cooperation between partners, the U.S. instead

operated on a one-to-one dynamic, engineering mutually exclusive relationships between itself

and other nations like Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and others. But this

outcome was never a foregone conclusion. Instead, in 1949-51 the United States encountered the

idea of creating an alliance mirroring NATO in Asia, under the title of a “Pacific Pact.” The end

result of American bilateralism in Asia only came after a brief period where the United States

toyed with the idea of a broader multilateral security collective for Asia.

Unlike Europe, the United States faced what amounted to an unfamiliar landscape in the

Asia-Pacific. A rapidly changing geopolitical landscape compounded by the respective

frangibility of potential partners incentivized American planners and diplomats to respond to and

develop proposals on short notice, often choosing the path of least resistance. In the minds of

American planners, “Asia” was a frontier fraught with uncertainty and self-interested allies. This

promoted reactive measures with only hastily-sketched out evaluations of long-term results. Akin

Jin 61

to the bilateral negotiating style of the Dulles team with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, this

chapter argues that the United States also sought to preserve maximum flexibility even whilst

juggling its responsibilities as the largest diplomatic mover in the region.

Importantly, Japan was the only nation that the United States could have complete

reliance on, and subsequently became the cornerstone of all future proposals and the centerpiece

consideration when responding to Asian proposals. The United States did not necessarily believe

that “Asianness” was an indicator of incompetence, but rather meshed together evaluations of the

limited political/military capacities of certain Asian countries with cultural assumptions. With

the advent of Cold Warrior mentalities and geopolitically-motivated fears, American policy-

makers actively decided to maximize flexibility and freedom of action wherever possible.

Fundamentally, Asia’s construction as a “frontier” and the western rim of the Pacific Ocean as an

outward perimeter of American security, rather than the Pacific as a region with its own

centripetal force, limited American beliefs at the time that any comprehensive involvement could

be productive.

I. Indigenous Momentum, or the Lack Thereof

The United States and twelve other European nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty,

which would lead to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on April 4,

1949. Speaking at the formal treaty signing ceremony in Washington D.C., some representatives

believed that NATO, although transformative, was only an evolution of past European efforts to

create a collective union and alliance in Western Europe. “As we have participated in the making

and implementing the Brussels Pact,” stated the Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker,

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referencing the 1948 military alliance between France, the UK, and the Benelux nations, “...so

shall we participate in making the [North Atlantic] treaty now before us a living and inspiring

reality.”

For Stikker, NATO’s intergovernmental tendrils were not novel. They were merely an

Americanized extension that worked upon well-trodden European efforts. In President Truman’s

address of the same day, a common theme was the emphasis of common interests overcoming

national boundaries. “There are different kinds of governmental and economic systems, just as

there are different languages and different culture. But these differences present no real obstacle

to the voluntary association of free nations…”

Commonality and cooperation breaking past

traditional boundaries was a colorful characteristic of U.S.-European diplomacy, and indicative

of the American belief that regional stability in Europe was a net benefit for the United States.

While NATO negotiations had been underway for months, rumors also spread of a

proposal for a mirrored alliance system in the Pacific. The Philippines, Australia, and Great

Britain all indicated their interest in expanded American involvement in Asia, using a similar

arrangement that American diplomats seemed so willing to implement in Europe. Both Australia

and the Philippines were anxious about a resurgent Japan and saw themselves on a frontline with

Communist machinations in Asia. Great Britain, although not promoting a military pact,

carefully lobbied the U.S. to increase aid to Southeast Asia, citing the need to draw nations

vulnerable to communism into a western orbit.

However, in a March 22, 1949 press conference

Secretary of State Acheson dismissed the idea that the United States was at all considering a pact

“Addresses by President Truman and Foreign Ministers at Signing of North Atlantic

Pact.” The New York Times, 5 April 1949.

Ibid.

Mabon, 150-151; “Pacific Defense Pact ‘Sympathy’”. The Observer. 13 March 1949.

Jin 63

for the Pacific. “Acheson...pointed out that there are already existing agencies for handling

problems in the Orient,” the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported, adding that Acheson cited the Far

Eastern Commission and the Allied Council of Japan (ACJ) as examples of such agencies.

should be noted that both the FEC and ACJ were organizations intended to oversee the

occupation of Japan, but which were in effect subordinate to American prerogatives.

Yet, the concept of a Pacific Pact did not die overnight. Both Syngman Rhee’s

government in South Korea and Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime, which was in the process of

relocating to Taiwan, embraced the idea wholeheartedly. In early July, Chiang Kai-shek issued a

joint communique with President Quirino of the Philippines, outlining their plans to establish a

Pacific Pact as well as their motivation for such an alliance.

In view of the lack of close collaboration among [Far Eastern nations] in the past,

and considering the gravity of the Communist menace which confronts their

freedom and independence today, we deem it necessary that these countries

should at once organize themselves into a union for the purpose of achieving

solidarity and mutual assistance to contain and counteract that common threat.

On the same day, Rhee endorsed the proposal with an effusive telegram from Seoul.

Despite a

dearth of American interest in a multilateral alliance in Asia, those interested parties in the pact

attempted to build their own momentum through public pronouncements echoing Truman’s

rhetoric of common goals overcoming national boundaries.

American analysts were skeptical of the intentions of Rhee, Chiang, and Quirino. A July

15 memorandum from the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (ONAA) described the latest

Stokes, Richard L. “Acheson Denies U.S. is Turning Iran into Base.” St. Louis Post-

Dispatch. 23 March 1949.

FRUS 1949 Vol. VII, Part 2, Document 330.

Mabon, 153.

Jin 64

proposals from Rhee as little more than another iteration of Korean lobbying for aid that the

United States was not prepared to give. “Korea...seeking arms and a U.S. military guarantee of

its frontiers, has been most vociferous in advocating for a pact with US participation. Direct

appeals for large supplies of arms and a US military commitment having failed, Rhee is heartily

endorsing the [pact proposals], presumably hoping to attain his goals indirectly.”

Only a few

days after the delivery of the ONAA memo, Secretary of State Acheson issued a telegram to

several American embassies and echoed the memo’s assumptions. “DEPT considers Chiang-

Quirino proposal for Pacific Union [as the] result [of] primarily [Chinese] Nationalist and Rhee

initiative seeking supplementary means [to] appeal for US MIL aid and influence U.S. public

opinion…”.

Functionally, Acheson instructed State diplomats to respond ambiguously to

entreaties for a Pacific Pact, neither denying the possibility that the US could become interested

in an alliance nor agreeing that such a future was close at hand. This approach fit an overall

American attitude of wishing to encourage anti-communist governments in Asia while remaining

fearful of involvement with unreliable or fragile regimes.

The State Department was right to believe that Syngman Rhee’s Pacific Pact proposals

were not selfless. Two months earlier, Rhee plainly indicated that the ROK’s national security,

rather than any belief in a broader collective vision, motivated his interests in a Pacific Pact. In

May 16, Rhee publicly outlined that he hoped the U.S. would either (1) join a Pacific Pact

including Korea, (2) adopt a mutual defense agreement with Korea alone, or (3) make a “public

“Chiang-Quirino Proposal for a Pacific Union,” 15 July 1949. Box 31, Folder “Pacific

Pact (1949-1950)”, Files Relating to U.S. Participation in SEATO 1954-1977, RG 59.

Telegram from Acheson to ‘Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers.’ 20

July 1949. Box 31, Folder “Pacific Pact 1949-1950”, Files Relating to U.S. Participation in

SEATO 1955-1977, RG 59.

Jin 65

declaration or pledge to defend a reunited democratic, independent Korea.”

Rhee’s statements

that he valued a multilateral alliance equally with a U.S.-ROK defense agreement undercut any

effort to present himself as a champion of Asian multilateralism. However, those motivations

were ultimately similar to the realpolitik concerns of Western European nations that successfully

sought an Atlantic Pact involving the United States earlier that year. In other words, a similar

dynamic would have been at play: countries concerned about security seeking American defense

guarantees of some kind.

The State Department adopted a variety of rhetorical arguments to push back against

early Pacific Pact proposals. In May, Acheson ruled out the possibility of a Pacific Pact despite

the looming collapse of the Nationalist regime in China, arguing that a pact would not be

practical until the internal strife among Asian nations was resolved.

Holding up the NATO pact

as a success story, Acheson outlined that Asian nations would have to demonstrate a similar level

of political stability and self-initiative with multilateral alliances before the U.S. would

contemplate joining a defense union.

Rhee was not a passive agent during this exchange of arguments. He soon held his own

press conference and pointed out that he had reversed priorities. While Acheson listed a

prerequisite—that Asian nations achieve internal stability prior to American support—Rhee was

immediately concerned that Asian nations, especially his own, would not be able to maintain

domestic stability without American support. For Rhee, the threat that faced noncommunist

states like his own was internal communist subversion, and greater international support was

"Rhee Renews Appeal for Pacific Pact." The Washington Post, May 17, 1949.

By the Associated Press. "Acheson Rules Out Pacific Pact." The Washington Post,

May 19, 1949.

Jin 66

vital to preventing the possibility of his government toppling.

Waiting for issues internal to

Asia to be “resolved” before the promulgation of a Pacific Pact could be catastrophic for the

cause of anti-communism in Asia.

The disparity between Rhee’s and Acheson’s statements exposes the diverging mindsets

that the two statesmen had regarding multilateralism in Asia generally, as well as the vastly

different responsibilities that both nations would expect in an alliance. Rhee’s nakedly

authoritarian rule had a shaky grasp domestically. In 1948 alone, two large-scale rebellions

erupted in South Korea which the ROK government only suppressed after violent military

crackdowns.

Simultaneously, Rhee was keenly aware that his 50,000-man military would be no

match for the burgeoning DPRK army to the north, which far outnumbered the South. In 1949,

the ROK was in no position to contribute to the material betterment of other allies. Acheson, and

the U.S. government generally, may have also viewed the world with a mindset of contingency

in 1949, as evidenced by American efforts like the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and the

creation of NATO that spring.

However, the combination of build-downs since World War II, defense sequesters, and

the relative distance between Washington and hot zones around the globe resulted in a

fundamentally different attitude towards events in East Asia. In the same vein of thinking that led

to the Department of Army advocating for an early end to the occupation of Korea (to free up

much-needed Army divisions for duties elsewhere in the world), the United States may have

been willing to expend resources in clear crisis zones, but was not similarly generous with

questionable partners in East Asia. After it became clear in 1949 that the Chinese Communist

Special to The New York Times. "RHEE SCORES ACHESON ON PACIFIC PACT

ISSUE." The New York Times, May 21, 1949.

Cumings, Origins of the Korean War Vol. II, 250-267.

Jin 67

Party would likely defeat Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, the United States had to

come to grips with reality if it were to face a land conflict in Asia. After Chiang Kai-shek

relocated to Taiwan, the United States would not have a powerful ally on the Asian mainland to

call upon. Consequently, the tangible military resources designated for distribution in Asia were

distinctly limited despite American profligacy in foreign engagements elsewhere.

Furthermore, the State Department repeatedly argued that the United States would not be

responsible for engendering the level of collective spirit required for a multilateral arrangement

to “work.” In August 1949, after several months of ROK and ROC lobbying, Acheson

telegraphed the American embassy in the Philippines, outlining the State Department view that

the formation and development of an Asia-Pacific pact depended “on indigenous incentive and

momentum developed in [the] countries concerned.” Additionally, “In [the] DEPT’s view, [the]

coalescence [of a] viable [Asian union] can come about only through genuine self-discovery of

common purpose and mutual need.” The anti-communist stances of the South Korean,

Nationalist Chinese, and Filipino governments, then, was apparently not a sufficient “common

purpose.” Most importantly, however, “encouragement by the US might well arouse expectations

of US economic assistance to an association of [Asian] members beyond any [levels] now

contemplated.”

The chief opposition in official American policy to a Pacific Pact stemmed

from this idea: that the U.S. would find itself required to support self-labelled “anti-communist”

regimes in Asia and trapped in disadvantageous commitments.

There are several assumptions at play in the formulation of State Department responses

towards a Pacific Pact. Firstly, the United States was not interested in producing a Marshall Plan

for Asia or subsidizing ostensibly anti-communist states in the region. Early plans for the

Telegram from Acheson to the U.S. Embassy in Manila. 19 Aug 1949, Box 31, Files

Relating to U.S. Participation in SEATO 1955-1977, RG 59.

Jin 68

Marshall Plan had actually included an Asian component—in 1947-48 future Secretary of State

Dean Acheson had expressed a clear interest in rebuilding Asia as well as Europe. However, due

to the difficulty of passing the already-contentious Marshall Plan through Congress, the Asian

component was shelved. This move produced the Europe-only aid plan and left Congress to

consider and pass aid bills to specific Asian nations on a case-by-case basis.

It would not be

possible to fulfill all, or many of, the requests for aid from Asian allies.

Secondly, the United States was not convinced that the conditions were right for the U.S.

to be involved in the creation of an Asia-Pacific pact. “Indigenous incentive and momentum”

were required to formulate a pact. The resulting alliance, then, would be characteristically

“indigenously”-produced and managed. The Pacific Pact, in other words, would not be adopted

by the U.S. as an extension of an overarching global policy. Instead, it could only function as a

club for Asian members to interact with one another, connected to the broader U.S. global grand

strategy through their individual bilateral relations with Washington. Unlike NATO, which was

surrounded by high-minded rhetoric on the importance of relations that crossed traditional

geographic boundaries, the Pacific Pact of 1949 had distinctly “Asian” connotations. Such a

connotation, as opposed to potential shared interests like non-communism or fighting for peace

in the world, limited its relevance to the United States. In the eyes of American policymakers, at

least publicly, they designated a Pacific Pact as strictly an “indigenous” affair that could only

solve “indigenous” problems, not global ones. Whereas American diplomats saw themselves as

in the thick of matters in Europe and actively taking the initiative to influence the course of

events, the Asia-Pacific was a different story. The U.S. would not take the bait and find itself

involved on a frontier from which it was separated—not conjoined—by the vast Pacific Ocean.

McGlothlen, 55-59.

Jin 69

American charges that the 1949 Pacific Pact proposals lacked “indigenous momentum”

also provided a contrast that helps explain hearty American cooperation through NATO. NATO,

American diplomats stated, was not an American-headed institution or an original American

concept—rather, it was the evolution of existing European efforts at multilateralism prior to the

formulation of the North Atlantic alliance. A history of regional multilateral cooperation, then,

was “proof” that potential participants would be genuinely interested in lowering national

barriers among themselves, rather than simply using a multilateral arrangement to extract aid

from the “big” power in the alliance. To define “momentum” in a diplomatic sense, it would

involve both sustained and transnational enthusiasm for an idea as well as the conclusion of other

international agreements and pacts that could eventually point towards a NATO-like alliance

involving the U.S.

Such a prerequisite may have been understandable in a practical sense. If the United

States entered into an arrangement with nations that already had seasoned diplomatic corps,

foreign policy institutes, and experience with international political-military cooperation, such an

arrangement would subsequently require less training, effort, and leadership responsibilities from

the U.S. In a qualitative sense, too, historical evidence of multilateralism would indicate the

“sincerity” of potential parties’ interest in a pact. On the other hand, it makes little sense to argue

that a history of multilateralism was required given that many potential Asian members were

newly-independent countries. The Republic of Korea would have simply had no opportunity to

acquire the level of pre-alliance historical experience necessary to satisfy Acheson’s listed

prerequisites prior to the formation of a Pacific Pact.

Additionally, two of the main parties calling for a pact—the ROC and the ROK—had

leaders and governments with little standing in the eyes of American diplomats. Although

Jin 70

military and political limitations on American commitments abroad would have engendered

lukewarm responses to the pact proposals of 1949 anyways, the sense that both Chiang and

Rhee’s government were riddled with corruption and incompetence generated the perception of

an even more unfavorable environment in Asia beyond the already difficult security issues.

Another clue answering why the U.S. responded coolly to the idea of a Pacific Pact lies in

a memorandum sent between from an Asian affairs analyst to the Near Eastern Affairs

department within the State Department on March 1950. In a curious line of reasoning, the

memo argues that a Pacific Pact would entail a concrete defense line in Asia, and in doing so,

would consequently expose more countries than it would protect. A formal defense agreement in

the Far East would have to be followed by agreements in South Asia and the Middle East, so as

to not spark feelings of “abandonment” by those nations outside of the Pacific Pact.

In other

words, formally defining the extent of American commitments was dangerous, inflexible, and

risked serving as a trigger for other commitments elsewhere. If definition posed risks, then the

solution is to be indefinite. American rhetoric could remain equivocal, vague, and generally

supportive, which would allow foreign nations to continue to believe that American support

could be forthcoming in the future.

The United States would have seen the creation of an anti-communist pact in Asia as too

draining on American resources and too definitive in terms of who the pact would both protect

and protect against. In 1949, ambiguity, in terms of reducing anxiety about the availability of

American aid, was the best course of action when the United States itself had no long-term

projection for its commitments in the Asia-Pacific.

“Memorandum from Mr. Hare to Mr. Howard, Subject: Japanese Peace and Security

Settlement.” 17 March 1950, Box 1, Folder “Butterworth’s Peace Treaty Files”, Records

Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, RG 59.

Jin 71

II. Coopting the Pact

Despite the 1949 pact proposals fizzling out by the end of the year, the term “Pacific

Pact” saw a revival beginning with the commencement of negotiations for a Japanese peace

treaty. Strangely enough, American diplomats floated the idea of a multilateral alliance and

sounded out interest from its partners in the Pacific, even though less than a year earlier the State

Department had dismissed a Pact as premature and lacking the requisite enthusiasm among

potential participants. Instead, as the peace treaty transitioned from existing solely on the drafts

of State Department planners to an international negotiating process, the United States found

itself willing to exert the necessary force which could not only formalize an international peace

treaty, but also a collective alliance for Asia.

Of course, American proposals for a “NATO in Asia” never came to fruition, much like

the Chiang-Quirino-Rhee proposal. By April 1951, the State Department abandoned plans for a

multilateral arrangement, repurposing collective security designs into a series of bilateral

agreements. Those agreements culminated in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Mutual Defense

Treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines, and the ANZUS Treaty, which bound together

Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. Despite the non-event of a 1951 Pacific Pact, the reasons

for both American initial intentions and eventual dismissal of the idea reflect the priorities,

mindsets, and strategic considerations of the State Department and other government planning

agencies at the time. Risk was avoided and flexibility maximized. Additionally, despite renewed

American interest in a pact, Korea was distinctly absent from any proposals. Korean exclusion at

this stage brought to the fore the recurring strategic and geopolitical reservations the United

Jin 72

States had towards involvement in Asia, and also emphasized the contingent, coincidental nature

of American support for the ROK during the Korean War.

a. Towards a NATO in Asia

American reliance on Japan was promoted by Cold War considerations, but had difficulty

reconciling with lingering wartime and postcolonial fears from other Asian nations. As discussed

in the previous chapter, Cold War-motivated mindsets led American planners to pivot towards

restoring Japanese sovereignty, in order to bolster American capabilities in East Asia. Yet the

American about-face in its attitude towards Japan was far from universal among nations in the

Asia-Pacific. Largely spared from the dangers of bombings, occupation, or invasion, American

diplomats could not look within their own wartime experiences in order to sympathize with the

tepid response of nations along the western edge of the Pacific Rim when announcing the end of

the occupation in Japan. For countries like Australia, the Philippines, and especially the ROK,

simply labeling Japan as “rehabilitated” did little to assuage the fresh memories of Japan’s

imperial ambitions. The United States faced the difficult task of reassuring both its partners and

other global observers that the end of its occupation in Japan would not endanger long-term

regional security while seeking to obtain short-term advantages against the Soviet Union and the

PRC.

Embedded in a May 5, 1950, draft from the Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs at

the time is a discussion of the two types of concurrent security arrangements discussed by the

U.S. government, although the author of the draft deemed neither as entirely acceptable to

American interests yet. The first possibility could be a “collective security arrangement” with

common standards of mutual defense among any participating nations. The second possibility

Jin 73

would be a quasi-continuation of the status quo, where SCAP and other Allied occupation

authorities in Japan would exercise sovereign control over Japan’s foreign policy and defense. In

either case, the author underlines the importance of the United States maintaining a strong grip

on events in Japan and the region: “The United States and its friendly Allies must continue to be

secured against the possible resurgence of Japanese aggression and Japan must continue to be

secured against possible Soviet-Communist aggression.”

100

A collective alliance, then, was a

convenient option that could bring American partners in the Asia-Pacific region together with

Japan and one another, united by a common goal of anti-communism.

The predominance of security issues was reflected in the composition of Dulles’

negotiating team. When Dulles set off in the summer of 1950 with a small team to begin treaty

negotiations, he borrowed a young colonel, C. Stanton Babcock, from the Army General Staff to

serve as his advisor on military issues. Babcock later recounted, “In our travels to Europe, the

Far East, and to Australia and New Zealand, it became more and more apparent that

acceptance...of a generous peace treaty depended, very materially, on the drafting of strong

security pacts which would satisfy the nations which had been victims of Japanese

aggression.”

101

Dulles’ briefing papers, prepared for him by State Department planners who had

labored over treaty drafts prior to Dulles’ appointment as a special negotiator, also included the

recommendation for a multilateral security pact to be negotiated alongside the peace treaty.

102

100

“Interim U.S. Position in Relation to a Peace Treaty with Japan.” 2 May 1950, Box 1,

Folder “Butterworth’s Treaty Files”, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, RG 59.

101

Major General C. Stanton Babcock (1904-1979), 1964, JFD Oral History Collection.

102

It is important to scrutinize Butterworth’s testimony carefully, as he personally had a

low opinion of Dulles due to Dulles’ tenure as Secretary of State. Butterworth, nevertheless,

confirms that the eventual negotiation of several bilateral alliances was not the original plan

prepared for him—Butterworth himself disagreed with this move as he felt there was no easier

Jin 74

collective alliance, akin to NATO, could simultaneously solve the dual issue of assuring wary

allies about Japan’s reinstatement and initiate a security order in the region for the future.

Nowhere, however, did Korea feature in those security pact ideas.

Military disadvantage was a major reason behind American disinterest. On November 3,

1950, Acheson drafted a statement that attempted to analyze the events in Korea in context: “As

far as the future position in Asia is concerned, it would seem that we must now more closely

limit ourselves to areas subject to sea and air power, which fits our natural role.” America’s

intervention on land in Korea, then, was a grave mistake in Acheson’s eyes. Similarly,

Acheson’s statement reveals an intense feeling that the U.S. had few partners it could rely on in

Asia, declaring that it was “important to accelerate some understanding with Australia and New

Zealand, the only two dependable countries in the Pacific Area.”

103

Acheson’s beliefs towards

the limited capacity and reliability of Asian nations cut directly against any plans for a Pacific

Pact. If the Secretary of the State felt positively about only the two predominantly white

countries in the region as potential members of an alliance, there was evidently little of the

necessary enthusiasm needed to inaugurate a pact. Acheson’s language, too, hints at larger racial

assumptions about whether non-white, formerly colonized countries were could be

“dependable.” The belief that non-white Asian nations lacked the sophistication or political

experience to be dependable American allies would also have especially limited Acheson’s

interest in a multilateral arrangement.

time for the U.S. to pull off a multilateral alliance than in 1950-51. Butterworth, W. Walton

(1903-1975), 1965, JFD Oral History Collection.

103

“Estimate of the Situation,” 3 November 1950. Box 47, John Foster Dulles Selected

Correspondence, John Foster Dulles Papers, Public Policy Papers, RSBC, Princeton.

Jin 75

Acheson’s concerns about land involvement were echoed by Defense officials. A January

4, 1951 memo cited a meeting between State Department officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“[T]he Joint Chiefs made it clear that the Pact which they had in mind should be strictly confined

to the island nations of the Pacific (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United

States, and possibly Indonesia)...”

104

Above all else, the Defense Department feared involvement

in a war on the general Asian mainland. Its defense perimeter, drawn on the western rim of the

Pacific, reflected that geographical limitation. Accordingly, a Pacific Pact could only involve

those nations where the United States could bring its naval and air power to bear.

Such a cautious attitude would be perfectly understandable prior to the start of the Korean

War and the implementation of NSC 68—the April 1950 document that called for the tripling of

America’s defense budget. However, by January 1951, the United States already had more troops

deployed in Korea than in any other country in the world. The ignition of the war sparked an

immense flow of aid, men, and resources to the ROK. Such a transfer of capacity and

commitment to Korea could not be easily reversed, especially as the situation on the peninsula

stabilized and the dramatic gains and losses of the early months of the war settled into a

stalemate roughly along the thirty-eighth parallel. For what reasons would Korea be excluded

from broader security designs in 1951?

b. The Impact of the War

American involvement in Korea, under the banner of the United Nations, had direct

implications for future security designs in Asia. Korea, itself, transformed dramatically in the

104

Emphasis added. “Memorandum from Allison, Subject: Pacific Pact.” 4 Jan 1951, Box

1, Folder “Defense Dept-Correspondence With”, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with

Japan, RG 59.

Jin 76

ensuing upheaval and violence. After the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by the DPRK,

the U.S. faced a decision of whether or not to intervene in the conflict. The Truman

administration entertained a number of possibilities, including whether the invasion was a Soviet

ploy to test American resolve. But Korea’s strategic position relative to Japan raised the

possibility of a communist threat sitting across a narrow strait to the Japanese home islands,

which would have been unacceptable for American security plans.

Additionally, the American intervention was also motivated by concerns of preserving

American prestige in Asia. On the day of the North Korean invasion of the South, Dulles and his

advisor John M. Allison were visiting Tokyo in early treaty negotiations with Japanese leaders.

Merely a week earlier, both diplomats had visited Seoul in a show of American support for the

Rhee regime. Dulles and Allison, only hours after hearing news of the North Korean invasion,

issued an urgent telegram to Acheson:

It is possible South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse attack and, if so,

this is the best way. If, however, it appears that they cannot do so then we believe

US force[s] should be used...To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked

armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to

world war.

105

The tenets of containment rested upon an American show of force wherever necessary. The

psychological factors at stake were more explicitly stated in a telegram several days later from

Acheson to U.S. embassy diplomats: “Importance of the Korean situation not great from

strategic standpoint, but as symbol of strength and determination of the US it is vital.” The

United States would commit to the ROK’s defense, not for Korea’s sake, but in order to present

105

Telegram from Tokyo to the Secretary of State, 25 June 1950. Box 4, Folder “1.

Immediate North Korean Aggression Reaction”, Korean War File, Truman Library.

Jin 77

the image that American partners would be supported against Communist aggression.

106

Such a

move would reassure Japan as well as noncommunist states in the Asia-Pacific. Korea,

regardless of the reasons, was now at the forefront of American involvement in Asia.

But the realities of American commitments on mainland Asia remained and the reversals

in the Korean War confirmed American pessimism that its advantages lay in the sea and air. The

PRC intervention in Korea in late October 1950 dashed American hopes for a quick end to a war

and reignited the belief that the U.S. simply did not have the capacity to win a large-scale land

war in Asia. As UN troops streamed back to the thirty-eighth parallel and Chinese attacks

destroyed the 8

Cavalry Division at the Battle of Unsan, Acheson authored his November 3

memorandum cited earlier, where he claimed that the U.S. should stay away from commitments

in areas on the contiguous Asian mainland. However, Acheson continued in that memorandum

by arguing that the U.S. should hold parts of South Korea regardless of the cost as a defeat would

“put Japan in a position where the nation would probably reconcile itself to falling into Soviet

communist orbit.”

107

Far from launching the ROK to the center of American future interest, the

course of the Korean War actually confirmed American beliefs that any Pacific Pact should

explicitly not involve the Korean peninsula. Korea remained important, militarily, only in

context of securing Japan.

The uncertainty involved with commitments in Asia directly influenced American

diplomats when considering the nature of the Pacific Pact. The dangers in Asia meant that there

was a smaller margin of error involved with negotiating a multilateral alliance that would have

106

Outgoing Telegram to ‘Certain American Diplomatic Officers’, 28 June 1950. Box 4,

Folder “Immediate North Korean Aggression Reaction”, Korean War File, Truman Library.

107

“Estimate of the Situation,” 3 November 1950. Box 47, John Foster Dulles Selected

Correspondence, John Foster Dulles Papers, Public Policy Papers, RSBC, Princeton.

Jin 78

unequivocal definitions on the nature of American involvement in the region. The pact retreated

from the ostensible purpose of its name and settled back into the role of permitting the

completion of the American-led negotiations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and serving as a

tool in Dulles’ toolbox. Although memoranda and policy proposals still used the same label—

"Pacific Pact”—that Chiang Kai-shek, Quirino, and Rhee had used back in 1949, the Pacific Pact

proposals under American guidance of 1950-51 were motivated by fundamentally different

reasons.

108

It appeared to have the same window dressing as the Pact proposals of 1949—and by

extension—the North Atlantic Treaty, but this new pact was not an objective in itself. A Pacific

Pact tethered to the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to allay the suspicions of potential

partners, and to demonstrate that the United States was potentially willing to support nations in

the Asia-Pacific even when it had no material commitments it was prepared to offer. Such an

instrument was necessary given the risks of being definitive and purposeful.

Early setbacks in the Korean War also increased the need for propaganda efforts that

would assert American solidarity in Asia. A January 4, 1951 memo co-authored by Assistant

Secretary for the Far East Dean Rusk circulated through the State Department, outlining the

benefits of a “Pacific Declaration”. A Pacific Declaration would be thematically linked to

proposals of a security-based Pacific Pact, but in effect be entirely separate and disconnected

from the requirements of any multilateral alliance. “A declaration of purposes, which did not of

itself establish the machinery for collective security, would be drafted primarily for its

propaganda effect,” the memo states. “It would therefore be designed to dramatize the

community of interests of the nations participating, [and] their concern for the peoples of

108

Mabon, 158.

Jin 79

Asia.”

109

There are several layers of analysis which to parse through here. Firstly, the declaration

would serve to reassure anxieties among Pacific nations about American security guarantees

through symbolic gestures, making up for the absence of tangible movements towards effecting

an alliance. Secondly, the use of the verb dramatize indicates both Rusk’s own feelings regarding

the lack of actual communal interests among Asia-Pacific nations, as well as reaffirming the

declaration’s role as a propaganda tool.

Additionally, the memo reveals that any declaration, and a subsequent pact, would be as

much directed at the participating nations as it would be for a broader audience. “...every effort

should be made to convince nations in Southeast Asia, for instance, as well as the people of

China, that the interests of the people of Asia were [of] concern [for] the [pact’s] members.”

110

The Far Eastern division of the State Department had circulated a similar memo in December

1950, advocating that “The psychological effect in Asia of a Pacific Declaration would be

particularly important at the present time. It would tend to strengthen the non-Communist nations

of Asia, to counteract the loss of prestige suffered through events in Korea, and to encourage

resistance in Communist-controlled areas.” The memo also argues that the participants of the

declaration would be chosen in order to signal to Asian nations that the United States was open

to the idea of committing itself to anywhere it needed to in Asia.

111

Ambiguity about American

intentions and limits, again, served the State Department well at a time when there was no

consensus about the extent and long-term plans of American designs. Additionally, a statement

109

Emphasis added. “Memorandum from Rusk and Emmerson, Subject: Pacific Pact.” 4

Jan 1951, Box 1, Folder “Defense Dept-Correspondence With”, Records Relating to the Treaty

of Peace with Japan, RG 59.

110

Ibid.

111

Emmerson, J.K. “Pacific Declaration”, 12 Dec 1950, Box 1, Folder “Defense Dept.-

Correspondence With”, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, RG 59.

Jin 80

of purpose and an affirmation of the community of interests between the U.S. and non-

Communist Asia, regardless of the actual absence of actual feelings of camaraderie, could bolster

America’s prestige in Asia.

In a time when reversals in Korea demonstrated how the sheer gravity of a misstep in

Asia, the United States faced the task of simultaneously ensuring that noncommunist resolve

would not collapse while refining security designs to avoid a future catastrophe. In a National

Security Council report dated May 17, 1951, the NSC outlined its belief that American

involvement in Asia had both direct effects—countering communist aggression—and

psychological importance. “The effect of the Korean struggle upon the military and political

prestige of the participants is of the greatest importance to the course of events in other parts of

Asia.”

112

Korea could not be abandoned, for the sake of America’s standing abroad and Japanese

security. But its potential as a key member of American grand security designs for the future of

Asia was distinctly limited by its difficult strategic station.

c. Korean Relations with Japan

Furthermore, Korean involvement in a Pacific Pact would have required addressing the

nature of ROK relations with Japan. Resolving outstanding issues that contributed to the

acrimony between the two nations was far easier said than done. Throughout the negotiation of

the San Francisco Peace Treaty, American diplomats underplayed Japanese war responsibility,

which was a necessary aspect of the U.S. strategy of reinstating Japan without reparations.

Korean nationalism, Rhee’s anti-Japanese public demeanor, and understandable resentment

towards Japan as well as Japanese insouciant attitudes certainly contributed to acrimonious post-

112

FRUS 1951, Volume VI, part 1, Document 12.

Jin 81

war relations between the ROK and Japan. But American officials had low expectations that

Rhee’s diplomacy with Japan would be productive as well as little interest in promoting Korean

interests. As a result, Korean-Japanese diplomacy remained unproductive, and limited the

possibility that the ROK could successfully present itself as an attractive member for a

multilateral alliance that would involve Japan. Once again, American diplomats sidelined Korean

concerns, by perceived necessity, because while Korea may have been the crucible of American

military intervention in Asia, Japan was the cornerstone of American grand strategy.

Rhee, publicly, had contradicting stances towards Japan. On the one hand, he saw the

need for a potential anti-communist partner. On the other hand, the pressures of public anti-

Japanese sentiment, as well as his own interest in presenting himself as an ardent Korean

nationalist, led Rhee often to espouse anti-Japanese rhetoric.

113

American diplomats thus had

good reason to believe that Korean motivations ran directly counter to the U.S. effort to prioritize

Japanese recovery. As recounted in Chapter 2, these views were evidenced by the American

report of the brusque ways the Korean minister to Japan attempted to gain an audience with the

Japanese government in October 1949.

114

However, there was also a push within the ROK government to integrate itself in Asia

regionally and even to restore relations with Japan. There was a concerted effort within the Rhee

government to establish better avenues of contact with the Japanese directly. This was, in part,

due to Korean perceptions that an American-sponsored dialogue would be biased against ROK

113

Cheong, 138; Parrott, Lindesay. Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. "Japanese

Resent Korean President's Demand for Tsushima Islands, Close to their Coast." New York Times

(1923-Current File), Aug 20, 1948.

114

Report from W.J. Sebald to the Secretary of State, 29 Oct 1949, Box 4037, Central

Decimal Files 1945-1949, RG 59, NACP.

Jin 82

interests. In September 1949, Rhee stated in a press conference that “Because there are some

Americans who like Japan, they act in favor of Japan in some points.”

115

The ROK initiated

several attempts beginning in October 1949 to generate trade with Japan, as well as an exchange

of Japanese technicians and anti-communist intelligence-sharing. The American response to

these overtures was mixed. Marshall Green, an analyst at ONAA in the State Department,

commented that the Korean efforts may “disclose a genuine concern on the part of Rhee…and

other Korean leaders for closer ties with Japan. An almost isolated bit of anti-Communist soil in

the North Asian continent, Korea has a good reason to look for a friend in Japan. Such a Korean-

Japanese rapprochement would seem to be in U.S. interests.”

116

At the same time, however, a

SCAP diplomat added his belief that these Korean overtures were of dubious value.

117

Green

himself admitted that “[Japan] has traditionally viewed the Koreans bordering on contempt,” and

that animosity along with the low practicality of Korean-Japanese intelligence sharing would

doom a Northeast Asian anti-communist front before it could get started.

118

ROK efforts to turn a new leaf in ROK-Japanese relations increased with the growing

threat of the DPRK and especially after the start of the Korean War. In a February 1950 visit to

Japan, Rhee himself emphasized the need for cooperation in light of the threat of communism

115

Rhee quote comes from a 30 Sept 1949 press conference, which is reprinted in part in

the following source: Letter from William Sebald to Secretary Acheson, “Korean-Japanese

Relations,” 29 October 1949. Box 4037, Folder 794.95/1-145 - 12-3149, Central Decimal Files

1945-1949, RG 59.

116

“Office Memorandum from Green to Allison.” 29 October 1949, Box 4037, Folder

794.95/1-145 – 12-3149, Central Decimal Files 1945-1949, RG 59.

117

Letter from William Sebald to Secretary Acheson, “Korean-Japanese Relations,” 29

October 1949. Box 4037, Folder 794.95/1-145 - 12-3149, Central Decimal Files 1945-1949, RG

59.

118

“Office Memorandum from Green to Allison.” 29 October 1949.

Jin 83

and concluded several trade deals with Tokyo.

119

One year later, after Korea had experienced

firsthand the instability and violence of the early months of the war, the ROK took efforts to tone

down its own concerns. The ROK National Assembly became increasingly aware that the United

States planned on excluding Korea from both a Pacific Pact and the peace treaty. This awareness

led the Assembly to pass several motions indicating that they would have no objection to a

Pacific “alliance” that would include Japanese armed forces. In other words, Japan could be

rearmed, so long as Korea was not left outside of a pact’s defense line.

The U.S. embassy submitted dispatches summarizing the assembly’s legislative

proceedings, including the transcript of one Korean assemblyman who stated that in the interest

of creating a Pact with the United States and Japan, “[w]e must discard the nationalistic

sentiment we have had in past days.”

120

The accompanying commentary by the American

ambassador, John Muccio, remarked that “[t]his is evidence of the strong pressure which

developments have brought on Korean thinking; such a concept would have been impossible

several months ago and would undoubtedly have been yelled down in the Assembly.”

121

harken back to earlier State Department criticisms of the Chiang-Quirino-Rhee proposals for a

Pacific Pact, it appeared that the Korean War was leading a majority of the ROK’s legislative

political power to discover a “common purpose”, even with a former archenemy like Japan.

119

Rhee’s statements are recounted in a report from the inspector of the U.S. Embassy in

Korea. Letter from Taylor, Foreign Service Inspector, to Perce. 20 Feb 1950. Box 1, Folder

“Pusan 1950”, Seoul Mission and Embassy Misc. Classified Records 1948-1955, RG 84.

120

“Summary of the Proceedings of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea,

Twentieth Meeting, Tenth Regular Session.” 2 Feb 1951, Box 4304, Central Decimal Files 1950-

1954, RG 59.

121

Muccio’s commentary comes from his cover summaries of enclosed files of National

Assembly proceedings. “Transmitting Summaries of Proceedings of the National Assembly,

January 22, 1951 – February 3, 1951.” 8 Feb 1951, Box 4304, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59.

Jin 84

The State Department did not facilitate or support the renewed Korean interest in

rapprochement with Japan. On at least one occasion, American authorities in Japan refused to

grant entry visas to Korean assemblymen who intended to visit Japan on a diplomatic mission,

rebuffing this attempt at Korean-Japanese diplomacy.

122

By July 1951, the extent to which

Dulles and State Department officials in Washington had excluded Korean interests motivated

Ambassador Muccio to pen a sternly-worded complaint back home about his own country’s

conduct. “Korea supposedly [a] liberated nation and Japan the ex-enemy; it is in US interest to

attain stability [between] both countries. Yet I note [that the] most difficult problems affecting

relations [between] Japan and the ROK are being shelved as far as the treaty is concerned…”

Muccio, in the interest of ROK-Japanese relations, argued that the signing of the peace treaty

should even be delayed to allow time for a bilateral treaty between Korea and Japan to be signed

concurrently.

123

Obviously, Muccio’s telegram made little headway in the department, but it is an

indication of how much American diplomats themselves felt frustrated with State Department

policy that dismissed the need to promote ROK-Japanese relations.

Geopolitics synergized with American cultural attitudes as well as pessimistic

perceptions of the Rhee regime, producing a clear preference to avoid involving Korea in a

would-be Pacific Pact. American beliefs of Korean incompetence in the political sphere did not

improve when Rhee’s military collapsed early in the war and then became subordinate to an

American-led command. The deep criticisms of many in the State Department towards the ROK

is expressed well in a November 1950 memorandum penned by the American vice consul for the

122

“Summary of the Proceedings of the National Assembly, Twenty-sixth Meeting,

Tenth Regular Session.” 16 Feb 1951, Box 4304, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59.

123

“Telegram from Pusan to the Secretary of State.” 4 July 1951, Reel 18. Microform

C43, Files of John Foster Dulles, RG 59.

Jin 85

U.S. Embassy in Korea: “The government which Koreans feel we [Americans] sponsor is at an

all-time low in popularity with its own people and does not appear able to exercise effective and

accepted leadership in solving the staggering problems of unification and rehabilitation unless

important changes and reforms are effected.”

124

In the American view, Rhee’s government was

unreliable, ineffective, and an encumbrance.

While concerns about the ROK’s international legitimacy momentarily gave reason for

Dulles’ team to seek Korean participation in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the motivations for

a security pact were tilted towards generating practical, military advantage. In other words, it

was easier for Dulles’ team to exclude Korea from discussions of military pacts rather than the

treaty, because the concept of a mutual defense agreement was vulnerable to domination by a

realist, balance-of-power mindsets and since Korean officials could not claim a “moral” right to

be included in a defense agreement. The ROK’s sacrifices in the war against the communist

threat in Asia was not enough to foster feelings of solidarity from Dulles’ team, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, or relevant policy-movers in the State Department. All of this engendered an

environment where American planners continued to maintain their distance, all the while

negotiating treaties and pacts that drew their borders outside of Korea.

It was in that vein that Dulles’ team never seriously considered a Pacific Pact that would

have included one of its most vocal, early supporters. The American intervention was not out of

any specific interest in Korean concerns, but as an element of the broader effort to combat

communism and make a demonstration on a global scale that the United States would stand by

noncommunist states in the Asia-Pacific. This framing of intervention in Korea, American

pessimism about the ROK’s vulnerable strategic position, and the belief that Korean concerns

124

“A Memorandum Concerning United States Political Objectives in Korea.” 30 Nov

1950, Box 1, Seoul Mission and Embassy Misc. Classifieds, RG 84.

Jin 86

obstructed true American goals in Asia, all resulted in Korean exclusion from the discussions of

a multilateral alliance. Korea itself had few rhetorical resources to call upon to argue for its

inclusion in a pact beyond vociferously aligning itself with the cause of anti-communism.

The Pacific Pact idea itself had fallen apart by early April 1951. On April 17, Acheson

announced a reversal of American policy in a telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia, noting

that Dulles now intended to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with interested parties. It

cites several reasons, including earlier logic that a multilateral arrangement could be damaging

for relations between the U.S. and nations that fell outside of the alliance. The language of the

telegram, however, also points to other assumptions that underpinned American decision-

making. “[A] series of agreements will provide basis of evolutionary development of larger

regional arrangement, if such an arrangement has any basis in reality.” Additionally, “[The] new

approach...has the additional advantage of avoiding [the] position of being merely the first

among equals.”

125

Despite the fact that the plans for a Pacific Pact in 1950-51 emanated from the State

Department, the same objections that Acheson had towards the Rhee-Chiang-Quirino pact

proposals remained. The statement that a larger regional collective might have no “basis in

reality” recalls previous American conclusions that potential Asian participants were only really

interested in obtaining a tangible form of American commitment, rather than any stake in

strengthening bonds between them. Finally, the United States sought to retain its flexibility, even

as it became involved with events on the far edge of its periphery in East Asia. The U.S. had

outsized responsibilities and subsequently saw itself as the heavyweight in a relationship. Like

125

“Telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta,” 17 April 1951. Box 31, Folder “Pacific

Pact 1949-1950”, Files Relating to U.S. Participation in SEATO, RG 59.

Jin 87

the bilateral tendencies in the negotiation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S. favored

dyadic relations where it could maximize its influence against a smaller power.

III. Conclusion

To reassure Pacific countries about a “rehabilitated” Japan, the U.S. was willing to float

the idea of a broader collective alliance, with both economic and military aid flowing from

Washington to its Asian partners. There is no evidence that earlier American pronouncements

about the absence of Asian collective spirit was anything more than a convenient rhetorical

phrase at the time. In doing so, however, the State Department delineated an alliance in the Asia-

Pacific as an Asian idea, promoted by Asian advocates for Asian needs. The Pacific Ocean, for

the State and Defense Department, was a frontier dividing the U.S. from Asia rather than a

common denominator with its own centripetal force. If and when the U.S. found itself interested

in exerting a leadership role in Asia, it would do so solely on its own terms rather than in pursuit

of a broader multilateral idea. While Rooseveltian ideas still had weight in the negotiation of the

peace treaty—with all its ideological connections to equality between nations, rehabilitation, and

peace in the world—calculations of geopolitical security never allowed any such space in the

negotiation of a defense arrangement for the region.

With the start of the Korean War and the crystallization of American grand strategic

commitments in the Asia-Pacific through the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S. in turn

coopted the Pacific Pact idea. But under American direction, the pact was little more than a

means to an end—the end being American domination of Japan’s strategic capacity and

Jin 88

reassurances that the U.S. would be ready in the unlikely event that Japan had imperialist

ambitions in the future.

With little consideration given to the mechanics of a collective organization and with no

interest in developing broader security ties between Asian nations, it was inevitable that the

Pacific Pact proposals would be shelved during the treaty negotiations and replaced with far

simpler and preferable bilateral agreements with key nations in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S.

government’s ironclad requirements that it maintain a distance from risky endeavors and make

room for ambiguity, subsequently, ensured that a multilateral alliance was fundamentally ill-

suited for American preferences. In the context of American ignorance of Asian, especially

Korean, concerns stemming from their experiences in the war in the Pacific, Japanese

rehabilitation and reinstatement as a sovereign state had to occur within the carefully-controlled

confines of American bilateralist negotiating methods. For American diplomats, introducing

other elements, like addressing issues in Korean-Japanese relations, would have caused

unnecessary delays. With the conclusion of a peace treaty and bilateral agreements in Asia, the

United States had decided its path in Asia, even as the final cinders of America’s multilateralist

moment had turned to ash.

Jin 89

Epilogue

A remarkable document included in the files of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the

National Archives is a letter to John Foster Dulles from an individual named Kozo Abe, a

professor based in Tokyo and the spokesman for an informal group of Japanese intellectuals.

Mailed from Tokyo six days before the conference, it is unknown if Dulles ever read it, although

its inclusion in the archives meant that his secretary certainly received it. The letter stated the

group’s opposition to Japanese rearmament, asking that Dulles instead support the cause of

permanent peace in the world. It decried the absence of reparations in the peace treaty draft,

claiming that it disregarded the interests of Asian peoples seeking to rebuild an Asia “destroyed

by the Japanese army and navy.” Abe acknowledged how little he could hope to influence the

conference proceedings, but nevertheless pleaded that the peace treaty and its accompanying

security treaty “may isolate Japan from all other Oriental peoples, present a great threat against

the peace of the world, and endanger the real independence of Japan.”

126

Abe’s misgivings about the peace treaty stem from how the United States positioned

Japan within the American defense structure in Asia. By itself, we cannot take Kozo’s letter as

representative of either the Japanese public, or even the intellectual class. However, it does

demonstrate that some observers even within Japan believed that the American diplomats behind

the peace treaty were not taking broader Asian grievances into account. By speeding up the

process of the return of Japanese sovereignty and ignoring residual wartime resentment, Japan

126

Letter from Kozo Abe to the ‘Chairman of the San Francisco Peace Conference’, 3

Sept 1951, Box 3, Folder “Letters Sent to Conference”, Files Relating to the Treaty of Peace

with Japan, RG 59.

Jin 90

faced a future of isolation. But Abe’s feared-Japanese isolation was itself the result of a broader

diplomatic mechanism at work, where the peace treaty served as an instrument that would bring

the Cold War to Japan and, in doing so, remove American involvement from the process of

Japanese reconciliation with World War II. Despite American dominance of politics in Northeast

Asia at the time, it would be up to future generations of Korean and Japanese political leaders to

restore normalized relations.

American exclusion of Korea from the peace treaty and the would-be Pacific Pact may

have isolated Korea, but it also isolated Japan. No multilateral framework was in place to share

the burden of reestablishing ties between Japan and its Asian nations. Nor was the arena set to

promote intra-Asian cooperation. The peace treaty represented a key moment when the United

States firmly chose to avoid handling intricate, morally-difficult, wartime questions. This choice

was not merely the result of realpolitik mindsets or at the urging of any one individual, but rather

an institutional outcome that derived from decades of America marginalizing Korea and having

few concrete plans to uphold the lofty multilateralist rhetoric that the State Department had

espoused during World War II.

The Rooseveltian idea of sovereign nations equal to one another despite differing levels

of capacity was firmly substituted with the reality that America now saw the world through a

Cold War lens. Putting a de jure end to the war with Japan was vital in pursuit of implementing a

new Cold War strategy, and not as an objective in and of itself. To the rejoicing of some, like the

group of Japanese businessmen who visited Nebraska in early 1952 and lauded the treaty for not

being that of a “conqueror’s”, and to the dismay of others, like Kozo Abe, the United States was

eager to pronounce Japan “rehabilitated” and ready to bear the responsibility of the anti-

communist crusade. There had occurred a premature end to a conversation of how to address the

Jin 91

history of Japanese colonialism, and how Japan should interact with countries that it had

formerly controlled.

U.S. reception of and later proposals for a Pacific Pact, a would-be NATO in Asia,

demonstrated the extent to which the framing of issues in national security terms could obliterate

multilateral idealism. Although the United Nations had intervened in the Korean War ostensibly

on behalf of the ROK, Korea—despite all of its interests, concerns, and claims of moral

redress—merely served as a symbol of American commitment to anti-communism in Asia. The

State Department actively ignored Korean issues and concerns whenever such matters impeded

the grand strategic timeframe. Korea transformed from a colonial state to a partner of the U.S.,

dependent solely on American interest in a bilateral relationship to survive. Cultural attitudes

may not have been the primary decider of American grand strategic actions, but they lent

credence to the same conclusions American diplomats reached through myopic Cold War

mindsets. American ignorance of Korean concerns gave all the more reason to sideline those

issues during the treaty and pact negotiations. Giving the ROK a voice, as Dulles might have

described it, would have opened a Pandora’s Box of unaddressed issues that would unacceptably

delay the advancement of American grand strategy.

When there was a historic moment for the United States to engineer ROK-Japanese

reconciliation, American officials balked. As the image of Communism rolling across Asia

burned itself in their minds, resolving the bitter legacy of Japanese control of Korea was a low

priority. The requirements of the Cold War, mixed with an inadequate American appreciation for

what constituted a valid World War II experience in the Asia-Pacific, culminated in the decision

to exclude the Republic of Korea from the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

Jin 92

In the nearly seventy years since the peace treaty, South Korea and Japan have both

remained as central figures in American strategy in Asia. A deployment in Korea or Japan is

common for American military personnel. American foreign affairs are intertwined with Japan

and South Korean policies, due to persisting security concerns in the region. Japan and South

Korea put together played host to a whopping thirty percent of American military personnel

deployed overseas in 2017. Despite the closeness of both countries to the United States, charged

issues stemming from Japan’s history of involvement in Korea and perceptions of historical

revisionism have plagued the efforts of some American planners to build a trilateral alliance

between the three. Colonial and wartime legacies have not disappeared with time, but instead

have festered and mutated despite some attempts to resolve the animosity.

127

American actions in 1950-51 represent a missed chance, as American diplomats chose to

follow the expedient course of action, sharply curtailing the extent of high-minded visions for a

postwar Asia. The U.S. had set the foundations for its grand strategy and discovered a concrete

base from which it could respond to the uncertainty, chaos, and contingency of events in the

Asia-Pacific. But Pandora’s Box could not be kept closed forever, and the casualties of U.S.

grand strategy in East Asia have continued to haunt the present day.

127

South Korea and Japan reached an agreement in 1965 to normalize relations, which

included Japanese “reparations” in the form of soft loans and economic aid. The ROK was then

under the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee, who used Japanese reparations to promote his

country’s development. This has complicated questions of reparations and redress for specific

Korean victims who were not individually compensated and feel that Japan’s government has

remained unrepentant of the past.

Jin 93

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