Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes, Bennett Clifford

FEBRUARY 2018

THE TRAVELERS

American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq

Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes, Bennett Cliord

Program on Extremism

February 2018

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Contents

Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... v

A Note from the Director ........................................................................................vii

Foreword ........................................................................................................................ ix

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1

Introduction: American Jihadist Travelers ........................................................5

Foreign Fighters and Travelers to Transnational Conflicts:

Incentives, Motivations, and Destinations .....................................................................5

American Jihadist Travelers: 1980–2011 ...........................................................................6

How Do American Jihadist Travelers Compare to Other Western Counterparts? ............8

Methodology and Statistics ....................................................................................... 11

Definitions ..........................................................................................................................12

Statistics .............................................................................................................................. 17

Category 1: Pioneers .................................................................................................... 23

Abdullah Ramo Pazara .......................................................................................................23

Ahmad Abousamra ............................................................................................................30

Pioneers: Enduring Relevance for Jihadist Groups .........................................................35

Category 2: Networked Travelers ......................................................................... 39

Clusters ...............................................................................................................................39

Families ...............................................................................................................................46

Friends ................................................................................................................................49

Networked Travelers: Why “Strength in Numbers” Matters ......................................... 52

Category 3: Loners ....................................................................................................... 55

“Mo” ....................................................................................................................................55

Mohamad Jamal Khweis ....................................................................................................62

Loners: Can Virtual Networks Replace Physical Recruitment? .....................................68

Returning American Travelers ..............................................................................71

Recruitment, Returnees, Reintegration: Challenges

Facing the U.S. Regarding Jihadist Travelers ..............................................................71

Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud ...........................................................................................73

Criminal Justice Approaches to Returning Travelers ..................................................... 75

Addressing the Threat of American Jihadist Travelers .............................. 79

Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 85

Notes ................................................................................................................................. 87

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | v

Acknowledgements

his report was made possible by the dedicated and tireless work of the Program on Extremism’s staff. The au-

thors wish to thank the Program’s Director Dr. Lorenzo Vidino, as well as research fellows Audrey Alexander,

Katerina Papatheodorou, and Helen Powell for their invaluable insight and significant contributions to the meth-

odology and construction of this report. Several of the Program’s research assistants, including Silvia Sclafani,

Tanner Wrape, Sarah Metz, Grant Smith, Gianluca Nigro, and Aaron Meyer, assisted in editing and verifying the

final product. The authors also thank Larisa Baste for designing this report.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the George

Washington University.

The Program on Extremism

The Program on Extremism at the George Washington University provides analysis on issues related to violent

and non-violent extremism. The Program spearheads innovative and thoughtful academic inquiry, producing

empirical work that strengthens extremism research as a distinct field of study. The Program aims to develop

pragmatic policy solutions that resonate with policymakers, civic leaders, and the general public.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | vii

A Note from the Director

Since its foundation, the Program on Extremism has made analysis of all aspects of the Syria and Iraq-related jihad-

ist mobilization in the United States one of its cornerstones. In 2015, it released its flagship report, ISIS in America:

From Retweets to Raqqa, which provided the foundation for various congressional hearings and is currently used as

a training text by law enforcement and intelligence agencies throughout the country. The Program then released

several groundbreaking studies: Cruel Intentions: Female Jihadists in America, a seminal study on the radicalization

of women; Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West, which analyzed all jihadist attacks in the

West since the declaration of the Caliphate; and Digital Decay: Tracing Change Over Time Among English-Language

Islamic State Sympathizers on Twitter, part of the Program’s larger effort to monitor various jihadist activities online.

The Program also regularly releases two related products: the Extremism Tracker, our monthly update which details

terrorism-related activities and court proceedings in the United States, and the Telegram Tracker, a quarterly analysis

documenting our researchers’ data collection of pro-Islamic State channels with English-language content on the

messaging application Telegram.

Our latest report, The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq, provides a uniquely comprehensive analysis of

the phenomenon of American foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Drawing on thousands of pages of documents and

dozens of exclusive-access interviews (including with returning foreign fighters), the report describes a phenome-

non that is bound to have enormous implications on the security environment for the coming years. As the nature

of the threat evolves, the Program on Extremism is committed to continuing its effort to produce evidence-based

and non-partisan analysis to support sound policymaking and public debate.

Dr. Lorenzo ViDino

Director, Program on Extremism

February 2018

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | ix

Foreword

he declaration of a caliphate by Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi in 2014 generated excitement among

Salafi-jihadist Muslims worldwide. Here, at last, was the

restoration of the long-awaited Islamic State that would

go on to conquer the world for Islam. Coming at the

crest of victories by the forces of the Islamic State of Iraq

and al-Sham (ISIS), an organization that traced its origins

to the insurgency in Iraq following the American-led

invasion of that country, Baghdadi’s audacious assertion

seemed to carry weight.

The anti-government protests in Syria—one dimen-

sion of the wave of uprisings that swept across North

Africa and the Middle East beginning in 2011—and

the Syrian government’s brutal response, had already

attracted foreign volunteers to the ranks of the rebels.

The Islamic State, as the caliphate was called, attracted

tens of thousands of additional recruits, far more than

the mujahideen who joined the Afghan resistance against

Soviet occupation in the 1980s or those who passed

through al-Qaeda’s training camps in the 1990s.

Some recruits came to the Islamic State as pilgrims,

escaping what they considered to be the oppression of

residing among infidels, to live among like-minded be-

lievers and build the new province of faith. Others came

to fight in the ranks of the Islamic State’s forces, perhaps

to participate in the final battle between Muslims and

unbelievers, prophesized in Sunni eschatology. Still

others came to gain the training and battle experience

that would enable them to assemble new organizations

that would launch new jihadist fronts at home.

The declaration of the Islamic State posed little immedi-

ate threat to U.S. homeland security, although ISIS went

out of its way to provoke revulsion and create enemies

abroad. The reaction in Washington was one of alarm.

One alarmed senator asserted that “we are in the most

dangerous position we ever have been as a nation.”

Another warned that American troops had to be sent to

Syria “before we all get killed here at home.” The public

mostly agreed.

In response to the Islamic State’s atrocities, an American-

led coalition began bombing ISIS targets and assisting

Iraqi and locally recruited ground forces in September

2014. Meanwhile, Syrian government forces and Iranian-

created militias, assisted by Russian air power beginning

in 2015, closed the ring on the Islamic State’s forces in

western Syria.

While guerrillas and terrorists are difficult to destroy,

defending territory in open battle against militarily su-

perior foes is generally a losing proposition. By the end

of 2017, the territorial expression of the Islamic State had

been almost entirely eliminated, although most analysts

believed that the armed struggle would continue.

Many of the foreign fighters died in the defense of cities

and towns held by the Islamic State. They were fervent

and expendable. They were often volunteers for suicide

missions. And they would have no future in an under-

ground contest, especially those from countries outside

of the region. Those not killed fled, some to other jihad-

ist fronts; many returned home.

Some of the returnees, no doubt, were disillusioned

by the brutal experience of life under the bloodthirsty

rule of the Islamic State’s merciless application of its

interpretation of Islamic governance, although some

foreign fighters enthusiastically participated in its bar-

barities. Some were traumatized by the savage warfare

that marked its defeat. Yet some escaped with their

commitment intact, determined to carry on the jihad.

As this book illustrates, the recruiters for future jihads

arise from past jihadist campaigns.

This excellent volume examines the experience of the

American jihadists in Syria and Iraq. It represents an-

other installment in the continuing research carried

out by George Washington University’s Program on

by brian Michael Jenkins

x | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

ForeWord

Extremism, which has already produced a number of

informative reports on various aspects of radicalization.

Far fewer foreign volunteers traveled to the Islamic

State from the United States than from Europe. The

estimated number of foreign volunteers from Europe

ranges from 5,000 to 6,000, most of them from France,

Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom, while U.S.

officials speak of several hundred—an all-in number that

includes those arrested before leaving the United States,

those arrested abroad, and those known to be killed. The

numbers remain a bit murky. Most of the 250 to 300

American jihadist recruits mentioned by authorities have

not been publicly identified, suggesting on-going inves-

tigations, sealed indictments, and some uncertainty.

This study examines 64 of these travelers in greater detail

than any previous study. The thoroughness of the re-

search offers new insights. It is typically not the purpose

of a foreword to summarize a book’s conclusions, but

some of the authors’ observations merit reinforcement.

One is that, consistent with earlier research, there is no

single profile of the American travelers and their mo-

tives vary greatly.

While much is made of the Islamic State’s recruiting

via the Internet and social media, the authors find that

in-person contacts played a major role in recruiting and

facilitating travel from the United States to Syria. It

would be an overstatement to say that there is an orga-

nized jihadist underground in the United States, but this

research shows that there is a patchwork of connections,

some reaching back to the Balkans conflicts of the early

1990s. This connectivity offers domestic intelligence op-

erations with leads to unravel and suggests that a small

number of key individuals play a significant role in any

new mobilization. Ensuring that the connections do not

coalesce into a larger web must be a primary objective of

counterterrorism strategy.

Returning foreign fighters pose only one dimension of a

multilayered threat. Some analysts fear that the Islamic

State’s leadership will seek to launch major terrorist attacks

in the West in revenge for the destruction of the caliphate.

Deprived of its nation-building message, the Islamic State’s

propaganda now focuses on war. U.S.-bound commercial

flights offer another vector of terrorist attack, one that

has engrossed al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Most

jihadist terrorist plots in the United States, however, have

been the schemes of domestic jihadists who did not go

abroad. They are more likely to carry out attacks than are

returning travelers.

The good news is that the destruction of the Islamic State’s

territorial enterprise deprives fervent jihadists of an acces-

sible destination. However, this is also the bad news. The

most determined, most prone to violence, have nowhere

to go. Will the closing of this escape valve presage an in-

crease in homegrown jihadist plots?

The numbers suggest that only a fraction of the volun-

teers who traveled to the Islamic State will return. And

thus far, very few of those returning to Europe or the

United States have been involved in plotting terrorist

attacks after their return. But as demonstrated in the

2014–2016 terrorist campaign in France and Belgium,

the greatest danger comes from a combination of return-

ing foreign fighters and local confederates. The United

States, however, lacks the large, alienated immigrant

diasporas of Europe where returning foreign fighters can

more easily find hideouts and accomplices. It is import-

ant that American attitudes and policies do not create

such conditions.

Arrest, surveillance, and suspicion by other would-be

jihadists who fear that any returning foreign fighters still

at large are likely to be police informants may suffice to

keep the returnees isolated. Imprisonment alone will not

solve the problem. Most homegrown jihadists as well

as those who went abroad were first radicalized in the

United States. Returnees disillusioned by their experi-

ence abroad could be recruited in efforts to discourage

homegrown terrorism and recruitment to new jihadist

fronts abroad.

Brian MichaeL Jenkins

February 2018

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 1

Executive Summary

his study reflects the most comprehensive, publicly

available accounting of Americans who traveled to

join jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq since 2011. It iden-

tifies 64 travelers, the largest available sample to date.

These individuals, and their stories, were uncovered

during a multi-year investigation. Authors interviewed

law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and defense

attorneys, and attended relevant court proceedings.

Additionally, they reviewed thousands of pages of legal

documents, filing information requests and federal court

motions to unseal records where necessary. Finally, the

authors conducted several interviews with American

travelers who returned from the territories held by the

Islamic State (IS).

Travel or attempted travel to jihadist-held territory in

Syria and Iraq is one of the most popular forms of mobi-

lization for American jihadist sympathizers. In addition

to successful travelers, at least 50 Americans attempt-

ed to travel but were prevented from doing so by law

enforcement. These cases constitute approximately one-

third of the 153 Americans who have been arrested on

Islamic State–related charges from 2011 to 2017. Cases

of travel or attempted travel to Syria or Iraq have steadily

decreased since 2015.

The study finds that there is no single profile of an

American traveler, although some demographic trends

reflect the broader population of jihadist supporters

in the United States. Travelers tend to be male, with

an average age of 27. They generally affiliated with IS

upon arrival in Syria or Iraq. The three states with the

highest proportional rates of recruitment are Minnesota,

Virginia, and Ohio.

Based on the underlying factors behind their travel,

how they made their journey, and what role they took

in jihadist groups, American travelers can broadly be

classified using the following three categories. Using

case studies, this report contains analyses of each cat-

egory of traveler.

•

Pioneers arrived early in Syria and Iraq and ascended

to some level of leadership in their respective jihad-

ist organizations. They are distinguished from other

travelers due to previous experience with critical

skills relevant to their organization—such as military

training, past participation in jihadist movements,

proficiency in religious doctrine or producing ideo-

logical material, and technical skills (bomb-making,

computer skills, etc.). Due to these abilities, pioneers

attain coveted positions within jihadist groups.

They often use their roles to reach out to individuals

within their network and encourage them to provide

support to jihadist groups. However, only a select few

individuals have the skills and abilities necessary to

become pioneers. Four travelers (6.3%) in the sample

are coded as pioneers, making it the smallest category

in number, but far larger if assessed in terms of their

impact on the jihadist movement.

•

Networked travelers use personal contacts with

like-minded supporters of jihadist groups in the U.S.

to facilitate their travel. In some of these cases, a

group of individuals, usually connected by kinship,

friendship, or community ties, travel together to

Syria or Iraq. Others, while traveling by themselves,

had contact with individuals in the U.S. who support-

ed their journey by providing financial or logistical

support, or with individuals who were involved

in supporting jihadist groups in other ways (e.g.

through committing or planning attacks). These

groups can be as small as two, and in one case, at

least a dozen individuals, all from the same commu-

nity and/or social network. Eighty seven percent of

the travelers for whom information is available had

some form of personal connection to other travelers

or jihadist supporters.

•

Loners are exceptions to the norm regarding the

recognized importance of networks in facilitating

travel. In contrast to networked travelers, loners

travel seemingly without the assistance of anyone

2 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

execUTive sUmmary

whom they know personally. Yet, despite appar-

ently lacking these facilitative links, they manage to

reach Syria and Iraq without being apprehended. To

make up for the lack of personal connections, loners

often turn to the internet, reaching out to virtual

connections who assist them in making the deci-

sion to travel and completing the journey. Six cases

(9.4%) in the sample were coded as loners. Loners’

stories counter common assumptions regarding

jihadist mobilization and travel facilitation. Due to

the complex, individualized factors that drive their

personal decisions, developing responses to loners is

an exceptional challenge.

The U.S. faces differing threats from each category.

Of significant concern to U.S. law enforcement is the

specter of American travelers returning to the U.S. from

Syria and Iraq. American returned travelers may bolster

domestic jihadist networks by sharing expertise, radical-

izing others, or committing attacks.

This study finds that to date, the phenomenon of return-

ing travelers has been limited in the U.S. context. From

the 64 travelers identified by name, 12 returned to the

U.S. Nine of those returnees were arrested and charged

with terrorism-related offenses. The remaining three

have, so far, not faced public criminal charges related

to their participation in jihadist groups in Syria or Iraq.

As of January 1, 2018, no returned travelers from Syria

and Iraq have successfully committed a terrorist attack

in the U.S. following their re-entry. Only one of the

12 returnees identified in this study returned with the

intent to carry out an attack on behalf of a jihadist group

in Syria. This individual was apprehended in the early

planning stages of their plot.

Therefore, the risk of returned travelers being engaged

in terrorist attacks has, to date, been limited. There have

been 22 jihadist attacks from 2011 to 2017; none of them

were committed by a perpetrator who was known to

have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups.

Thus, “homegrown” extremists currently appear to be

more likely to commit domestic jihadist attacks than

returning travelers.

Yet, returning travelers pose other threats. If left unad-

dressed, returnees can augment jihadist networks in the

U.S., provide others with knowledge about how to travel

and conduct attacks, and serve as nodes in future jihadist

recruitment. Throughout the history of American ji-

hadist travelers, several individuals who were formative

to future mobilizations had returned to the U.S. from

fighting with jihadist groups overseas.

To address this threat, the U.S. may consider broadening

its options to counter jihadist travel and respond to the

risk from returnees.

•

The American traveler contingent defies a single

profile, and approaches should account for their

diverse nature. The categories of travelers present-

ed in this study can assist in developing a basis for

classification and review of the threat posed by

individual travelers.

•

The roles of travelers who hold non-combatant roles

in jihadist groups should be considered. Of note are

women travelers, who traditionally assume auxiliary

roles in jihadist groups. They function in logistical

and financial capacities, as well as more communal,

day-to-day operations. The U.S. should also develop

a comprehensive process for returning children, who

cannot be prosecuted and should be re-integrated

into society.

• Unlike many other countries, American laws crim-

inalizing jihadist travel were in place well before the

mobilization to Syria and Iraq. The statutory law offers

law enforcement flexibility and leeway in charging

travelers. However, in some cases, prosecution is

infeasible. At times, it is difficult to garner evidence

about a traveler’s activities in Syria and Iraq that is

admissible in a court of law. As a result, prosecutors

are often forced to charge returned travelers with

lesser offenses. While the average prison sentence

for individuals who attempted (but failed) to travel

to Syria and Iraq is approximately 14 years, the seven

successful travelers that have been convicted from

2011–2017 received an average sentence of ten years

in prison.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 3

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

•

Considering that many convicted American travel-

ers will be released within the next five to ten years,

prison deradicalization programs should be regarded

as a priority. There are no deradicalization or reha-

bilitation programs for jihadist inmates in the U.S.

federal prison system. Without these programs,

incarcerated travelers have few incentives to renege

on their beliefs, and may attempt to build networks

in prison or radicalize other prisoners.

•

Programs designed to prevent future radicalization

also require sustained official attention. Disillusioned

American returnees may have some role to play in

these programs as effective providers of interventions.

If national-level targeted intervention programming

is developed, efforts can be informed by the successes

and failures of local initiatives, as well as similar proj-

ects developed in other countries.

•

Digital communications technologies are useful

tools for facilitating jihadist travel. Yet, regulation

(e.g. censorship, content and account deletion, reg-

ulating or banning privacy-maximizing tools) of

online platforms favored by jihadists may have little

effect on travel facilitation networks. While the

availability of jihadist propaganda has undoubtedly

diminished on open platforms due to content remov-

al, American travelers tend to access such material on

lesser-known online repositories. Travelers also mi-

grated to alternative social media platforms and use

a range of privacy-maximizing services—including

virtual private networks, anonymous browsers, and

encrypted messengers—to access content, communi-

cate with recruiters, and mask their locations.

If the previous mobilizations of American jihadists to

Afghanistan, Bosnia, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, or

elsewhere are any guide, individuals and dynamics from

one mobilization often play outsized roles in future re-

cruitment networks. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the

U.S. government, American civil society organizations,

and scholars of jihadism to use the lessons from the

Syria- and Iraq-related mobilizations to develop pro-

active and comprehensive policies to address American

jihadist travel.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 5

Introduction: American Jihadist Travelers

ince the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has reported

that 300 Americans attempted to leave or have left the

U.S. with the intention of fighting in Iraq and Syria.

While the details of many of these cases remain either

unknown or obscure, this study is among the first to

offer an overview and analysis of America’s jihadist

travelers. Drawing on an array of primary sources, in-

cluding interviews with returnees, court documents, and

the online footprints of known travelers, it sheds light

on why and how they joined jihadist groups, and what

threat they currently pose to the U.S.

After an introductory discussion of the current liter-

ature on the topic, including the history of American

involvement in foreign jihadist conflicts, the study

provides the most comprehensive publicly available sta

tistical breakdown of this phenomenon. This approach

helped inform the creation of a new typology of jihadist

travelers: pioneers, networked travelers, and loners.

These sections will also include select in-depth analyses

of some of the more revealing case studies that best

exemplify each category. Next, the report documents

cases of American travelers who returned to the U.S.,

assessing their threat and the current U.S. response. The

study concludes with a set of recommendations for both

government and civil society.

Foreign Fighters and Travelers

to Transnational Conflicts: Incentives,

Motivations, and Destinations

In absolute terms, the current mobilization of foreign

fighters and jihadist travelers to Syria and Iraq outnum-

bers all other mobilizations to jihadist conflicts during

the past 40 years.

Estimates of the total number of

foreigners who have traveled to Syria and Iraq broadly

range between 27,000 and 31,000, the majority of whom

originate from North Africa and the Middle East.

At its

peak, an estimated 2,000 jihadist travelers were crossing

the Turkish border into Syria weekly; since 2016, this

number has decreased to around 50 crossings due to the

declining territorial holdings of the Islamic State of Iraq

and Syria (IS) and increased border enforcement by the

Turkish government.

Foreign Fighters vs. Travelers

David Malet defines the term “foreign fighters” as

“non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies

during civil conflicts.”

According to this definition, “for-

eign fighters” would comprise a significant percentage of

the individuals in the sample. However, it is worth noting

that this terminology does not account for individuals

who joined the Syrian and Iraqi jihadist insurgencies

with different motives, roles, and backgrounds. Instead,

this study uses the term “travelers” to refer to the U.S.

persons who have traveled to Syria or Iraq since 2011 to

participate in jihadist formations.

The term “foreign fighter” presumes an individual’s mo-

tivations, and their role in the organization in question.

While most of the individuals in the sample left their

homes for Syria and Iraq specifically to participate in

conflict and served in combat roles upon arrival, some

did not. The rise of IS, whose mission was framed not

only in terms of attacks and military campaigns but also

addressed legitimate, religio-political governance, drew

individuals who (albeit misguidedly) traveled to join

the group in the hopes of living peacefully in the new,

self-declared Caliphate while avoiding combat. It is also

important to point to the roles of women in these jihad-

ist organizations; while most groups prohibit women

from combat, they hold active and essential positions

in day-to-day operations and management.

Thus, the

term “traveler” more closely encapsulates not only those

who travel to fight in jihadist groups, but also those with

different intentions.

Motivations

Currently, the Syrian conflict has the lion’s share of

the global base of jihadist recruits.

Yet, it is a mistake

to assume that all travelers were drawn to Syria for

6 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

inTrodUcTion: american JihadisT Travelers

the same reasons. Many travelers who left for Syria in

the years directly after 2011 did so in reaction to per-

ceived injustices committed by the Syrian regime. Some

were not attracted to a specific jihadist group prior to

traveling, but later made networked connections that

dictated their choice of organization. A number of these

individuals likely went abroad rather than staying home

to plot attacks largely because of the opportunity and

“social desirability” of waging jihad.

However, with the

emergence of specific organizations like IS and Jabhat

al-Nusra (JN), an increasing number of travelers had

decided which group to join prior to leaving.

Before 2011, data on travelers were largely incomplete.

The overall number provided small sample sizes unsuit-

able for generalization. Scholars are still at an impasse

in determining the factors that have led to jihadist

travel over the years; however, new data establish some

macro-level trends.

The recent Syria and Iraq–based

mobilizations generated a more extensive dataset of ji-

hadist travelers for study. When analyzed, they disprove

some common explanations of why individuals travel

abroad to participate in jihadist organizations.

The overarching assessment of scholars of jihadist

radicalization and mobilization is that sweeping, unidi-

mensional theories of why individuals fight overseas lack

methodological rigor, are driven by political or personal

biases, or both.

The most comprehensive studies utilize

a multitude of methods from across social and political

sciences to explain what is, in essence, a highly person-

alized and individual decision. They also admit that a

theory which is useful in one test case may not be helpful

in another.

Some theories of mobilization focus on socio-economic

barriers (unemployment, poverty, “marginalization”/

lack of societal integration) as motivators for individuals

to fight abroad. At face value, some of these factors may

appear to be reasonable or logical explanations for mo-

bilization. At best, however, studies have demonstrated a

weak correlation between economic variables and jihadist

travel.

On one hand, some studies find that a substantial

number of individual jihadist travelers from a specific

country had financial problems, were unemployed, or

living on social welfare.

However, when applied to

the American context, these trends appear to be less

illustrative. The sample of American IS supporters cut

across economic boundaries, and American Muslims

as a population tend to experience greater levels of

economic success and integration than their counter-

parts in other Western countries.

Simultaneously, a

near-consensus of studies also show that there is no

correlation between a country’s economic performance

indicators and the number of travelers in Syria and Iraq

from that country.

Another single-factor theory that merits discussion is

the argument that jihadist traveler mobilization stems

from increased access to digital communications tech-

nology, and the strategies that jihadist organizations use

to recruit and mobilize followers online. Undeniably,

the internet has become foundational to how jihad-

ist organizations recruit, network, and communicate

within their ranks; a number of cases within this dataset

reflect these dynamics. That notwithstanding, there are

very few cases wherein a traveler radicalized, decided to

travel, traveled, and reached their destination without

any offline connections.

At some point in this process,

travelers must make the jump from the online world into

real-life interactions.

American Jihadist Travelers: 1980–2011

Some estimates place the number of U.S. persons in-

volved in overseas jihadist movements from 1980 to 2011

at more than a thousand.

During this 30-year period,

the destinations chosen by Americans fighting overseas

varied geographically and temporally. The conflicts and

areas that drew in the most American jihadist travelers

included the conflict in Afghanistan during the 1980s,

the 1990s civil war in Bosnia, and the mid-2000s cam-

paigns waged by al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda and

Taliban affiliates on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

There is additional evidence of American jihadist par-

ticipation in other conflicts, including in Yemen and the

North Caucasus.

The major networks of jihadist traveler recruitment in

the U.S. mainly began during the Soviet occupation of

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 7

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

Afghanistan.

Several individuals linked to the initial

iteration of al-Qaeda, including the “father of jihad”

Abdullah Azzam, were active in recruiting Americans

to join the mujahideen (jihadist fighters) fighting against

the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Under the front of

charity or relief organizations, these recruiters set up

shop in several American cities and drew from the base

of individuals who attended their lectures and speeches

to recruit foreign fighters.

Sources vary on how many

Americans were active in Afghanistan in the 1980s. J.M.

Berger has identified at least thirty cases of Americans

participating in the Afghan jihad, some of whom contin-

ued onwards to other conflicts, and others who returned

to the U.S.

Some individuals from this first

mobilization in Afghanistan simply

moved onwards to the next set of

jihadist conflicts, in particular to the

civil war in 1990s Bosnia. One ex-

ample is Christopher Paul, a Muslim

convert from the Columbus, Ohio,

area who participated in al-Qaeda

training camps in Afghanistan during

the late 1980s and early 1990s, and

later joined the foreign fighter bri-

gades active on the Bosnian Muslim

side of the civil war.

At the conclusion of the conflict

in Bosnia, Paul traveled through Europe and made a

number of connections with al-Qaeda cells. He subse-

quently returned to the U.S. and attempted to recruit

his own network of jihadist supporters in Columbus.

After almost two decades of participating in jihadist

movements in numerous countries, Paul was arrested

by the FBI in 2007.

A 2014 RAND study identified 124 Americans who

traveled or attempted to travel overseas to join jihadist

groups after September 11, 2001.

Almost one-third

were arrested before reaching their destinations, and

approximately 20% were reportedly killed overseas.

The most popular destination for jihadist travelers was

Pakistan (37 cases), followed closely by Somalia (34

cases); al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab were the two most pop-

ular jihadist groups.

Pakistan became the preferred destination for jihadist

travelers seeking to join al-Qaeda’s main corpus of fight-

ers in South Asia. The 2001 U.S. military engagement

in Afghanistan forced al-Qaeda to relocate its infra-

structure to Pakistan.

From 2007 onward, Somalia

outpaced Pakistan as the primary destination for trav

elers.

One other conflict zone of note is Yemen, where

two powerhouses of the American jihadist scene made

their mark on anglophone jihadist recruitment net-

works. The New Mexico–born cleric Anwar al Awlaki,

already well-known for preaching jihad on both sides

of the Atlantic, traveled to Yemen in 2004 and joined

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Together

with another American, Samir Khan, the two created

the AQAP magazine Inspire, which became formative

in radicalizing future decades of

English-speaking jihadists.

Three phenomena from these

pre-Syria mobilizations of American

travelers may help shed light on the

dynamics characterizing the current

wave of travelers. First, as is the

case now, a significant proportion

of jihadist travelers to Afghanistan,

Bosnia, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen

appeared to have done so in connec-

tion with networks—close communities, friendship and

acquaintance groups, and families.

Cases of attacks in

the U.S. perpetrated by individuals who returned from

jihad overseas are very rare. The RAND study found that

90% of the jihadists in the survey were either arrested in

the U.S. prior to traveling, killed or arrested overseas, or

arrested directly after returning home.

In their sample,

9 of the 124 travelers returned to the U.S. and planned

attacks—none of these plots came to fruition or resulted

in any deaths.

These two factors point to the third and likely most

important phenomenon: the individuals who have

been most influential in recruiting American jihad-

ists are those who act as “links” between the various

mobilizations. These are the individuals who, upon

conclusion or dispersal of a conflict, move onwards

to the next battlefield and form connections between

“Some estimates

place the number

of U.S. persons

involved in overseas

jihadist movements

from 1980 to 2011

at more than a

thousand.”

8 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

inTrodUcTion: american JihadisT Travelers

their old networks and new networks. Ideologues

like AQAP cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, whose work on

“lone actor jihad” survived his death, have their works

re-purposed to recruit individuals during later mobi-

lizations. Operatives like Christopher Paul use skills

that they learn in their previous experience with jihad

to facilitate plots worldwide. Recently, “virtual entre-

preneurs” like the Somalia-based al-Shabaab member

Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan (aka Mujahid Miski),

use the internet to actively facilitate the travel of U.S.

persons to multiple battlefields across the globe. These

transitionary figures often act as nodes for recruitment

of their fellow Americans back home either for the

purpose of conducting attacks or traveling to the latest

jihadist hotspot.

How Do American Jihadist Travelers

Compare to Other Western Counterparts?

American and European jihadist travelers tend to differ

in numbers, demographic profiles, and means of re-

cruitment. The American contingent is far smaller than

those of most European countries. It is estimated, for

example, that more than 900 jihadist travelers have left

from France, 750 each from Germany and the UK, and

over 500 from Belgium.

Although the proportion of

travelers to total population and Muslim population are

different, in sheer numbers the mobilization from the

U.S. more closely compares to the phenomena in coun-

tries like Spain (around 200) and the Netherlands (220).

Three major factors explain the smaller American mo-

bilization. Geographic distance between the U.S. and

the Syrian/Iraqi battlefields plays a role. The increased

length of the journey that would-be American travelers

must take to reach Syria allows opportunities for law

enforcement to interdict jihadists.

Secondly, the U.S. legal system has multiple tools at its

disposal to prosecute jihadist travelers. At the outset

of the Syria-related mobilization of jihadist travelers,

many European countries did not have laws criminal-

izing travel. In the U.S., traveling to a foreign country

in pursuit of joining a designated foreign terrorist

organization (FTO) has constituted a federal criminal

offense under the material support statute (18 USC

§ 2339A and 2339B) since its adoption in the mid-

1990s.

Historically, this law has been interpreted

broadly (e.g., providing one’s self, in the form of travel,

to a designated FTO is classified as material support).

Prosecutors are given substantial leeway, and those

tried under the statute are almost always convicted.

Currently, IS-related material support prosecutions

in the U.S. have a 100% conviction rate.

Moreover,

those convicted of material support in the U.S. can

face prison sentences of up to 20 years and a lifetime

of post-release supervision. In Europe, a much smaller

percentage of travelers have been prosecuted. Even in

cases where prosecution is successful, convicted trav-

elers face shorter sentences.

Finally, wide-reaching jihadist recruitment networks

were far more established in the European context

prior to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Militant Salafist

groups, including al-Muhajiroun in the UK, Sharia4

in several European countries, Profetens Ummah (PU)

in Norway, and Millatu Ibrahim in Germany, were all

active in several European cities before 2011. When the

Syrian conflict began, these groups began to mobilize

their supporters to engage in networked travel to the

Middle Eastern theater to participate in jihadist move-

ments.

In assessing the stories of European jihadist

travelers from these countries, many were active mem-

bers of these groups prior to leaving. Similar initiatives

existed in the U.S. (for example, Revolution Muslim),

but they were not organized on the same scale as their

European counterparts.

The impact of geographic distance, the legal landscape,

and organized Salafi-jihadist networks before the Syrian

conflict not only manifested in the increased numbers

of travelers from Europe, but also affected a difference

in how and from where travelers were recruited. In the

American context, a significant percentage of individuals

travel in small numbers—at most, two or three from a

specific city or neighborhood. Some do so by themselves

without any network or connections prior to their de-

parture. In contrast, many of the major hubs of European

recruitment, including cities, towns, and even small

neighborhoods, are home to dozens of foreign fighters

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 9

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

apiece.

In the U.S, particular areas may exhibit similar

clustering (Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, may be

a rudimentary case), but none exist on the scale of their

European counterparts.

This relative lack of face-to-face contact with jihadist

recruitment networks helps explain both the lower num-

bers of American IS travelers and the role of the internet

in inducing Americans to travel. Case studies of many of

the individuals included in this dataset reveal that in lieu

of personal ties to fellow jihadist supporters in the U.S.,

travelers used online platforms to make connections

throughout the world.

There are a few notable caveats.

First, this is not to suggest that online recruitment was

the only factor motivating American jihadists. In many

cases, however, access to online networks exacerbated

the impact of personal circumstances and connections.

The upper echelon of American travelers—those who

traveled to Syria, established themselves in the opera-

tions of jihadist groups, and then turned homeward to

recruit other Americans—usually relied on previous

personal networks to facilitate their travel. While these

individuals used the internet to communicate with

friends, family, and potential supporters in the U.S.,

there is little evidence to suggest that online propaganda

played as large of a role as it did in motivating loners.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 11

Methodology and Statistics

he authors collated the sample of 64 American ji-

hadist travelers during a multi-year investigation,

utilizing a range of sources. These include thousands

of pages of documents from U.S. District Court cases.

Some of the court filings presented in this study were

unsealed following legal and open-access requests made

by the Program on Extremism. The Program submit-

ted more than a dozen Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA) requests and six appeals to initial rejections of

those requests. In addition to the FOIA process, the

Program filed several motions in federal courts across

the country to enjoin the release of records. As a result,

the authors obtained hundreds of pages of previously

sealed documents.

This report also presents data gathered from social

media accounts that are confirmed to belong to

American travelers. These accounts were drawn from

the Program on Extremism’s database of over 1,000,000

Tweets, from over 3,000 English-language pro-IS

Twitter accounts.

Finally, the authors conducted in-person interviews

with U.S. prosecutors, national security officials, de-

fense attorneys, returned American travelers, and their

families. These discussions provide insight into the radi-

calization and recruitment processes, travel patterns, and

networked connections of American travelers.

As some of the travelers interviewed were defendants in

criminal proceedings, authors took multiple safeguards

in presenting information from those interviews in

this report. Where necessary, the names of interview

subjects were redacted or changed to protect anonymity

and privacy.

The principal researchers are well-aware of the signif-

icant methodological issues presented by interviewing

returned jihadist travelers. In presenting interview data,

this report relies on previous studies where researchers

interviewed travelers to understand the motivations and

factors behind their travel.

At the same time, it attempts to avoid the methodolog-

ical missteps that many studies and media reports have

made in transmitting data drawn from interviews with

current or former violent extremists.

In the areas of this study that present material gleaned

from interviews with travelers, the authors attempt

to introduce but heavily qualify statements made by

the traveler, explain the complexities in first-person

accounts of radicalization and mobilization, and limit

potential inferences. Each interview shows that the

decision to travel is often opaque, multivariate, and

non-generalizable.

Some interviewed travelers returned to the U.S., and

since their return, have either pleaded guilty or been con-

victed by trial of terrorism-related offenses. Convictions

can serve as a check on self-serving information, but also

introduce other methodological problems.

On one hand, U.S. federal investigators and law en-

forcement can corroborate aspects of travelers’ stories

during court proceedings. Also, if travelers are already

cooperating with law enforcement, they have little

incentive to lie directly about their motivations for

traveling or their activities in Syria and Iraq.

On the other hand, if they are awaiting sentencing,

they can inflate or deflate aspects of their actions

in the hope of receiving more lenient treatment. In

any event, the authors made a considerable attempt

to qualify the statements made by travelers that are

presented in this report.

From this material, the list of travelers was narrowed

down to a sample, using several selection criteria

highlighted below. This report codes travelers using

demographic variables: age; gender; state of origin;

current presumed status; U.S. citizenship/permanent

12 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

meThodoloGy and sTaTisTics

resident status; whether they had been apprehended

or prosecuted; and whether they returned to the U.S.

Using these factors, combined with investigations

into their travel and role in jihadist groups, the au-

thors classified travelers (where possible) into one

of three categories: pioneers, networked travelers,

and loners.

Definitions

This report defines “American jihadist travelers” as U.S.

residents who traveled to Syria and/or Iraq since 2011

and affiliated with jihadist groups active in those coun-

tries. An additional selection criterion requires sample

subjects to have a legal name. Each aspect of this defini-

tion is explained below.

U.S. Residents

The sample includes U.S. citizens, U.S. permanent resi-

dents, temporary and unlawful residents of the U.S., and

other individuals with substantial ties to the U.S. The

term “American” is often used throughout this report to

refer to these individuals.

Travel to Syria and Iraq

In order to be included in the sample, Americans must

have successfully traveled to Syria or Iraq to join jihadist

groups from 2011 onward.

The authors chose 2011 as the starting point as it

marked the beginning of protests against the regime

of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the formal start of

the armed insurgency against al-Assad and the Syrian

Arab Republic.

More importantly, 2011 marked the

arrival of the first foreign combatants in Syrian jihad-

ist groups.

Since 2011, at least 50 Americans have been arrested

for attempting to join IS overseas, with at least 30 more

attempting to join other jihadist groups.

Attempted, but

unsuccessful travelers are not included in the sample.

The traveler in question must have successfully entered

Syrian or Iraqi territory.

With the recent decline of IS territory in Syria and

Iraq, American travelers have explored other areas as

potential destinations for jihadist travelers.

There are

documented instances of American jihadist travelers

to several other countries, including Yemen, Libya,

Somalia, and Nigeria. However, these cases are not in-

cluded in the sample.

OTHER DESTINATIONS

From 2011 onward, Syria and Iraq were

the preferred destinations for travelers.

However, there are notable cases of

American jihadists who chose other

destinations.

Mohamed Bailor Jalloh, a Virginia resident,

traveled to West Africa in June 2015. During

his trip, he contacted IS members active in

the region and planned to travel onward to

join IS in Libya. However, he did not make

the journey. Instead, he returned to Virginia

and was arrested after planning an attack

on members of the U.S. military.

Mohamed Rak Naji, a citizen of Yemen and

legal permanent resident of the U.S., trav-

eled to Yemen in 2015 to join the regional

IS afliate. He eventually returned to New

York and was in the process of planning an

attack when he was apprehended by law

enforcement.

Sources: “Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint.”

2016. USA v. Mohamed Bailor Jalloh, United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Case: 1:16-mj-00296. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/

extremism.gwu.edu/files/Jalloh%20Affidavit%20

in%20Support%20of%20Criminal%20Complaint.pdf;

“Complaint and Affidavit In Support of Arrest Warrant.”

2016. USA v. Mohamed Rafik Naji, United States District

Court for the Eastern District of New York. Case: 1:16-

mj-01049. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.

gwu.edu/files/Naji%20Complaint%2C%20Affidavit%20

in%20Support%20of%20Arrest%20Warrant.pdf.

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meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

Association with Jihadist Groups

In order to be included in the sample, a traveler must

have either:

• associated with a U.S. designated FTO that ascribes

to Salafi-jihadist ideology while in Syria and Iraq

or,

• associated with a non-designated militant group that

ascribes to Salafi jihadist ideology.

The authors use Quintan Wiktorowicz’s definition

of Salafi jihadist groups, namely, organizations that

“[support] the use of violence to establish Islamic

states.”

This interpretation directly applies to the

two bedrock organizations of the global Salafi-jihadist

movement, al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS).

Both groups, despite differences in how, when, and

where violence is considered permissible, extensively

use force in pursuit of establishing a system of Islamic

governance in the territory they control.

Since 2011, a seemingly endless number of jihadist or-

ganizations have been established in Syria or Iraq. Two

designated organizations are especially dominant. The

Islamic State (IS) initially emerged from the frame-

work of AQ’s affiliate in Iraq (AQI), but gradually

separated from AQ’s central leadership. In June 2014,

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the re-establishment

of the Caliphate.

Meanwhile, AQ’s regional affiliate in Syria continued

operations under the banner of the central leadership.

This subsidiary has gone by several different names,

but most sources refer to it by its original name, Jabhat

al-Nusra (JN). Under the leadership of Abu Mohammad

al-Julani, the organization underwent a de jure separa-

tion from AQ’s central leadership in 2016, and renamed

itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for the Conquest of the

Levant).

As all of the American travelers in the sample

who aligned with AQ’s affiliate did so while it was still

called Jabhat al-Nusra, the authors refer to the group

throughout the report using this name.

A third group represented in the sample is Harakat

Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Movement of

the Freemen of the Levant, known commonly as Ahrar

al-Sham). Ahrar al-Sham is an umbrella organization

for dozens of Salafist and Islamist battalions operat-

ing in Syria.

Unlike AQ, IS, and JN, it is not a U.S.

designated terrorist organization. Specific battalions

within Ahrar al-Sham associated with the Free Syrian

Army (FSA), which at various points in time has re-

ceived support from the U.S.-led coalition.

However, as Hassan argues, while Ahrar al-Sham has

slightly different positions on specific tactics and

methods than AQ, IS, or JN, “people in rebel-held

Syria still see Ahrar al-Sham as it is, as a jihadist orga-

nization … the apple has not fallen far from the tree.”

The group also utilizes violence towards the goal of

constructing Islamic governance.

Thus, this report

considers Americans who associated with Ahrar

al-Sham to have joined a jihadist group in Syria.

Association is defined broadly in this report. It includes

documented evidence of an individual participating

in a range of activities for a jihadist group, including

directly fighting for the group, attending a group’s

training camp, participating in military operations

alongside the group, providing funding or services to

the group, or other activities covered under the mate-

rial support statute.

The sample excludes Americans who have traveled to

Syria and Iraq and affiliated with other militant groups

or designated FTOs that are not Salafi-jihadist. For

instance, there are reports of U.S. persons or residents

fighting alongside a litany of Kurdish militant organi-

zations (for example, with Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, also

known as the YPG or People’s Protection Units),

with

the Free Syrian Army (FSA),

and militant organiza-

tions affiliated with the Syrian regime.

These travelers

are not included in the sample unless there is evidence

that they assisted or associated with jihadist formations

during their time abroad.

Legal Name

Propaganda material and bureaucratic forms released

by jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq identify several

individuals as “Americans.” With rare exceptions, this

material does not list travelers by their real, legal names.

14 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

meThodoloGy and sTaTisTics

Instead, they default to using the traveler’s kunya, or

Arabic nom du guerre.

The traditional term used to identify Americans is

al-Amriki (the American). In some cases, a traveler

identified in jihadist material as al-Amriki could be

cross-listed with the legal names of American travelers

and identified. For example, Abu Hurayra al-Amriki was

found to be the kunya of Moner Abu-Salha. Abu Jihad

al-Amriki referred to Douglas McCain.

Zulfi Hoxha

adopted the kunya Abu Hamza al-Amriki.

However, some American travelers chose other kunyas

based on their individual ethnic backgrounds. Talmeezur

Rahman, a native of India who attended university in

Texas, went by Abu Salman al-Hindi (the Indian).

Alberto Renteria, a Mexican-American who grew up

in Gilroy, California, took the kunya Abu Hudhayfa

al-Meksiki (the Mexican).

In at least ten cases, the authors found individuals

who were identified as “al-Amriki.” However, absent

a connection to a legal name, these cases could not be

included in the sample. The designation al-Amriki,

while commonly used to refer to Americans, is used to

refer to individuals with other nationalities who may

not have any connection to the U.S.

Without a link to

a legal name, individuals could potentially be included

twice in the dataset, once by their legal name and once

by their kunya.

Finally, in the cases without a legal name, it was in-

credibly difficult for researchers to uncover essential

demographic information about the traveler in ques-

tion. Therefore, these individuals were excluded from

the sample.

UNIDENTIFIED “AL-AMRIKI”

Several individuals identifying themselves as “al-Amriki” have appeared in jihadist propaganda

material since 2011. Many are not mentioned in this report, as the authors could not verify their

true names or details about their stories. Notable examples include:

•

Abu Muhammad al-Amriki famously appeared in a February 2014 IS video, criticizing the

leaders of JN and explaining his decision to defect from the group to join IS. Speaking in

heavily-accented English, he claimed to have lived in the U.S. for over 10 years. His real name

and status in the U.S. are unclear, but due to his social media activity and connections in Syria,

he was assessed to be a native of Azerbaijan. He was reportedly killed in January 2015.

•

In March 2015, IS claimed that one of its militants, Abu Dawoud al-Amriki, conducted a suicide

bombing in the Iraqi town of Samarra against Iraqi troops and Shi’a militia groups. He was

the rst reported American to conduct a suicide attack on behalf of IS.

Sources: Lonardo, David. 2016. “The Islamic State and the Connections to Historical Networks of Jihadism in Azerbaijan.”

Caucasus Survey 4 (3):239–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2016.1221218; al-Bayan radio news bulletin, March 2, 2015.



Surely Guide Them To Our Ways,” a May 2017 video from IS’

Ninawa province in Iraq.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 15

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

THE TRAVELERS

ABDUL AZIZ, Ahmad Hussam al-Din Fayeq

ABOOD, Bilal

ABOUSAMRA, Ahmad

ABU SALHA, Moner

ADEN, Abdifatah

AHMED, Abdifatah

aL-HAYMAR, Ridwan

ALI, Arman

ALI, Omar

aL-JAYAB, Aws Mohammed Younis

aL-KAMBUDI, Sari Abdellah

ALLIU, Erius

aL-MADIOUM, Abdelhamid

aL-MOFLIHI, Ahmed

BAH, Mamadou

BHUIYA, Mohimanul

BRADLEY, Ariel

CLARK, Warren

COOK, Umar

DEMPSEY, Brian

DENNISON, Russell

DOUGLAS, Robert

eL-GOARANY, Samy

FAZELI, Adnan

GARCIA, Sixto Ramiro

GEORGELAS, John

GEORGELAS, Joya “Tania”

GREENE, Daniela

HARCEVIC, Haris

HARROUN, Eric

HOXHA, Zulfi

IBRAHIM, Amiir Farouk

INGRAM, Terry

ISMAIL, Yusra

JAMA, Yusuf

KANDIC, Mirsad

KARIE, Hamse

KARIE, Hersi

KATTAN, Omar

KHAN, Jaffrey

KHWEIS, Mohamad Jamal

KLEMAN, Kary Paul

KODAIMATI, Mohamad

KODAIMATI, Mohamad Saeed

KODAIMATI, “Rahmo”

MAMADJONOV, Saidjon

MANSFIELD, Nicole Lynn

MASHA, Mohamed Maleeh

McCAIN, Douglas

MOHALLIM, Hanad Abdullahi

MOHAMUD, Abdirahman Sheik

MUHAMMAD, Saleh

MUTHANA, Hoda

NASRIN, Zakia

NGUYEN, Sinh Vinh Ngo

NIKNEJAD, Reza

NUR, Abdi

PAZARA, Abdullah Ramo

RAHMAN, Talmeezur

RAIHAN, Rasel

RENTERIA, Alberto

ROBLE, Mohamed Amiin Ali

SHABAZZ, Sawab Raheem

SHALLCI, Sevin

16 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

meThodoloGy and sTaTisTics

<<JIHADIST<<TRAVELERS<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

AMERICAN

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 17

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

Statistics

This sample of 64 jihadist travelers comprises a range

of ages, ethnic backgrounds, states and cities of origin,

group affiliations, and socio-economic statuses.

•

The average age at time of travel was around 27 years

of age.

• 89% of the dataset are men.

• At least 70.4% were U.S. citizens or legal permanent

residents prior to departure.

•

Travelers came from 16 different states; the states

with the highest rates of travelers are Minnesota,

Virginia, and Ohio.

•

Upon arrival in Syria, 82.8% affiliated with the Islamic

State (IS), while the remainder (17.2%) affiliated with

other jihadist groups.

• 22 travelers (34.4%) are believed to have died in Syria.

12 (18.8%) were apprehended in the U.S. or overseas,

and 3 (4.7%) returned to the U.S. without facing

charges.* 28 travelers (43.8%) are at large, or their

status and whereabouts are publicly unavailable.

• 12 travelers (18.7%) returned to the U.S. The majority

(75%) of returned travelers were arrested and charged.

* One traveler returned to the U.S. from Syria and did not

face public charges. Later, he went back to Syria, where he

conducted a suicide bombing attack.

Demographics

Within the sample, the average age that a traveler em-

barked on their journey to Syria and Iraq was 26.9.

The youngest travelers in the dataset were 18 years old.

Minor travelers, whose identifying information is sealed,

meaning that it is not made available to the public, are

not included in the sample. The youngest, Reza Niknejad,

went to Syria and joined IS shortly after his 18th birth-

day, with the assistance of two high school classmates

who were eventually tried as adults for assisting him.

On the other end of the spectrum, the oldest American

traveler with a known age was 44 when he traveled to

Syria.

Kary Kleman, a Floridian, claimed that he mi-

grated to Syria to participate in “humanitarian” activities,

later realizing that what led him to Syria was a “scam.”

Kleman surrendered to Turkish border police in 2017;

he was promptly arrested on charges that he fought for

IS. His extradition to the U.S. is pending.

A majority of the travelers in the sample (70.4%)

were U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents.

Furthermore, two travelers were granted refugee status

in the U.S. before departure, and another was studying

in the U.S. under a student visa. Sixteen cases (25%)

involve an individual whose residency status could not

be determined.

Men comprise 89% of the sample. However, in assessing

the gender breakdown of American jihadist travelers, it

is essential to consider potential methodological barriers.

Samples of Western travelers may underestimate the

number of women, particularly those that draw largely

from publicly available data. Women jihadists are more

likely to avoid detection and apprehension than their

male counterparts, and are possibly underrepresented

in datasets as a result.

In this report’s sample, the seven

cases (11%) of American women jihadist travelers are

important for assessing the overall mobilization. This

number may not reflect the extent of American women’s

participation in jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. Studies

of European travelers have found higher percentages of

women travelers. A 2016 study of all Western travel-

ers found that around 20% were women, but in some

countries, women represent as much as 40% of the

contingent.

One of the earliest known American cases of jihadist

travel to Syria or Iraq was Nicole Lynn Mansfield, a

33-year-old from Flint, Michigan, who left for Syria

in 2013. Mansfield, a convert to Islam, was the first

American to have been killed in Syria.

She was shot

and killed during a confrontation with Syrian govern-

ment forces in the Idlib province in May 2013.

There

are multiple conflicting accounts of which jihadist group

she was affiliated with at the time of her death: Syrian

government sources claim she was fighting for JN and

was killed after throwing a grenade at Syrian soldiers.

Ahrar al-Sham also claimed her as a member.

18 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

meThodoloGy and sTaTisTics

In November 2014, 20-year-old Hoda Muthana (kunya:

Umm Jihad) left her hometown of Hoover, Alabama, for

Syria. Prior to her departure, she was active in the com-

munity of English-speaking IS supporters on Twitter

and other social media sites, and continued her online

presence after arriving in Syria.

Reports at the time

suggested that she likely lived in the city of Raqqa with

a notable cluster of Australian IS supporters, including

her husband, Suhan Rahman (Abu Jihad al-Australi).

Ninety days after their marriage, Rahman was killed

in a Jordanian airstrike.

Muthana’s current status and

whereabouts are unknown.

Zakia Nasrin, her husband Jaffrey Khan, and her

brother Rasel Raihan all entered Syria through the Tal

Abyad border crossing in the summer of 2014.

Nasrin

is a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Bangladesh.

Shortly after graduating from high school, she mar-

ried Khan, whom she met online. Her friends noted

her increasingly conservative behavior following

her marriage.

Following arrival in Syria, Khan and

Nasrin had a daughter. Nasrin allegedly worked as a

doctor in a Raqqa hospital controlled by IS.

Rasel

Raihan was killed in Syria; Nasrin and Khan’s statuses

remain unclear.

Despite the small sample size, American jihadist

women travelers help shed light on Western women’s

participation in jihadist networks. The three women

above, alongside others in the sample, defy convention-

al stereotypes about how and why women (especially

Western women) participate in jihadist movements.

Although many presume that female jihadists are

duped into participation, and motivated by the per-

sonal pursuit of love or validation, their contributions

and motivations for engagement vary as much as

their male counterparts.

Though often relegated to

support roles, women’s more “traditional” efforts as

the wives and mothers of jihadists are not necessarily

passive either. American women were committed to

the jihadist cause and decided to travel on their own

accord. They also appear to have played significant roles

in their respective jihadist organizations.

Muthana

highlights the role of Western women in networks of

online jihadist supporters, Nasrin served in a critically

important and understaffed non-combat position (in a

hospital), and Mansfield may have been more directly

involved in operations.

Geography

The sample includes travelers from 16 states. It is

paramount to assess total figures alongside the rate of

recruitment in proportion to the total population. The

rates used in this report are generated by taking the

number of travelers from a state or metropolitan statisti-

cal area and dividing them by either the total population

of the state or the Muslim population in the state.

provide a more accurate sample, these figures are then

multiplied by 100,000 (for the total population rate) and

1,000 (for the Muslim population rate), resulting in es-

timates of how many jihadist travelers in Syria and Iraq

AMERICAN CHILDREN IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

Minors are excluded from the sample.

However, there is evidence that some

American children traveled to Syria or Iraq

alongside their families. Some, including

Zakia Nasrin and Jaffrey Khan’s daughter,

were born in jihadist-controlled territory.

In 2017, a 15-year-old Kansas teenager es-

caped IS-held territory after living there for

ve years. She left the U.S. with her father

and traveled to Syria. There she married a

IS ghter, and was pregnant with his child

when she escaped. Additionally, IS released

a video in August 2017 that depicted an un-

named young boy in jihadist-held territory

making threats against the U.S. In the video,

the boy claimed to be an American citizen.

Sources: “‘We Were Prisoners’: American Teen Forced

into ISIS Speaks.” 2017. CBS News. October 11, 2017.

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/american-teen-

forced-into-syria-by-father-escapes-isis-in-raqqa;

Dilanian, Ken, and Tracy Connor. 2017. “The Identity of

the ‘American’ Boy in an ISIS Video Is Still a Mystery.”

NBC News. August 24, 2017. https://www.nbcnews.

com/news/us-news/u-s-trying-identify-american-boy-

isis-video-n795691.

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meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

from a particular state there are for every 100,000 people

and 1,000 Muslims in the state. Finally, states with less

than two travelers are not included to avoid inferences

from incomplete samples.

This method places the issue

of jihadist travel in the U.S. in the proper context by

using a proportional rate.

Calculated this way, the states with the largest fre-

quency of jihadist travelers per 100,000 people are

Minnesota (0.127 travelers), Virginia (0.048 travelers),

and Ohio (0.043 travelers). For the rate per 1,000

Muslims, the top three states are Minnesota (0.417

travelers), Missouri (0.171 travelers), and Ohio (0.150

travelers).

The nationwide frequencies, in contrast,

are 0.019 travelers per 100,000 people, and 0.018 trav-

elers per 1,000 Muslims.

These rates, compared to the total population and

the estimated Muslim population in each state, are

infinitesimally small. In sum, these numbers demon-

strate that the phenomena of recruitment of jihadist

travelers in all states to the battlefields of Syria and

Iraq is limited. Unlike in Europe and elsewhere, the

phenomenon of traveler recruitment in the U.S. has

not been characterized by large-scale networks with

deep transnational ties to foreign jihadist groups.

Rather, it has been shaped and facilitated by individual

kinship- and friendship-oriented groups and, at times,

virtual connectivity.

Only seven out of the 16 states in the sample produced

more than three jihadist travelers. The states with the

highest number of cases are California (13), Texas (9),

and Minnesota (7). However, given that the two most

populous states in the country represent the highest

producers of travelers reveals relatively little about the

geographic dimensions of IS recruitment in the U.S.

The authors also utilized a smaller unit of analysis, and

evaluated mobilization within particular cities. At this

level, rates per capita (due to the low number of trav-

elers from each metropolitan statistical area) are less

helpful, but in terms of total count, several metropolitan

areas stand out. The areas with the highest frequency

of travelers are the Minneapolis-St. Paul and San Diego

metropolitan areas, which have seven cases each. The

Twin Cities also have the highest proportion of travel-

ers to every 1,000 Muslims in the broader metropolitan

statistical area.

These areas are considered anomalies with regard to

how many travelers emerged from each metropolitan

area, but pale in comparison to recruitment from other

Western cities. In the U.S., even when areas like the

Metropolitan Statistical Area

Number of

Travelers

Travelers per

100,000 people

Travelers per

1,000 Muslims

Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington (MN-WI)

7 0.197 0.495

San Diego-Carlsbad (CA)

7 0.211 0.318

Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington (TX)

6 0.083 0.039

Columbus (OH)

5 0.245 0.321

New York-Newark-Jersey City (NY-NJ)

5 0.025 0.022

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria (DC-VA-MD)

4 0.065 0.029

Sacramento-Roseville-Arden-Arcade (CA)

3 0.131 0.169

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land (TX)

3 0.044 0.022

Flint (MI)

2 0.489 0.181

St. Louis (MO-IL)

2 0.071 0.169

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater (FL)

2 0.066 0.055

Boston-Cambridge-Newton (MA)

2 0.042 0.022

FREQUENCY OF TRAVELERS BY METRO AREA

FREQUENCY OF TRAVELERS BY STATE

State

Number of

Travelers

Travelers per

100,000 people

Travelers per

1,000 Muslims

California

13 0.033 0.048

Texas

9 0.032 0.021

Minnesota

7 0.127 0.417

Ohio

5 0.043 0.150

Florida

4 0.019 0.024

Virginia

4 0.048 0.019

New York

4 0.020 0.010

Missouri

2 0.033 0.171

Massachusetts

2 0.029 0.092

Michigan

2 0.020 0.017

New Jersey

2 0.022 0.012

20 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

meThodoloGy and sTaTisTics

Twin Cities and San Diego produce seemingly sizable

traveler contingents, the cases do not usually exhibit the

same networked ties between them as seen in European

towns and cities.

Nevertheless, further analytical research is necessary to

uncover which factors in these American communities

make them frequent places of origin of jihadist travelers,

in comparison to others. In some cities, most notably

the Minnesota Twin Cities, there have been high-profile

court cases on American travelers and attempted trav-

elers. This resulted in extensive local investigative

journalism that yielded a considerable amount of publicly

available information. However, in many other areas,

information is scarce.

Status in Syria and Iraq

Gathering evidence about an individual’s activities in

Syria and Iraq after leaving the U.S. is a challenging task.

In the constellation of militant groups and other orga-

nizations active in Syria and Iraq, evidence about which

organization an individual traveler affiliated with can be

difficult to come across. Adding to this issue, individu-

als change their affiliations as the landscape of militant

groups changes.

To resolve some of these concerns, this study codes

travelers in the sample by the last known jihadist group

that they participated in based on evidence available to

the authors. For some of the travelers in this dataset, it

was the group they were affiliated with at the time of

their death; for others, it was the last group to which

they publicly claimed support. Additionally, for travelers

who were subject to federal investigations with available

evidence, court records also detail their interaction with

FTOs in Syria and Iraq.

A majority of the travelers (82.8%) are associated with

IS. Several started their careers with other jihadist

groups, but later joined IS as the organization grew

territorially and established itself as a formidable force

in Syria and Iraq. The remaining 17.2% includes trav-

elers who affiliated with JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other

jihadist groups.

The fact that IS enjoyed this level of support within the

demographic is unsurprising. In comparison to other

jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, IS relied heavily on

travelers to provide assistance to their military cam-

paigns and solidify the ideological narrative that they

were attracting Muslims from all over the world to

re-establish the historical Caliphate.

In contrast, groups

like JN and Ahrar al-Sham were mainly reliant on local

Syrian fighters, although before IS’ rise to preeminence,

they also attracted some travelers in the early stages of

the conflict.

The travelers in the sample who did not affiliate with IS

generally arrived earlier in the conflict and were killed,

captured, or left the conflict before June 2014. Some

of the sampled travelers who initially associated with

JN or another AQ affiliate also arrived early. If they

stayed in Syria or Iraq for a significant period, espe-

cially following IS’ declaration of the Caliphate in June

2014, they switched affiliations. This would appear to

underline another noted shift in how recruitment of

travelers to the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts occurred.

Early Western travelers were often motivated mainly

by joining the armed resistance against al-Assad in de-

fense of the Syrian people; later travelers were more

drawn to specific groups, their goals, and their ideolo-

gies (notably IS).

The status and current whereabouts of the sampled trav-

elers is more difficult to determine. Without conclusive

evidence that an individual traveler has been killed or

captured, they are considered in this report to be “at

large” (43.8%). That notwithstanding, death rates for

Western travelers have been catastrophic. In early 2017,

Western intelligence services estimated that more than

half of the travelers from Western Europe and North

America died fighting in Syria and Iraq.

Therefore, it

is likely that some percentage of individuals who are

considered at large were killed, but their deaths went

unreported.

The authors found credible evidence that 22 of the 64

sampled travelers (34.4%) died in Syria and Iraq. The first

reported death was Nicole Mansfield on May 29, 2013,

but the U.S. government has yet to publicly provide a

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 21

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

confirmation. Following her case, there were several

high-profile deaths of American travelers in the summer

and fall of 2014. This includes Douglas McCain, the first

U.S. citizen whom the government acknowledged had

died fighting for IS. In many cases, the exact date of death

for travelers is unknown.

Twelve of the 64 sampled travelers (18.8%) returned to

the U.S. Nine of the 12 were either apprehended over-

seas and extradited to the U.S. or returned to the U.S.

and promptly arrested. Law enforcement has not pressed

public charges against the remaining three travelers. In

addition to the American travelers who have returned to

the U.S., two more participants in the Syrian and Iraqi

conflicts within the sample are currently being detained

by foreign governments.

Categorization

Based on a combination of the factors discussed above

that shaped why, when, and how an American traveled

to Syria and Iraq to participate in jihadist organizations,

the authors derived a tripartite typology for American

travelers. These categories help provide a useful heuristic

for not only American policymakers, but other countries

that are facing the problem of jihadist travelers.

This is intended to contextualize the factors shaping jihad-

ist travel and assist in preliminary risk analysis. Developing

complex frameworks for responding to jihadist travel is a

priority for the U.S. government and many other coun-

tries. Using these categories, analysts and policymakers

can more accurately determine the type of threat a specific

traveler is likely to pose.

These three categories are not mutually exclusive. The

networked traveler and loner categories are predicated

on the factors that influenced an individual’s travel,

whereas the pioneer category is mainly based on their

role. Thus, while it is not possible for an individual to

be a networked traveler and a loner at the same time,

pioneers may be either.

The three categories—pioneers, networked travelers,

and loners—are defined below, with a statistical break-

down (where possible) of what percentage of the sample

they comprise.

Each section provides case studies of

individual U.S. travelers within that category, and the

relevance of the classification.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 23

Category 1: Pioneers

his report uses the term “pioneers” to refer to the

top-tier of U.S. jihadist travelers in Syria and Iraq.

Pioneers arrived early, built connections in jihadist net-

works, and contacted supporters who were still in the

U.S. to encourage them to provide support or join their

organizations. These individuals often become nodes of

jihadist recruitment in the U.S. and are linked to several

other cases of material support and travel.

This subset of cases rarely occurs in the dataset. The

overwhelming majority of travelers embarked on

their journey in small groups or alone, whereas these

individuals travel with the support of more extensive

networks. They use their connections and skills to build

notoriety, and eventually reach leadership positions in

jihadist organizations.

From a definitional standpoint, pioneers usually fit three

criteria. First, as the name suggests, pioneers arrived

earlier in the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts than many of

their counterparts. Travelers who left prior to the rise

of IS did not hold the same misconceptions as their later

counterparts. Many had a clearer sense that they were

going overseas to fight, versus subsequent travelers who

may have been convinced that they could serve jihadist

organizations in non-combat roles. Pioneers often hit

the ground running upon arrival in Syria, nearly imme-

diately participating in military campaigns.

To provide an overview of what this category of trav-

eler entails, the following sections detail the stories of

Abdullah Ramo Pazara and Ahmad Abousamra, two

examples of pioneers. They highlight the networks

they were able to build, both on the battlefields of Syria

and back home in the U.S. Despite their differing back-

grounds, both men became pioneers of the American

jihadist scene in Syria and used their influence in order

to further recruitment in the U.S. and elsewhere around

the world.

Abdullah Ramo Pazara

In February 2015, six Bosnian immigrants to the U.S.

were charged with providing material support in the

form of money, rifle scopes, knives, military equipment,

and other supplies to jihadists in Syria and Iraq through

intermediaries in Bosnia and Turkey.

A seventh in-

dividual, Abdullah Ramo Pazara, was named but not

charged in the indictment as one recipient of the material

support.

Pazara was described as a Bosnian native who

immigrated to the U.S., became a naturalized citizen, and

resided in St. Louis, Missouri, before leaving for Syria to

fight for IS in May 2013.

Pazara’s case drew interest from U.S. government agen-

cies, scholars of terrorism, and the media for numerous

reasons. He was one of the first Americans whom the

U.S. government publicly acknowledged had traveled to

Syria to fight. Digging into his backstory further, news

outlets in Bosnia and Herzegovina uncovered that Syria

was not Pazara’s first military engagement, revealing his

service records from the Bosnian Civil War in the mid-

1990s.

Upon arrival in Syria, he used connections to the

dozens of Bosnians already in-theater to climb the ranks

of multiple jihadist organizations, eventually ending

up as a mid-level commander of an IS tank battalion.

Finally, his requests to his fellow Americans back home

from the battlefields in Syria not only included military

and tactical equipment, but also more mundane items,

including packets of Swiss Miss hot cocoa mix.

The full arc of Abdullah Ramo Pazara’s story, from his

roots in the former republics of Yugoslavia to his death

on the battlefield fighting the PKK in the town of Kobane,

reveals the twisting paths that many Americans take in

traveling to join jihadist groups overseas. Pazara is the

classic example of an American pioneer traveler in Syria:

setting up a litany of contacts, distinguishing himself in

Syria from other Americans, and reaching back to the U.S.

to recruit and mobilize others.

24 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 1: Pioneers

Motivations

Ramo Pazara (at this time, he had not adopted the name

Abdullah) was born in 1976 in the Socialist Republic

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then a part of communist

Yugoslavia. His home village, Gomjenica, is situated on

the outskirts of the town of Teslic in an area of Bosnia

predominantly inhabited by Orthodox Serbians. In

Teslic, a multiethnic and multi-religious municipality,

Pazara lived alongside Bosnian Muslims, Orthodox

Serbians, and Catholic Croats.

The civil war that tore Bosnia and the rest of Yugoslavia

apart disrupted Pazara’s adolescence. Teslic’s location and

multiethnic status made it subject to the ethnic cleansing

that occurred during the Bosnian Civil War. In April

1992, the paramilitary forces of the Bosnian Serbs, known

as Vojska Republike Srpske or VRS, demanded that

Teslic’s residents swear allegiance to the VRS. Bosnian

Muslim and Croat public officials could join the VRS, or

be forced to resign and face the consequences.

In Teslic,

the VRS perpetrated dozens of crimes against humanity,

including liquidating local Bosnian Muslim political lead-

ers, indiscriminately bombing villages, and establishing

concentration camps.

Shortly following his death in Syria, the online news-

paper Sloboda Bosna claimed that Pazara fought for the

VRS, despite being a Bosnian Muslim.

Several Bosnian

expert sources confirmed the existence of these records,

which detail that Ramo Pazara joined the VRS at the age

of 17 alongside his father and fought in the Pelagicevo

region and the towns of Majevica and Bihac.

During

the height of the war, in 1994, Pazara served as a sniper

for a VRS unit fighting in the Bosnian-Croatian border

town of Orasje.

The common assumption is that Pazara’s generation of

Bosnian Muslim jihadists all have networked ties to the

jihadist brigades operating in Bosnia at the time of the

civil war. These formations include the infamous El-

 brigade, in which many individuals (including

foreign fighters) who were later connected to al-Qaeda

operations in Bosnia and overseas fought during the

civil war. Pazara’s case is an exception to the rule. As a

VRS paramilitary, it is likely that Ramo Pazara fought

directly against jihadists during the Bosnian Civil War—

the Bosnian Serb VRS fought, in various circumstances,

against the  brigade, which allied itself with

the Bosnian Muslim cause.

In any event, Pazara’s experiences during the Bosnian

War proved formative to his later life in America, and his

eventual travel to Syria to join the fighting there. Firstly,

after the civil war ended in 1995, and after Pazara and his

father completed their alleged tour of duty for the VRS,

they were still not allowed to return to their hometown

of Teslic. Returning to Teslic risked their imprisonment,

torture, or potential deaths. Ultimately, Pazara and his

father were subject to the same ethnic cleansing inflicted

on the rest of the Bosnian-Muslim residents. Like other

Bosnian Muslim families, the Pazara family was forced

into the diaspora.

Pazara’s arrival in the U.S. during the late 1990s would

have placed him in an immediate conundrum. If Pazara

disclosed his participation in the Bosnian Serb Army on

immigration forms, as required by law, he could have

been subject to prosecution for war crimes or deported to

Bosnia. Failing to disclose participation in the VRS on im-

migration forms is also a potentially prosecutable crime.

Pazara ultimately decided not to disclose his war record

on immigration forms, and did not formally apply for cit-

izenship until he had lived for at least fifteen years in the

U.S. The concern was likely not only the potential legal

consequences of disclosure, but also the backlash from

the Bosnian diaspora in America. Many members of the

diaspora from Pazara’s generation saw their hometowns

destroyed and family members killed at the hands of the

VRS and other Serb paramilitary forces, forcing them to

flee the country. The mere rumor of VRS participation

would likely have made Pazara a pariah. Few records of

Pazara from the early years of his life in America are

publicly available.

Pazara’s transition from Bosnian militia sniper to U.S.

civilian life was rocky. He settled in Warren, Michigan,

and co-founded a commercial trucking company with

his then-wife in 2004. Financial records detail the diffi-

culties faced by the Pazaras’ company—it registered slim

profits and massive debts in the three years that it was

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 25

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

active. The Pazaras filed for divorce in 2007, with his

wife taking control of the trucking company. One year

later, Ramo Pazara filed for bankruptcy in the state of

Michigan and agreed to forfeit most of his property.

From 2008 to 2011 Pazara maintained addresses in

Michigan but spent a considerable amount of time with

his relatives in Utica, New York.

It was in Utica where Pazara likely first came into contact

with one of the future members of the network that he

would eventually reach out to once he arrived in Syria.

Nihad Rosic, a much younger Bosnian immigrant, was

working as a truck driver by day and a semi-pro mixed

martial artist by night in the Utica area.

Rosic’s parents

and Pazara’s brother and sister-in-

law, as documented on social media,

had a close relationship.

According to Rosic’s attorney in the

ongoing trial proceedings, Rosic

“turned a corner” in terms of his

religiosity around 2011—the same

time that Pazara was frequently

visiting Utica and began to adopt

more conservative beliefs and ap-

pearance.

Prior to his arrest for

material support, Rosic also had an

extensive record of domestic abuse.

In 2011, he was arrested and charged

with endangering the welfare of a

child after punching a woman who

was carrying a baby in her arms.

Then, in 2012, he

served a year-long sentence for beating his wife with a

belt in front of their children. The dispute arose when

Rosic found a bottle of his wife’s perfume in the house,

which he interpreted as violating the Islamic prohibition

on alcohol-based products.

By the time Pazara moved permanently to St. Louis,

Missouri, in late 2011 in search of work, he had already

adopted the outward appearance of a committed Salafi

believer. The St. Louis metropolitan area is home to

over 70,000 Bosnians, the largest diaspora community

outside of Europe. The St. Louis Bosnian-American

community has frequently been assessed to be one of

the most well-integrated immigrant communities in the

U.S.

Although Pazara was living in a large, tight-knit

Bosnian community, one local leader later told the St.

Louis Post-Dispatch that “nobody” knew him. Despite

Pazara’s reported embrace of conservative Islam, none

of the local imams in St. Louis’s many mosques claim

to have known him. His landlord and neighbors, while

noting his long beard and thawb (traditional Arab robe),

claimed that he kept to himself.

Pazara did, in fact, have a small group of friends in

the St. Louis area. Many of them shared similar back-

grounds, economic difficulties, and recent changes in

their religiosity. Among them was Ramiz Zijad Hodzic

(nicknamed “Siki”), another former

resident of Teslic. Hodzic served

on the opposite side of the Bosnian

Civil War as Pazara, and eventu-

ally won Bosnia’s highest military

honor (the Golden Lily).

In the

mid-1990s, he and his wife Sedina

arrived in America as refugees.

Pazara and Ramiz Hodzic shared a

hometown, military experience, and

less-than-stellar financial records.

The Hodzics were over $300,000

behind in federal and state taxes, and

faced lawsuits for unpaid rent and

credit card bills.

Their adoption of

conservative Islam also apparently

occurred around the time Pazara

arrived in St. Louis. The Hodzics’ neighbors claimed

that they remembered Ramiz frequently attempting to

barbecue while drunk and that Sedina started wearing

the hijab just a few months before her arrest.

Although publicly available evidence is sparse, Pazara

and the Hodzics used the internet and social media to

connect with like-minded members of the Bosnian di-

aspora worldwide. The period between 2011 and 2012,

when Pazara moved to St. Louis and connected with

the Hodzics, was also the timeframe in which the Syrian

conflict began to escalate from its roots in opposition

protests to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to a more

globalized engagement involving foreign participants.

Ramo Pazara in Utica, New York, 2010.

26 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 1: Pioneers

Members of the Bosnian diaspo-

ra, many of whom have personal

experiences with the plight of

civil war, the status of refugees,

and ethnic cleansing, were un-

derstandably deeply concerned

about similar events taking

place in Syria.

Unsurprisingly,

Salafi-jihadist groups who pub-

lish in the Bosnian language

used these sentiments to recruit

on social media. Using websites

like Put Vjernica (Way of the

Believer), Vijesti Ummeta (News

from the Ummah), as well as

popular social media platforms

like Facebook, they disseminated

material encouraging Bosnians

in the diaspora to respond to the plight of Muslims in

Syria by joining militant groups.

Pazara was not a particularly observant Muslim prior

to about a year or so before his travel to join Salafi-

jihadist groups in Syria, but he also once participated

in a paramilitary formation which directly fought, and

even committed war crimes against Muslims in Bosnia.

Today, however, many Bosnian jihadist supporters in

the diaspora are too young to have actively participated

in the Bosnian War, and may not have viewed Pazara’s

alleged participation in the VRS as damning, or even

relevant. The only connection that would have mattered

was their mutual interest in jihad.

Journey and Network

Shortly after he became an American citizen in May

2013, Pazara traveled to Syria to fight.

He adopted

a new name as part of his naturalization proceedings,

and formally became Abdullah Ramo Pazara.

Eleven

days later, he traveled to Syria through Zagreb, Croatia,

Bosnia, and Istanbul.

Pazara was supposed to go with two others, but only

one—Haris Harcevic—made the journey. Nihad Rosic,

who remained in touch with Pazara via social media,

also intended on traveling to Syria, according to the

2015 indictment.

However, at

the time of Pazara’s May 2013

journey, he was still imprisoned

on the domestic violence charge

and could not go.

Several indi-

viduals with knowledge of the

investigation, as well as border

records in Bosnia, confirmed

that Harcevic also traveled with

Pazara through the Balkans,

Turkey, and Syria in summer

2013.

Harcevic, who is included

in the study’s sample, arrived in

Syria, remained only for a short

time, and promptly returned

to the U.S.

He has not faced

any charges in the criminal case

against Pazara and his network,

although his brother Armin was charged with providing

material support.

After Pazara arrived in Syria, his friends in St. Louis,

Ramiz and Sedina Hodzic, allegedly began reaching out

to online contacts to collect funds and buy supplies for

Pazara. From August 2013 to September 2014, Pazara

reportedly used Facebook and email to request specific

items, coordinate shipments, give updates on his loca-

tion and status, and share information about the jihad

in Syria.

In total, four people (Nihad Rosic, Mediha Salkicevic,

Jasminka Ramic, and Armin Harcevic) allegedly sent

money to Ramiz and Sedina Hodzic to help buy military

equipment and supplies for Pazara and other travelers in

Syria.

According to the indictment, the money was used

to purchase “U.S. military uniforms, combat boots, mil-

itary surplus goods, tactical gear and clothing, firearms

accessories, optical equipment and range finders, [and]

rifle scopes.”

The Hodzics allegedly sent the supplies

to unnamed individuals in Turkey and Saudi Arabia,

who then transferred the materials to Pazara and other

Bosnian fighters in Syria and Iraq.

They also allegedly

collected funds for the families of Bosnian travelers.

In April 2014, Nihad Rosic purchased a plane ticket

to Istanbul for July 20, 2014 after discussing travel to



Louis, Missouri, 2012.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 27

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

Syria with Pazara on Facebook Messenger.

However,

when Rosic tried to board Norwegian Airways Flight

DY7002 to Oslo, Norway, for the first leg of his journey,

he was prevented from flying due to the conditions of

his probation.

Rosic’s failed voyage to Syria may have

tipped off law enforcement to the funding scheme. In

February 2015, the U.S. Attorney’s Office filed indict-

ments against Nihad Rosic, Ramiz Hodzic, Sedina Unkic

Hodzic, Mediha Salkicevic, Jasminka Ramic, and Armin

Harcevic. Federal agents arrested all six defendants.

Pazara in Syria

According to Vlado Azinovic, Pazara’s role in

Syria was a mid-level tank and vehicle battal-

ion commander for IS, commanding a unit of

about 60 to 70 men.

However, when Pazara

first arrived in Syria in the summer of 2013, IS

as an organization had not reached the level of

notoriety and success that it attained after the

declaration of its self-proclaimed caliphate in

June 2014. Like many other travelers, Pazara ini-

tially fought for a smaller outfit, and as a result of

the changes in the political and military landscape

in Syria, eventually found his way into IS.

Pazara initially was a member of a jihadist outfit

called Jaish al Muhajireen w’al Ansar (The Army of

Emigres and Helpers, or JMA). The group largely

comprised travelers from the Caucasus, Central

Asia, and the Balkan countries who made up the

bulk of the group’s fighting force.

JMA was led

by former members of the mid-2000s jihadist un-

derground in the Caucasus and the Balkans, who,

after facing prosecution in their home countries,

migrated to Turkey and then onwards to Syria at

the outset of the conflict.

JMA has played an outsized role in the intra-

jihadist competition in Syria. Soon after Pazara’s

arrival, one of JMA’s commanders, Tarkhan

Batirashvili (aka Umar al-Shishani), defected

to IS.

JMA split, with the bulk of the group’s

members joining Umar al-Shishani in IS; this

cohort included the majority of JMA’s Bosnian

militants.

Ultimately, Umar al-Shishani became

IS’ most senior military leader, and the fighters that

stayed with him from his JMA days were also given

leadership positions.

The JMA split particularly benefited one of Umar al-Shis-

hani’s lieutenants, a seasoned Bosnian jihadist named

Bajro Ikanovic. Ikanovic had previously spent four years

in Bosnian prison after being apprehended during the

planning stages of attempting to detonate an explosive

device outside of a Western embassy in Sarajevo, on behalf



el-Sanjaki,” Abdullah Ramo Pazara, Bajro Ikanovic, Sejdin Omerovic.

Bottom: Jihadists in Syria, including Abdullah Ramo Pazara (seated in





American traveler, Daniela Greene. Greene, a former FBI employee,

traveled to Syria in 2014.

28 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 1: Pioneers

of al-Qaeda.

Before his reported death in March 2016,

the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) of

Bosnia and Herzegovina considered Ikanovic to be the

most dangerous Bosnian citizen in Syria and Iraq.

Ikanovic was sanctioned as a specially designated global

terrorist by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in

2015. The designation claims that Ikanovic held various

leadership positions in IS, including being a member of

the organization’s judicial branch for religious-military

affairs, the Shura Council, and the head of the larg-

est IS training camp in northern Syria at the popular

border-crossing point of Azaz.

In Azaz, Ikanovic “ap-

propriated” a mansion from a former Syrian regime

official that was used to transit travelers from the Balkans

and elsewhere into Syria.

Another one of Pazara’s Bosnian connections in Syria

made his name in a completely different, but nonetheless

prescient manner. A teenager from the Sanjak region

of Serbia, Mirza Ganic (aka Abu Shahid) was in charge

of multiple Bosnian online jihadist forums, and was

known for his braggadocio and charisma in supporting

IS.

Despite his youth and combat inexperience, Ganic’s

prolific social media presence commanded the respect of

a broad swath of Bosnian travelers. His influence appar-

ently extended far into the diaspora. According to court

documents, Ramiz Hodzic posted a picture of a combat

knife and commented that Mirza Ganic was interested in

obtaining the weapon for “slaughtering.”

When Ganic

was killed in Aleppo in September 2014 at the age of 19,

Pazara posted on Facebook:

My brother Abu Shahid was martyred. I pray to

Allah to grant him jannah [heaven] and the paradise

of Firdaus, and bring him together in jannah with

the Prophet of Allah, peace be upon Him.

Most of the available evidence about Pazara’s time in

Syria comes from his Facebook account. While today,

jihadist formations make more active pushes to prevent

their fighters from harming their operational security

by using social media in-theater, during the early days

of the Syrian conflict it was en vogue for travelers to

become outsized social media personalities. Pazara’s ac-

count, under the name Abdullah Ramo Mudzhahid, kept

a diary of who he was associating with, daily news from

the frontlines, and pictures of himself, his compatriots,

and their activities.

The earliest photos on this account depict a more

romanticized view of combat, showing Pazara in

recruitment-style pictures. Accompanying one image of

him posing with a rifle, Pazara commented:







The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 29

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

I pray to Allah that this picture can be used

for da’wa [outreach] … May Allah give my brothers

and sisters even more strength for this job, which

leads us on the path to Paradise.

Other images attempt to explain to those outside of

IS-controlled territories that their creature comforts

from their home countries—including motorcycles and

Bosnian-style lamb roasts—would be available if they too

joined IS.

However, other pictures show that Pazara was whole-

heartedly committed to fighting and combat in Syria.

In March 2014, he communicated with an unnamed

individual in the U.S. Pazara allegedly told of a mission

in which his battalion took control of a large area, killed

11 opposing soldiers, and captured one prisoner.

Pazara stated that he intended to slaughter the

prisoner the next day.

A few weeks later, Ramiz

Hodzic, Pazara’s friend in St. Louis communicat-

ed with Nihad Rosic, Pazara’s friend in Utica,

New York. Hodzic claimed he saw a video of

Pazara’s group in action, potentially during the

late-March operation Pazara described. Hodzic

told Rosic that he saw “ours” (that is, Pazara’s

group) kill five soldiers, one of whom they

beheaded.

He allegedly used this example to encourage

Rosic to donate money to buy “five good snipers,” which

Rosic allegedly did on April 15, 2014.

In May 2014, Pazara uploaded a photo album of dead

Kurdish combatants to his Facebook page, killed fight-

ing Pazara’s battalion. “These kafirs [nonbelievers] of

the PKK [the Kurdistan Workers’ Party] … with Allah’s

help, were killed during the last military action fighting

against the Islamic State,” Pazara proclaimed online.

“This is what is waiting for them in the world, these

infidels in the trenches were killed one by one fleeing

their homes.”

Four months later, IS fighters began a siege of the

areas surrounding Kobani in the autonomous region



if they kill me I will become a martyr. I would love for my brothers felt the sweetness of faith and jihad for just one

second, they would immediately be sent to heaven, Allahu Akbar.”

Facebook post from Abdullah Ramo Pazara discussing a battle against



30 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 1: Pioneers

of Rojava on the Turkish-Syrian border. They faced

stiff resistance from a coalition led by Kurdish factions

and Iraqi Peshmerga forces, along with elements of the

Free Syrian Army. On or around September 22, 2014,

Pazara died in battle in Kobani at the age of 38.

To date, Pazara stands as one of the highest-ranked

Americans to ever have fought for IS. His combat expe-

rience during the Bosnian Civil War, regardless of what

side it was for, appears to have helped him navigate jihad-

ist combat in Syria in ways that other American citizens

could not. Building on his position, he remained in contact

with his networks in the U.S., and attempted to facilitate

their material support, and in Nihad Rosic’s case, travel

to join IS. Abdullah Ramo Pazara is thus a quintessential

example of a jihadist pioneer in Syria and Iraq. His story

serves as a reminder of how particular Americans, con-

tingent on their abilities and networks, can distinguish

themselves from other American travelers.

Ahmad Abousamra

The eighth issue of IS’ official magazine publication,

Rumiyah (Rome), released in early April 2017, con-

tained a eulogy for the media propagandist Shaykh Abu

Sulayman ash-Shami.

The magazine claimed that Abu

Sulayman was a senior figure in the production of IS

media, and that he died in January

2017 as a result of a missile strike

during a battle.

In a rare inci-

dence, the magazine identified

Abu Sulayman by his real name

halfway through the article. Even

before that, close followers of the

American jihadist scene could

instantly recognize his identity

from the cover photo alone. “Abu

Sulayman” was Ahmad Abousamra,

a dual Syrian-American citizen

wanted by the FBI for providing

material support to terrorists.

By the time of his death in 2017,

Abousamra had attempted to par-

ticipate in jihadist organizations

across the globe (including Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, and

Syria) for a decade and a half. Abousamra, a computer

scientist by training, spoke Arabic and English fluently,

was a skilled propagandist with a deep understanding of

jihadist ideology. These traits made him an invaluable

asset, especially because he also had a knack for eluding

U.S. law enforcement. He avoided arrest on multiple

occasions and transitioned between two passports and

dozens of aliases. In some ways, Abousamra helps eluci-

date the threat posed by individuals who can seamlessly

transition between various jihadist battlefields. As the

nature of the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts change, the trav-

elers who will be vital to establishing jihadist campaigns

elsewhere may fit profiles like Abousamra’s.

Motivations

Abousamra was born in 1981 in France.

His father,

Dr. Abdulbadi Abousamra, moved the family to the

Boston, Massachusetts, metropolitan area after accept-

ing a position as an endocrinologist at Massachusetts

General Hospital.

Dr. Abousamra is also a prominent

Muslim Brotherhood–linked activist and community

organizer. He helped found the Islamic Academy of

New England and the al-Noor Academy, a private

Islamic middle and high school in Mansfield, south of

Boston. He was also the president of the Islamic Center

of New England’s Sharon, Massachusetts, branch, and

the vice president of the Muslim

American Society of Boston.

Ahmad, nevertheless, attended

the Xaverian Brothers Catholic

High School while growing up

in Boston.

He was on the honor

roll, but transferred to Stoughton

High School during his senior

year, reportedly because Xaverian

Brothers did not permit male

students to grow beards.

After

graduating in 1999, he attended

Northeastern University, and even-

tually transferred to the University

of Massachusetts–Boston, where

he graduated in 2006 with a degree

in computer science.

Cover page of IS’ Rumiyah magazine, issue

8, depicting Ahmad Abousamra. April 2017.

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meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

Around the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks,

Ahmad Abousamra reportedly began outwardly express-

ing his interest in participating in jihadist movements

to his circle of friends, including allegedly praising the

9/11 attacks.

One member of this circle was Tarek

Mehanna, an Egyptian-American student from Sudbury,

Massachusetts, another upper-middle-class suburb in

the Boston area. Abousamra and Mehanna were family

friends. They also developed a shared interest in Salafi-

jihadism and were highly active on jihadist web forums.

In the early 2000s, they began researching ways to travel

to Pakistan to attend al-Qaeda training camps using the

internet.

Abousamra also contacted Hassan Masood,

a Pakistani national with knowledge of the areas in

Pakistan with training camps. Masood was the son of the

former imam of the mosque in Sharon that Abousamra

attended.

The elder Masood was eventually deported

to Pakistan for immigration violations.

His brother

(and Hassan Masood’s uncle), Hafiz Muhammad Saeed,

was the founder of Lashkhar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistani

affiliate of al-Qaeda.

Abousamra traveled to Pakistan in 2002, with the intent

of receiving military training at a LeT training camp.

He was given money by an unnamed co-conspirator to

donate to the mujahideen.

Upon arrival in Pakistan,

he attempted to enter the LeT training camps, but

according to Masood, he was “blown off.” Abousamra

was turned away from the camps because he had no

fighting experience, and he was an Arab, and not a

Pakistani.

Abousamra eventually met a facilitator

named Abdulmajid after talking about a religious slogan

with him on a bus; Abousamra believed he could help

him gain entry to a training camp. Instead, Abdulmajid

instructed Abousamra to return to the U.S. and “do

whatever [he could]” to help the cause of jihad.

Upon

his return, Abousamra, Mehanna, and a recent convert

to Islam named Daniel Maldonado continued to research

ways to support jihadist groups overseas and commit

attacks at home.

After the Pakistan plan failed, Abousamra and his friends

discussed next steps. They planned an attack on a mall

in the Boston area, in the hopes of mimicking the terror

caused by the 2002 Beltway sniper shootings.

The

group discussed other possibilities, including assassinat-

ing members of the Bush administration and committing

an attack on a local U.S. Air Force base. However, they

could not find a source for the automatic weapons that

they needed.

Moving forward, the group re-considered jihadist travel.

Iraq was initially appealing: the U.S. military engagement

there had just started, and al-Qaeda in Iraq (later, the

Islamic State in Iraq, the predecessor group to IS) were

growing in influence due to high-profile operations.

However, Abousamra and his co-conspirators could

not determine a way to reach Iraq from neighboring

countries. Instead, Abousamra traveled to Sacramento,

California, in October 2003 to receive guidance from

Jason Pippin, an American-born convert from Georgia

who had trained with LeT and also studied in a Yemeni

madrassa in the 1990s.

Abousamra met Pippin on

an online Salafi-jihadist web forum. Pippin discussed

his experience in Yemen and gave Abousamra and

Mehanna advice about how to travel and who to con-

tact.

Abousamra gave Pippin $5,000 for a plane ticket,

hoping that he would join them. However, Pippin re-

mained in California.

Journey

In February 2004, Abousamra, Mehanna, and an un-

named co-conspirator embarked on their journey to

Yemen through the United Arab Emirates.

All three

only saw Yemen as a transition point.

Per Pippin’s

advice, they were to stay in Yemen for a few weeks to

participate in a training camp, before eventually trans-

ferring to the battlefield in Iraq to fight with AQI.

On arrival in the United Arab Emirates from the U.S., the

unnamed co-conspirator dropped out after he received

a call that his father was sick. He gave Mehanna and

Abousamra the money he had saved for the trip—a few

thousand dollars—and promptly returned to the U.S.

Mehanna and Abousamra entered Yemen on February

4, 2004.

Again, their attempt to find a suitable training

camp was thwarted. Abousamra went onwards to Iraq to

fight for AQI, arriving in the country on February 13.

Mehanna, on the other hand, returned the U.S. and acted

32 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 1: Pioneers

as a conduit between the al-Qaeda media offices and

Western jihadists by translating propaganda material.

Abousamra’s first Iraq expedition did not last long,

either. After two weeks in-country, he traveled through

Jordan and his father’s home country of Syria, eventually

returning to the Boston area in August 2004.

He then

regrouped with Mehanna, who described their new role

to another unnamed individual as “the media wing” of

AQI, assisting in the translation of several videos pro-

duced by the group from Arabic into English.

As late

as April 2006, Mehanna and Abousamra were in contact,

hatching a plan to reach out to the leader of LeT in the

hopes of traveling to Pakistan again.

Another member

of Abousamra’s group of friends, Daniel Maldonado, went

to Somalia in 2006 with his family and another American,

Omar Hammami (also known as Abu Mansur al-Amriki),

whom he met online.

Maldonado attended a training

camp run by al-Shabaab; after catching malaria and escap-

ing Somalia into Kenya, he was apprehended by Kenyan

forces in 2007, extradited to the U.S., and sentenced to 10

years in federal prison.

Maldonado called Mehanna while he was in Somalia

prior to his arrest. At this point, federal agents were

monitoring Mehanna and Abousamra, and knew that

Maldonado had reached out

to Mehanna about his pur-

pose of travel to Somalia.

December 2006, FBI agents

interviewed Abousamra first

and Mehanna second, four

days apart. Authorities in-

quired about their respective

trips to Yemen and Iraq and

Mehanna was also asked about

Maldonado’s call.

According to

court documents, Abousamra

lied about the “purpose and

intended destination[s]” of his

two trips to Yemen and Iraq;

Mehanna lied not only about

these activities, but also provid-

ed false information about the

location of Daniel Maldonado.

Abousamra saw the writing on the wall and fled the

country in December 2006. At this point, he had already

graduated from UMass-Boston.

Tarek Mehanna,

absent a second passport and held down by studies at

the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy, stayed behind.

Mehanna and Abousamra (in absentia) were indicted

in 2009 on a variety of charges, including providing

material support to designated FTOs, conspiring to kill

U.S. nationals in a foreign country, and making false

statements to the FBI.

A jury convicted Mehanna and

he was subsequently sentenced to 17 and a half years in

federal prison in 2012.

Abousamra vanished after his December 2006 departure.

The FBI did not place Abousamra on a watchlist before

his departure, reportedly for “operational reasons.”

repatriated to Syria, and settled in the Aleppo area with

his wife and at least one child. By the time a court issued

his arrest warrant in 2009, Abousamra was well outside

the reach of American law enforcement. In December

2013, the FBI listed Ahmad Abousamra as a “Most

Wanted Terrorist,” and offered a reward of $50,000 for

information leading to his arrest.

However, there was

no updated information regarding his activities since

the departure to Syria. It was unclear whether he was

involved in jihadist activity in Syria or the region in be-

tween when he left the U.S. in

2006, and the beginning of the

Syrian conflict in 2011.

Abousamra in Syria

The first verification that

Abousamra had joined a fac-

tion of the Syrian conflict was

in 2014. A senior U.S. law

enforcement official revealed

that Abousamra had joined IS,

claiming that the group had

assigned him to assist in their

efforts to spread their English-

language propaganda on social

media.

100

At this time, scholars,

analysts, and governments were

still attempting to uncover the

leadership behind the IS media

FBI Most Wanted Terrorist notice for Ahmad

Abousamra, released December 2013.

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meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

distribution division. Two features that seemed to distin-

guish the media operations of IS from previous jihadist

organizations’ material was their professional-quality

productions and their ability to disseminate this content

through social media.

Abousamra, in his years of attempting and failing to

find a long-term role in several jihadist organizations,

found a match in IS. After the start of the Syrian con-

flict, he lived in one of the hotspots of resistance to the

Syrian regime on the battlefields of Aleppo. His eulogy

in Rumiyah claims that he joined one of the factions

in Aleppo, but was wounded in a battle. He eventual-

ly came across soldiers affiliated with IS in Iraq, who

Abousamra recognized as the successor of al-Qaeda in

Iraq, the organization that he fought for and assembled

media products for nearly a decade prior.

101

The soldiers

were fighting in the Aleppo region under the name of

Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl ash-Sham (The Victory Front of the

People of Sham).

102

He first requested that these soldiers take him to Iraq,

which was denied. Then, he asked to participate in a

suicide bombing, which was also rejected. Eventually,

he found a role “preaching aqidah [the creed]” to the

soldiers.

103

During this period, the split between JN

and IS occurred, and Abousamra joined the ranks of

the faction’s soldiers who pledged allegiance to Abu

Bakr al-Baghdadi. A wounded Abousamra was set to

participate in a suicide bombing mission early in his

career with IS, but by chance he came into contact with

one of the senior-most members of the media division

of IS, Wa’il al-Fayad (Abu Muhammad al-Furqan).

104

Abousamra’s eulogy claims that al-Fayad instantly rec-

ognized Abousamra’s talent, brought him on board to

the media team, and sent another fighter in his place for

a suicide mission.

105

Abousamra’s first job in the IS media department was

ghostwriting treatises and opinions for the director, al-

Fayad. Abousamra used the pen name “Abu Maysarah

ash-Shami” to denote the articles he wrote on behalf of

al-Furqan, most of which are available in Arabic and

take an especially harsh stance on Salafi-jihadist orga-

nizations that had not declared allegiance to Abu Bakr

al-Baghdadi.

106

The most famous of Abousamra’s essays

written under the Abu Maysarah nom du plume coined

the phrase “Jews of Jihad.” This has since become the

common pejorative used by IS supporters to refer to

followers of al-Qaeda’s current leadership, particularly

Ayman al-Zawahiri.

107

In the essay, Abousamra claimed

that al-Qaeda and its leaders were the contemporary

equivalent to the Jews during the time of the original

Caliphate, who converted to Islam not due to their belief

in the religion, but because they merely feared their de-

clining political position in the Arabian Peninsula if they

did not.

108

Eventually, al-Fayad rewarded Abousamra for his ef-

forts. In July 2014, IS’ al-Hayat Media Center, directed

by al-Fayad, published the first issue of the monthly

magazine Dabiq.

109

The issues of Dabiq, which ran for

a two-year period until July 2016, were translated into

several languages. Abousamra, now under his own

kunya of Abu Sulayman ash-Shami, was responsible for

directing translation efforts (especially for the English

version), and was the magazine’s chief editor and a

frequent contributor.

110

Al Arabiya, citing a source from the Iraqi Ministry of

Interior, claimed in May 2015 that the Iraqi military

killed two Americans who had been senior members of

IS’ media team, as the result of a strike in the west of

Anbar province near Fallujah. The men were named as

Abu Osama al-Amriki, a documentary filmmaker, and

another filmmaking expert, Abu Mohammad al-Suri,

also known as “Abu Samra.”

111

While proof of death

was unconfirmed, the Iraqi military made a concerning

claim that Abousamra was involved in the filming of

the infamous videos depicting the beheadings of James

Foley, Stephen Sotloff, David Haines, Alan Henning, and

Peter Kassig in 2014.

112

These claims were not verified,

although evidence that Abousamra was directly involved

in English-language media production for IS around this

time lends them some credence.

According to IS sources, Abousamra was working with

Wa’il al-Fayad on a new magazine product, Rumiyah,

in the fall of 2016; this contradicts the claim that

Abousamra was killed in 2015.

113

The first version of

34 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 1: Pioneers

Rumiyah, released on September 5, 2016, hailed the death

of IS’ official spokesperson, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani,

who reportedly died in late August.

114

According to some

sources, al-Fayad, Abousamra’s mentor, was slated to

assume al-Adnani’s role.

115

However, al-Fayad was killed

two days after the release of the first issue.

116

Following al-Fayad’s death, Abousamra could have

taken his job as director of the IS media division.

Abousamra’s eulogy, however, reports that the death of

his mentor “greatly saddened” him, and that in the days

following his passing, Abousamra requested to return to

the battlefield rather than staying to manage the media

office. He was transferred to ribat (forward position) in

al-Thawrah, Syria, where he was reportedly killed in

January 2017.

117

Alongside his eulogy appearing as the

feature article of the eighth issue of Rumiyah is an orig-

inal poem scripted by Abu Sulayman ash-Shami called

“The Bliss of a Martyr.”

118

The U.S. government has not verified Abousamra’s death.

The FBI reward offered for information leading to his

capture or arrest remains active—in the cases of other

known jihadists who have been confirmed dead, the

Bureau traditionally retracts the reward offer. A senior

law enforcement also claimed that IS issued false death

claims in the past to “get the heat off” their leaders if they

were subject to surveillance or a targeted airstrike.

119

Outside the death claim, there are, however, some in-

teresting commonalities and discrepancies between the

account in Rumiyah and U.S. law enforcement’s timeline.

The article places Abousamra in Aleppo around the same

time that the FBI released updated information that he

was living there in 2013. It states that Abousamra was

active on the Aleppo front of the jihadist resistance, and

adds that his counterparts often referred to him as “Abu

Sulayman al-Halabi” (Halab referring to the Arabic name

for Aleppo), rather than the more generic Abu Sulayman

ash-Shami (the Syrian) or al-Amriki (the American).

120

The eulogy also gives an account of Abousamra’s previ-

ous travel to join jihadist groups, claiming that he:

… completed his studies in Computer Science at the

University of Massachusetts in Boston, graduating

as an engineer and programmer, before resolving

to go forth in the cause of Allah with some of his

friends. So they left as muhajirin [travelers] to Allah,

not coordinating their journey with anyone. They

roamed between Yemen, Pakistan, and Iraq, hoping

to meet someone who would bring them to the

mujahideen. But once they became weary of finding

the way, and as they feared inciting the suspicions

of intelligence agencies, they returned to America,

asking Allah to guide them towards their goal.

121

Two elements of the eulogy differ from the details on

Abousamra included in court documents in the Mehanna

trial. The eulogy states that he was close to carrying out a

jihadist attack with “two of his companions” that would

involve “seizure of some weapons from the Crusaders,

which they would then use for an attack behind enemy

lines that they hoped would cause the killing of a large

number of mushrikin [polytheists].”

122

This account

varies from the FBI account regarding the sequenc-

ing of the attack plot. According to court documents,

Abousamra and Mehanna discussed committing attacks

in the U.S. before their trip to Yemen in 2004; accord-

ing to Rumiyah, they continued discussing this plot and

were in the final stages of preparation when FBI agents

interviewed Mehanna and Abousamra in 2006, which

prompted Abousamra to leave the country. Whether

Image from Abousamra’s eulogy in Rumiyah, issue 8. April 2017.

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this claim is jihadist bluster, a “journalistic” mistake, or

direct evidence that the two continued their interest in

a domestic attack after returning from Yemen is hard

to parse.

The eulogy also documents another plot by Abousamra

to kill a U.S. citizen overseas, claiming that he “took part

in planning to kill the American apostate Hamza Yusuf

during his last trip to Turkey.”

123

Yusuf, a prominent

American Islamic scholar and co-founder of Zaytuna

College, did visit Turkey in the aftermath of the July

2016 military coup attempt.

124

However, Rumiyah’s ac-

count does not provide any more details about this plot

or Abousamra’s involvement.

Ahmad Abousamra is another instructive example of a

“pioneer.” He arrived in Syria at least five years before

any other Western traveler had done so. Like Pazara, he

managed to find himself in the right place at the right

time in Syria’s jihadist networks, directing himself to-

wards the political allegiances and critical relationships

that allowed him to rise in the ranks of his group’s

leadership. His skills, including language proficiency,

religious knowledge, and technical know-how, set him

apart from other recruits. Unlike Pazara, Abousamra

reportedly did not directly reach out to individual

Americans in his networks back in the U.S. (according

to available public knowledge). Nevertheless, his role

as a propagandist and media distributor allowed him

to edge himself into the media products, treatises, and

scholarship that attracted thousands of other travelers

to Syria and Iraq to fight for IS.

Pioneers: Enduring Relevance for

Jihadist Groups

From a security or law enforcement perspective, jihadist

pioneers pose vexing challenges. Not only do they have

deep influence in homegrown networks, but if not killed

or apprehended while in Syria and Iraq, this category of

traveler is the most likely to drive recruitment efforts

to new battlefields. Besides, few Americans possess the

capabilities or influence necessary to rise in the ranks of

jihadist organizations. Many do not have the required

combat experience, language abilities, technical skills,

or connections necessary to amount to much more

than foot soldiers in insurgent militant organizations.

Pioneers stand out in this regard; they often possess one

or more of these qualities and build on them after their

arrival in Syria and Iraq.

However, date of arrival in Syria can sometimes be mis-

leading: some early arrivals were killed quickly, reneged

on their beliefs, or struggled to adapt to their new cir-

cumstances. The mere feat of a pioneer’s survival and

longevity in a combat or insurgency environment is a

testament either to outright skill or tactical and strategic

adaptation. Both Pazara and Abousamra lasted through

their first combat experiences in Bosnia, Pakistan,

Yemen, and Iraq, respectively. Abousamra was never

arrested, despite transiting back and forth between

the U.S. and the three different countries in which he

attempted to receive military training from jihadist

organizations. Pazara hid his wartime records, allow-

ing him to avoid potential war crimes prosecution or

deportation in the U.S.

Moreover, pioneers are specialists in critical skills needed

by jihadist groups. The majority of American travelers

to Syria had little to no combat experience prior to their

travel. While Abousamra did not have extensive combat

experience, he was able to distinguish himself in Syria

through his understanding of Salafi-jihadist ideology,

abilities as a propagandist, and computer skills. This

combination made him incredibly important to IS. At

the time he joined, IS was in the process of revolution-

izing its branding through stark points of departure

from the current debates in Salafi-jihadism, propaganda

that could appeal to Western (and especially English-

speaking) audiences, and a comprehensive use of digital

communications technology. Assisting in these efforts

may not have constituted an automatic entry ticket into

the leadership ranks of LeT, AQAP, or AQI, but they did

for IS during that time.

Lastly, pioneers make the right connections. Sometimes,

this happens as a result of random occurrences. Abu

Muhammad al-Furqan stumbled across Ahmad

Abousamra, a zealous but wounded Syrian-American

with experience in the media business and computer

36 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 1: Pioneers

skills, just as he was about to undertake a suicide mis-

sion. Abdullah Ramo Pazara happened to arrive in Syria

just as the split between AQ and IS was being finalized,

propelling his countrymen into leadership roles.

These three characteristics—adaptability, technical skills,

and connections—are also why the category of pioneer

travelers must be examined as part of the larger threat

that jihadist travelers pose to the U.S. and the West.

The current debate focuses heavily on the danger of

returning fighters and whether the territorial demise

of organizations like IS will increase the likelihood of

homegrown attacks or broader recruitment networks,

jump-started by returnees.

This debate, while useful and necessary, could benefit

from an assessment of which kinds of travelers pose the

largest threat from a national security perspective. The

Pazara and Abousamra stories add some insight in this

regard, not only into how returning travelers have influ-

enced recruitment in the U.S., but also the comparative

risk of returnees and pioneers.

Both Abousamra and Pazara had contact with veterans

of jihadist campaigns at some point during their sagas,

with Abousamra talking to at least one returned trav-

eler. Abousamra traveled from Boston to Sacramento,

California, to meet Jason Pippin, who had returned

from a training camp in Kashmir operated by LeT, via

a madrassa run by another “Afghan Arab” whom he

met in Yemen. After his return to the U.S., Pippin re-

mained active on several jihadist web forums, which is

where he first encountered Abousamra. Pippin advised

Abousamra about jihadist training camps in Yemen, tes-

tifying at Mehanna’s trial that he told Abousamra which

airport to travel through, which madrassas to attend, and

who to contact. Although Abousamra eventually was

unsuccessful in his search for training camps in Yemen,

in this case, Pippin, a returned traveler, provided exper-

tise, contacts, and other information about fighting for

jihadist groups overseas.

Pippin, a former “pioneer” himself, returned to the U.S.

and continued to assist in jihadist recruitment until 2005,

when he denounced extremism. He eventually became

a government witness in the trial against Mehanna.

Nonetheless, this incident shows that while returning

travelers from Syria and Iraq, especially returning “pi-

oneers,” may not directly participate in attack plots or

travel themselves, they retain the contacts and skills that

they attained during their travel. They may attempt to

assist the next generation of recruits in reaching those

territories, or whichever battlefield overtakes them as

the next attractive destination for jihadist travelers.

Pazara’s commander Bajro Ikanovic was not a returnee.

Instead, he was a veteran of a homegrown cell of al-Qaeda

supporters in Sarajevo. The relationship between Pazara

and Ikanovic demonstrated the inverse of the argument

that former travelers return home and spur homegrown

plots: in this instance, Ikanovic, a former homegrown

plotter in Bosnia, traveled overseas to Syria and facili-

tated the travel of other individuals.

Returning pioneers are likely to be few and far between.

Those who do come back to the U.S. may not attempt

to participate in attacks themselves, but may encourage

others to either commit violent acts or travel overseas

to join jihadist groups. From previous mobilizations,

there are several relevant examples of both. Christopher

Paul, a former participant in the Afghan and Bosnian

jihad, was contacted when he returned to Ohio by two

men who wanted to conduct a bomb attack at a mall.

Like Pippin, Paul shared his expertise with the group

in a series of meetings, but authorities arrested all

three before the plan came to fruition. Daniel Curtis

“Saifullah” Boyd, also a returnee from training camps in

Afghanistan and Pakistan, set up another camp in North

Carolina, where several individuals who eventually

traveled or attempted to travel to join jihadist groups

underwent military training.

A more pertinent issue related to pioneers, however,

concerns who the next generation of pioneers will be

when the next major battlefield opens after Syria and Iraq.

The travelers who pick up their first major experience

with jihad and jihadist movements in Syria and Iraq and

then transition to another campaign will be the Ahmad

Abousamras and Abdullah Ramo Pazaras of tomorrow.

If the history of Americans participating in jihadist

organizations is any indication, the next generation

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of pioneers will be crucial to recruiting and inspiring

Americans to join alternative battlefields. Whether it

will be in the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia,

or anywhere else remains to be seen. Like their coun-

terparts who carried their experiences from previous

military engagements to Syria and Iraq, these recruits

will represent the upper echelon of American jihadists.

The most concerning takeaway from the current gen-

eration of pioneers is that it is difficult to determine

which of the contemporary travelers may become

pioneers in subsequent mobilizations. While Pazara

had combat experience, he garnered it in a completely

different ideological context outside the confines of

the Salafi-jihadist movement. Abousamra, for various

reasons, was unable to join jihadist groups during his

first attempts in Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq. Even those

who have attempted but failed to travel to Syria may be

successful in traveling to other battlefields and rising

the ranks there. Nevertheless, the pioneer category is

the foremost example of the linkages and networks be-

tween jihadist organizations in different geographic and

temporal contexts. It is therefore prudent for analysts,

scholars, and law enforcement to place extra attention

on which individuals become “pioneers,” and how they

manage to do so.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 39

Category 2: Networked Travelers

he majority of known American travelers did not

make the journey alone. Instead, they formed

groups of individuals who worked with others to plan

and execute their eventual departure. For many American

travelers, their best chance to reach jihadist-held territory

was to build strength in numbers. Due to the role of in-

terpersonal relationships in facilitating their travel, this

report refers to these travelers as “networked travelers.”

In many cases, networks are essential. What is less ap-

parent, however, is how they matter, and which types

of networks are likely to facilitate travel. To this end,

this section presents several stories of various types of

networked travelers, with a focus on their motivations

and how they used social connections to travel to Syria

and Iraq. Given that many of these individuals were

part of a more extensive web of supporters who may

not have been charged publicly with criminal activi-

ties, details of their radicalization may not be available.

Wherever possible, the authors attempted to augment

information through interviews with family members,

friends, and lawyers prosecuting or representing those

in that circle.

In this study’s review of networked travelers, three

types of networks frequently appear: community-based

clusters, friend groups, and families. In the American

context, the last two types of networks are more fre-

quent. They comprise specific families or tight-knit

friend groups that travel alongside one another or

support the jihadist cause in a variety of ways (plan-

ning attacks, financing, etc.). Less common are clusters,

which are made up of multiple family and friend groups

within a specific community, that all participate in ji-

hadist activity. This section highlights cases within

each sub-category of networked travelers, including an

extensive description of one of the only known clusters

of the American jihadist scene.

Clusters

The Minnesota Cluster

From 2013 until the end of 2017, at least seven residents of

the Minnesota Twin Cities area traveled to Syria and Iraq

to fight. Concurrently, at least ten residents attempted to

travel but were unsuccessful. This rate of jihadist mobili-

zation makes the state of Minnesota, and the Twin Cities

more specifically, among the highest producers of jihadist

travelers to Syria and Iraq in the U.S.

The Minnesotan contingent in Syria and Iraq is well-

documented. The court cases against the ten unsuccessful

travelers revealed a wealth of information regarding

other Twin Cities residents who successfully traveled.

A U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security

Committee report found that more than one-quarter

of successful and unsuccessful U.S. travelers came from

Minnesota.

During a 2015 press conference, then–U.S.

Attorney Andrew Luger, responsible for prosecuting the

majority of Minnesota’s IS-related cases, was more direct

in his assessment: “We have a terror recruiting problem

in Minnesota.”

However, the Syria and Iraq-related mobilizations from

Minnesota were not without precedent. Nor are they the

largest mobilization of Minnesotans. From 2007 to 2013,

at least 23 young men from the Twin Cities participated

in a different conflict—the civil war in Somalia.

After

Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia in 2006, many young

men from the Twin Cities, most of whom were Somali

immigrants to the U.S. or second-generation Somali-

Americans, traveled to Somalia to fight.

All of them

joined the jihadist group al-Shabaab.

When the Syrian conflict flared up in the early 2010s,

another wave of young men from Minnesota traveled

to Syria and Iraq. The travelers from Minnesota in both

waves were mostly Somali-American, with some excep-

tions. More importantly, however, there are networked

40 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 2 : neTWorked Travelers

links between the mobilizations. The majority of the

seven travelers to Syria and Iraq had, at the time of their

travel, connections to at least one other traveler or at-

tempted traveler. Some had links to the first wave of

Minnesotan travelers to Somalia.

These connections were formed by a conglomerate of

the first two types of social networks—friendship and

kinship. When the first Minnesotans arrived in Syria,

they attempted to recruit their friends and family from

back home in the Twin Cities to join them. Then–U.S.

Attorney Luger described this recruiting strategy as a

“peer-to-peer, brother-to-brother” approach, noting

that “the person radicalizing your son, your brother,

your friend, may not be a stranger. It may be their best

friend right here in town.”

To illustrate how deep and networked many of these

connections were, critical examples include the first

three individuals with roots in Minnesota to travel to

Syria and Iraq: Abdifatah Ahmed (aka Abdirahmaan

Muhumed), Hanad Abdullahi Mohallim, and Douglas

McCain. By many accounts, Ahmed was the first Twin

Cities resident to arrive in Syria and Iraq.

Ahmed left

Minnesota for London in 2013. The individuals who

communicated with him while he was in London claim

his decision to travel to Syria in the winter of 2013 was

seemingly instantaneous. One day, he was broke, de-

spondent, and constantly chewing khaat (a plant-based

stimulant popular in the Horn of Africa), the next day

there were rumors in Minneapolis that he had joined a

jihadist group in Syria.

In January 2014, it was clear that Ahmed joined a jihadist

group in Syria. He posted two photos on his Facebook

page of him standing under a black flag, with a Quran in

one hand and an AK-47 in the other. These photos were

posted with the caption, “I give up this worldly life for

allah and to save the ummah if that makes terrorist I am

happy with it.”

He told a friend from Minnesota, who

later became a confidential human source for the FBI,

that “Islam is not just praying u know … Someone who

get kill for the sakeof Allah can ask allah to for give up

to 70 of his family.”

One month later, he contacted another old friend from

Minnesota via Facebook. Douglas McCain, a graduate

of Robbinsdale Cooper High School in New Hope,

Minnesota, converted to Islam in 2004.

McCain went to

the same high school as Troy Kastigar, another Muslim

convert from Minnesota who was killed fighting for

al-Shabaab in Somalia in 2009. The two were also room-

mates for a brief period.

McCain later moved to San

Diego, California, where he was residing at the time of

his departure from the U.S. While not Somali-American,

McCain had deep ties to the Somali community, and was

employed in a Somali restaurant in San Diego at the time

of his departure.

In March 2014, McCain contacted Ahmed via Facebook

private message and gave him his contact information.

Pictures from Abdifatah Ahmed’s Facebook account depicting him

in Syria, 2014. Pictures obtained from Minnesota Public Radio.

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He also told Ahmed: “In sha Allah i need to hala at u

I am flying out to Turkey.”

Ahmed scolded McCain,

telling him not to discuss jihadist travel on Facebook and

instructed him to turn off the location services on his

phone.

On March 9, McCain traveled from San Diego

to Istanbul. On the same day, Minnesota resident Hanad

Mohallim departed from Minneapolis to Istanbul. The

FBI later discovered that McCain and Mohallim’s tick-

ets were both fraudulently paid for with the same credit

card, which belonged to McCain’s brother’s girlfriend.

Hanad Mohallim was 18 years old at the time of his

departure. He had recently switched between several

Minneapolis-area high schools due to academic diffi-

culties.

On the day of his departure, he told his family

that he was going out for a job interview.

His mother,

who noticed a significant change in Mohallim’s religious

beliefs prior to travel, realized that Mohallim was at-

tempting to travel. Daringly, she went to Turkey to try

to find Mohallim and bring him back to Minnesota.

Turkey, she spoke with Mohallim several times, but to

no avail. She later recounted to federal investigators that

Hanad was working as a border guard for a jihadist group

and had no intentions of returning to the U.S.

When federal investigators interviewed Mohallim’s

mother, they uncovered critical information regarding

her son’s connections. First, Mohallim’s mother imme-

diately recognized a picture of McCain, who she referred

to as “Duale” and “Doug.”

McCain used “Duale” as his

name on Facebook and in other social media accounts.

She also commented that Mohallim met McCain

through her nephews, who lived in Edmonton, Canada.

According to Mohallim’s mother, Hanad Mohallim’s

travel to visit these cousins in 2013 sparked his interest

in jihad.

Across the border, Canadian authorities also identified

three of Mohallim’s cousins in Edmonton as jihadist

travelers. Brothers Hamse and Hersi Karie, and their

cousin Mahad Hirsi, all left Edmonton in October 2013

and were believed to be in Syria.

The Karie brothers

are U.S. permanent residents and previously lived in

San Diego and Minnesota. Several members of the Karie

family knew McCain personally.



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42 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 2 : neTWorked Travelers

On March 10, 2014, one day after McCain embarked

on his travel, a third Karie brother arrived in San

Diego and contacted McCain. McCain replied that he

“wasn’t in [San] Diego” and that he “went to go hala

at yo brothers.”

This was a reference to Hamse and

Hersi Karie, who were already in Syria. One month

later, McCain messaged the third Karie brother from

Turkey, informing him that he had arrived. The brother

responded, “where is the little [expletive],” referencing

Hanad Mohallim, his cousin.

McCain told the brother

that he and Hanad Mohallim had connected with Hamse

Karie, Hersi Karie, and Mahad Hirsi, and were on route

to Syria.

Upon arrival in Syria, all five travelers—Abdifatah

Ahmed, Douglas McCain, Hanad Mohallim, Hamse

Karie, and Hersi Karie—remained in contact with friends

in Minnesota and San Diego. They were also active on

social media. The pictures, videos, and statuses posted by

Ahmed, McCain, and Mohallim on their social media ac

counts had particular credence in the Twin Cities, where

young men in their friend and family circles gained a

new-found inspiration for traveling to Syria and Iraq to

join IS.

By the end of 2014, all five travelers were reported dead

within weeks of one another. Douglas McCain became

the first American to be reported by the U.S. government

as killed in Syria and Iraq.

He died in a battle between IS

and the FSA in late August 2014. Abdifatah Ahmed died

in Syria during the same period.

In late 2014, Hanad

Mohallim, Hamse and Hersi Karie, and Mahad Hirsi

were killed during the battle of Kobani.

By that time, however, this first group of travelers had

laid the groundwork for others to attempt to travel to

Syria and Iraq. Prior to his death, Hanad Mohallim was in

contact with his best friend from Minnesota, Abdullahi

Yusuf. Yusuf reached out to Mohallim shortly before

the latter departed from Minneapolis and exchanged

several phone calls and text messages during the course

of Mohallim’s time in Syria.

Yusuf contacted Mohallim when he was in the planning

stages of his own travel to Syria to join IS. Defaulting

again to the “strength in numbers” approach, Yusuf

found a fellow traveler, Abdi Nur, to join him on his

journey to Syria. Nur and Yusuf both attended the Dar

al-Farooq Youth and Family Center, an Islamic com-

munity center in Minnesota.

They met each other

through a mutual friend, Guled Omar, who was the

“ringleader” for several other Minnesota travelers in

their attempts to travel to Syria.

Before their travel, Nur and Yusuf operated in lockstep

to prepare themselves for the journey and ensure that

they would not be detected. They went on a shopping

trip to Macy’s to buy gear and clothing. They purchased

plane tickets to Istanbul, scheduled for back-to-back

days in May 2014.

Then, both men made fateful trips

to attain expedited U.S. passports at a local issuing office

in Minneapolis.

Abdi Nur went to the Minneapolis Passport Agency

first, on April 24, 2014. He listed his intended travel

destination as Australia, and the application interview

proceeded normally. Eventually, the agent approved his

passport application.

Four days later, Abdullahi Yusuf

went to the passport agency. He listed his destination as

Turkey. By all measures, Yusuf botched the interview.

He gave conflicting accounts about his purpose of travel

to Turkey, could not remember specific details about his

travel plans, and was visibly nervous, lowering his voice

and avoiding eye contact with the agent.

The interview

raised enough suspicion for the passport agent to inform

their supervisor, who then tipped off the FBI.

The passport agency also approved Yusuf’s application,

but the FBI closely monitored his activity. Yusuf raised

additional concern when he used his new passport to open

a checking account, with which he purchased his ticket to

Istanbul.

On the day of Yusuf’s planned departure, Nur

also drove Yusuf to the train station, where he would take

a train to Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport.

On May 28, 2014, federal agents apprehended Yusuf as

he attempted to board his flight.

Nur, whose efforts to attain a passport and travel ticket

did not elicit the same level of suspicion, successfully

boarded his flight from the same airport the next day. A

day after he traveled, a member of Nur’s family alerted

federal agents. They disclosed chat records with Abdi

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Nur on the messaging application Kik. In these chats,

Nur claimed that he had “gone to the brothers” and that

“everybody dies but I want the best death … take care of

hooyo [mother] for me inshallah.”

After arriving in Syria, Nur reached out to other

Minnesotan travelers for advice and guidance. He was

a long-time Facebook friend of Mohamed Abdullahi

Hassan, more commonly known as “Mujahid Miski.”

Hassan left Minnesota for Somalia during the peak of

the first wave of recruitment in 2009, and joined al-

Shabaab at the age of 18. He established an extensive

social media presence under the “Mujahid Miski” label,

and used his accounts to promote al-Shabaab, and later

IS.

He was linked to several jihadists in the U.S., in-

cluding Elton Simpson, the perpetrator of the 2015

attack in Garland, Texas, and Nicholas Rovinski, who

planned several assassinations.

In an early August 2014 conversation, Hassan asked Nur

how many “brothers from mpls [Minneapolis]” traveled

to the battlefields in Syria.

Nur replied that besides him,

three had successfully entered Syria—potentially refer-

ring to Abdifatah Ahmed, Douglas McCain, and Hanad

Mohallim—and “others” were planning to travel.

Hassan

gave Nur some sage advice, from one Minnesotan traveler

to another. After asking Nur if he knew “Duale” (Douglas

McCain), Hassan informed him:

try to all connect and make one of you guys mas’uul

[a Somali term referring to a guardian, or someone

that is responsible for others’ affairs] … being con-

nected in jihad make you stronger and you can all

help each other by fulfilling the duties that allah swt

put over you … like us in Somalia the brothers from

mpls are well-connected so try to do the same … It is

something we have learned after 6 years in Jihad.

It is unclear whether Nur knew Ahmed, McCain, and

Mohallim personally prior to his travel. However, heed-

ing Hassan’s advice, Nur continued to encourage and

assist other travelers from Minnesota.

In addition to Abdullahi Yusuf, nine other men from

Minnesota who knew Abdi Nur personally attempted to

travel to join IS. Two of them (Yusuf Jama and Mohamed

Roble), successfully reached Syria, while the remainder

(Zacharia Abdurahman, Hamza Ahmed, Abdirahman

Daud, Adnan Farah, Mohamed Farah, Hanad Musse,

and Guled Omar) were unsuccessful. AnotherTwin

Cities resident, Abdirizak Warsame, provided finan-

cial and logistical support to the others. Before Nur’s

departure, this group, in varying combinations, held

meetings with each other regarding travel to Syria at

the Dar al-Farooq center and several Somali restaurants

in the Twin Cities area.

One of the successful travelers, Mohamed Roble, was

Nur’s nephew.

He applied for a passport in late August

2014, weeks after Nur’s conversation with Miski, and

days after Douglas McCain’s death. Roble used a set-

tlement check from a previous personal injury suit to

finance his travel, once the funds became available to

him on his 18th birthday.

Learning from Abdullahi

Yusuf’s mistakes, Roble’s passport application listed his

destination as China rather than Turkey.

He did not

travel from Minneapolis to China alone—he left the

Twin Cities with his mother (Nur’s sister).

Once he

arrived in China, he planned an excursion to Istanbul

in December 2014. He absconded to Syria during this

trip to Istanbul.

His friends in Minnesota identified

him in early 2015 photographs depicting him fighting

for IS in Syria.

Other rumors about Roble’s and Nur’s activities in Syria

also reached a network of their friends in Minnesota.

In March 2015, Guled Omar told a confidential human

source in Minnesota that Roble had brought a significant

portion of his settlement money with him to Syria. Using

these funds, he reportedly bought Nur and another

Somali fighter named Khattab al-Somali new cars and

paid for two of Khattab’s marriages.

One leading source of information for those who

remained in Minnesota was Abdi Nur’s social media

presence. Using the Twitter handle “DustyFeet,” re-

ferring to a quote from the Prophet Muhammad, he

posted frontline pictures and updates from the battle-

fields of Syria, depicting himself as an average kid from

Minnesota who found his destiny in jihad.

He also in-

teracted with several of his friends in Minnesota. Some

44 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 2 : neTWorked Travelers

of them were concerned about his disappearance, and

others sought to join him.

Directly after Nur traveled to Syria in late May, three

other Minneapolitans started planning their course of

action. Yusuf Jama, Guled Omar, and an individual who

later became a confidential human source planned to

travel via car to San Diego, California, and onwards to

Istanbul by plane in late May.

However, Omar’s family

caught wind of the plot, and prevented the men from de

parting.

Undeterred, Yusuf Jama booked a labyrinthian

itinerary of plane tickets to test whether he could go to

Syria. He “test ran” traveling on June 1, 2014, embarking

on a same-day, round-trip journey between Minneapolis

and Chicago.

After ensuring that he was not on the

no-fly list, he boarded a June 9 flight to Istanbul from

John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York.

Yusuf Jama called a family member on June 25, 2014. He

would not specify his whereabouts, but told them that

he was out of the country. Investigators later uncov-

ered that Jama and Abdi Nur called their families from

the same number.

Jama may have been the individual

who Mohamed Roble and Guled Omar referred to as

“Khattab al-Somali.” Evidence also suggests that another

co-conspirator, Abdirizak Warsame, contacted one of the

Karie brothers to help smuggle Jama into Syria.

In November 2014, five young Minneapolitans at-

tempted to travel to Syria. Their efforts, which failed,

demonstrate that they were familiar with the routes

taken by Yusuf Jama. Zacharia Abdurahman, Hamza

Ahmed, Mohamed Farah, and Hanad Musse planned to

take a bus from Minnesota to New York, where they

would board flights to Istanbul.

Another route they

considered was traveling to San Diego, crossing the

border into Mexico, and then proceeding to Istanbul.

This was the same planned route as the first, failed at-

tempt taken by Yusuf Jama and Guled Omar in late May

2014. Reportedly, Omar was so convinced of the San

Diego option that he declined to travel with the other

four men to New York City. Instead, he attempted to

board a flight from Minneapolis to San Diego by himself

on November 6, 2014.

When all five men arrived at their respective ports of

departure, authorities intercepted them and prevented

them from traveling. Guled Omar was asked by federal

agents at the Minneapolis airport why he brought his

passport for a domestic flight and why he had no bag-

gage, before summarily being prevented from boarding

his plane.

This was not Omar’s first time being stopped

at the airport. In 2012, he was interviewed by the FBI

while attempting to travel to Nairobi, Kenya. His older

brother, Ahmed Ali Omar, had already joined al-Shabaab



New York Times.

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in Somalia, and investigators were concerned that Guled

was planning to join him.

The remaining four (Abdurrahman, Ahmed, Mohamed

Farah, and Musse) were apprehended by federal agents at

JFK and gave differing and vague accounts of their travel

purposes.

More concerningly, while their flights had

all been booked within 30 minutes of one another, their

itineraries and return flights from Istanbul did not align,

alerting federal agents that they may not have intended

to return to the U.S.

Ultimately, all five failed travelers were released and

allowed to return to Minneapolis, albeit under strict

surveillance. A confidential human source recorded con-

versations and uncovered that all five men, and two others

(Abdirahman Daud and Adnan Farah), were attempting

to obtain fake U.S. passports in order to travel to Syria

undetected.

They also learned that several of the men

were in contact with Abdi Nur (and prior to his death,

Hanad Mohallim) about how to travel successfully.

Evidence collected by the source details that Guled Omar

was still advocating for the fake passports option. The

source told Omar that he had a contact in San Diego

who could procure forged documents. The other defen-

dants collected photographs of themselves and money

to support this venture.

However, Omar, the de facto

leader of the group, was concerned that several of his

co-conspirators who failed during the NYC attempt

in November 2014 would endanger the odds of suc-

cess.

Omar delayed his own trip to Syria, because he

did not want to travel with Mohamed Farah, Zacharia

Abdurahman, or Hanad Musse.

Ultimately, the group of willing participants for the San

Diego plan reduced to Mohamed Farah and Abdirahman

Daud. Mohamed’s brother Adnan intended to travel to

San Diego, but his mother confiscated and hid his pass-

port to prevent him from leaving.

The two men, and

the confidential human source, traveled to San Diego on

April 17, 2015.

Days later, several of the co-conspirators were arrested

during an FBI operation. Mohamed Farah and Daud

were detained in San Diego. Concurrently, Adnan

Farah, Abdurrahman, Musse, and Omar were taken

into custody in Minneapolis.

In December 2015,

federal law enforcement arrested Abdirizak Warsame,

and in February of the following year, Hamza Ahmed

became the ninth individual arrested as part of the

wider investigation.

The resulting criminal proceedings against these attempt-

ed travelers produced a bevy of information about the

networks responsible for recruitment to IS in the Twin

Cities. The investigation uncovered several successful

travelers, multiple attempted travelers, and a handful

of others who provided financial support or services

to IS. The investigation resulted in six members of the

cluster pleading guilty and three convictions by trial, and

heralded innovative approaches to how the U.S. govern-

ment responds to recruitment cases.

Abdullahi Yusuf,

one of the first attempted travelers, currently takes part

in a program aimed towards rehabilitating jihadists. He

was granted supervised, conditional release in November

2017.

The others are serving sentences ranging from

two-and-a-half to 35 years in federal prison.

In Syria and Iraq, most of the major players in this

mobilization died. In addition to Ahmed, McCain, the

Karie brothers, and Hanad Mohallim, Yusuf Jama’s

brother informed Guled Omar that Yusuf had been

killed in battle in Syria in March 2015.

Abdi Nur is

presumed dead.

The status of his nephew, Mohamed

Roble, remains unclear.

Besides this cluster, there are two other cases of travelers

from Minnesota’s Twin Cities. Details about potential

connections to the previous co-conspirators are not

publicly available. In August 2014, 20-year-old Yusra

Ismail stole a passport from an unnamed individual,

and told the person that she was traveling to a wedding

in Africa. She later messaged her family, claiming that

she had traveled to Syria to join IS.

Eighteen-year-old

Abdelhamid al-Madioum bought a plane ticket from

Morocco to Istanbul while on family vacation. After

his family returned to the U.S., they received a call

from Abdelhamid saying that he was working at an IS-

controlled hospital in the Iraqi city of Mosul.

Ismail’s

and al-Madioum’s current whereabouts are unknown.

46 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 2 : neTWorked Travelers

Families

The Kodaimati Family

Mohamad Saeed Kodaimati was born in Aleppo, Syria,

in 1991.

Ten years later, he emigrated with his family

to the U.S. By the age of 17, he became a naturalized

citizen. Kodaimati lived in a vari-

ety of places in the U.S., including

Charlotte, North Carolina, and San

Diego, California.

In December 2012, Kodaimati and

his family left San Diego to return

to their native country. When

they arrived in Istanbul bound

for Syria, they were detained by

Turkish officials for lacking proper

documentation.

The Kodaimati

family spent 35 days in a Turkish

jail awaiting judgment.

They were jailed in the same prison

block as an Austrian IS support-

er named Mohamed Mahmoud

(aka Abu Usama al-Gharib).

Mahmoud is a well-known figure

in European jihadist networks. He

previously spent four years in an

Austrian prison for his role in cre-

ating German-language versions

of jihadist propaganda material

and threatening suicide attacks. He

also played a formative role in the

foundation of the Salafi militant

organization Millatu Ibrahim.

March 2013, he was arrested in the

Turkish province of Hatay. Like the

Kodaimatis, Mahmoud had improp-

er documentation—in this case a fake

Libyan passport.

During their time

in jail, Mahmoud acted as a translator

between the Turkish prison officials

and the Kodaimatis.

After Mahmoud was released in 2014, he traveled to Syria,

where he would become a high ranking IS official and a

prominent face in the group’s propaganda.

Kodaimati

and his family were released from jail sometime in 2013.

According to Kodaimati’s account, the Turkish police

escorted them to the “U.S. consulate in Ankara, Turkey,”

but they were refused admission.

Turkey then deported the entire

Kodaimati clan to Syria.

Kodaimati, his younger brother

Rahmo, and his father, also named

Mohamad, returned to their family

home in Aleppo. At the time, the

town was a fault line area, split be-

tween Assadist forces, assorted rebel

groups, and jihadist formations.

Their home was in Kafr Hamra,

a suburb of Aleppo controlled by

jihadist organizations.

After re-

turning to Syria, Kodaimati took a

variety of roles in jihadist groups—

first in JN, then IS.

According to U.S. officials, he was

a “media person” for JN, in charge

of providing online updates of their

operations. Specifically, he worked

for the “Sharia Authority,” the wing

of the group responsible for estab-

lishing proper Islamic governance

and enforcing the justice system

in the area of Hanano.

On his

Facebook page, Kodaimati posted

several media releases from JN’s

Sharia Authority.

100

As IS and JN

became increasingly at odds with

each other, however, Kodaimati

acted as a mediator between the

two terrorist organizations.

101

He obtained this position after

he contacted his former jail mate

Mohamed Mahmoud, who was

already an important figure in IS.

Top: Yusra Ismail at her high school

graduation. Image obtained from

Minnesota Public Radio. Middle: Mohamad

Saeed Kodaimati. Bottom: Individual later





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meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

By his own admission, Kodaimati also participated in

fighting, telling one friend, “We went out and partici-

pated in a raid, and we struck [with] the ammunition

which we possess … waiting to be resupplied, so that

we may go out [again].”

102

According to charging

documents, he “admitted that he participated in a

diversionary attack on a Syrian political prison in co-

ordination with al-Nusra.”

103

He was not the only one in his family to participate in

combat. His father Mohamad, also a U.S. citizen, was

injured by shrapnel from a rocket attack. In April 2014,

Kodaimati told a friend on Facebook that his father

was “on the battlefront … his work [has to do] with

snipers.”

104

The next month, Kodaimati referenced

his younger brother, known only by the nickname

“Rahmo,” and said that he was actively participating

in combat as well.

105

Pictures posted on Facebook also

depict Kodaimati’s brother and father engaging in

combat alongside him.

106

For his part, Kodaimati states any actions he took in

Syria were a matter of survival. He describes his decision

as motivated by the unrelenting conflict environment:

“if you were male and were clean-shaven, and had good

hygiene, you could be accused of being an infidel and

killed. If you tried to blend in by sporting a beard then

maybe you would be left alone and could pass through

checkpoints. Beards became very popular as you can

imagine.”

107

In previously unpublished letter written to

the trial judge before sentencing, Kodaimati claims: “I

am not a terrorist, do not like violence and whatever I

did while in Turkey and Syria was necessary for survival.

My family is living in a war zone where they are being

bombed by barrel bombs. It is a desperate situation.”

108

He states he tried to find more honest work, and briefly

traveled back to Turkey to become a driver for Médecins

Sans Frontières.

109

In March 2015, Kodaimati attempted to travel back to

the U.S. He bought a plane ticket for a March 5 flight

from Istanbul to San Diego, via Charlotte. However,

he was not allowed to board the flight—likely because

he had been placed on the no-fly list—and was told to

report to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.

110

On March 10

and 11, 2015, Kodaimati made false statements during

two interviews with FBI and Diplomatic Security Service

special agents at the embassy.

111

At the conclusion of

these conversations, the agents told Kodaimati that he

was free to go.

Approximately two weeks later, Kodaimati boarded a

flight from Istanbul to Charlotte. Immediately following

re-entry into the U.S., federal agents stopped him and

further interviewed him, but again he was permitted to

continue onwards.

112

Kodaimati drove cross-country to

his hometown of San Diego on March 29, 2015. One

month later, he was arrested for making false statements

to the FBI.

113

Kodaimati lied about knowing members of IS, his

involvement with JN, and his involvement in combat

operations. In October 2015, he pleaded guilty to one

count of making false statements in an international ter-

rorism case.

114

He was sentenced to 96 months in prison

the following year.

115

The current statuses of his brother

and father, presumably still in Syria, are unknown.

Kodaimati in Syria. Some images reportedly depict Kodaimati’s father and brother.

48 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 2 : neTWorked Travelers

The Ali Family

Recently unsealed court documents and a series of in-

terviews with a returned American traveler revealed

two brothers from an upper-middle-class Dallas suburb

who left together to join IS. The documents came from

the trial of the two boys’ parents, who misled the FBI

regarding their children’s whereabouts. Arman and

Omar Ali left Cairo, Egypt, where they claimed they

were studying, to go to Syria in November 2014.

116

Federal law enforcement claims that their parents,

Mohommad and Sumaiya Ali, “communicated regularly

with [Arman and Omar] regarding their whereabouts

and desire to fight for ISIS.”

117

The elder brother, Arman,

attended the University

of Texas at Austin from

2008 to 2011, but accord-

ing to the university, did

not graduate.

118

His class-

mates at UT-Austin claim

that sometime during his

second year on campus, he

began to espouse radical

viewpoints.

119

After the

start of the Tahrir Square

protests in 2011, Arman

eventually left Austin for

Egypt, where records show he enrolled at the American

University in Cairo.

120

It is unclear what pushed his

younger brother, Omar, into joining him in Egypt.

An individual who knew both Ali brothers con-

firmed, however, that they did not radicalize solely

amongst themselves. While they lived in Plano, they

attended a semi-regular Quran study group at a local

mosque.

121

The coordinator of the study group was

John Georgelas, a young American convert to Islam

from Greek Orthodox Christianity. The local imam

allowed Georgelas to run the study group, where the

Ali brothers became eager students.

122

Georgelas, also known as Yahya al-Bahrumi, later became

a pioneer of the American jihadist mobilization to Syria

and Iraq.

123

Georgelas, a lifelong Texas resident, converted

to Islam while studying religion at Blinn College, and

moved to study Arabic in Damascus months after 9/11. In

Damascus, he gained a deep understanding of the classical

Arabic language and religious texts.

124

After marrying his

then-wife, Tania, the family moved multiple times be-

tween Damascus, London, California, and Plano, Texas.

125

During the 2000s, Georgelas was an active participant

in the online jihadisphere. A data technician by day,

Georgelas offered tech support to a variety of jihadist

web forums. In 2006, he was arrested for attempting to

hack the website of the American Israel Public Affairs

Committee (AIPAC) and sentenced to 34 months in

prison.

126

After his release,

he remained in the Dallas–

Fort Worth area, and it was

during this time that he ran

the Quran study group.

It is unknown whether

the Alis were in contact

with Georgelas after their

2011 departures to Egypt,

although coincidentally,

Georgelas also left Dallas

for Cairo around the same

time.

127

In August 2013,

John and Tania Georgelas

traveled from Egypt to Syria with their children in tow.

After a few months, Tania and the children developed

serious illnesses. They escaped Syria and returned to

the U.S.

128

Thereafter, John Georgelas became a senior

ideological figure and propagandist within IS, potentially

the highest-ranking American to have participated in a

jihadist group. Georgelas served in the media office, and

was reportedly crucial to the production of several IS

products, including its radio service, al-Bayan Radio.

129

He appeared briefly in a June 2017 video released by IS’

al-Hayat Media Center.

130

More than one year after the Georgelases, both Arman

and Omar Ali traveled from Cairo to Syria.

131

Prior to

their departure in November 2014, they discussed their

plans with their parents. In February 2014, Sumaiya Ali

told Omar to “do what you need to do,” to which Omar



obtained from Dallas Morning News.

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responded, “Ok then going to Syria it is.”

132

A month

before their departure, Arman Ali emailed his father

a video of an IS military parade in Libya and discussed

other Americans who traveled to join IS.

133

As soon as the brothers entered Syria, conversations

with their parents took on a different tone. In March

2015, Arman Ali emailed his father:

… things are heating up here, and I can’t guarantee

me or O[mar] will be there in 2 months. Don’t tell

[mom] or anyone else this, I’ve been to the hospi-

tal everyday with brothers from my group. Close

friends have died, too many injured. Me and O[mar]

r perfectly fine right now, but soon we may not be.

134

Two months later, federal investigators interviewed

Mohommad and Sumaiya Ali. Both parents claimed that

their sons were still in Cairo, and that their sons were

“peaceful,” “liked to study,” and were not affiliated with

terrorist groups.

135

In May 2017, two years following this

interview, federal prosecutors charged both parents with

making false statements in an international terrorism

case.

136

In September 2017, both parents pleaded guilty.

According to the terms of a sentencing agreement, they

will serve 36 and 18 months of probation, respectively.

137

This case highlights a critical dilemma facing travelers’

families. They have the option to turn in their family

members to federal authorities, which could subject them

to decades-long prison sentences. Alternatively, they

can try to take justice into their own hands to prevent

family members from traveling (like Asher Abid Khan’s

parents) or lie to protect them (like the Ali brothers’ par-

ents). While families can be instrumental in fostering

radicalization or facilitating travel, they can also serve

as critical early warning systems to notify appropriate

authorities.

138

However, as it stands today, there are few

good choices for those who want to intervene to prevent

their family members from traveling.

139

Friends

The concept of a networked terrorist group formed by

small, close circles of friends remains an important con-

ceptualization of how radicalization and mobilization

occur in the West.

140

According to this formulation,

initially postulated in the years following 9/11, the ma-

jority of jihadists were not radicalized via a top-down

process, but as the result of small friendship groups

that progressively convinced them to support jihadist

organizations.

141

Certainly, this formulation should not

be used as a sweeping motive to explain the radical-

ization of all Western jihadists. In its original terms,

however, it can be useful in analyzing specific cases on

their merits.

In the dataset, several cases appear to fit this description

of jihadist mobilization. In some cases, not enough is

known about their radicalization process to assume that

it occurred solely in a friend-group setting. However,

in each of these cases, Americans were progressively

encouraged to travel, and eventually facilitated their

travel, through a small group of friends. The size of the

group may range, from two friends to several. They

also sometimes involve “friends-of-friends” or online

contacts. Throughout these cases, however, friendship

groups help facilitate an American’s travel to join a ji-

hadist organization in Syria and Iraq.

Sixto Ramiro Garcia and Asher Abid Khan

A combination of online and offline connections assisted

two young Texans in planning their travel. In January

2014, 20-year-old Asher Abid Khan sent a Facebook

friend request to one of his friends from his mosque back

home in South Texas.

142

At the time, Khan was living

with a relative in Australia. The recipient was Sixto

Ramiro Garcia (aka Abdullah Ali) a Mexican-American

convert to Islam. Khan and Garcia were reportedly close

friends before Khan’s departure to Australia, and the two

used to watch extremist videos together when they both

lived in Texas.

After Garcia accepted the friend request, Khan sent him

a message stating that he was interested in traveling to

Iraq to join IS.

143

The two Texans then triangulated a

plan to join the organization—one from Texas and the

other from Australia.

A week later, Khan sent another friend request, this

time to Mohamed Zuhbi, a well-known Australian IS

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supporter and alleged facilitator. Khan messaged Zuhbi:

“I’d like to join ISIS, can you help?”

144

The conversation

progressed, with Khan expressing his willingness to “die

as a shahid [martyr].” During the conversation, Zuhbi

systematically walked Khan through the process of trav-

eling to join IS. He told Khan to take a flight to Istanbul

and proceed via bus to the Turkish-Syrian border town

of Antakya.

145

From there, IS smugglers could meet Khan

and escort him across the border.

A week after his conversation with Zuhbi, Khan relayed

the information to Sixto Ramiro Garcia on Facebook

and offered to print his Turkish visa out for him. The

three-way transfer of information from Zuhbi to Khan,

and Khan to Garcia, also continued. Khan asked Zuhbi a

host of questions, including what kind of sim card to buy

in Turkey to contact Zuhbi, which plane ticket Garcia

should buy, and whether he should trim his beard before

travel to avoid suspicion.

146

On February 23, 2014, Garcia traveled from McAllen,

Texas, his hometown, to Houston.

147

From there, he

boarded his flight to London, en route to Istanbul. Garcia

was nervous about the plan. Before his departure, he

texted Khan: “If I could, I would destroy all the butterflies

in my stomach.”

148

Khan attempted to reassure his friend:

“lol, bro, chil and have fun. This is an experience so enjoy

and learn from it.” Khan reminded Garcia about their

cover. “You’re a tourist and tourist are never nervous,

they’re curious.”

149

Khan also departed from Syria on February 23. He left his

relatives’ house in Australia with tickets to Istanbul via

Malaysia. However, Khan did not complete the journey.

When he arrived in Kuala Lumpur, his Australian rela-

tives tipped off his parents, who attempted a last-minute

effort to prevent their son from joining IS.

150

Khan

received a message from his parents claiming that his

mother had been hospitalized. This was not true, but the

ploy convinced Khan to abandon his plans and return

home to Texas.

151

Garcia, meanwhile, continued on his journey. On

February 24, Khan informed Garcia that he was return-

ing home to Houston to be with his family. Garcia was

incensed by his friend’s change of heart. “Dude, you can’t

pull [expletive] like that. I didn’t come with all that much

cash. I have no connections. I’ve got no clue, WTF.”

152

Seemingly feeling indebted to Garcia for encouraging

his travel without following through on his own, Khan

connected Garcia with Zuhbi and asked for help getting

Garcia through the border into Syria. Garcia and Zuhbi

exchanged a series of messages. “Please pick me up. Im

in the bus station [at] Antakya. Call me … I tried calling

your number but I think I’m missing some things. There’s

guys asking me if I’m [trying] to go to Syria.”

153

Zuhbi

responded, “Go to a hotel. Hotel Antakya is preferred.”

Finally, after some back and forth, the two men agreed

to meet at a local mall. “Ok, I am wearing white glasses

on top of my black hat, blue sweater white Jordan’s and

black pant, a very shirt under my sweater.”

154

Three days after Garcia arrived in Turkey, he crossed the

border into jihadist-controlled territory. He told Khan

he had “been delivered :)”

155

Over the course of the next

few months, Khan and Garcia continued their online

communications. Garcia provided him with a play-by-

play of his experiences, claiming he was in a boot camp

and had an “ak” (AK-47) that he had fired. He also stated

he was involved in battles, a “lil bit.”

156

From February

to August 2014, Garcia was part of a jihadist group not

affiliated with IS. He sent Khan pictures from Syria, in-

cluding an AK-47: “that’s my baby … you can have one

too if you like.”

157

Finally, in August, Garcia messaged Khan, noting that

he had finally joined IS.

158

This was the last conversa-

tion that Garcia and Khan ever had on Facebook. At its

conclusion, Khan told Garcia to “make sure they [e.g.,

IS] are doing everything according to Islam, not killing

innocent ppl and all that.”

159

Shortly following Garcia’s arrival in Syria, his concerned

family members contacted the FBI, and a formal inves-

tigation commenced.

160

The Bureau obtained a search

warrant for Garcia’s social media accounts, which led

them to uncover his connections with Khan. This scru-

tiny intensified when Khan filed another visa request to

travel to Australia in October 2014. Investigators were

concerned that he intended on following through with

his plans to go to Syria.

161

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On December 25, 2014, Garcia’s family received a

message from his Facebook account. An unknown IS

member informed them their loved one was dead.

162

Khan was arrested five months later. He recently pleaded

guilty to providing material support to IS.

163

Brian Dempsey and Terry Ingram

In May 2015, federal investigators filed a criminal

complaint alleging that Brian Arthur Dempsey, Sr., a

43-year-old resident of Sacramento, California, had made

false statements to federal authorities in an international

terrorism case.

164

Dempsey’s case is an anomaly in multi-

ple regards. First, Dempsey is one of the oldest travelers

in the dataset, one of two individuals over the age of 40.

He lived in the Sacramento area until July 2013, when he

initially went to Syria. Moreover, Dempsey was a sworn

California peace officer until 2012. He served as a youth

counselor for the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitations for over a decade.

165

At some point

prior to his travel to Syria and Iraq, likely between 2011

and 2013, he converted to Islam.

166

The complaint alleges that Dempsey and another individ-

ual, referred to as “Person A,” conspired to travel to Syria

in July 2013 to “participate in combat.”

167

Dempsey only

stayed in Syria for a month and a half, before attempting

to return to the U.S. via Rome, Italy.

168

Unfortunately for

Dempsey, he had already been added to the U.S. no-fly

list. As a result, FBI agents stopped and questioned him

at the airport.

During the August 22, 2013, interview, Dempsey lied to

the FBI about his time in Syria, most of which he spent

in the border town of Azaz. He told special agents that

he traveled to Syria with Person A to “help refugees” and

that he asked his brother to call the State Department

to ensure that entering Syria was legal.

169

Moreover, he

claimed not to know any members of terrorist organi-

zations, and that no one in Azaz was fighting the Syrian

regime.

170

According to Dempsey’s story, they had no

opportunities to help refugees; the only thing he and

Person A did in Azaz was “hang out.”

171

After this interview, Dempsey canceled his return to the

U.S. and remained in Italy. Internal law enforcement

documents show that Dempsey was on an official list of

foreign fighters compiled by the Italian government.

172

In January 2014, U.S. law enforcement interviewed

Dempsey again in Rome. During this interview, he

made multiple statements that disputed claims he made

during the airport encounter. Dempsey admitted that

he had traveled to fight, and also that he had contacted

members of several jihadist organizations in Azaz, in-

cluding IS, JN, and Ahrar al-Sham. He also claimed to

have engaged in combat on at least two occasions during

his stay in Syria.

173

U.S. authorities were planning to resolve the charges

against Dempsey in exchange for cooperation, but

in October 2014, Dempsey absconded from Italy.

174

Subsequently, law enforcement filed criminal charges

against Dempsey for making false statements.

175

Dempsey,

meanwhile, traveled to Germany, and then onwards to

the United Kingdom (UK). His exact itinerary remains

unclear, but in January 2017, he was arrested in the UK.

Extradition proceedings are pending.

176

After Dempsey’s departure from Syria in August 2013,

Person A stayed in Syria. A source with knowledge of

the investigation confirmed to the authors that Person A

refers to Terry Ingram, another Sacramento resident and

convert to Islam.

177

Ingram’s whereabouts are unknown,

but the source also remarked that Ingram was far more

“radical” than Dempsey, and likely joined either IS or JN

after Dempsey’s departure.

178

Ingram took an unusual path towards jihadism. In the

early 1990s, a group called the Juris Christian Assembly

(JCA) formed in Stanislaus County, California. The

group’s name was somewhat of a red herring. Its main

purpose was to protest tax laws and it ascribed to what

can now be generally termed as a “sovereign citizen”

ideology.

179

In short, Juris Christian Assembly’s mem-

bers believed that they were not subject to state taxes,

because they were “free Christian Israelite Citizen[s], not

resident[s] of the forum state, the corporation referred

to as ‘the State of California.’”

180

As members of the group refused to pay taxes, they accu-

mulated hundreds of thousands of dollars of back taxes,

and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) placed liens on

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their holdings.

181

In response, the group’s leader and

several members, including Terry Ingram, conspired to

defraud the government by filing fraudulent warrants

for IRS officials and intimidating government employ-

ees.

182

In January 1994, group members assaulted and

threatened to kill the Stanislaus County recorder.

183

Ingram participated in the JCA plot by filing false

warrants to an IRS center in Fresno, in the amounts

of $12,550.48 and $1,238.94. Two other members also

went to his place of employment, a local car dealership,

and demanded that Ingram’s wage levies be removed

while posing as federal government employees.

184

June 1995, Ingram and several others were indicted on

several fraud counts, as well as the attack on the county

recorder. Ingram was found guilty and was eventually

released from prison in 1999.

185

Given the lack of publicly available evidence about these

cases, it is especially hard to determine how a former

correctional officer and a former “sovereign citizen” who

both converted to Islam met one another, and decided to

travel to Syria to fight. Dempsey’s eventual extradition

and prosecution in the U.S. may bring more details to

light. However, these cases are reminders that the social

connections that influence travelers are not always

straightforward or conventional.

Networked Travelers:

Why “Strength in Numbers” Matters

As noted previously, dozens of academic studies found

that previous face-to-face interactions with fellow trav-

elers are a strong determinant of mobilization. In some

cases, these connections and social bonds extend beyond

the decision to travel. Some studies point to the effect of

small group interactions on their members’ progressive

adaptation of radical viewpoints.

186

This thesis is diffi-

cult to prove conclusively. Radicalization is a complex

process. What holds true in one individual’s case may

not hold in another. Like other travelers, the moti-

vations of networked travelers vary, from those who

originally went for familial reasons to others enticed by

a greater jihadist narrative that depicted life in a utopian

Islamic society.

The majority of travelers in our sample established

close connections to other American travelers, and

supporters of jihadist groups more broadly, prior to

their travel. Some reached out to individuals online

who self-identified as facilitators or smugglers into

jihadist controlled territory. They plugged into a well-

worn network of jihadists who provided step-by-step

directions on how to fool customs officials, which

hotels to stay in, and who to call once they reached

the Syrian and Iraqi borders. They augmented that

knowledge and connections with their offline rela-

tionships, leaning on deep social connections to plan

and execute their international travel. In many cases,

it is not clear that these individuals would have suc-

cessfully traveled to Syria and Iraq without the help

of these real-world connections.

However, some individuals learn the difficult lesson

that connecting to other jihadist sympathizers is in-

sufficient for successful travel. Strikingly, the same

networks (friends, families, and social groups) served

as roadblocks in some cases. If certain friends or family

members uncovered a would-be traveler’s plans, their

travel attempts unraveled. Asher Abid Khan, for ex-

ample, made all the contacts necessary to smuggle his

friend, Sixto Ramiro Garcia, into Syria. But, when his

parents discovered his plans, they prevented him from

making the journey himself.

Including more people in a travel plot can backfire.

During their final attempt to secure fake passports

and travel to San Diego, the Minneapolis attempted

travelers grew increasingly paranoid. Several cluster

members pulled out of the group because they didn’t

trust members who made previous, unsuccessful travel

attempts. Guled Omar eventually became so frustrated

with some of his co-conspirators that he told anoth-

er group member, “I don’t want to travel anywhere

with them … I feel like if I go anywhere with them

it’s a failure.”

187

The feeling was not limited to one

member—Zacharia Abdurahman pulled out of the plan

days later, fearing that the number of people involved

increased the likelihood that law enforcement would

interdict the plot.

188

Ironically, both Abdurrahman and

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Omar confided their distrust of other group members

to the FBI’s confidential human source.

External interventions or internal rifts between group

members provide law enforcement a window to disrupt

travel facilitation networks. Oftentimes, law enforce-

ment was notified by concerned family members or

friends. Sometimes, attempted interventions happened

too late, occurring after the individual already traveled.

However, when there was a network behind that indi-

vidual, input from family members and friends helped

law enforcement identify other travelers and attempted

travelers. Moreover, law enforcement frequently used

confidential human sources to infiltrate small group

plots to facilitate travel. Prosecutors in the Minnesota

cluster cases owed a significant degree of their success to

evidence attained from confidential sources.

Nevertheless, building social contacts allow travelers

to generate a “Hydra effect.” Law enforcement may

apprehend a few travelers, but several more will slip

through the cracks and reach their destination. In gen-

eral, deep-seated connections lower the probability that

external forces will intercept travelers. For instance,

Mohommad and Sumaiya Ali were willing to mislead

the FBI, facing up to eight years in prison, rather than

tell investigators that their sons had traveled to Syria and

Iraq to join IS.

Moreover, connections make it easier for group mem-

bers to share technical and logistical information about

how to travel. Mohamed Roble drew on the successes

and failures of Abdi Nur and Abdullahi Yusuf’s re-

spective attempts to travel, taking a route that would

not immediately alert authorities. In several of the

aforementioned cases, including Garcia, McCain, Nur,

Mohallim, and Jama, travelers relied on pre-established

social connections to contact smugglers and facilitators

who could help escort them across the border into Syria

and Iraq.

Another valuable lesson from networked travelers is that

successful travel often has a serendipitous element. Abdi

Nur and Abdullahi Yusuf were similar in many ways:

both were young Somali-Americans from Minnesota

who wanted to travel to IS, pursued the same course of

action, received their passports within the same week,

and traveled one day apart from each other. More im-

portantly, Yusuf had a stronger link to the network than

Nur, as Hanad Mohallim was his best friend. However,

Yusuf botched his passport application interview, and

Nur did not. A senior law enforcement official involved

in the investigation later recalled that without the sus-

picions raised during the interview, Yusuf might never

have been apprehended.

189

The one known exception to the norm of American

traveler networks is the Minnesota cluster. Unlike

its counterparts, which usually involve isolated

groups of two or three members, the Minnesota

cluster transcended several friendship and family

groups and included at least 15 people directly. The

2007–2013 recruitment wave to Somalia entailed that

the new generation of jihadist recruits had access to

organized formations of jihadist travelers, with ex-

perience, knowledge, and skills that could be used

in future recruitment. It is no coincidence that upon

arrival to Syria, Abdi Nur reached out to Somalia-

based Minneapolitan Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan

for guidance. Several other co-defendants had family

and friendship connections to al-Shabaab members.

Drawing from this structure, and the charismatic

personalities it produced, the Minnesota travelers

formed tight-knit kinship and friendship groups to

facilitate their travel.

These clusters are less frequent in the U.S. context than

in other settings. Nevertheless, the majority of successful

American travelers had some form of network behind

them. These webs were based on social connections

with friends, family members, and community groups,

and were used to facilitate travel. Beyond those factors,

networks vary from case to case. Some involved exter-

nal contacts (e.g. Mohamed Zuhbi); many used digital

communications technologies to augment existing per-

sonal contacts. Networks vary in size, but the majority

comprised of small groups of two, three, or four people.

Despite the diversity of network types, these findings are

in line with much of the current research on the role of

personal connections.

190

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Category 3: Loners

f the cases analyzed in this report, loners are the

least common. The term describes travelers whose

motivation to join does not appear to have come from

any face-to-face interactions, and whose journey was

seemingly undertaken in isolation.

According to publicly available evidence, these individ-

uals only became known to authorities after successfully

joining the group and either turning themselves in, ap-

pearing in publicly released propaganda, or having their

deaths on the battlefield announced or reported by the

organization to the media or their families.

This section will analyze the cases of two American loners.

The first, who will be referred to only as “Mo,” traveled

to IS territory in June 2014, before turning himself in at a

U.S. consulate in Turkey in November of the same year.

Much of the data from this case was gathered during an

interview between the authors and “Mo.”

The second case is that of Mohamad Jamal Khweis. In

December 2015, he left his home in North Virginia to

join IS, stayed with the group for almost three months,

and eventually turned himself in to Kurdish forces in

March 2016. Here, the authors rely on court documents

from the case, the prosecution’s exhibits used for evi-

dence, and notes taken by the authors during his trial.

“Mo”

Mo was one of the first Americans to travel to Syria,

leaving his home on the East Coast in June 2014. In a

lengthy interview with the authors, he laid out some of

the factors which motivated him to join IS, while also

providing insight into how he made the journey and

what he saw while with the group.

While his story helps to explain why some young Western

Muslims are captivated by IS’ cause, those hoping for a

simple explanation will be disappointed. When asked

why he joined IS, Mo rejected the premise of the ques-

tion, responding, “You should ask me why did I go there

[to Syria].” To him, joining IS was an afterthought—he

had no strong ideological affinity specifically to the group.

He was, however, drawn to its wider project: “I went be-

cause I wanted to live in a sharia environment.”

Motivations

Mo traces the roots of his decision to what he describes as

a “catalyzing moment” in 2013 when, while studying at a

major American university, one of his professors screened

a video of Submission. Released in 2004, the provocative

film by the late Dutch director Theo van Gogh depicted a

woman wearing a see-through burqa with Quranic verses

tattooed on her body. The film represented a touchstone

moment in the story of Islam in the West after 9/11.

gained even more notoriety after van Gogh was murdered

in the streets of Amsterdam in 2004 by Mohammed

Bouyeri, who supposedly acted to avenge and preserve

the honor of Islam.

Mo was shocked and angered by what he saw, explain-

ing that “the burqa is the ultimate symbol of virtue and

purity, members of my own family wore it. I didn’t see

it as purely offensive, but a desecration.” He began to see

the concept of freedom of speech in a different light: “This

idea of freedom of speech was being used to desecrate.”

He was also shocked and disappointed at the reaction

of his fellow students: “I looked around the classroom

and everyone was just watching like it was nothing.” He

took this as a tacit approval of the themes of the film,

and began to see his peers in a different light. While he

wanted to stand up and express his anger, Mo stayed

quiet, explaining, “I was not intellectually equipped to

properly criticize this, I didn’t know how to make sense

of it or explain it.” This feeling spurred him on to further

educate himself. He soon took to the internet in an effort

to learn how, as a Muslim living in America, he should

respond to the attitudes expressed in the film.

While it would be simplistic and incongruous to draw

a direct link between this film and Mo’s journey to IS, it

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caTeGory 3: loners

appears to have started him on a path which resulted in

a significant transformation in his identity and beliefs.

Religious but not very observant at the time, Mo now

began to seek out a clearer understanding of his religion

and what answers it had to the issues brought up in the

film. This made him vulnerable to the type of propagan-

da being produced by IS at the time, which specifically

targeted Western Muslims who were dealing with crises

of identity and struggling to figure out where they fit in

their home countries.

However, this was a formulation which Mo did not en-

tirely accept when put to him, rejecting what he saw as an

attempt to “put me in this box and explain my decisions …

it’s not that simple.” Radicalization cannot be explained

using any single “moment” or root cause.

However, for

researchers, it is important to identify patterns that may

contribute to a more informed understanding of this

phenomenon, while also acknowledging the layers of un-

quantifiable complexity involved in influencing personal

decisions to join extremist groups.

Alongside this possible religio-political awakening, Mo

also mentioned an experience of personal trauma. Years

earlier, his pregnant sister and her unborn child died in

tragic circumstances. Here, too, it is tempting to turn yet

again to academic theory: perhaps a traumatic moment

that could be seen as a so-called “push factor” in his rad-

icalization process. Mo rejected this too, noting that the

deaths occurred almost eight years before he joined IS.

Nonetheless, it was telling that Mo found this story rel-

evant enough to bring up in a discussion framed around

his radicalization. Even more interesting was his claim

that the woman in the burqa which so offended him in

Submission reminded him of his sister. Without proper

evaluation, one can only wonder about the kind of psy-

chological impact this might have had on him.

From the moment he had watched the film, Mo claims

that his “main source of learning was online.” He spent

hours researching Islam and politics, and began develop-

ing a stronger sense of his religious duties as a result of

his online consumption. The work of American-Yemeni

al-Qaeda ideologue and recruiter Anwar al-Awlaki

was particularly impactful.

Mo came to see him as a

legitimate source on Islam due to the multitude of ser-

mons he gave while preaching in the U.S. He started

becoming much more aware of the fact that, as he saw

it, “Muslims have political woes” and as a result, “became

more interested in groups out there that were defending

Muslims and also in living in a place where Islam was

being properly implemented.”

Mo soon concluded that the U.S., and the West in

general, was not a place any “real” Muslim could live.

Countries where films like Submission were created

and screened could not be the right environment for a

Muslim wishing to observe their religion properly. He

also became more aware of his wider social and moral

environment. He grew squeamish at the depictions of

scantily clad Victoria’s Secret models outside of its store

in New York, particularly when thinking about how he

would react to such images in the presence of his young

female family members: “How can I explain that to my

young cousin or niece looking at that? That is objectify-

ing women, no doubt.”

Relatedly, among the concepts he became acquainted

with through his online research was hijrah, or migra-

tion for the sake of Islam. The term hijrah has multiple

interpretations depending on the brand of Islam one

ascribes to, and for many Muslims, it is a largely irrel-

evant concept for the modern world.

For some, hijrah

refers to leaving one city, or even a specific neighbor-

hood, deemed to be harmful to one’s faith for a more

conducive environment. At its most extreme, hijrah has

a militant expression. Jihadists describe hijrah as not only

leaving Western nations deemed to be part of the war

on Islam, but also traveling to an area to fight in defense

of Muslims who are perceived to be “under attack.”

propaganda outreach to Westerners has placed great

emphasis on hijrah to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq as

a duty for Western Muslims.

Mo’s understanding of hijrah fell somewhere in be-

tween these two interpretations: “For me, hijrah was

about leaving a place where haram (things forbidden in

Islam) was easy and halal (things that are permissible,

or even encouraged, in Islam) was difficult.” He began

to feel that this was precisely his situation in America:

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“Some Muslims are fine living here, and find ways to

live a proper Islamic life, but at that time I was not one

of them.”

Not only did he begin to see those Victoria’s Secret models

in a new light, but he also became aware of the “sins” of

the Western financial system. For instance, Mo believed

he “could not take part in” loans with interest rates,

which constituted riba (usury), considered a sin in Islam.

Previously, he was happy to take interest-heavy student

loans to pay for his tuition. Now, he was so vehemently

opposed to riba that he dropped out of college rather than

accepting money tinged with sin.

Thus, what began as a perception of increased scrutiny

and criticism of Islam in the West rapidly evolved into a

drastic personal transformation. Influenced by Islamist

propaganda, Mo resolved that he had to depart his coun-

try of birth. He also described being inspired by the Arab

uprisings: “After the Arab Spring, Muslims were finally

getting rid of the dictators.” For him, this meant that

there was now more scope for states to govern according

to sharia law.

It is also revealing that, once he decided to make hijrah

and leave America, Mo claimed that IS territory was

not his first destination of choice: “that was, of course,

Saudi Arabia.” He believed that the Kingdom offered the

purest version of Islamic life, and planned on enrolling

in the University of Medina. However, his knowledge

was not advanced enough. Besides lacking other basic

requirements to matriculate in the university, Mo was

not able to recite a sufficient number of Quranic verses.

His dreams of living in Saudi Arabia dashed, Mo began

considering other options. Many associate IS propaganda

with the graphic and violent depictions of the group’s

punishments of its enemies. Yet, at the time, a substantial

amount of its media output focused on the depiction of its

territory as the only true Islamic utopia, where sharia law

was properly implemented, and Muslims were thriving.

“There were all these videos showing the public works IS

was taking part in, it looked like a good Islamic commu-

nity to raise a family.” At the time that he was researching

the group, the first wave of the most infamous videos,

such as the brutal beheadings of the American journalists

James Foley or Steven Sotloff, had yet to be released. “The

effort of IS as I saw it was Islamic government, and that’s

what I wanted.”

At best, Mo’s idealized depiction of IS certainly displays

a level of naïveté. At worst, he was fully cognizant of IS’

violent nature. Most discerning observers at the time

had already identified IS as a jihadist group with its roots

in AQ franchises in Iraq. Nonetheless, Mo’s outright re-

jection of Western media and any non-Muslim analysis

of the Syrian conflict convinced him to turn a blind eye

to IS’ flaws, while taking their propaganda at face value.

Mo claims he was not aware that IS was a group that

was “like al-Qaeda,” and notes that he had already re-

jected al-Qaeda because he was against the group’s use

of suicide bombings after learning online that this tactic

contradicts sharia law. The justifications put forth by

jihadists for suicide bombing, which draw upon analo-

gies from a handful of Quranic verses and stories from

the Hadith, did not convince him. In fact, in a display

of some level of Islamic knowledge, he described these

Mo is not the only American who sought a non-combat role in

IS. This is a copy of a cover letter from Warren Clark (Abu



to become an English teacher for IS. The application was

retrieved from a house in Mosul, Iraq, and exclusively

obtained by the authors.

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caTeGory 3: loners

justifications as qiyas maal fariq (analogy with discrepan-

cy). This is a term used by Islamic scholars who reject the

religious rationale for suicide bombing used by jihadists.

Suicide bombing and its permissibility is, at its core, an

issue of Islamic jurisprudence, or . Through a pro-

cess of deductive analogy (qiyas) in which the primary

texts of Islam are studied, compared and contrasted,

Sunni Islamic scholars of  create injunctions on how

Muslims should deal with new circumstances.

The 

of suicide bombing encouraged and spread by jihadists

is rejected along these lines and seen as merely a way of

trying to take attention away from the fact that it is an

act of suicide, which is a major sin in Islam.

It was on this basis that Mo claimed to reject al-Qaeda in

favor of IS. “Al-Qaeda put me off, I was always against

terrorism and especially suicide bombing.” In spite of the

numerous reports detailing IS’ use of suicide attacks, he

appears to have thought IS was different. “As far as I could

see at the time, IS was not the same as AQ, the effort of IS

was Islamic government and that’s what I wanted. It felt

legit, and the clue was even in their name!”

Journey

Once he had begun to embrace IS, Mo started to follow

influential members and supporters of the group on

Twitter, a platform he found particularly useful as it

allowed him to receive news of the group’s activities

“straight from the source.” As he followed and read

about the experiences of fellow Americans and other

English-speakers in Europe who joined IS, the prospect

of traveling to Syria soon began to feel more realistic. It

was not as hard as it first seemed: “I knew from following

these guys that the border [between Syria and Turkey]

was porous, and that Urfa [Şanlıurfa, a Turkish town

near the Syrian border] was the place to go.”

His online activities quickly caught the attention of the

authorities. Concerned that he was preparing to travel

to Syria, FBI agents from the Joint Terrorism Taskforce

interviewed him in early June 2014. “When they came

to visit me, all of a sudden it became real. It wasn’t just

something on my computer anymore.” During a con-

sensual interview, Mo claimed that he supported rebel

groups in Syria, but did not have the means, knowledge,

or wherewithal to travel. In truth, however, the FBI visit

simply added more urgency to his plans: “The train now

felt like it was leaving the station, I had to either go soon

after that or not at all.” Just a week after the interview, on

June 12, 2014, he booked a flight from New York to Italy.

This journey included a stopover in Istanbul in the hope

that it would mask his intentions to remain in Turkey

and go on to Syria. As an illustration of his commitment

to join, at the time of his trip he was recovering from an

ankle injury and needed crutches to walk. Yet he was still

willing to brave the rough terrain of southern Turkey

and northern Syria.

Upon arrival in Istanbul, Mo immediately made his way

to Şanlıurfa. Surprisingly, prior to his arrival, he had not

made contacts or connections with members of IS or the

smugglers who would help him cross the border and join

the group. He relied instead on finding the right people

once he was in the town or, if all else failed, “even just

go there and cross by myself.” By then, he had also come

across a famous pro-IS Twitter user who went by the

handle @Shamiwitness—at the time, this was the group’s

leading online “fanboy.” Authorities in India later con-

nected this account to Mehdi Biswas who, tweeting from

Bangalore, was eventually arrested in December 2014 in

India for glorifying IS.

While analysis of @Shamiwitness’ activities to date

paint him merely as a propaganda disseminator for IS,

it seems that his role may have in fact also been one

of direct facilitation for would-be Western travelers.

While in Şanlıurfa, Mo used Twitter to reach out to

@Shamiwitness, who put him in touch with three local

IS facilitators, including a British IS member called Abu

Rahman al-Britani. Using Kik, the encrypted messen-

ger of choice for IS travelers at the time, he reached out

to al-Britani. Mo was then given a number for an IS

smuggler and told by al-Britani that he could use him

for tazkiya, a vetting process whereby a known fighter

vouches for a new member to other IS members.

He eventually agreed with the smuggler on where and

when to meet. That night, he was picked up outside of

his hotel and taken to a safe house which held other

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travelers including what he claimed was a Russian

former neo-Nazi convert to Islam.

After a few hours,

they were taken in a car across the border into Syria

and dropped off—“he [the smuggler] pointed to Orion’s

Belt and told us to follow it until we came to a village.”

Mo was still limping in his surgical boot from his ankle

injury (he had left his crutches behind) as they trekked

over rough terrain to reach the village. In the process he

and his fellow travelers were arrested by Turkish border

guards, beaten up, and briefly detained before being

released for reasons that remain unclear. Post-release,

the group eventually arrived at the village. From there,

they were picked up by men claiming to be with IS and

moved to another safe house in Suluk, a Syrian town

about seven miles south of the border with Turkey.

Mo in Syria

During his two-week stay in Suluk, dozens of travelers

from a variety of countries joined Mo. While staying

in the safe house, Mo claims that he began to harbor

serious doubts about the choice he had made to travel to

Syria. Hoping to find a welcoming group of “brothers” he

could join, he was quickly disappointed: “They weren’t

the type of Muslims I grew up with.” Mo referred to

them as lacking in akhlaq, which translates directly from

Arabic to “disposition,” and refers to the strong moral

and virtuous character of a person. The fraternal bonds

and camaraderie among travelers, so often highlighted

as motivating factors for those who join jihadist groups,

did not exist in the way he expected: “They prayed dif-

ferently, they had a bad attitude towards sharing food,

they weren’t doing wudu (ritual ablution before prayer)

properly, and the bathrooms were kept terribly.”

Mo also claims that he never traveled to IS territory with

the intention of fighting. Instead, he hoped to start a new

life in the sharia environment he had come to yearn for:

“I wanted to maybe start a business and eventually raise

a family.” When, during his time in Suluk, an IS member

brought a suicide vest for the new members to become

familiar with, he began to see the group in a different

light. He also became concerned for his safety. After eve-

ning prayers, the man also gave a speech to the group

about suicide bombing, claiming IS supported it despite

being qiyas maal fariq. Mo, having already explained his

rejection of the practice on these terms, was shocked:

“They know it is legally weak, but they still accepted it,

and he told us that ‘we gain benefit from it, so we do it.’”

As time went on, Mo claimed to grow increasingly de-

spondent about his new home. After losing his glasses

during the scuffle with the Turkish border guards, he

was unable to get a good view of his wider surroundings

until a fellow recruit lent him his pair. “That was the first

time I got a full view of where I was—just this desolate

desert—I felt hopeless and thought ‘how the hell do I get

back home from here?!’” He was also able to speak to

his parents using a burner cell phone which was passed

around by the recruits, only increasing his feelings of

regret and homesickness.

Other English speakers in Suluk were a mix of people,

both those having second thoughts, like Mo, and more

committed, hardcore jihadists. In the former category

was someone he knew as Abu Salman al-Hindi. This

was the kunya of Talmeezur Rahman, an Indian nation-

al raised in Kuwait who attended a university in Texas

between 2012 and 2014.

His story has been reported

in the media, though his current whereabouts are un-

known. A trained computer scientist, Rahman hoped to

offer his technical expertise to IS, but soon found out he

would have to fight; like Mo, he was intent on avoiding

the battlefield. Mo and Abu Salman bonded over their

shared fate and became friends: “Salman was one of the

only guys there I could relate to.”

Mo claimed that other American recruits were more

fervent in their beliefs and their desire to fight. After

Mo spoke to his parents, a Somali-American from

Minneapolis named “Omar” accosted him.

“He asked

me how strong my parents’ Islam was, and if I had made

 on [excommunicated] them.” An uncompromising

hardcore jihadist ideologue committed wholeheartedly

to jihad, Omar represented the other end of the spec-

trum of the Western IS recruits in Suluk at the time.

Indeed, according to Mo, “most of the Americans I met

during my time in Syria were very ideological and ready

for fighting.”

It was also during Mo’s time in Suluk that IS leader Abu

Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the

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Caliphate, and he recalls the celebrations among the IS

members. One thing that disturbed him was IS mem-

bers cheering and calling themselves irhabeen (Arabic for

“terrorists”) a term often used by jihadists to describe

themselves and celebrate their acts of violence. This,

he claims, was further confirmation that he had grossly

misunderstood the group he joined.

Among the most valuable pieces of information provid-

ed by Mo in the interview was his explanation of how

new recruits were processed and trained. After waiting

in Suluk for two weeks, he and dozens of others were

taken to a camp named Farooq, which he described as

a “sharia camp” focused on ideological indoctrination.

Home to around 300 recruits, it was under the control

of a senior IS member with the title of Emir of Sharia

and Teaching, whom Mo only knew by his first name,

“Amari.” The camp’s exact location was unclear to him,

other than it was south of Raqqa, in north-central Syria.

The area between Suluk and Raqqa spans about 50 miles,

and during the time Mo was there, it was either under

direct IS control or contained corridors through which

the group could safely pass. Upon arrival, recruits were

separated by native language and put through various

forms of sharia training, including classes on creed

(aqidah), methodology (manhaj), Quranic study, and

some basic tactical training. “They were basically teach-

ing us Wahhabi stuff,” he said, referring to the form of

conservative Islam taught in Saudi Arabia.

During his time in Camp Farooq, Mo again found

himself again being questioned by more ideologically

committed Americans. When an IS commander asked

his group who among them wanted to go and fight

in Deir ez-Zor, a town to the southeast of where they

were, Mo recalls how he hesitated to volunteer: “I sort of

half-raised my hand but then quickly put it back down.”

He was now desperate to avoid a fight, but some of his

fellow Americans took notice, including “this one guy

from Harlem [who] saw what I did and criticized me in

front of everyone.”

Mo soon let his mask slip again during a class at the

camp, when he expressed doubts about his commitment

to his teacher. “I told him I was experiencing waswas,” an

Arabic term used in Islam to refer to the evil whispers

of shaytan (the Devil) which sow doubt in one’s mind.

He immediately regretted this action, however: “After

expressing doubts about Deir ez-Zor, I was stupid to put

attention on myself again.” He was right to worry. Later

that day a sheikh at the camp warned his pupils to “watch

out for those who make doubt, they have question marks

on their heads.” This terrified Mo, who saw the remark

as a direct threat to his life.

After three weeks in Camp Farooq, they were moved

to Camp Abdullah Azzam (known colloquially as Camp

AA). Here, the focus was much more on military train-

ing, and the facility’s previous use as a Syrian army camp

made it fit for purpose. During drills, recruits who were

identified as the toughest and most able to fight were

transferred to what Mo said was called “commando

training,” something he was not cut out for, neither

mentally nor physically.

At each camp Mo attended, he was required to fill in a

Microsoft Access form with details of his age, experi-

ence, and what he felt he could offer IS. The electronic

form for Camp AA also asked what role he wanted to

take on. He was offered the choice of a being a fight-

er, a suicide bomber, or an inghimasi, which refers to

someone who fights on the front line while wearing a

suicide vest.

According to Mo, none of these options were appealing.

Instead, he tried to offer his services as a “researcher” to

avoid fighting: “I didn’t want to fight, so I told them I

went to a very good school, and my value to them was

my mind.” In a desperate bid to sway his commanders,

he pitched an idea involving the construction of a device

that could emit an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP), which

he claimed could help them down enemy fighter jets. It

was a truly last-ditch effort and, as he admitted, “I didn’t

know [expletive] about making an EMP, but I figured

this could buy me some time.”

To his relief, Mo was not pressed any further about his

EMP idea. His scheme to avoid the battlefield worked.

His commanders decided to send him to Manbij in north-

western Syria to work with an IS emir who was handling

the group’s local transport logistics and designing

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bunkers and underground tunnels. Interestingly, Mo

claims that IS was using Palestinians who had become

experts in tunnel building for Hamas to dig routes for

IS between Syria and Turkey. Unable to read or write

Arabic, though, he was only of limited use and was even-

tually tasked with teaching less tech-savvy members how

to use various computer programs.

By this time, however, Mo committed to leaving IS ter-

ritory and the group. Since his time in Camp AA and in

Manbij, he was trying to devise a plan for how he could

escape. Through some online research at an internet café,

he learned that people were leaving Syria for Turkey via

several border crossings. Reaching Turkey seemed a re-

alistic prospect, but he was going to need some help, and

a lot of luck.

First, Mo needed a viable excuse to be allowed to leave.

He decided to exploit the traditional instincts of his

commander by telling him that he had met a girl online

whom he wanted to marry but needed to visit first. After

getting permission to leave, he took a minibus to Raqqa,

followed by a taxi to Tal Abyad on Syria’s northern

border with Turkey. He hoped to cross the border there,

but as he approached, he noticed IS members guarding

the checkpoint. He could not risk being recognized and

was forced to turn back, taking a taxi to Manbij where his

commander was waiting for him. The disappointment,

however, was etched on his face and, recognizing the

situation his passenger was in, Mo’s driver took pity on

him. As with many taxi drivers in the area, he was also

a smuggler. He told Mo he could help him cross into

Turkey, but he was going to have to wait a few days.

In the meantime, he had to explain to his commander

why he was returning without his new wife in tow.

Although his excuse was that she had refused his propos-

al, “they didn’t believe me and got suspicious.” He began

noticing that he was treated differently, and “people got

cold towards me very quickly.”

The shift increased his paranoia about being executed

by a group whose leadership had already demonstrated

a “better safe than sorry” approach towards Western

members with questionable loyalties. On top of this,

Mo had also noticed that a higher percentage of the

English-speaking members he knew were being sent to

the front lines and dying in battle.

Realizing that his escape was now or never, Mo began

to take more significant risks. On October 31, 2014, just

five months after traveling to join IS, Mo bought a SIM

card which allowed him to send emails—something he

claimed was against the rules—and sent a message to

the FBI. Having already been interviewed by FBI agents

while in America, he hoped they would be able to verify

his identity and pick him up once he crossed the border.

“Please help,” he wrote, claiming that “my window is

closing,” and “I’m fed up with this evil.” Rather fancifully,

he also asked for “complete exoneration” and to “have

everything back to normal with me and my family.” The

FBI’s response was only mildly reassuring. Mo was told

that U.S. authorities could do nothing to help him while

he was still in Syria and that he would first have to make

his way to a U.S. consulate in Turkey.

Mo’s only hope was the smuggler from Raqqa who had

taken pity on him, but he would still have to escape the IS

headquarters on the outskirts of Manbij. On the day Mo

had agreed to meet him in Raqqa, he had another stroke

of luck. Fighting around the area had been particularly

intense, and guards were not manning the gates of the

camp: “I just walked out of the front gate and got a ride

into town.” After leaving the camp, he went to Raqqa and

met the smuggler. Once Mo reached Raqqa, he was taken

Redacted version of Mo’s message to the FBI, October 2014.

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caTeGory 3: loners

to the border crossing where, for the final leg of his jour-

ney, he was guided into Turkey on foot by a young boy.

On November 4, four days after he had contacted the FBI,

Mo arrived at a U.S. Consulate in Turkey and announced

himself. During his discussions with U.S. officials, he

recounted his experiences over the last five months

with IS. He also willingly provided all the intelligence he

could offer, including smuggling routes, locations of the

IS camps he had visited, and the names of the Western

members of the group whom he had encountered.

Mo was eventually sent back to the U.S. and charged

with providing material support to a foreign terrorist

organization and receiving military training from a

foreign terrorist organization. He pled guilty to both

charges in late November 2014. Today, he continues to

fully cooperate with investigators.

Most aspects of Mo’s story, including his claims to have

not actually “fought” for IS, have been corroborated by

U.S. authorities. Of these assertions, the most naturally

questionable statement is that he was unaware of how

violent IS was. Unsurprisingly, it is a claim made by nu-

merous Americans and other Westerners who traveled

to Syria or Iraq before returning home or being cap-

tured on the battlefield by Western forces or their allies.

Of course, these claims can be dismissed as attempts

to avoid the harsh penalties that come with terrorism

convictions. However, this also highlights how many

Westerners who are legally treated as “foreign fighters”

after traveling to join IS and other jihadist groups may

never have seen any actual combat.

Mo’s expressed desire to “live under Islam” is shared by

many others who travel to IS territory. The utopian and

religious appeal of this message must not be ignored. Not

all members are violent psychopaths out for a cheap thrill;

some are committed to IS’ religio-political ideal and see it

as the most effective vehicle for the Islamist vision (and,

of course, some members likely fit both categories).

Mo now appears to have rejected the zealous idealism

that drove him to leave his home in the first place: “All

the [expletive] I’ve been through, I don’t care anymore.

America is my home.” His view of the U.S. has also been

influenced by his treatment from U.S. authorities since

his surrender. Prosecutors have given him significant

leeway and assistance in return for his cooperation.

Some may believe, in fact, that the U.S. judicial system’s

treatment of Mo has been too lenient. In any event, his

experiences after returning to his native country have led

him to question his previously held notions of America’s

supposed war on Muslims.

In the future, Mo may also be useful to those hoping

to sway radicalized Americans seeking to join or act on

behalf of the group. Having been part of IS, he will have

the credibility that few others do. His message to them

is simple: “Don’t be impulsive, think and sit still before

you do something stupid.”

Mohamad Jamal Khweis

On February 3, 2017, just days after taking part in the

military operation that removed IS from Mosul, Colonel

Arkan of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces was sifting

through a haul of documents on the first floor of a house

IS had converted into an office building. As he looked

through each sheet of paper, one piece of information

caught his eye. It was a document containing details of an

IS recruit named Abu Omar al-Amriki. Having worked

alongside the U.S. military on various counter-terrorism

operations, the Colonel had a keen eye for information

that American intelligence would find useful, and any IS

member bearing a kunya that ended in al-Amriki cer-

tainly fit the bill. Taking a closer look at the spreadsheet

detailing the recruit’s personal information, he also found

the fighter’s real name: Mohamad Jamal Amin Khweis.

Under the category of “current mission” was written

Muqatil, Arabic for “fighter.”

Nearly a year before this find, which would serve as a

critical piece of evidence in Khweis’ trial, Peshmerga

forces in Northern Iraq arrested a young American who,

it was later revealed, was Khweis.

He had fled IS some

days earlier and handed himself in to Kurdish forces.

After spending over two months in Kurdish custody and

being interrogated by the FBI, he was extradited to the

U.S. to face charges of fighting for a designated foreign

terrorist organization.

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The case of Mohamad Khweis, a former Metro Access

driver from Virginia who traveled to join IS in late

2015, is emblematic of the loner category of American

travelers. His story shares several similarities to Mo’s.

He reportedly told no one of his plans before he left,

was largely influenced by his online activities, was not

involved in any known physical jihadist networks in the

U.S. and even took a similar route into Syria.

However, his case differs in two crucial ways. Firstly, he

traveled a year and a half after Mo and was operating in

a much less permissible environment. Authorities had by

now begun to allocate more resources to investigating

cases of Americans joining IS. This meant that, unlike

Mo, Khweis had to take extraordinary measures to mask

his communications and movements. As a result, this

case reveals much more about how Americans were

able to use the latest encryption and location masking

technology to join IS. Of all the instances of American

travelers, none have yet provided as much information

about what technology they use to communicate and

cross the border between Turkey and Syria.

Through

his use of a suite of online tools, Khweis was able to plot

his route into IS territory apparently without any outside

assistance until reaching the Turkish border with Syria.

In addition, Khweis pleaded not guilty to the charges

he faced and against the recommendations of his de-

fense team, he also took the stand at his trial.

The

cross-examination of Khweis as a witness during his trial

allowed for the revelation of details that offer rare and

useful insight to researchers.

Motivations

Unlike Mo, who had expressed a desire to live a more

devout Muslim life after adopting a stronger Muslim

identity, there is little evidence that Khweis experienced

any semblance of a religious awakening. During his

trial, he claimed that he was not devout, rarely prayed,

and had even been drinking alcohol while making his

way to IS territory.

Among other revelations from this trial were the de-

tails of a series of interviews Khweis gave to the FBI

while still in Kurdish custody in Erbil, Iraq. During

these discussions, Khweis explained both why and how

he joined IS in Syria, including an admission that he

had agreed to become a suicide bomber for the group.

Unlike Mo, who joined during the earliest phases of the

group’s ascendency before it was widely publicizing its

violent acts Khweis admits to being fully aware of the

nature of IS. He watched the group’s extreme propa-

ganda, including the video depicting the immolation of

Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh.

He also viewed

numerous sermons from well-known English-language

jihadist preachers, including Abdullah al-Faisal, Anwar

al-Awlaki and Ahmad Musa Jibril.

According to one of the agents who conducted these

early interviews, Khweis’ inspiration to join IS was

driven by his desire to be part of the establishment of the

Caliphate. This was despite being aware of IS involve-

ment in overseas terrorism, including the November

2015 Paris attacks, which took place just a month before

Khweis left to join the group.

Mohamad Khweis’ intake form from IS-controlled Fatah al-Rum training camp, with Colonel Arkan’s inscriptions.

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caTeGory 3: loners

While the evidence strongly suggests that Khweis was

sympathetic to IS, and he was found in possession of

phones containing numerous pieces of the group’s

propaganda, he also later claimed during his trial that

he believed aspects of IS’ ideology went against Islam.

These perspectives represented a significant part of his

defense, in which he argued that he disagreed with IS’ use

of violence, had joined the group out of curiosity, and

was forced to agree to become a suicide bomber out of

fear for his life rather than due to his deep commitment

to the organization.

Further contributing to the lack of clarity surrounding

Khweis’ motivations was his evasiveness during discus-

sions with the FBI. The agents noted in the trial that he

changed his story on a number of occasions. For exam-

ple, on the subject of his agreeing to be a suicide bomber,

he first claimed he did so to prove his commitment to

the group and only later made the claim that he agreed

out of fear. He also initially claimed to the FBI that he

had “given” himself to the group.

It “controlled” him

and he would have acted on orders he received from

superiors whether or not he agreed with them.

Later

on during his trial, however, Khweis testified that he

traveled to IS territory to satisfy his curiosity about a

group he had been researching for many months. During

cross-examination, he claimed that:

I wanted to go to the Islamic State, the caliphate,

and see for myself how it is, how are people living

there, and one day tell my kids, I have been there.

You know, it’s not all like it seems … I just wanted

to, you know, just share with them like history, like

places, places I have been.

Considering that Khweis had mounted a vigorous de-

fense after his “not guilty” plea, it is difficult to determine

why he joined IS. His assertions denying his support for

the group during the trial must be seen in this context,

while also not being dismissed out of hand. Among the

claims that were not disputed by the prosecution was

that he was not profoundly ideological and had no links

to a wider jihadist network. However, there is irrefutable

evidence that he was in possession of a wide array of

IS propaganda, had traveled to IS territory in the full

knowledge of its role as an international terror group

that was targeting the U.S., and had willingly gone

through the official IS intake process for all new recruits.

Like many similar stories of IS recruitment, there may

never be a fully comprehensive account of what drove

Khweis to join the group.

Journey

In many ways, Khweis’ journey to IS territory mirrors

that of many other American travelers. He took a simi-

lar route, crossing the border near the Turkish town of

Gaziantep on his way to Raqqa and a number of other

IS strongholds in Syria and Iraq. The authors have since

uncovered details about his case which allow for the

most in-depth understanding about how American IS

travelers make their journeys.

After approximately a year of planning, one of the first

steps taken by Khweis once he had resolved to make the

trip was to sell his car to help both pay off his credit

card debts and finance his travel.

While it may seem a

strange priority, these credit card payments were likely

a diversion to distract investigators from his plans, by

suggesting that he intended to return to America and

continue his life. According to the FBI, this is a common

tactic among successful and unsuccessful IS travelers.

He also created the first of several new email addresses

that he would use during his journey. Within minutes

of setting this account up, he used it to book his flights

from the U.S. to Turkey.

On December 16, 2015, Khweis, equipped with five

cellular phones and a laptop, took the Iceland-based

budget transatlantic airline WOW Air from Baltimore–

Washington International Airport, via Iceland, to

London Gatwick.

While at the airport in London,

he attempted to contact a well-known British extrem-

ist and member of the al-Muhajiroun network named

Abu Bara’a, but he did not receive a response.

From

Gatwick, he flew to Amsterdam, where he spent two

days staying in the city’s red light district. His final flight

was from Amsterdam to Istanbul.

While still in America, Khweis also purchased a separate

ticket for a flight from Istanbul to Greece which, like

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Mo’s ticket to Italy, he never intended to use.

Instead,

he hoped it would mask his final destination from any

suspicious border or law enforcement agencies. This also

explains the circuitous route he took through Europe

on his way to Turkey, which also helped him avoid any

undue attention from authorities. While in Turkey,

he booked a flight back to Washington, D.C., which

he never boarded. This step was yet another effort to

conceal his intentions and give the impression that he

planned to return home after an innocent trip.

Upon his arrival in Istanbul on December 20, Khweis took

a bus to Gaziantep.

While in the border town, Khweis

created another email address using the name Zach K.

and set up two Facebook accounts and a Twitter profile

using the handle @fearislove1, which he intended to use

to contact IS members who could facilitate his travel into

Syria.

One of his two Facebook accounts was set up using

a nonexistent email address, again a standard tactic for IS

travelers attempting to mask their identity.

Khweis’ new email address was also used to set up an

Apple ID which he used to download a variety of secure

messaging applications he hoped would help him speak

with IS members and mask his location and online ac-

tivity. Between the time of his arrival in Turkey and

his crossing of the border into Syria, he downloaded

a host of apps that were based on encrypted commu-

nication and masking online activity including Kik,

Surespot, Telegram, VPN Master, VPN Defender, VPN

InTouch, and a Tor browser called VPN Browser.

Following his passage into IS-controlled territory, he

continued expanding his digital toolbox. Among the

apps he downloaded in Syria were secure/encrypted

calling applications, including Vodafone Secure Call,

VIVA Secured Call, Cryptotel, and Secure Video Calls

Free.

He also used an app called Snaptube to download

IS videos from YouTube, including videos of executions

and mass graves.

After four days of trying to contact IS members using

his new Twitter account, he gained little traction and

decided to create a second account with a name that was

more explicit in its support for the group: the username

“Greenbird” with the handle @iAGreenBirdiA.

Khweis would later admit to FBI interrogators and in

court, the names were an open advertisement to online IS

recruiters of his sympathy for the group and his desire to

die fighting for it. “IA” is an acronym for the Arabic term

inshallah, meaning god willing, while “GreenBird” refers to

the belief that people who die fighting for IS are martyred

and turn into green birds for their ascent to heaven. One

of the agents who interrogated Khweis testified in court

that he “acknowledged that [IS] and other violent terror-

ist groups use this to reference martyrdom, violent jihad,

suicide bombing.”

Using his new Twitter account, he reached out to at least

three different Twitter users whom he had identified as

actively assisting people who wanted to travel into Syria

and join IS. The first responded to his request for help by

telling him “I am a sister,” suggesting that she was only able

to interact with and help other women.

An account named “Mad Mullah” (@martenyiii) even-

tually helped Khweis.

The account’s biography info

stated that the user was based in Syria and offered advice

on hijrah and other matters related to IS. Subsequent

investigations by the authors have found that this ac-

count was involved in helping at least one other person

travel to join the group.

This account also interacted

on Twitter with Shawn Parson (Abu Khalid al-Amriki),

a Trinidadian national who fought for IS and appeared

in one of the group’s recruitment videos targeted at

other Trinidadians.

On December 25, Khweis had sent a direct message

to Mad Mullah: “Salaam akhi [brother] do u have

Telegram?”

He was then asked to move their conver-

sation to the encrypted messaging application. On this

app, Khweis was told to download a second similar en-

crypted messaging application to which they moved and

had a detailed conversation about arranging Khweis’ safe

passage into Syria.

This three-tiered communication

approach—from Twitter, to Telegram, and finally to a

third encrypted messenger application—demonstrates

the length that IS members were going to hide their

tracks online, making it very difficult for authorities to

track their activities in real-time.

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caTeGory 3: loners

This example mirrors the tradecraft of IS travelers at-

tempting to avoid detection online as they plan their

route to the Caliphate and reach out to IS recruiters and

facilitators. This approach appears to have worked in

Khweis’ case. Based on the information currently avail-

able, Khweis’ interest in IS and his trip to join the group

was completely unknown to authorities until his arrest

by Kurdish forces in March 2016. Khweis’ journey was

only uncovered after his arrest, when he informed the

FBI of his online activity and usernames. Despite vol-

unteering this information, authorities do not appear

to have been able to access the encrypted discussions

Khweis had on Telegram and other similar applications.

Khweis was staying in his hotel room in Gaziantep

when he contacted Mad Mullah. Later that day, he

received a call telling him to meet with IS smugglers

outside the hotel. Khweis left Gaziantep in a taxi, con-

tinued on foot across the border, and then traveled into

IS-held territory in an SUV.

He was joined by other

new recruits, including, according to his own account,

three men from Paris who claimed to have been inspired

by the recent attacks in the city.

During the journey

they were instructed to put their phones on airplane

mode and, if possible, remove the batteries to avoid

possible detection.

Similar to Mo’s account, they too

were stopped by Turkish police near the border, but

were released after negotiations between the police and

the taxi driver.

Khweis in Syria

Over the next few weeks, IS members took Khweis to a

series of safe houses where he received ideological train-

ing and interacted with other travelers from around the

world. He recalled to interrogators an unusually high

number of Russian speakers from former Soviet coun-

tries.

Khweis’ first experiences in Syria and Iraq were

navigating the labyrinth of administrative bureaucracy

that IS had created in its held territory.

In the first of these safe houses, located in Raqqa, he

underwent the basic IS intake process for newcomers.

He handed over his passport and driver’s license, and his

details were entered on the Microsoft Access form that

Colonel Arkan would later recover in Mosul. Taking the

kunya “Abu Omar al-Amriki,” this is when he expressed

his willingness to become a suicide bomber.

In the second safe house, also in Raqqa, Khweis spent

two weeks undergoing religious training. During this

period, he was introduced to the details of IS ideology.

He studied alongside around 60 other recruits, includ-

ing unnamed American and Australian citizens.

also underwent a blood test intended to check him

for various diseases. Though it is unknown if IS could

properly test the sample, he was given the all clear and

issued with an official IS medical identification card.

Most significantly, however, it was also in this safe house

where Khweis was introduced to the Jaish al-Khilafa

brigade. Jaish al-Khilafa is a unit within IS tasked with

identifying and training recruits from Western countries,

with the intent of sending them back home to conduct

terrorist attacks.

Members of the unit explained to

Khweis the requirements of joining, which included



from Khweis’ account to Mad Mullah, December 2015.

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having to be single, uninjured, and willing to train in

remote locations with minimal food and water. He was

also told that when a recruit returns home, they would

have to live a reclusive lifestyle to avoid detection.

While Khweis declined to join them, he later told inves-

tigators that another American, who remains unnamed,

left with the group before returning some days later with

medical issues.

Following this, he was sent to a third location on the

outskirts of Raqqa to receive more detailed religious

training, before being moved to yet another safe house.

This facility was located in Mosul, Iraq, during the time

the city was under IS control. Staying in an abandoned

church with around 60 other IS members, for 25 days he

underwent further religious training along with some

basic medical training.

Here, he was instructed to help

care for injured fighters and maintain the residence.

While Khweis was promised that he would soon receive

the military training he sought, this did not, according to

his own account, materialize.

His final destination before he deserted was an IS katiba

(IS community) made up of fighters and their families

in Tal Afar, Iraq, where IS issued Khweis a uniform

and instructed him to carry out basic tasks. He stayed

in the katiba for about 30 days.

As part of the indoc-

trination process he was undergoing, Khweis claims to

have watched videos of apparent atrocities carried out

by the Iraqi army on IS members and civilians.

In a number of cases, when inexperienced recruits such as

Khweis first arrive, they act as apprentices to IS fighters

who pass through the safe houses, cleaning up after them,

arranging their meals, and organizing their weapons. For

many, this inauspicious and unglamorous experience

goes against the expectations they had developed before

joining. In Tal Afar, Khweis grew tired of running er-

rands and became frustrated that he was not receiving any

military training. He expressed his concerns to a senior IS

member in the area and, while he was promised things

would change, they did not. This may have influenced his

eventual decision to leave the group.

Khweis’ escape from IS mirrored Mo’s. Having gained the

trust of his IS overseers while in Tal Afar, he was afford-

ed more freedom than before, including being allowed to

leave the house unescorted. Like Mo, he claims to have

befriended a local taxi driver who helped him plan his

route to Kurdish-held territory in Iraq. Having read about

the American military alliance with the Kurdish Regional

Government and its Peshmerga forces, he correctly

Left: Mohamad Khweis’ IS Soldiers’ Bureau, Eastern Region intake form in Arabic. Right: His form in English.

68 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

caTeGory 3: loners

assumed that they would be the most likely to help return

him home to America. Aware that there were Kurdish

forces near to Tal Afar, Khweis

downloaded a number of maps

that helped him eventually find

the Kurdish controlled region

of Northern Iraq.

After several preliminary

attempts, Khweis left Tal

Afar for Kurdish-held ter-

ritory. Prior to doing so, he

destroyed his laptop and cell

phones. Khweis’ taxi driver

contact, fearful of retribution,

refused to drive Khweis all the

way into Kurdish territory.

He dropped him off at a safe

distance and made him walk the rest of the way.

While

traveling in the direction of Kurdish territory, he came

across a group of Kurdish shepherds and began speaking

to them in English, asking for help. A lost American IS

fighter in the Kurdish desert instantly drew their inter-

est. They began recording Khweis on their phones, and

the Peshmerga arrived on-site to arrest him soon after.

Khweis was held by Kurdish forces for two months until

the FBI arrived to question him. Soon after the FBI’s

arrival, Khweis was extradited to the U.S. to face trial

for material support.

In 2017, he was convicted and

sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Loners: Can Virtual Networks Replace

Physical Recruitment?

As previous sections have shown, face-to-face interac-

tions are often an essential element of the radicalization

and mobilization processes.

Loners demonstrate the

multiple paths individuals take in joining jihadist groups,

and help warn against relying on any single specific

theory or cause.

Cases of loners also shed light on how Americans were

able to travel to jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq alone,

armed only with smartphones and laptops. They did

not require any in-person contacts until they reached

out to facilitators upon arrival near the Turkish border

with Syria. While this may appear to be a remarkable

feat given the length of the

journey and security challeng-

es involved, groups such as IS

and its sympathizers online

have made extensive efforts

to provide “travel guides” for

Westerners intent on joining

them.

These guides detail the

latest and most secure com-

munication applications, the

most reliable facilitators, and

the most secure routes. In the

cases of the two individuals

profiled in this section, their

use of the internet, along with

a variety of operational security measures, ensured that

both succeeded in traveling to join IS.

Thus, the role of online communications is also per-

haps the most prevalent among cases in this category.

Several recent developments in technology (particularly

regarding secure and encrypted messaging) have proven

to be valuable tools for modern insurgent and terrorist

groups. In lieu of access to physical networks, both Mo

and Khweis utilized virtual networks to facilitate their

travel. Both men “met” the individual that was able to

assist them in traversing the Turkish-Syrian border via

Twitter. Highlighting the changing nature of IS’ use of

digital communications technology, Khweis, who trav-

eled more than a year after Mo, was directed to several

other messaging and communications platforms after

first making contact on Twitter.

The track record of American recruits using social media

as a “stand-in” for in-person travel facilitation networks

is generally poor. There are dozens of cases in which a

would-be traveler to Syria and Iraq who reached out to

others on Twitter or other platforms caught the attention

of authorities.

Mo avoided detection by waiting until

arrival in Turkey to reach out to a facilitator on Twitter;

Khweis covered his tracks with a host of encrypted

Personal property recovered from Mohamad Khweis at

the time of his arrest by the Peshmerga, including two

credit cards, U.S. dollars, Turkish lira, Iraqi dinar, three

cell phones, and a Virginia drivers license.

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messaging applications, anonymous browsers, multiple

access devices, and other cybersecurity procedures.

Finally, these two “loners” demonstrate the multivalent

impact of IS’ recruiting strategy towards Westerners,

particularly Americans. Due to their fear of legal retri-

bution, both Mo and Khweis’ accounts should be taken

with a grain of salt. However, they cited not only the

graphic, hyper-violent videos that many associate with

IS, but also the group’s other propaganda output, de-

picting the legitimacy of their system of governance and

their enforcement of Islamic law. It is essential to con-

sider the differential impact of both types of messaging,

and how they may contribute to drawing different types

of recruits.

The stories of Mo and Khweis provide several new

and unique insights into the motivations of American

travelers and the methods they used to travel to join IS.

While likely not generalizable, they demonstrate that

in the U.S. context even individuals without access to

broader facilitation networks still manage to go overseas

to support jihadist groups. Neither Mo nor Khweis, ac-

cording to publicly available evidence, were connected

to any physical recruitment network or other cases of

travel or support in the U.S. While not representative

of the broader sample—most American travelers did so

in conjunction with others—the loners reveal that face-

to-face access to recruiters is not necessary to radicalize

or successfully travel.

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Returning American Travelers

ased on the original research presented in this study,

12 Americans who traveled to Syria and Iraq to join

jihadist groups have since returned to the U.S.

This

count may not include all cases, but if the actual numbers

of returnees generally mirror this estimate, the U.S. has

faced a much smaller inflow of returning travelers than

other Western countries. In Europe, for example, it was

estimated in October 2017 that around 1,200 of the 5,000

citizens of the European Union (EU) who left for Syria

and Iraq have returned to their home countries.

As IS faces territorial decline, the concern for Western

law enforcement officials is twofold. First, travelers could

return to their home countries and re-integrate into the

domestic jihadist milieus that they left behind. They may

also participate in attacks. What is less clear, however,

is the precise numbers, roles, impacts, and overall threat

of returning travelers. Different countries—with varying

traveler contingents, unique domestic national securi-

ty situations and perspectives, and diverging political

climates regarding how the state should respond—face

different threats from returnees.

Geographic, economic, and legal barriers, in addition

to a substantially smaller traveler contingent, decrease

the risk that an American traveler will return to the

U.S. and conduct an attack. However, this assessment

of 12 known cases of American returnees, situated in

a broader review of 22 jihadist attacks in the U.S. since

2011, finds that:

•

None of these 12 American travelers who returned to

the U.S. from Syria and Iraq since 2011 successfully

carried out a domestic attack. None of the 22 jihadist

attacks in the U.S. since 2011 were carried out by

returned travelers.

•

One individual—Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud—who

returned to the U.S. from fighting in Syria and Iraq

was directly instructed by his group’s leadership to

carry out an attack in the U.S. However, he was

apprehended in the early planning stages of the attack

after re-entry.

• Overall, U.S. law enforcement and the U.S. criminal

justice system have effectively monitored, detected,

and where applicable, prosecuted returning travelers.

•

The approach to returnees has mostly been ad hoc

rather than strategically organized, and over-relies on

criminal prosecution, convictions, and lengthy prison

sentences. Due to the complexity of cases of returnees,

these options may not always be available. Moving

forward, alternative mechanisms for responding to

the threat of returned jihadist travelers are necessary

to supplant the existing criminal justice process.

Recruitment, Returnees, Reintegration:

Challenges Facing the U.S. Regarding

Jihadist Travelers

Returning Western travelers are regarded as threats to

their countries of origin because of the risk that they

may re-join and participate in jihadist networks at

home. However, in the case of the U.S. and the broader

Western context, the major questions for national secu-

rity authorities are not only if returnees will participate

in jihadist movements, but how they will do so.

These concerns were validated by the November 2015

Paris attacks and 2016 Brussels bombings, orchestrated

by IS-affiliated jihadists who returned from Syria to

conduct their attacks. Studies of earlier mobilizations

have found that experienced jihadists returning from

abroad increase the lethality of domestic terrorist plots.

However, these studies often assume the existence of

large-scale domestic jihadist networks or organized

militant Salafist groups in travelers’ countries of origin,

which returnees can become involved in upon re-entry.

Thus, these findings may not equally apply to the U.S.,

which lacks these factors.

Nevertheless, there are several mitigating factors to

large-scale re-entry of jihadist operatives into their

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reTUrninG american Travelers

countries of origin. Most will die on the battlefield—

already, European and American intelligence officials

have estimated that at least half of the traveler contingent

in Syria and Iraq has been killed.

From the remainder, a

significant number will either be apprehended by com-

peting factions on the battlefield, or arrested while trying

to return home. Some will migrate onwards to the next

major conflict.

Despite these limiting factors, travelers can and will

return home; many already have. Even in the early days

of the conflict, between January 2012 and July 2014,

300-400 travelers reportedly returned to Europe from

Syria and Iraq.

A subsequent study in 2016 averaged

statistics from EU member states and estimated that

around 30% of the 4,300 travelers from these countries

had returned.

This is not to suggest, however, that all

returnees pose immediate security

threats or should be dealt with in

the same manner. The critical issue

remains which of these returnees

intend to stay engaged with their

jihadist organizations by recruiting,

networking, and even planning at-

tacks after their return, and which

are going home after completely

rejecting their former organizations.

Across the ocean, the U.S. gov-

ernment has repeatedly expressed

concerns about the risk of American

returnees attempting to conduct at-

tacks on U.S. soil. In 2014, then–FBI

director James Comey testified that:

Foreign fighters … gain battlefield experience

and increased exposure to violent extremist ele-

ments that may lead to further radicalization to

violence; they may use these skills and exposure

to radical ideology to return to their countries of

origin, including the U.S., to conduct attacks on

the homeland.

The ongoing demise of IS in Syria and Iraq was predict-

ed to result in an exodus of former travelers, including

some Americans. However, recent assessments from

U.S. intelligence officials demonstrate that the per-

ceptions of the threat from returnees have been

updated to account for changing realities. Former

National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas

Rasmussen claimed in May 2017 that while counterter-

rorism authorities in the U.S. were “worried about being

overwhelmed by this reverse foreign fighter flow … we

have come to realize it is quality that matters, as much

or more than quantity, when it comes to foreign fighters

returning home.”

With these concerns in mind it is important to point out

that the story of IS mobilization in America is charac-

terized by a desire among adherents to join the group

overseas, rather than conduct terrorist attacks on its

behalf at home. As of January 1, 2017, 42% of IS-related

legal cases included an attempted traveler, whereas only

32% involved individuals who were

plotting domestic attacks. A simple

cost-benefit analysis for IS support-

ers would seem to point towards a

higher number of domestic attacks.

In the age of lone-actor terrorism, it

is arguably more straightforward for

an American IS sympathizer to plan

and conduct a low-level terror attack

than it is for them to successfully

travel to IS territory. The risk they

run of being killed or apprehended

on the battlefield is at least as high as

it is while planning or conducting an

attack at home. Yet, a greater number

of American IS supporters attempted

to travel to Syria and Iraq rather than

plotting domestic attacks, even as the military fortune of

the organization declined.

Nevertheless, as travel becomes an even more difficult

prospect, there may be an increase in attack plots among

those who would have initially preferred to travel. One

relevant example is the case of Emanuel Lutchman, a

26-year-old resident of Rochester, New York, who intend-

ed to travel to Syria to join IS in 2015. When Lutchman

reached out via social media to Abu Isa al-Amriki, an

IS member and attack planner in Syria, he was told to

“With these

concerns in mind it

is important to point

out that the story

of IS mobilization

in America is

characterized by

a desire among

adherents to join

the group overseas,

rather than conduct

terrorist attacks on

its behalf at home.”

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forego travel and conduct an attack in the U.S. instead.

Lutchman planned a stabbing rampage in Rochester

scheduled for New Year’s Eve 2015.

Law enforcement

apprehended Lutchman the day before the attack; he was

sentenced to 20 years in prison in early 2017.

If American supporters of jihadist groups do shift towards

primarily plotting domestic attacks in the coming years,

how would a potential influx of returning travelers to the

U.S. effect these dynamics? Contrary to initial concerns,

the emerging consensus in the academic literature is that

Western returnees are less involved in domestic terror-

ism than is often assumed. According to Petter Nesser et

al., 45% of IS-linked plots in Europe between 2014–2016

“involved one or more cell members with foreign fighter

experience.”

While this figure appears high, they also

note it represents a drastic reduction from previous mo-

bilizations. Similar longitudinal studies in the U.S. find

even fewer cases of returnees involved in jihadist plots.

Related research by Thomas Hegghammer and Nesser

also demonstrates that returnee involvement in do-

mestic terrorism is rare, especially compared to the

overall numbers of Western travelers. Their 2015

study, which examined 69 jihadist terrorist plots in the

West (Europe, North America, and Australia) between

January 2011 and June 2015, found a meager “blowback

rate” of travelers involved in terrorist plots and attacks

in their countries of origin.

More specifically, they

found that nine separate plots involved 11 individuals

who had been to Syria, eight of whom received training

from IS, and the remainder from JN or other jihadist

groups.

At the time of their research, the estimate was

that there were approximately 4,000 travelers from the

countries examined in the study. Thus, only one out of

every 360 travelers returned to their home countries to

plot attacks.

Hegghammer and Nesser also note that

IS sympathizers in the West who have not traveled to

Syria or Iraq “outnumber returning foreign fighters as

plot instigators.”

Despite this, in the rare instances where returnees

have conducted attacks in Europe during the past five

years, these attacks have been among the most lethal.

From the Paris and Brussels attacks in 2015 and 2016

respectively, to the Manchester arena bombing in 2017,

many of the attacks with the highest casualty numbers

and levels of sophistication have involved people who

traveled to jihadist-held territory.

To date, the U.S. has not only experienced fewer attacks

conducted by returning travelers than in Europe, but

some studies find that the few attacks since 2001 involv-

ing returnees are in fact less lethal than the U.S. attacks

perpetrated by “homegrown” jihadists.

This latter cat-

egory includes attackers who, while inspired by jihadist

ideology, had not traveled to join or train with a jihadist

military organization overseas. None of the three most

lethal jihadist attacks in the U.S. since the start of the

Syrian conflict in 2011—the Orlando nightclub shooting

in June 2016, the shootings in San Bernardino, California,

in December 2015, and the October 2017 truck ramming

attack in New York City—involved an individual that

traveled and returned from jihadist-held territory.

To date, none of the 12 known returned American trav-

elers from the Syrian and Iraqi conflict has successfully

committed an attack in the U.S. following their re-entry.

Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 until the

end of 2017, only one is known to have plotted an attack

following their return, acting on the specific orders

from their jihadist organization in Syria. The following

section examines this story and its potential lessons for

American policymakers and law enforcement seeking to

address the threat of returnees.

Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud

In June 2014, 23-year-old Ohio resident and naturalized

U.S. citizen Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud returned to

the U.S. from Syria, where he had been a member of

JN.

He was not immediately arrested upon his return,

and pressed forward with the plans to conduct an attack

given to him during his time in Syria.

Mohamud was following in the footsteps of his older

brother, Abdifatah Aden, who left Ohio to join JN in

August 2013 and died in battle approximately ten months

later.

During Aden’s time in Syria, he kept in regular

contact with Mohamud via private online messages. In

their conversations, Mohamud repeatedly expressed a

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reTUrninG american Travelers

desire to join his brother “as a Mujahid,” and coordinated

the funding and logistics to facilitate Mohamud’s travel.

The final step involved Mohamud applying for a U.S.

passport so that he could begin his journey to Syria.

Mohamud also told another individual that he intended

to travel to Syria to fight, and expressed his desire to kill

the soldiers of U.S. allies on the battlefield.

In April 2014, Mohamud booked a plane ticket from

Columbus to Athens, Greece, using Istanbul as a

stop-over. He never boarded his connecting flight to

Athens, and from the Istanbul airport traveled to the

Turkish-Syrian border town of Reyhanlı, following his

brother’s instructions.

Using a network of JN facilita-

tors whom his brother connected him with, Mohamud

was smuggled into Syria in late April 2014.

While in

the country, he was trained in building explosives,

using firearms, and hand-to-hand

combat, before being specially se-

lected by a JN cleric to return home

and conduct an attack in the U.S.

Before he returned home, Mohamud

appears to have already begun his

attack planning, visiting the website

for the Federal Bureau of Prisons and

searching for details on the location

of Aafia Siddiqui.

Siddiqui was a

former Boston resident and al-Qaeda

operative who was sentenced to 86

years in prison in 2010 for the at-

tempted murder of a U.S. military

officer in Ghazni, Afghanistan.

Freeing Siddiqui from

prison is a cause célèbre for Western jihadists. While it is

unclear what Mohamud’s intentions were in searching

for Siddiqui’s location, it is likely that he was researching

the possibility of planning an attack on the prison facility

in Texas where she is being held.

Mohamud re-entered the U.S. on June 8, 2014.

After

leaving Syria, he maintained contact with JN facilitators

who smuggled him into the U.S. using an unnamed

private messaging system, although the nature of these

conversations remains unknown.

Upon his return to

the U.S., he expressed his desire to target either police

or members of the armed forces to witnesses whom he

had tried to recruit.

He had also identified a military

base in Texas where he hoped to be able to capture and

execute American soldiers.

In November 2014, he even

booked a flight from his home in Ohio to Dallas/Fort

Worth airport in Texas, but does not appear to have

made the journey.

At some point after returning to the U.S., Mohamud

attracted the attention of the FBI. It is not clear how

soon after his return from Syria that law enforcement

made contact or started an investigation. According to

court documents, agents first interviewed Mohamud

about his travel overseas in February 2015.

During

this interview, Mohamud denied that he had any ties to

jihadist groups in Syria, and told federal agents that he

had never left Istanbul during his 2014 trip.

Mohamud was eventually arrested

on February 21, 2015, on a rarely

used Ohio state terrorism offense.

He was pulled over by a police

officer in Columbus for a routine

traffic violation on the night of his

arrest, and when asked to produce

identification, he gave the officer his

brother’s driver’s license.

At that

time, Abdifatah Aden was already on

a terrorist watch list, and when the

officer double-checked the driver’s

license, they arrested Mohamud on

the spot.

Eventually, a federal jury indicted Mohamud on two

counts of providing material support to terrorists and

one count of making false statements to the FBI in April

2015.

In August 2015, Mohamud pleaded guilty to all

charges. Mohamud was sentenced to 22 years in prison

on January 22, 2018.

Mohamud’s case is the only cur-

rently known example of an American who, since the

start of the Syrian conflict, returned home after receiving

express instructions and training to carry out an attack

from a jihadist group based in the region.

At present, the returnee threat to the U.S. is therefore

negligible compared to that faced by most other Western

Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud

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nations. Unlike their European counterparts, which in

some cases have been able to take advantage of open

borders in the EU and exploit refugee flows into the

continent to move more freely, American travelers have

so far found it more difficult to return home undetect-

ed. There is currently no publicly available evidence to

suggest that American travelers have slipped into the

country without the knowledge of authorities. Any who

attempt to do so also face among the most daunting ob-

stacles of any contingent of Western travelers wishing

to return home.

The current returnee threat picture in the U.S. may

change, however, especially given the likely increase in

American travelers who will be fleeing Syria and Iraq as

IS and other jihadist groups lose territory. Now, more

than any other time since the start of the Syrian civil war,

is when authorities will need to be most vigilant in their

tracking and pursuit of America’s returning travelers.

With this in mind, it is important to note that

attack-planning is not the only role that returning,

experienced jihadists can serve in domestic terrorist

networks in the U.S. As previously highlighted, certain

travelers (for example, Christopher Paul, Jason Pippin,

and Ahmad Abousamra) who returned to the U.S. from

jihadist campaigns in the 1990s and 2000s became

crucially important in assisting small-scale networks

of jihadists in the U.S. In some cases, they acted as

jihadists-cum-consultants, providing others who were

looking to travel overseas or conduct attacks at home

with information, connections, and technical expertise.

There are several cases where returned travelers served as

trans-generational links between jihadist mobilizations.

Eventually, they may travel or assist others in traveling

to another battlefield, or in some cases, lend their exper-

tise to individuals looking to commit attacks in the U.S.

If not addressed appropriately, returnees could facilitate

a future generation of American travelers.

Criminal Justice Approaches to

Returning Travelers

The U.S. responses to returning travelers from Syria

and Iraq have largely been determined on a case-by-case

basis. U.S. national security decision-makers must decide

whether American jihadist travelers who are attempting

to return home should be arrested and prosecuted. This

decision is based on two factors: clear evidence of a crime

and the traveler’s risk to national security.

At the time of their return to the U.S., all 12 known

returnees had some touchpoint with federal law en-

forcement. At the minimum, their activities in Syria

and Iraq and attempted return were closely monitored

or investigated. Some were arrested upon return to the

U.S., and others were detained overseas and returned

to the U.S. in custody. In total, nine out of the 12 (75%)

known American returnees have been prosecuted in

U.S. criminal courts following their re-entry to the U.S.

Despite some debate about the use of military tribunals

to prosecute returning travelers as “enemy combatants,”

the Article III criminal court system has so far been an

effective forum for prosecuting returning travelers from

Syria and Iraq.

Five returnees were arrested after returning to the U.S.;

four more were arrested in a foreign country and re-

turned to the U.S. in custody. As it stands today, the U.S.

and its law enforcement agencies have been successful at

identifying travelers, detecting if and when they return

to the U.S., and prosecuting them where applicable.

Overall, a compelling argument can be made that the

U.S. process, which focuses primarily on criminal jus-

tice proceedings against returning jihadist travelers, has

effectively responded to the threat. This can mainly be

attributed to the extensive and flexible legal framework,

including the material support statute and other terrorist

travel laws, that were in place well before the outbreak

of the Syrian and Iraqi mobilizations.

In the three remaining cases, the FBI monitored or in-

vestigated a returning traveler, but eventually declined

to press charges. Decisions to forego prosecution of a

returnee are complex and opaque, but in these cases,

certain individual factors seem to have influenced the

decision strongly. Tania Georgelas left Syria with her

children after leaving her husband in 2013.

Haris

Harcevic traveled with Abdullah Ramo Pazara to Syria,

leaving the country two weeks after he arrived. In both

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reTUrninG american Travelers

cases, law enforcement ultimately did not arrest or

charge these individuals with any crime.

In one case, however, a Florida resident evaded prose-

cution after returning to the U.S. from Syria, and later

traveled back to Syria and conducted a suicide bomb-

ing. Moner Abu Salha, a 22-year-old from Fort Pierce,

Florida, briefly participated in a militant training camp

in 2012 before returning home and staying in Florida for

several months.

According to U.S. counterterrorism

officials, at the time of his return to the U.S., law en-

forcement agencies had some knowledge of his first visit

to Syria, but had insufficient evidence to prove that he

fought for a designated foreign terrorist organization.

As a result, Abu Salha slipped through the cracks and

returned to Syria. Upon his return to Syria, he fought

for JN, conducting a suicide attack on a restaurant in

Northern Syria in May 2014.

However, in another, similar case,

the FBI interdicted a former com-

batant in Syria who was attempting

to travel back to jihadist-controlled

territory after his return to the

U.S. Sinh Vinh Ngo Nguyen, a

California resident, traveled to

Syria in December 2012 and fought

for jihadist groups, returning to the

U.S. in the spring of 2013.

Shortly

after his return, an undercover

federal agent posing as an al-Qaeda

recruiter reached out to Nguyen,

and offered to help him return to

jihad by traveling to Pakistan.

Nguyen was arrested in

October 2013 and later sentenced to 13 years in federal

prison for making false statements to the FBI and mate-

rial support for terrorism.

The effectiveness of these laws and strategies becomes

exceptionally apparent when the situation in the U.S.

is compared to the responses of other Western coun-

tries to returnees. One notable case is in the United

Kingdom; the Home Office estimated in 2016 that

over 400 of the country’s 800 travelers had returned,

of which only 54 (13.5% of returnees) faced criminal

charges.

Intelligence sharing, updated criminal pro-

cedures, and policies for responding to returnees have

all improved drastically in European countries since

the outset of the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts.

However,

many of these policies were adopted too late to respond

to the peak of the wave in foreign fighter travel, and

have mixed records in successfully responding to re-

turning foreign fighters. Even when criminal cases

can be brought against returning travelers in Europe,

conviction records are lower.

However, the current U.S. strategy to address the threat

of jihadist returnees is not failsafe. The de facto U.S. re-

sponse has been to push returnees through the criminal

justice system, charge them with violations of the ma-

terial support statute, and sentence them accordingly.

However, charges and sentences given to U.S. return-

ees have ranged drastically. In reality, lengthy prison

sentences have been the exception, not the norm.

To date, eight returned travelers

have been convicted or plead-

ed guilty to criminal charges,

of which seven have received a

prison sentence. Data are likely

to shift as more cases are tried,

but currently, the average prison

sentence given to returnees is ap-

proximately ten years in prison. If

cases where authorities declined

to bring charges (thus, resulting

in a returnee spending zero years

in prison) are added, the average

prison sentence for returnees in the U.S. is just under

eight years. In comparison, individuals that attempt-

ed to travel to Syria and Iraq, but were apprehended

during travel, received an average prison sentence of

14 years in prison.

When sentences given to returnees are dissected on

a case-by-case basis, the discrepancies are even more

explicit. Only three of these cases (Mohamud, Khweis,

and Nguyen) involved a material support charge; they

are also the cases in which sentences are the longest

(22, 20, and 13 years in prison, respectively). However,

“The de facto U.S.

response has been

to push returnees

through the criminal

justice system, charge

them with violations of

the material support

statute, and sentence

them accordingly.”

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the most common charge leveled against American

returnees is not material support (under 18 U.S.C.

§2339A); instead, it is making false statements (under

18 U.S.C. §1001). If convicted, false statement charges

carry a maximum sentence of five years in prison; if

the enhancement for making a false statement in a ter-

rorism case is pursued, the maximum penalty is eight

years.

In contrast, the maximum sentence for material

support is 20 years.

Thus, based on this limited sample, building materi-

al support cases against returning travelers does not

appear to be as effective or straightforward as initially

anticipated. The conviction rate may be higher in the

U.S. than in Europe, but many of the cases in the U.S.

involved lesser charges with smaller sentences. This

solution guarantees that returning travelers will be

convicted, but contrary to popular belief, prosecutors

in the U.S. cannot always rely on returnees receiving

decades-long prison sentences. Inconsistencies in

charging and sentencing reveal two critical flaws with

the way that the U.S. has addressed returning travelers

thus far.

First, several convicted jihadist travelers to Syria

and Iraq will be released from prison in the coming

years. No deradicalization or disengagement programs

currently exist in U.S. prisons. Therefore, it is worth

considering whether jihadist prisoners will reject their

ways or continue to participate in jihadist groups

following their release.

Given the potential role for

returnees to form nodes in networks of supporters,

even with convicted returnees who will spend the

next few decades in prison, it is also important to de-

termine if they are attempting to network-build while

incarcerated.

As similar experiences in Europe prove,

convicted jihadists using the prison and parole systems

as a method of finding like-minded individuals, as well

as radicalizing others, can be critical in forming future

terrorist networks.

Moreover, several of these cases show that in some in-

stances, building a material support case against returned

travelers is not possible. One substantial roadblock is

gathering evidence about a traveler’s activities in Syria

or Iraq. Sometimes, actionable intelligence cannot trans-

late into admissible evidence in a court of law. In the

proverbial “fog of war” and the constellation of sub-state

military actors in Syria and Iraq, it is often especially

difficult to determine precisely which organization

a traveler was allied with during their time in Syria

and Iraq.

In order to conclusively prove any material

support charge, or the terrorism enhancement to false

statements charges, prosecutors must provide substantial

evidence that the traveler in question had connections to

a designated foreign terrorist organization. The built-

in defense for travelers is that although they may have

provided support to a militant organization in Syria or

Iraq, they did not support a designated organization.

If a returning traveler is not deemed to be high-

risk, or material support charges are not available,

it may be worth weighing the costs and benefits of

non-prosecutorial options in addition to whichever

lesser criminal charges can be applied. To provide a

wide array of effective options, the U.S. must invest

more political and financial resources into alterna-

tive and preventative counter-terrorism programs.

This may not only decrease the recidivism risk from

returned jihadist travelers, but also provide insights

and potential solutions to countering the homegrown

jihadist threat more broadly.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 79

Addressing the Threat of American Jihadist Travelers

he challenges posed by American jihadist travelers

are varied and complex. While the data and analysis

provided in this study can help further our understand-

ing, it is also important that they are applied to future

policy and civil society efforts towards preventing jihad-

ist travel. Despite the multifaceted nature of the issue,

there are recurring themes and implications which can

be useful in forming potential responses.

Although large-scale travel has now concluded, as the

U.S. experience with jihadist travelers from the 1990s and

2000s suggests, there may be a future mobilization of trav-

elers when new battlefields emerge. Policymakers must

attain a solid understanding of the dynamics in jihadist

travel that have developed across mobilizations so that the

U.S. can respond adequately to future waves. To account

for the complexity of the threat, the U.S. must develop

multifaceted, innovative, and alternative approaches.

The risk that “homegrown” extremists will commit

attacks on U.S. soil outweighs the risk of attacks

from returning travelers.

Since 2011, there have been 22 jihadist

attacks in the U.S. None of them were

committed by a traveler who returned

from Syria and Iraq. More to the point,

only one of the 64 travelers is known

to have returned to the U.S. for the

purposes of committing an attack.

This is not to say that travelers do not

pose any threat, or that the current

approach of monitoring their activities is flawed. Yet, the

risk of attacks from returning travelers is overshadowed

by jihadists who never leave the U.S. This comparison

is not only supported by research on the traveler con-

tingent in Syria and Iraq, but studies of other jihadist

mobilizations of Americans.

However, there is evidence

from previous periods of mobilization to suggest that

returnees have assisted homegrown jihadists in attack

planning and travel. Travelers who return from Syria

and Iraq bring new contacts, skills, and status within ji-

hadist movements. Policies must be supplemented with

responses designed to prevent returning jihadists from

facilitating the plots of others.

A multi-tier classification and review system is

necessary to assess the threat posed by individual

travelers.

Overall the U.S. utilizes a provisional, case-by-case ap-

proach to returning travelers. This allows for a degree of

flexibility, but absent a framework for processing differ-

ent types and categories of travelers, agencies default to

prosecution. U.S. strategies should consider the differing

risks, levels of disengagement, and appropriate responses

to jihadist travelers.

This strategy should include tiered threat assessments,

categorizations of travelers, and a variety of responses,

spanning from traditional to non-traditional approaches.

The appropriate responses to returning jihadist travel-

ers should be determined by several

factors, such as: age, background, per-

sonal connections to other jihadists,

behavior prior to departing, their

overseas activities, and their motiva-

tions for returning to the U.S.

In addition to these variables, this

study’s three categories of travelers

can be instructive for authorities

when determining responses to each case. Are they a

pioneer or veteran of multiple conflicts? Have they built

networks with like-minded supporters in the U.S. that

may facilitate their re-entry into jihadist activity? Or are

they loners who do not have the personal connections

to reintegrate into jihadist networks? From such classi-

fications, authorities could develop a range of policies

and responses.

“The risk of attacks

from returning

travelers is

overshadowed by

jihadists who never

leave the U.S.”

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addressinG The ThreaT oF american JihadisT Travelers

The most pressing question for U.S. officials is whether

a traveler is returning for the purposes of conducting

an attack. Approaches should include threat assessments

of travelers from the intelligence community, combined

with input from overseas allies and partners, to assess

this probability.

When travelers who are planning to commit an attack

do return, the response should be clear cut: prosecution.

However, the challenge is in determining appropriate

measures for cases in which returnees do not intend to

plan terrorist attacks. Law enforcement must distinguish

between individuals who have completely disengaged

from jihadism, and those who have not. Some trav-

elers will return after surrendering to U.S. forces or

renouncing their jihadist groups. This class of returnees,

if leveraged correctly, can be crucial human intelligence

sources. They can provide a window into the operations

of jihadist organizations and other Westerners fighting

overseas. However, these travelers have their own in-

centives and disincentives for providing information.

Notably, they may view cooperation as a ticket to a

reduced jail sentence or other privileges. Nonetheless,

a record of cooperation with federal authorities may

decrease the risk of recidivism.

More perplexing cases involve individuals who disen-

gaged from the battlefield in Syria and Iraq, but not from

jihadism or their group. These are high-risk cases for

facilitation and terrorist recidivism. Law enforcement

faces a difficult challenge in assessing whether their dis-

engagement is genuine and lasting.

The U.S government also needs a strategy to respond

to travelers who held ostensibly non-combatant roles

in jihadist groups. In the wave of IS-related mobiliza-

tion, whole families traveled to the group’s territory in

Syria and Iraq. Returning women and children travelers

possess unique experiences, and may have different re-

integration needs than adult male travelers. However,

authorities should not essentialize their roles.

Women returnees, like their male counterparts, may

downplay their involvement in a ploy to receive fa-

vorable treatment in judicial proceedings. Despite this,

American policymakers should understand that women

travelers often play essential roles in the operation of

jihadist organizations. They should not be exempt from

criminal liability for their actions merely because they

are women, or because they served in non-combat roles.

The U.S. government must work with non-

governmental partners (including, psychologists, so-

ciologists, community leaders, and families) to prepare

for the return of American children who were taken

by their families or born in Syria and Iraq. While the

U.S. has prosecuted individuals as young as 15, the

Department of Justice may decline to press legal charges

against returning minors. There is currently no system

in place to address this issue. These minors have spent

their formative years engrossed in a culture that values

death and espouses hatred for the West. A process of

disengagement, or even deradicalization, is required for

these individuals.

Prosecutions are a necessary, but insufficient strat-

egy to respond to American jihadist travelers. In

addition to convictions, the U.S. government must

develop alternative responses, especially in the U.S.

prison and parole systems.

The diverse nature of American travelers and returnees

demonstrates that in most cases, criminal prosecution

is warranted. However, it is not always the appropriate

response. Article III criminal prosecution has heralded

significant successes in the response to returning travel-

ers. For instance, Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud received

a 22-year sentence, the longest for any returnee from

Syria or Iraq. Yet, these cases are exceptions to the norm.

Strikingly, the prison sentence for convicted, successful

travelers is, on average, four years less than the average

sentence for individuals who attempted to travel but

were apprehended.

Returning travelers have been convicted for several

offenses. However, if a material support case cannot

be established, remaining offenses usually carry much

shorter prison sentences. Travelers’ activities in Syria

and Iraq are disguised by the “fog of war,” and evidence

from the battlefield may not be admissible in court. Thus,

law enforcement is forced to pursue lesser charges as a

fallback. In November 2017, NCTC Deputy Director

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Russell Travers addressed the potential downside of this

approach: “if [travelers] are arrested and put in jail, the

chances are that the sentences will be relatively light in

some cases, and they will be out on the streets in a few

years … this is going to be recurring threat.”

It is worth considering the costs and benefits of this ap-

proach. The amount of time that travelers convicted of

a lesser offense spend in prison may be relatively negli-

gible. Travelers also have the potential to build networks

within the prison system, and have few incentives to

disengage from jihadism while incarcerated.

To date, two individuals who were convicted of offenses

related to their participation in jihadist groups in Syria

and Iraq have already completed their sentences. Within

the next five years, at least three more are scheduled

for release. Currently, there are no deradicalization and

disengagement programs targeted towards incarcerated

terrorists in the U.S. federal prison system. In this regard,

the U.S. lags behind many Western nations and must

make such programs a priority. The alternative—allowing

individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses

to serve out sentences without any deradicalization

programming—is a band-aid solution that relies solely

on the deterrent effect of prison sentences.

U.S. Bureau of Prisons officials have expressed concerns

that individuals convicted of terrorism offenses may

build support networks within prison and attempt to

radicalize other inmates.

European countries have had

an especially difficult lesson to learn regarding terrorist

networks that were partially or wholly facilitated in their

prison systems. For instance, several members of the

cell responsible for the 2015 Paris attacks and the 2016

bombings had previously been incarcerated, and two of

them initially met one another in the same prison.

Yet, perhaps in response to these failures in traditional

criminal justice approaches, some European countries

have developed innovative strategies aimed towards

deradicalizing and re-integrating travelers.

An instruc-

tive example is Denmark’s Aarhus model. This program

developed a four-stage process for returning travelers to

utilize counseling services provided by a consortium of

community leaders, psychologists, sociologists, former

travelers, and their families.

Another alternative option relies on the use of dis-

engaged and deradicalized returnees in targeted

interventions. This approach has been implemented in

several European countries using former members of

various types of extremist groups (including far-right

extremists, white nationalists, criminal gang members,

and jihadists).

These options, due to the personnel they

require, can fail without strict program guidelines, clear

metrics of success, and careful risk assessments.

Some American returnees have expressed disillusion-

ment with the false utopian vision offered by jihadist

groups. The U.S. should consider leveraging these in-

dividuals in a more comprehensive way. In a very select

number of cases, law enforcement should discreetly con-

sider pursuing alternatives to prosecution for returning

travelers who can use their experience to discourage

future recruits. Prior to this decision, a comprehensive

review of their intent and disillusionment with jihadism

must be implemented.

Targeted intervention programs, including those

that utilize returnees, have not been attempted on a

large scale in the U.S. However, small-scale programs

are underway to develop innovative approaches to

address returnees and prevent future recruitment.

Policymakers may consider scaling up these programs

as part of a coherent national strategy. For example,

an American returnee is currently involved in an

experimental intervention program aimed towards

deradicalizing other would-be travelers.

The returnee

has thus far succeeded in using the credibility gained

from their experience to dissuade at least one other

American from making similar mistakes. This pro-

gram is not yet part of any national strategy, and the

dedicated local officials who implement this program

receive little federal support.

However, just like criminal prosecution, such alternative

approaches should not be considered silver bullets. They

are designed to augment the criminal justice process, not

replace it. High-risk cases of travelers for whom alternative

82 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

addressinG The ThreaT oF american JihadisT Travelers

programs are not appropriate will certainly exist. For

others, however, they may be worth considering.

Regulating online services (e.g. censorship, content

and account deletion, restricting or banning privacy-

maximizing tools) may have limited utility in

countering jihadist travel-facilitation networks.

Many governments are still struggling to adapt to the

dynamic role of digital communications technologies

in terrorist recruitment. Identifying and monitoring

travelers was considerably simpler when they used open

platforms to plan their travel arrangements. In many

ways, the blatant openness of

their support provided oppor-

tunities for surveillance and a

window for law enforcement

to interject through arrests.

Recently, supporters of jihadist

groups have primarily transi-

tioned to online platforms that

offer privacy-maximizing ser-

vices (such as secure browsers,

virtual private networks, pro-

tected email services, mobile

security applications, and encrypted messengers).

The U.S. government has repeatedly raised this con-

cern. Authorities claim that as a result of terrorist

supporters “going dark,” law enforcement is less likely

to prevent individuals from traveling to conflict zones

or planning attacks. Acting Deputy Attorney General

Rod Rosenstein argued that “‘going dark’ threatens to

disable law enforcement and enable criminals and ter-

rorists to operate with impunity. When police cannot

access evidence, crime cannot be solved. Criminals

cannot be stopped and punished.”

Some European

countries have taken a more robust stance. For ex-

ample, in October 2017 UK Home Secretary Amber

Rudd introduced a plan to criminalize accessing and

viewing jihadist material online.

UK Prime Minister

Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron

have also considered laws to make social media service

providers liable for failing to remove jihadist content

from their platforms.

These tougher stances were developed mainly in

response to recent homegrown terrorist attacks in

Western countries, and were adopted well after the peak

of jihadist travel to Syria and Iraq. There is evidence

that many travelers utilized digital communications

technologies to help facilitate their journey. While some

requests for regulations on these services have merit and

may assist in reducing terrorist recruitment, they face

multiple obstacles.

The impulse to ramp up online

censorship by taking down

social media accounts and con-

tent is understandable given the

success of jihadist groups in the

online environment. Removing

jihadist supporters and propa-

ganda from Twitter, Facebook

or YouTube, now standard

practice for these companies,

helps to diminish the group’s

presence on open platforms.

In the cases of budding jihadist

sympathizers with no real-world connections to the

group, censorship may ensure that IS propaganda and

recruiters are now harder (albeit still possible) to access

and contact.

However, while there is no doubt that ease of access to

jihadist propaganda online was a factor in many cases

analyzed in this report, there is little evidence to suggest

that this was the primary motivation for their travel. In

most cases, a range of factors, online and offline, pushed

individuals to make their journeys. Even when travelers

went online, they displayed an active understanding of

how to circumvent existing censorship measures by using

lesser-known social media platforms. On these alternative

platforms, propaganda, content, and facilitators remained

easily (if not equally) accessible.

Thus, while censorship efforts will continue, they should

be done with an acknowledgement that the approach has

several limitations. American jihadists who migrated to

“While...ease of access to

jihadist propaganda online

was a factor in many cases

analyzed in this report,

there is little evidence to

suggest that this was the

primary motivation for

their travel.”

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 83

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

lesser-known social media platforms found a similar

amount of jihadist material and access to recruiters.

Mohamad Khweis’ case indicates the full spectrum of

measures that travelers have taken to not only evade

online censorship and account deletion, but also mask

both their online activities and international travel.

FBI investigators found no less than four secure call-

ing platforms, three end-to-end encrypted messaging

applications, three VPN services, an anonymous

browser, and a video downloading application on

Khweis’ mobile devices.

Attempts to counter terrorist use of privacy- maximizing

tools face even greater hurdles than online censorship.

In December 2015, then-FBI director James Comey

expressed his frustration that the Bureau was unable to

access 109 encrypted messages between Garland attacker

Elton Simpson and an “overseas terrorist.”

The issue

has also become more pressing in Europe, with demands

from politicians that popular applications which offer en-

cryption, like WhatsApp and Telegram, cooperate more

with authorities.

In response, certain countries have

requested “backdoor” access to encrypted messages.

There is no doubt that these emerging communication

tools are of immense benefit to terrorists. Encryption

and government access, therefore, is likely to be the most

complex and long-running of all the debates surrounding

extremist use of the internet. With this in mind, en-

cryption must also be understood outside of the narrow

context of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Countless

people use encryption and other privacy-maximizing

services every day, mostly for benign reasons, and it is

often an invaluable tool for dissidents living under op-

pressive regimes.

Even if it was beneficial to do so, it is likely too late to

limit access to end-to-end encryption.

Encryption is

the future of digital communications. The technology is

readily available, and new applications offering encryp-

tion are regularly developed. While possible technical

solutions—including specific backdoor access to archived

chats rather than live encrypted conversations—are

beyond the scope of this report, there are many issues

which must be considered if governments plan to regu-

late, weaken or ban these tools.

For instance, some companies offering privacy-

maximizing services will refuse to acquiesce to

government requests. One notable example is Telegram,

which claimed in a March 2017 statement that “Telegram

has disclosed zero bytes of user data to third parties,

including governments” and claimed that it has no in-

tention of cooperating with any government requests for

data.

Moreover, the incentives and disincentives that

help convince major technology companies to remove

content or share data with governments may not apply

to smaller social media providers. To counter terrorists’

use of the internet in a rapidly-shifting online environ-

ment, the U.S. government must learn how to engage

smaller (and more ideologically driven) companies.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 85

Conclusion

his study’s overview of the Americans who trav-

eled to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups offers

a number of contributions. Among them is the provision

of a new set of categories that help to add further depth

and nuance to our understanding of the nature of jihadist

mobilization among Americans. By dividing the travel-

ers between loners, networked travelers, and pioneers,

the authors sought to explain both how and why they

joined groups like IS. Not all travelers are motivated by

the same factors, nor do they follow a single blueprint

for how to successfully make the journey.

Their reasons for leaving the U.S. are as varied as their

profiles. In some cases, they were motivated to travel

primarily by their desire to fulfill perceived religious

obligations. They wanted to reside in, and help culti-

vate, what they believed was the perfect Islamic society.

Taken in by propaganda, they saw a land that was run

by the law of God, ensuring divine justice and guaran-

teeing paradise for its members. Some suffered from an

identity crisis that led them to question their place in

America and their relationships with their non-Muslim

fellow citizens. Others found themselves swept up by the

febrile atmosphere created within their peer group, all of

whom sought the excitement and adventure of fighting

together to protect fellow Muslims. However, to ascribe

one single motivating factor to any American traveler

oversimplifies a complex process. There are less tangible,

often serendipitous, causes which scholars and analysts

often ignore.

The reasons why Americans have returned home,

however, appear to be more prosaic. For many of

the returnees, life in jihadist-held territory did not

live up to their expectations. The propaganda, while

enthralling, presented an idealized version of reality,

meaning that their real-world experience upon arrival

was often jarring. Living conditions were much harsh-

er than they saw in the online magazines and videos,

and the promises of companionship and camaraderie

were rarely fulfilled. Instead, cultural clashes, bitter

in-fighting and suspicion among recruits and leader-

ship abounded. Many of the Americans had little to no

combat experience and were assigned duties such as

cleaning safehouses, cooking, and caring for the sick

and injured. This was hardly the glamorous experience

they anticipated, and some sought a way back to the

comforts of home.

In at least one instance, however, a traveler returned to

America intent on committing an attack. Abdirahman

Sheik Mohamud was trained and sent back by JN and,

had his plan been successful, it would have been the

first terrorist attack in the country committed by a

returnee from Syria or Iraq. However, this study finds

that the returnee threat to the country thus far has

been minimal. Besides Mohamud, the remaining eleven

known returnees did not attempt attacks, according to

current sources.

The U.S. is unique among other Western nations in

this regard. While many of the most lethal IS-related

attacks in countries like Belgium, France, and the UK

have been executed by individuals trained by the group,

the opposite is true here. At present, all of the major

terrorist attacks in the U.S. since the establishment of IS

have been perpetrated by Americans who did not travel

to or receive training from a group. Comparatively,

European jihadists have found it relatively easy to return

home from Syria and Iraq.

Beyond attacks, however, returnees pose several security

challenges. In prison, they may attempt to leverage their

credibility as successful travelers to radicalize fellow in-

mates. Their relatively short sentences mean that most

returnees may be out of prison in just under a decade.

Given that the Bureau of Prisons does not currently offer

any deradicalization or rehabilitation programs for jihad-

ists, there is a likelihood that some returnees will attempt

to rejoin the cause upon release. While they will likely

be subject to intense scrutiny by the probation services,

these individuals may either attempt to travel again,

86 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

conclUsion

plot a domestic attack, or help to establish local jihadist

networks. In Europe, for example, jihadist inmates have

been known to make connections to underground crim-

inal networks.

Their newfound contacts assisted them

with skills such as illegal weapon procurement, document

forgery, human smuggling, and other illicit enterprises.

The statistics provided in this report also serve as an

essential reminder of how IS mobilization has manifest-

ed itself in the U.S. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the figures

related to American travelers closely mirror those of

domestic IS supporters more broadly. Demographically,

their profiles are similar. The majority of travelers are

males with an average age of just under 27 years old.

Methodological barriers to accurately assessing the

number of women travelers notwithstanding, women

represent only a fraction of the sample size. Per the in-

formation currently available, however, women play an

outsized role and are heavily involved in creating and

cultivating recruitment networks.

The figures also reveal that the vast majority of travel-

ers are American citizens or permanent residents. The

traveler phenomenon, like the domestic terrorist threat,

is primarily homegrown. This finding is important for

the government to consider as it continues to assess

how counter-terrorism measures must adapt to this

ever-evolving threat.

Authorities are understandably concerned about the un-

certain number of travelers who remain at large.

This

contingent represents a serious threat, as some of them

may act as nodes for American jihadist recruitment net-

works. As jihadist organizations face increased pressure

in Syria and Iraq, several of them may also flee the region

and join other affiliates or associated groups.

While the findings of this study provide a firm basis

for understanding the traveler phenomenon, important

research questions remain. For instance, if researchers

can better understand why Westerners leave groups like

IS, this data can be used to inform ongoing efforts to

deter future recruitment. Research on the effectiveness

of current targeted intervention programs involving

formers, and how such interventions are conducted,

could contribute significantly to ongoing prevention

efforts in the West.

Moreover, this study has highlighted geographic areas

in the U.S. with disproportionately high levels of jihadist

mobilization. The most active location in the U.S. appears

to be Minnesota, where more than a dozen Americans

have joined or attempted to join IS. However, the dy-

namics of these types of areas are far better understood

in Europe than they are in the U.S. An important avenue

of possible future research is examining what factors are

behind the relatively high degree of radicalization they

have experienced.

This latest experience of American mobilization to

overseas jihadist groups can provide a roadmap to poli-

cymakers and the public. If history is a guide, there will

be another large-scale jihadist mobilization in the future.

The U.S. must develop a proactive and comprehensive

strategy to address jihadist travel, continuously adapting

preexisting measures while developing more innovative

approaches based on the lessons of the past six years.

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 87

Notes

Introduction

1. Authors’ interview with Federal Bureau of Investigation

officials on October 24, 2017. This number includes trav-

elers, attempted travelers, and participants of jihadist and

non-jihadist groups.

2. Hoffman, Bruce. 2016. “The Global Terror Threat

and Counterterrorism Challenges Facing the Next

Administration.” CTC Sentinel 9 (11). https://ctc.usma.edu/

posts/the-global-terror-threat-and-counterterrorism-

challenges-facing-the-next-administration.

3. The Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated

Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria

and Iraq.” 2015. New York: The Soufan Group. http://

soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_

ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.

4. Witte, Griff, Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley. 2016.

“Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as Islamic State Loses

Its Edge.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016, sec. Europe.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/flow-of-

foreign-fighters-plummets-as-isis-loses-its-edge/2016/

09/09/ed3e0dda-751b-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html.

5. Malet, David. 2013. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in

. New York, NY: OUP USA. p. 9

6. Alexander, Audrey. 2016. “Cruel Intentions: Female Jihadists

in America.” Program on Extremism. https://cchs.gwu.edu/

sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Female%20Jihadists%20

in%20America.pdf.

7. Stern, Jessica, and J.M. Berger. 2015. “ISIS and the Foreign-

Fighter Phenomenon.” The Atlantic, March 8. https://

www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/

isis-and-the-foreign-fighter-problem/387166.

8. Hegghammer, Thomas. 2013. “Should I Stay or Should I Go?

Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice Between

Domestic and Foreign Fighting.,” American Political Science

Review 107 (1), p. 6.

9. Cilluffo, Frank J., Jeffrey B. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp.

2010. “Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict

Zones.” George Washington University Homeland Security

Policy Institute. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/

files/downloads/HSPI_Report_16.pdf. 29.

10. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2010. “Violent Radicalization in

Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know.”

 33 (9): 797–814. doi:10.1

080/1057610X.2010.501423; Hegghammer, Thomas.

2010. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and

the Globalization of Jihad.” International Security 35 (3):

53–94. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00023; Schmid, Alex P. 2013.

“Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation:

A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review.” ICCT

Research Paper. International Centre for Counter-

Terrorism–The Hague. https://www.icct.nl/download/file/

ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-

Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf.

11. Benmelech, Efraim, and Esteban F. Klor. 2016. “What

Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?” Working

Paper 22190. National Bureau of Economic Research.

doi:10.3386/w22190.

12. For instance, Hegghammer, Thomas. 2016. “Revisiting the

Poverty-Terrorism Link in European Jihadism.” presented

at the Society for Terrorism Research Annual Conference,

Leiden, the Netherlands, November 8. http://hegghammer.

com/_files/Hegghammer_-_poverty.pdf.

13. Johnson, Toni. 2011. “Muslims in the United States.”

Council on Foreign Relations. September 19. https://www.

cfr.org/backgrounder/muslims-united-states.

14. Benmelech and Klor, “What Explains the Flow of Foreign

Fighters to ISIS”

15. Archetti, Cristina. 2015. “Terrorism, Communication and

New Media: Explaining Radicalization in the Digital Age.”

Perspectives on Terrorism 9 (1). http://www.terrorismanalysts.

com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/401.

16. Ibid.

17. Berger, J. M. 2011. Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the

Name of Islam. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc. p. xi

18. Ibid.

19. Other notable figures include the “Blind Sheikh” Omar

Abdel-Rahman, and the Pakistani sheikh Mubarek Ali

Gilani. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

2011. Washington DC: Government Printing Office.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Prominent figures from this mobilization include Clement

Hampton-El, who was later sentenced to 35 years in U.S.

prison for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

plot; Wadi el Hage, who is currently serving a life sentence

for his role in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East

Africa; and Daniel Patrick “Saifullah” Boyd, who after his

return from Afghanistan organized a group of six family

members and friends in North Carolina to travel overseas

to participate in jihadist formations. These cases appear to

be exceptions to the rule in terms of the 1980s Afghanistan

88 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

noTes

mobilization—the vast majority of these travelers never

returned to the U.S. Berger, J.M, Jihad Joe.

23. “Ohio Man Sentenced to 20 Years for Terrorism Conspiracy

to Bomb Targets in Europe and the United States.” 2009.

Department of Justice Press Release. February 26.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-man-sentenced-20-

years-terrorism-conspiracy-bomb-targets-europe-and-

united-states.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Jenkins, Brian. 2014. “When Jihadis Come Marching Home:

The Terrorist Threat Posed by Westerners Returning from

Syria and Iraq.” RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.

org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE130-1/

RAND_PE130-1.pdf.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander. 2011. “As American as

Apple Pie: How Anwar Al-Awlaki Became the Face of

Western Jihad.” International Centre for the Study of

Radicalisation. http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/

10/1315827595ICSRPaperAsAmericanAsApplePieHow

AnwaralAwlakiBecametheFaceofWesternJihad.pdf.

32. Ibid.

33. Jenkins, “When Jihadis Come Marching Home”

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Van Ginkel, Bibi et al. 2016. “The Foreign Fighters

Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, Threats &

Policies.” ICCT Research Paper. The Hague, Netherlands:

International Centre for Counterterrorism- The Hague.

https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-

Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-

April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf.

37. Ibid.

38. Doyle, Charles. 2016. “Terrorist Material Support: An

Overview of 18 U.S.C. §2339A and §2339B.” CRS Report.

Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/

natsec/R41333.pdf.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Rotella, Sebastian. 2016. “How Europe Left Itself Open to

Terrorism.” Frontline. October 18. http://www.pbs.org/

wgbh/frontline/article/how-europe-left-itself-open-

to-terrorism.

42. Raymond, Catherine Zara. 2010. “Al Muhajiroun

and Islam4UK: The Group behind the Ban.”

International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/

1276697989CatherineZaraRaymondICSRPaper.pdf;

Reynolds, Sean C., and Mohammed M. Hafez. 2017. “Social

Network Analysis of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and

Iraq.” Terrorism and Political Violence (forthcoming):1–26.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1272456. Lia,

Brynjar, and Petter Nesser. 2016. “Jihadism in Norway: A

Typology of Militant Networks in a Peripheral European

Country.” Perspectives on Terrorism 10 (6). http://www.

terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/563.

43. Levin, Brian. 2015. “The Original Web of Hate: Revolution

Muslim and American Homegrown Extremists.”

American Behavioral Scientist 59 (12):1609–30. https://doi.

org/10.1177/0002764215588815.

44. Vidino, Lorenzo, Francesco Marone, and Eva Entenmann.

2017. “Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks

in the West.” Milan, Italy: Joint Program on Extremism,

ICCT-The Hague, ISPI Report. https://extremism.gwu.

edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/FearThyNeighbor%20

RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf.

45. Klausen, Jytte. 2015. “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media

Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.”

 38 (1):1–22. https://doi.org/10.

1080/1057610X.2014.974948.

Methodology and Statistics

1. The Program provided U.S. government officials from

four separate departments and agencies an opportunity to

respond the findings of this report. In each instance, federal

officials declined to provide additional information on

the record, citing ongoing investigations and issues with

classifications. However, those same officials did not argue

that the release of this information would raise national

security concerns.

2. There has been an extensive scholarly debate on the method-

ological upsides and downsides of using interview data from

jihadists within terrorism studies. See, for example, Brannan,

David W., Philip F. Esler, and N. T. Anders Strindberg.

2001. “Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards an Independent

Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate

Activism.”  24 (1):3–24. https://

doi.org/10.1080/10576100118602. Nilsson, Marco. 2015.

“Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad:

Interview Evidence from Swedish Jihadists.” Studies in

 38 (5):343–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/

1057610X.2015.1005459; Dawson, Lorne L., and Amarnath

Amarasingam. 2017. “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights

into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq.” Studies

 40 (3):191–210. https://doi.org/1

0.1080/1057610X.2016.1274216; Nilsson, Marco. 2017.

“Interviewing Jihadists: On the Importance of Drinking Tea

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 89

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

and Other Methodological Considerations.” 

 0 (0):1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.

2017.1325649.

3. Khalil, James. 2017. “A Guide to Interviewing Terrorists and

Violent Extremists.”  0 (0):1–15.

https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1385182.

4. Lister, Charles R. 2016. The Syrian Jihad: al-Qaeda, the Islamic

State and the Evolution of an Insurgency. London, UK: Oxford

University Press.

5. Ibid.

6. “GW Extremism Tracker.” 2017. Program on Extremism,

December. https://extremism.gwu.edu/isis-america;

Gilkes, Sarah. 2016. “Not Just the Caliphate: Non–Islamic

State–Related Jihadist Terrorism in America.” Program on

Extremism. https://abcnews.go.com/images/US/gwu-

program-extremism-not-just-caliphate-20161206.pdf.

7. Amarasingam, Amarnath, and Colin Clarke. 2017.

“Where Do ISIS Fighters Go When the Caliphate

Falls?” The Atlantic, March 6, 2017. https://www.

theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/

isis-foreign-fighter-jihad-syria-iraq/518313.

8. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” n.d. U.S. Department of

State. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.state.gov/j/

ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

9. Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2006. “Anatomy of the Salafi

Movement.”  29 (3):207–39.

https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004.

10. Byman, Daniel. 2015. “Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS:

Different goals, different targets.” Testimony before the

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the

House Committee on Homeland Security, April 29.

https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-

qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets.

11. Ibid.

12. Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi.

2015. “Druze Clues: Al Nusra’s Rebranding and What It

Means for Syria.” , October 5, 2015.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-10-

05/druze-clues.

13. Hassan, Hassan. 2016. “Jihadist Legacy Still Shapes

Ahrar Al-Sham.” Tahrir Institute for Middle East

Policy. June 3, 2016. https://timep.org/commentary/

jihadist-legacy-still-shapes-ahrar-al-sham.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. “18 U.S. Code § 2339A - Providing Material Support to

Terrorists.” n.d. LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed

December 3, 2017. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/

text/18/2339A.

18. Fritz, Jason, and Joseph K. Young. 2017. “Transnational

Volunteers: American Foreign Fighters Combating the

Islamic State.” Terrorism and Political Violence (forthcom-

ing):1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1377075.

19. Anonymous. 2014. “I Learned to Fight Like an American

at the FSA Training Camp in Jordan.” Vice. April 3,

2014. https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/wd4xe4/

syria-deraa-USA-Jordan-FSA-regime-CIA.

20. Romero, Dennis. 2014. “The Mysterious Case

of L.A. Gangsters in Syria.” L.A. Weekly. March

5, 2014. http://www.laweekly.com/news/

the-mysterious-case-of-la-gangsters-in-syria-4487924.

21. Engel, Richard, Ben Plesser, Tracy Connor, and

Jon Schuppe. 2016. “The Americans: 15 Who Left the

U.S. to Join ISIS.” NBC News. May 16, 2016.

https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/

americans-15-who-left-united-states-join-isis-n573611.

22. The authors were the first to publicly identify Abu Hamza

al-Amriki as Zulfi Hoxha. He appeared in a segment of a video

produced by IS’ media division in Iraq in May 2017. Against

the backdrop of a weapons storage facility, he displayed IS’

newest weapons technology and encouraged sympathizers in

the U.S. to conduct attacks. This identification was confirmed

by a U.S. senior law enforcement official during an interview

with the authors in December 2017.

23. Authors’ interview with returned traveler, May 2017.

24. Engel et. al., “The Americans: 15 Who Left the U.S. to

Join ISIS.”

25. Most famously, Shawn Parson, a citizen of Trinidad and

Tobago who became an IS fighter and recruiter, took the

kunya Abu Khalid al-Amriki.

26. This statistic is based on analysis of the 52 fighters in the

sample with known ages.

27. “Criminal Complaint.” 2015. USA v. Reza Niknejad, United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Case:

1:15-mj-00325-IDD. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/

extremism.gwu.edu/files/Niknejad%20Complaint.pdf.

28. Mohamad Kodaimati is older than Kary Kleman, although

his exact age is unknown.

29. Weiss, Michael, Georg Heil, and Paul Cruickshank. 2017.

“American ‘Convert’ Who Lived in ISIS Territory Detained

by Turkey.” CNN. April 28, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/

2017/04/26/us/american-detained-turkey/index.html.

30. Ibid.

31. “Jihadist women, a threat not to be underestimated.” 2017.

General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Ministry

of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Kingdom of the

Netherlands. https://english.aivd.nl/publications/

publications/2017/12/14/publication-jihadist-women-a-

threat-not-to-be-underestimated.

90 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

noTes

32. Gaub, Florence, and Julia Lisecka. 2016. “Women in Daesh:

Jihadist ‘cheerleaders’, Active Operatives?” Brief Issue 27.

EU Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.

eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_27_Women_in_

Daesh.pdf.

33. BBC News. 2013. “US Woman Killed Fighting in Syria,” May

31, 2013, sec. Middle East. http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-middle-east-22727911.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Hall, Ellie. 2015. “Gone Girl: An Interview With An

American In ISIS.” BuzzFeed. April 17, 2015.

https://www.buzzfeed.com/ellievhall/gone-girl-

an-interview-with-an-american-in-isis.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Authors’ interview with Muthana family member, June 2016.

40. Engel, Richard, Ben Plesser, and Tracy Connor. 2016.

“An American ISIS Cell: The Story of 3 U.S. Recruits.”

NBC News. May 18, 2016. https://www.nbcnews.com/

storyline/isis-uncovered/american-isis-cell-story-3-u-s-

recruits-n573831.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Alexander, “Cruel Intentions: Female Jihadists in America.”

46. Ibid.

47. This method is drawn from other estimates of foreign

fighter travel rates, including Benmelech and Klor, “What

Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?”; and

Rosenblatt, Nate. 2016. “All Jihad Is Local: What ISIS’ Files

Tell Us About Its Fighters.” New America Foundation.

https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/

policy-papers/all-jihad-is-local.

48. To illustrate this skew, the state with the highest rate when

states with less than two travelers are included is Maine,

where there was one case of travel, but less than 2,000,000

people, only 2,000 of which are Muslims. Maine’s rate of

travel was seven times the national average.

49. States with higher rates, but less than two travelers include

Maine, Tennessee and Alabama.

50. All state and metropolitan area total population figures

referenced in this study are derived from the 2016 projec-

tions from the U.S. Census. https://www.census.gov/topics/

population/data.html. All state and metropolitan area esti-

mates of Muslim population are derived from the 2010 U.S.

Religion Census. http://www.usreligioncensus.org.

51. Cities with one case of travel, and higher rates than the cities

listed above include Birmingham, Alabama; Portland, Maine;

and Chattanooga, Tennessee.

52. Bakker, Edwin, and Mark Singleton. 2016. “Foreign Fighters

in the Syria and Iraq Conflict: Statistics and Characteristics of

a Rapidly Growing Phenomenon.” In Foreign Fighters under

International Law and Beyond, edited by Andrea De Guttry,

Francesca Capone, and Christophe Paulussen, 9–25. The

Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press.

53. Ibid.

54. Khalil, Phyl, and Michael Noonan. 2014. “North American

Foreign Fighters.” Journal for Deradicalization 1:66–96.

http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/6.

55. Bakker and Singleton, “Foreign Fighters in the Syria and

Iraq Conflict.”

56. There is insufficient evidence to classify 18 out of the 64 trav-

elers (28.1%) in the sample under a particular category.

Category 1: Pioneers

1. “Indictment.” 2015. USA v. Ramiz Ziyad Hodzic, et al. United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,

Case: 4:15-cr-00049. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/

extremism.gwu.edu/files/Harcevic%20Indictment.pdf.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. “RAMO ABDULLAH PAZARA: Srpski Ratnik I Islamski

Fanatik.” 2015. Slobodna-Bosna.ba. February 19, 2015.

http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/19266/ramo_

abdullah_pazara_srpski_ratnik_i_islamski_fanatik.html.

5. Hughes, Seamus, and Bennett Clifford. 2017.

“First He Became an American—Then He Joined

ISIS.” The Atlantic, May 25, 2017. https://www.

theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/

first-he-became-an-americanthen-he-joined-isis/527622.

6. “Waiver of Indictment/Plea to Information.” 2015. USA v.

Jasminka Ramic. United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri, Case: 4:15-cr-00049, p. 17

7. “Judgement.” 2013. Prosecutor v. Mico Stanisic and Stojan

Zupljanin. International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia (ICTY), Case IT-08-91-T http://www.icty.

org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf.

8. Ibid.

9. Sloboda-Bosna.ba, ““RAMO ABDULLAH PAZARA: Srpski

Ratnik I Islamski Fanatik.”

10. Ibid

11. Ibid

12. In 2016, a Georgia man who also served in the Bosnian

Serb Army was convicted of obtaining U.S. citizenship by

providing false and fraudulent information on a naturalization

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application and sentenced to more than four years in prison.

“Georgia Man Convicted of Immigration Fraud for Failing

to Disclose Role in Bosnian Prison Camp.” 2016. DOJ Press

Release. May 26, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/

georgia-man-convicted-immigration-fraud-failing-

disclose-role-bosnian-prison-camp.

13. Hughes and Clifford, “First He Became an American”

14. Ibid.

15. “Nihad Rosic | MMA Fighter Page.” Tapology. Accessed

November 20, 2017. https://www.tapology.com/

fightcenter/fighters/19267-nihad-rosic.

16. “Detention Hearing.” 2015. USA v. Nihad Rosic, United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Case:

4:15-cr-00049, p. 6. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/

extremism.gwu.edu/files/Rosic%20Detention%20

Hearing%20Transcript.pdf.

17. Ibid., pp. 11-12

18. Ibid., pp. 11-12

19. Moore, Doug, and Laurie Skrivan. 2013. “Making St. Louis

Home: The Bosnian Resettlement 20 Years Later.” Stltoday.

com. June 22, 2013. http://www.stltoday.com/news/

multimedia/special/making-st-louis-home-the-bosnian-

resettlement-years-later/html_dafa620f-9408-5daf-b123-

1b2ee29fda56.html.

20. Patrick, Robert. 2015. “Allegations of St. Louis Terrorism

Support Rooted Back in Bosnian War.” Stltoday.com. April

11, 2015. http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-

courts/allegations-of-st-louis-terrorism-support-rooted-

back-in-bosnian/article_0a3b08c5-29da-5f7c-ab4e-

b281f086f29f.html.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Gutman, Roy. 2012. “Bosnians Watching Syria with a

Sense of Having Been There.” McClatchy. April 10, 2012.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/

article24727666.html.

26. Azinovic, Vlado, and Muhammad Jusic. 2016. “The New

Lure of the Syrian Civil War- The Foreign Fighters Bosnian

Contingent.” Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Atlantic

Intiative. http://www.atlanticinitiative.org/images/The_

New_Lure_of_the_Syrian_War__The_Foreign_Fighters_

Bosnian_Contingent.pdf.

27. Patrick, “Allegations of St. Louis Terrorism Support Rooted

Back in Bosnian War.”

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. “Indictment,” USA v. Ramiz Ziyad Hodzic, et al.

31. “Detention Hearing,” USA v. Nihad Rosic.

32. Hughes and Clifford, “First he Became an American.”

33. Ibid.

34. “Indictment,” USA v. Ramiz Ziyad Hodzic, et al.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. “Six Bosnian Natives Charged With Providing Material

Support To Terrorists.” 2015. DOJ Press Release.

February 6, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmo/

pr/six-bosnian-natives-charged-providing-material-

support-terrorists.

41. Author’s interview with Dr. Vlado Azinovic, May 23, 2017.

42. al-Shishani, Murad Batal. 2013. “‘Obliged to Unite under One

Banner’: A Profile of Syria’s Jaysh Al-Muhajireen Wa’l-Ansar.”

Jamestown Foundation. April 19, 2013. https://jamestown.org/

program/obliged-to-unite-under-one-banner-a-profile-of-

syrias-jaysh-al-muhajireen-wal-ansar.

43. Ibid.

44. Flood, Derek Henry. 2015. “The Islamic State Raises Its Black

Flag Over The Caucasus.” CTC Sentinel 8 (6):1–5.

45. Ibid.

46. Zuvela, Maja. 2007. “Three Jailed in Bosnia for Planning

Suicide Attack.” Washington Post, January 10, 2007.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2007/01/10/AR2007011001025.html.

47. “U Iraku Poginuo Bajro Ikanović, Državljanin BiH.” 2016.

Vijesti.ba. March 23, 2016. http://vijesti.ba/clanak/

302774/u-iraku-poginuo-bajro-ikanovic-drzavljanin-bih.

48. “Treasury Sanctions Major Islamic State of Iraq and

the Levant Leaders, Financial Figures, Facilitators, and

Supporters.” 2015. US Department of the Treasury Press

Center. September 29, 2015. https://www.treasury.gov/

press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0188.aspx.

49. “Hteo Je Da Pogine U Svetom Ratu. Nismo Uspeli Da Ga

Odgovorimo.” 2014. Blic.rs, January 9, 2014. http://www.

blic.rs/vesti/tema-dana/hteo-je-da-pogine-u-svetom-

ratu-nismo-uspeli-da-ga-odgovorimo/42kr1q9.

50. “Arraignment/Detention Hearing.” USA v. Mediha Salkicevic.

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Missouri, Case: 4:15-cr-00049. https://extremism.

gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/Salkicevic%20

Arraignment%20Text.pdf.

51. Abdullah Ramo Mudzhahid, 2014. Facebook post, January 24.

52. Abdullah Ramo Mudzhahid, 2013. Facebook post, October.

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noTes

53. “Indictment,” USA v. Ramiz Ziyad Hodzic, et al.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Abdullah Ramo Mudzhahid, 2014. Facebook post, May 7.

57. Beganović, Ezher. 2014. “U Siriji Poginuo I Ramo Pazara

Iz Teslića.” SAFF, September 24, 2014. http://saff.

ba/u-siriji-poginuo-i-ramo-pazara-iz-teslica.

58. Rumiyah. 2017. “Among the Believers Are Men,” April 2017.

59. Ibid.

60. Cruickshank, Paul. 2017. “ISIS Lifts Veil on American at

Heart of Its Propaganda Machine.” CNN. April 7, 2017.

http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/middleeast/isis-american-

propaganda-editor/index.html.

61. McPhee, Michele, and Brian Ross. 2014. “Official:

American May Be Key in ISIS Social Media Blitz.” ABC News.

September 3, 2014. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/

headlines/2014/09/official-american-may-be-key-in-isis-

social-media-blitz.

62. Anderson, Karen. 2014. “FBI on Mass. Terror Suspect:

‘Don’t Know Where He Is, What He’s Doing’.” WCVB.

October 15, 2014. http://www.wcvb.com/article/fbi-on-

mass-terror-suspect-don-t-know-where-he-is-what-he-s-

doing/8209979.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. “Superseding Indictment.” 2009. USA v. Tarek Mehanna

and Ahmad Abousamra. United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts. Case: 09-CR-I0017.

69. Singman, Brooke. 2015. “Moderate Imam Reveals How

Radicals Won Battle for Soul of Boston Mosques.” Fox News.

July 26, 2015. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/07/22/

moderate-imam-reveals-how-radicals-won-battle-for-soul-

boston-mosques.html.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. “Superseding Indictment.” USA v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad

Abousamra.

73. “Affidavit.” 2009. USA v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad

Abousamra. United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts. Case: 09-CR-I0017.

74. “Superseding Indictment.” USA v. Tarek Mehanna and

Ahmad Abousamra.

75. Ibid.

76. “Government Sentencing Memorandum.” 2012. USA v. Tarek

Mehanna. United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts. Case: 09-CR-I0017.

77. Ibid.

78. Valencia, Milton. 2011. “Mehanna Friend Said to Seek

Camps for Training.” The Boston Globe, November 16,

2011. https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2011/11/16/

man-who-trained-terrorist-testifies-gave-mehanna-

associate-contacts-yemen/Xtg5EQTfJNj8RqUHC0nrRL/

story.html.

79. “Superseding Indictment.” USA v. Tarek Mehanna and

Ahmad Abousamra.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Lavoie, Denise. 2011. “Witness Says Mass. Men

Discussed Mall Shooting.” Boston.com, November 28, 2011.

http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/

articles/2011/11/28/witness_in_mass_terror_case__sought_

terror_camp.

84. “Superseding Indictment.” USA v. Tarek Mehanna and

Ahmad Abousamra.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. “Indictment.” 2009. USA v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad

Abousamra. United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts. Case: 09-CR-I0017.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Anderson, ““FBI on Mass. Terror Suspect: ‘Don’t Know

Where He Is, What He’s Doing.”

96. “Indictment.” USA v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad Abousamra.

97. “Tarek Mehanna Sentenced in Boston to 17 Years in Prison

on Terrorism-Related Charges.” 2012. FBI. April 12, 2012.

https://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2012/

tarek-mehanna-sentenced-in-boston-to-17-years-in-

prison-on-terrorism-related-charges.

98. “FBI Engages Social Media in Terrorist Manhunt.”

2012. Public Radio International. October 4, 2012.

https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10-04/

fbi-engages-social-media-terrorist-manhunt.

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99. “Wanted Fugitive Ahmad Abousamra Added to the FBI’s

Most Wanted Terrorists List.” 2013. FBI. December 18,

2013. https://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2013/

wanted-fugitive-ahmad-abousamra-added-to-the-fbis-most-

wanted-terrorists-list.

100. McPhee and Ross, “Official: American May Be Key in ISIS

Social Media Blitz.”

101. Rumiyah, “Among the Believers Are Men.”

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Joscelyn, Thomas. 2017. “How a US Citizen Became a Key

Player in the Islamic State’s Rivalry with Al Qaeda.” FDD’s Long

War Journal. April 7, 2017. https://www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2017/04/how-a-us-citizen-became-a-key-player-

in-the-islamic-states-rivalry-with-al-qaeda.php.

108. Abousamra, Ahmad (Abu Maysarah ash-Shami). 2016.

“Jews of Jihad: Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda.” https://www.

longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Arabic-

version-of-Jews-of-Jihad.pdf.

109. Joscelyn, “How a US Citizen Became a Key Player in the

Islamic State’s Rivalry with Al Qaeda”

110. Ibid.

111. “ISIS Movie Maker, Documentary Producer ‘Killed’ in Iraq

Airstrike.” 2015. Al Arabiya. May 31, 2015. http://english.

alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/05/31/ISIS-

movie-maker-and-documentary-producer-die-in-Iraqi-

airstrike.html.

112. Ibid.

113. Rumiyah, “Among the Believers Are Men.”

114. Rumiyah. Issue 1, September 2016.

115. Warrick, Joby. 2016. “ISIS’s Second-in-Command Hid

in Syria for Months. The Day He Stepped Out, the U.S.

Was Waiting.” Washington Post, November 28, 2016, sec.

National Security. https://www.washingtonpost.com/

world/national-security/isiss-second-in-command-hid-

in-syria-for-months-the-day-he-stepped-out-the-us-was-

waiting/2016/11/28/64a32efe-b253-11e6-840f-e3ebab6b-

cdd3_story.html.

116. BBC News. 2016. “US Strike ‘Kills IS Propaganda Chief,’”

September 16, 2016, sec. Middle East. http://www.bbc.

com/news/world-middle-east-37390408.

117. Rumiyah, “Among the Believers Are Men.”

118. Abousamra, Ahmad (Abu Sulayman ash-Shami). 2017.

“The Bliss of a Martyr.” Rumiyah, April 2017.

119. Cruickshank, “ISIS Lifts Veil on American at Heart of Its

Propaganda Machine.”

120. Rumiyah, “Among the Believers Are Men.”

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Yusuf, Hamza. 2016. “When Evil Fails.” Sandala (blog). July

31, 2016. https://sandala.org/when-evil-fails.

Category 2: Networked Travelers

1. McEnroe, Paul, and Allison Sherry. 2015. “Minnesota Leads

the Nation in Would-Be ISIL Terrorists from U.S., Report

Finds.” Star Tribune, September 29. http://www.startribune.

com/minnesota-leads-the-nation-in-would-be-isil-terrorists-

from-u-s-report-finds/329942131.

2. “U.S. Attorney: We Have a Terror-Recruiting Problem in

Minnesota.” 2015. NBC News. April 20, 2015. https://www.

nbcnews.com/dateline/video/u-s-attorney-we-have-a-

terror-recruiting-problem-in-minnesota-430813251584.

3. Yuen, Laura, and Sasha Aslanian. 2013. “Minnesota Pipeline

to Al-Shabab.” Minnesota Public Radio News. September 25,

2013. http://minnesota.publicradio.org/projects/ongoing/

somali_timeline.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Perez, Evan, and Shimon Prokupecz. 2015. “Minneapolis

Men Allegedly Trying to Join ISIS Highlight Role of

American Recruiter.” CNN. April 20, 2015. http://www.cnn.

com/2015/04/20/politics/isis-minnesota-arrests-abdi-nur/

index.html.

7. Ibrahim, Mukhtar M. 2017. “As Life’s Pressures Mounted,

He Left Minnesota for ISIS.” Minnesota Public Radio News,

December 6, 2017. https://www.mprnews.org/story/

2017/12/06/minnesota-isis-fighter-abdifatah-ahmed-

court-documents.

8. Ibid.

9. “Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant.”

2015. United States District Court for the District of

Minnesota. Case: 014-mj-00973, pp.8-9.

10. Ibid. Where possible, direct quotes from social media

communications are presented in their original format and

phrasing without edits to spelling and grammar.

11. “Details Emerge About Douglas McCain, American

Jihadist Killed in Syria.” 2014. VOA. August 27, 2014.

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-man-suspected-of-fighting-

alongside-militants-killed-in-syria/2429355.html.

12. Omar, Ammar Cheikh, and Saphora Smith. 2014.

“ISIS’ Douglas McCain, Best Friend Troy Kastigar

Both Waged Jihad.” NBC News. August 27, 2014.

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https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/isis-douglas-mccain-

best-friend-troy-kastigar-both-waged-jihad-n190001.

13. VOA, “Details Emerge About Douglas McCain, American

Jihadist Killed in Syria.”

14. “Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant,”

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,

p.10.

15. Ibid., p. 10

16. Ibid., p. 21

17. Yuen, Laura, Mukhtar Ibrahim, and Sasha Aslanian. 2015.

“From MN Suburbs, They Set out to Join ISIS.” Minnesota

Public Radio News, March 25, 2015. https://www.mprnews.

org/story/2015/03/25/minnesota-teens-isis.

18. “Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant,”

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

p. 22

19. Ibid., p. 23

20. Ibid., p. 23

21. Ibid., p. 23

22. McCain used Duale Khalid as his name on Twitter, and

Duale ThaSlaveofAllah on Facebook. His Twitter handle was

@iamthetooth. Tellingly, the Karie brother that attempted to

visit him in San Diego also referred to him as “Tooth.” Ibid;

VOA, “Details Emerge About Douglas McCain, American

Jihadist Killed in Syria.”

23. Ibid., p. 22

24. Huncar, Andrea. 2015. “3 Canadians Believed Killed Fighting

for ISIS.” CBC News. January 14, 2015. http://www.cbc.ca/

news/canada/edmonton/3-isis-recruits-from-edmonton-

believed-killed-1.2901146.

25. “Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant,”

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,

pp. 13-23

26. Ibid., pp. 13-14

27. Ibid., pp. 14-15

28. Ibid., pp. 14-15

29. VOA, “Details Emerge About Douglas McCain, American

Jihadist Killed in Syria.”

30. Ibrahim, “As Life’s Pressures Mounted, He Left Minnesota

for ISIS.”

31. Huncar, “3 Canadians Believed Killed Fighting for ISIS.”

32. Temple-Raston, Dina. 2017. “An American Teen Tried

to Join ISIS. Then Came His Second Chance.” New York

Magazine. November 26, 2017. http://nymag.com/daily/

intelligencer/2017/11/abdullahi-yusuf-isis-syria.html.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. “Criminal Complaint.” 2014. USA v. Abdullahi Yusuf and

Abdi Nur. United States District Court for the District of

Minnesota. Case: 14-mj-1024. https://extremism.gwu.edu/

sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/Yusuf%20Criminal%20

Complaint.pdf, pp. 11-13

36. Ibid., p. 13

37. Ibid., pp. 4-6

38. Ibid., p. 6

39. Ibid., pp. 7-8

40. Ibid., pp. 11-12

41. Ibid., pp. 9-11

42. Ibid., pp. 13-15

43. Ibid., pp. 15-16

44. Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander, and Seamus Hughes. 2017.

“The Threat to the United States from the Islamic State’s

Virtual Entrepreneurs.” CTC Sentinel 10 (3). https://www.

ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-threat-to-the-united-states-

from-the-islamic-states-virtual-entrepreneurs.

45. Hassan surrendered to Somali government forces in

November 2015. Joseph, Dan, and Harun Maruf. 2015.

“American Al-Shabab, Nabbed in Somalia, Denies IS Links.”

VOA. December 8, 2015. https://www.voanews.com/a/

american-al-shabab-arrested-in-somalia-denies-links-to-

is/3093529.html.

46. “Criminal Complaint,” USA v. Abdullahi Yusuf and Abdi Nur,

p. 16

47. Ibid., p. 16

48. Ibid., p. 17

49. “Criminal Complaint.” 2016. USA v. Mohamed Ali Amiin

Roble. United States District Court for the District of

Minnesota. Case: 16-mj-584. https://extremism.gwu.edu/

sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/Roble%20Criminal%20

Complaint%2C%20Signed%20Affidavit.pdf, p. 5

50. Ibid, pp. 5-7

51. Ibid. pp. 8-9

52. Ibid., p. 9

53. Ibid., pp. 10-11

54. Ibid., pp. 11-12

55. Ibid., pp. 13-14

56. Shane, Scott. 2015. “From Minneapolis to ISIS: An

American’s Path to Jihad.” The New York Times, March 21,

2015, sec. Middle East. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/

03/22/world/middleeast/from-minneapolis-to-isis-an-

americans-path-to-jihad.html.

57. Ibid.

58. “Criminal Complaint.” 2015. USA v. Mohamed Abdihamid

Farah et. al. United States District Court for the District of

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Minnesota. Case: 0:15-cr-00049. https://extremism.gwu.

edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/Omar%20Criminal%20

Complaint.pdf, p. 13

59. Ibid., p. 13

60. Ibid., p. 14

61. Ibid., p. 14-15

62. Ibid., p. 14-15

63. “Criminal Complaint.” 2015. USA v. Abdirizak Mohamed

Warsame. United States District Court for the District of

Minnesota. Case: 0:15-mj-00978. https://extremism.gwu.

edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/Warsame%20Complaint.

pdf, pp. 9-10.

64. “Criminal Complaint.” USA v. Mohamed Abdihamid Farah et.

al., pp. 14-16

65. Ibid., p. 15

66. Ibid., p. 15-16

67. Ibid., p. 16

68. Ibid., p. 16

69. Ibid., pp. 17-21

70. Ibid., pp. 19-21

71. Ibid., pp. 22-23

72. Ibid., pp. 22-24

73. Ibid., pp. 24-29

74. Ibid., pp. 25-26

75. Ibid., p. 26

76. Ibid., p. 29

77. Ibid., p. 29

78. Shane, Scott. 2015. “6 Minnesotans Held in Plot to Join ISIS.”

The New York Times, April 20, 2015, sec. U.S. https://www.

nytimes.com/2015/04/21/us/6-somali-americans-

arrested-in-isis-recruiting-case.html.

79. McEnroe, Paul. 2015. “Twin Cities Suspect Arrested by FBI

Was Pulled off Flight to Middle East.” Star Tribune. February

5. http://www.startribune.com/twin-cities-suspect-arrest-

ed-by-fbi-was-pulled-off-flight-to-middle-east/290964081.

80. Montemayor, Stephen. 2017. “After Prison, Will

Minnesota’s ISIS Defendants Come out Better or Worse?”

Star Tribune. July 1. http://www.startribune.com/after-

years-in-prison-will-minnesota-s-isis-defendants-come-out-

better-or-worse/432015773.

81. Temple-Raston, “An American Teen Tried to Join ISIS.

Then Came His Second Chance.”

82. Ibid.

83. Yuen, Laura, Mukhtar Ibrahim, and Sasha Aslanian. 2015.

“Called to Fight: Minnesota’s ISIS Recruits.” Minnesota

Public Radio News, March 25. https://www.mprnews.org/

story/2015/03/25/minnesota-isis.

84. “Sentencing Position of the United States of America.” USA

v. Abdullahi Mohamed Yusuf. United States District Court for

the District of Minnesota. Case: 0:15-cr-00046. p. 8

85. “Criminal Complaint.” USA v. Yusra Ismail. United States

District Court for the District of Minnesota. Case: 0:14-mj-

01047. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.

edu/files/Ismail%20Criminal%20Complaint.pdf.

86. Montemayor, Stephen. 2017. “Feds Have at Least Six

Open Cases Looking at ISIS Support in Minnesota.”

Star Tribune. September 9. http://www.startribune.com/

on-vacation-in-morocco-normandale-student-made-

break-for-isis/443462893.

87. Littlefield, Dana. 2016. “Syrian Gets 8 Years for Lying to U.S.

Officials about His Ties to Terrorism.” LA Times, March 14,

2016. http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-0315-

san-diego-terrorism-20160315-story.html.

88. Ibid.

89. “Criminal Complaint and Affidavit.” 2015. USA v. Mohamad

Saeed Kodaimati, United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. Case: 3:15-cr-01298-AJB.

https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/

Kodaimati%20Criminal%20Complaint.pdf, pp. 17-18

90. Ibid., p. 17.

91. Ibid., pp. 15-18

92. Heinke, Daniel, and Jan Raudzus. 2015. “German

Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.” CTC Sentinel 8 (1).

https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/german-foreign-fighters-in-

syria-and-iraq.

93. Ibid.

94. “Criminal Complaint and Affidavit.” USA v. Mohamad Saeed

Kodaimati. pp. 16-18

95. Heinke and Raudzus, “German Foreign Fighters in Syria

and Iraq.”

96. A minor discrepancy in Kodaimati’s account of this event

is that the U.S. diplomatic facility in Ankara is an embassy,

not a consulate. “Letter to Judge Battaglia.” 2016. USA v.

Mohamad Saeed Kodaimati, United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. Case: 3:15-cr-01298-AJB.

97. “Criminal Complaint and Affidavit.” USA v. Mohamad Saeed

Kodaimati. p. 5

98. Ibid., pp. 5-6

99. Ibid., p. 10

100. Ibid., p. 10-11

101. Ibid., pp. 10-12

102. Ibid., p. 20

103. Ibid., pp. 21-22

96 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

noTes

104. Ibid., p. 20

105. Ibid., p. 20

106. Ibid., pp. 20-22

107. “Letter to Judge Battaglia.” USA v. Mohamad Saeed Kodaimati.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

110. “Criminal Complaint and Affidavit.” USA v. Mohamad Saeed

Kodaimati, pp. 6-9

111. Ibid., pp. 6-9

112. Ibid., p. 9

113. Ibid., pp. 25-26

114. “San Diego Man Pleads Guilty, Admits Making False

Statements in an International Terrorism Investigation.”

2015. Press Release. FBI. October 29, 2015. https://

www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/sandiego/news/

press-releases/san-diego-man-pleads-guilty-admits-

making-false-statements-in-an-international-terrorism-

investigation.

115. “San Diego Man Sentenced to 96 Months in Prison for

Making False Statements in an International Terrorism

Investigation.” 2016. DOJ Press Release. March 14, 2016.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/san-diego-man-

sentenced-96-months-prison-making-false-statements-

international.

116. Krause, Kevin. 2017. “FBI Says Men from Plano Went to

Fight with ISIS and Their Parents Lied about It.” Dallas

News. October 10, 2017. https://www.dallasnews.com/

news/crime/2017/10/10/fbi-says-young-men-plano-went-

fight-isis-parents-lied.

117. “Factual Basis.” 2017. USA v. Mohommad Hasnain Ali, United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Case:

4:17-cr-00087-MAC-CAN. https://extremism.gwu.edu/

sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/MAliFactualBasis.pdf, p. 1

118. Krause, “FBI Says Men from Plano Went to Fight with ISIS

and Their Parents Lied about It.”

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Authors’ interview with returned traveler, June 19, 2017.

122. Ibid.

123. Wood, Graeme. 2017. “The American Climbing the

Ranks of ISIS.” The Atlantic, March 2017. https://

www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/

the-american-leader-in-the-islamic-state/510872.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. “Inside the Khilafa”. 2017. Al-Hayat Media Center, June 28.

131. “Factual Basis.” USA v. Mohommad Hasnain Ali, pp. 1-2

132. Krause, “FBI Says Men from Plano Went to Fight with ISIS

and Their Parents Lied about It.”

133. “Factual Basis.” USA v. Mohommad Hasnain Ali, pp. 1-2

134. Ibid., p. 2

135. Ibid., pp. 2-3

136. Krause, “FBI Says Men from Plano Went to Fight with ISIS

and Their Parents Lied about It.”

137. Ibid.

138. Williams, Michael J., John G. Horgan, and William P.

Evans. 2016. “The Critical Role of Friends in Networks

for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of

Vicarious Help-Seeking.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism

and Political Aggression 8 (1):45–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/

19434472.2015.1101147.

139. Ibid.

140. Sageman, Marc. 2011. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in

the Twenty-First Century. University of Pennsylvania Press:

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

141. Ibid.

142. “Criminal Complaint.” 2015. USA v. Asher Abid Khan,

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Texas. Case: H15-712 M. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/

extremism.gwu.edu/files/Khan%2C%20A.%20Criminal%20

Complaint.pdf.

143. Ibid.

144. “Arraignment/Detention Hearing.” 2015. USA v. Asher Abid

Khan, United States District Court for the Southern District

of Texas. Case: H15-712 M, p. 14

145. Ibid., pp. 15-16

146. Ibid., p. 16

147. Ibid., p. 16-18

148. Ibid., p. 18

149. Ibid., p. 18

150. Goldman, Adam. 2015. “An American Family Saved Their

Son from Joining the Islamic State. Now He Might Go to

Prison.” Washington Post, September 6, 2015, sec. National

Security. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

national-security/an-american-family-saved-their-son-

from-joining-the-islamic-state-now-he-might-go-to-

prison/2015/09/06/2d3d0f48-44ef-11e5-8ab4-

c73967a143d3_story.html.

151. Ibid.

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152. “Arraignment/Detention Hearing,” USA v. Asher Abid Khan.

p. 19

153. “Criminal Complaint,” USA v. Asher Abid Khan. pp. 10-11

154. Ibid., p. 11

155. Ibid., p. 12

156. Ibid., pp. 12-13

157. Ibid., p. 13

158. Ibid., p. 13

159. Ibid., p. 13

160. Goldman, “An American Family Saved Their Son from

Joining the Islamic State. Now He Might Go to Prison.”

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid.

164. This document, alongside numerous other court filings,

were sealed until October 2017. Despite no public announce-

ment of the charges or the unsealing, Program on Extremism

researchers uncovered the documents shortly thereafter.

“Criminal Complaint.” 2015. USA v. Brian Arthur Dempsey,

Sr., United States District Court for the Eastern District of

California. Case: 2:16-cr-00119-MCE. p. 2

165. Ibid., p. 2

166. Authors’ interview with source with knowledge of the

investigation, October 20, 2017.

167. Criminal Complaint,” USA v. Brian Arthur Dempsey, Sr. pp.

2-4

168. Ibid., p. 3

169. Ibid., pp. 2-3

170. Ibid., pp. 2-3

171. Ibid., p. 3

172. Documents provided to the Program on Extremism by an

Italian law enforcement source.

173. “Criminal Complaint,” USA v. Brian Arthur Dempsey, Sr.,

pp. 3-4

174. Ibid., pp. 5-6

175. The complaint was kept under seal until 2015, out of the

fear that releasing it could affect the investigation into

Person A, or that Dempsey would contact and coerce key

government sources. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

176. “Petition to Unseal Indictment.” 2017. USA v. Brian Arthur

Dempsey, Sr., United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California. Case: 2:16-cr-00119-MCE. pp. 1-2.

177. Authors’ interview with source with knowledge of the

investigation, October 20, 2017.

178. Ibid.

179. Berger, J.M. 2016. “Without Prejudice: What Sovereign

Citizens Believe.” Occasional Paper. Program on Extremism.

https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/

files/downloads/JMB%20Sovereign%20Citizens.pdf.

180. Hallissy, Erin. 1995. “Lien and Mean / Intimidation of

Government Officials with Pseudo-Legal Claims on Their

Property and the Chilling Ambush of a County Recorder

Herald an Ominous New Direction for the Anti-Tax

Movement.” SFGate. July 16, 1995. http://www.sfgate.

com/crime/article/Lien-and-Mean-Intimidation-of-

government-3028395.php.

181. Ibid.

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid.

184. Ibid.

185. Ibid.

186. Sageman, Marc. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks.

University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, PA.

187. Criminal Complaint.” USA v. Mohamed Abdihamid Farah et.

al, pp. 25-26

188. Ibid., p. 26

189. Authors’ interview with senior U.S. law enforcement offi-

cial involved in the investigation, November 2017.

190. Coolsaet, Rik. 2016. “Facing the Fourth Foreign Fighters

Wave: What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to Islamic

State? Insights from the Belgian Case.” 81. Egmont Paper.

Egmont Royal Institute for International Affairs. http://

www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/02/egmont.

papers.81_online-versie.pdf?type=pdf. Holman, Timothy.

2016. “‘Gonna Get Myself Connected’: The Role of Facilitation

in Foreign Fighter Mobilizations.” Perspectives on Terrorism 10

(2). http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/

article/view/497; Marone, Francesco. 2017. “Ties That Bind:

Dynamics of Group Radicalisation in Italy’s Jihadists Headed

for Syria and Iraq.” The International Spectator 52 (3):48–63.

https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1322800.

Category 3: Loners

1. Quotations in this section are derived from the authors’

interview with “Mo”, May 9, 2017.

2. The trial occurred in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia in June of 2017.

3. Peters, Rudolph. 2008. “Dutch Islamist Extremism: Van

Gogh’s Murderer and His Ideas.” In Jihadi Terrorism and

the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, 115–27. Farnham,

UK: Asghate.

4. Ibid.

5. Ingram, Haroro J. 2017. “Learning from ISIS’s Virtual

Propaganda War for Western Muslims: A Comparison

98 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

noTes

of Inspire and Dabiq.” In Terrorists’ Use of the Internet:

Assessment and Response, edited by M. Conway, L. Jarvis, O.

Lehane, Stuart Macdonald, and Lella Nouri. Amsterdam, the

Netherlands: IOS Press.

6. Horgan, John. 2008. “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots

to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization

into Terrorism.” The ANNALS of the American Academy

of Political and Social Science 618 (1):80–94. https://doi.

org/10.1177/0002716208317539; Wiktorowicz, Quintan.

2005. Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West.

Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.

7. For more on the enduring relevance of Anwar al-Awlaki’s

work, see Meleagrou-Hitchens, “As American as Apple Pie:

How Anwar Al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad.”;

Shane, Scott. 2016. Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and

the Rise of the Drone. New York: Tim Duggan Books.

8. Dawson and Amarasingam. “Talking to Foreign Fighters:

Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq.”

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Winter, Charlie. 2015. “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’:

Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy.” London,

UK: Quilliam.

12. Bukay, David. 2006. “The Religious Foundations

of Suicide Bombings.” Middle East Quarterly 13

(4), September. http://www.meforum.org/1003/

the-religious-foundations-of-suicide-bombings.

13. Ibid.

14. Burke, Jason. 2014. “Indian Police Arrest Owner of pro-

Islamic State Twitter Account.” The Guardian, December

13. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/13/

india-isis-twitter-mehdi-masroor-biswas-shamiwitness.

15. Weaver, Mary Anne. 2015. “Her Majesty’s Jihadists.” The

New York Times, April 14. https://www.nytimes.com/

2015/04/19/magazine/her-majestys-jihadists.html.

16. This description potentially matches Anatoli Zemlyanka (aka

“Jihadi Tolik”), a Russian ex-Neo-Nazi from Siberia who

converted to Islam and joined IS in Syria. He appeared in a

2015 beheading video. Sonne, Paul. 2015. “Russia Grapples

With Its Own ‘Jihadi John,’ as Moscow Steps Up Role in

Syria.” Wall Street Journal, December 15. http://www.wsj.

com/articles/russia-grapples-with-its-own-jihadi-john-

as-moscow-steps-up-role-in-syria-1450175412.

17. Engel et. al., “The Americans: 15 Who Left the U.S. to

Join ISIS.”

18. Omar’s real name and identity are unknown. It is unclear

whether he was a member of the aforementioned cluster of

IS recruits from the Minnesota Twin Cities.

19. Authors’ interview with senior law enforcement official

familiar with the investigation, May 2017.

20. “Government’s Amended Trial Exhibit List, Exhibits 29A,

29B.” 2017. USA v. Mohamad Jamal Khweis, United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Case

1:16-cr-00143.

21. Ibid.

22. Kheel, Rebecca. 2016. “Report: American ISIS Fighter

Captured.” TheHill. March 14, 2016. http://thehill.com/

policy/defense/272884-reports-american-isis-fighter-

captured-while-defecting.

23. Zapotosky, Matt, and Rachel Weiner. 2016. “American

ISIS Fighter Who ‘found It Hard’ Returns to Face

Criminal Charges.” Washington Post, June 9. https://www.

washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-

isis-fighter-who-found-it-hard-returns-to-face-criminal-

charges/2016/06/08/b6990ea2-efa5-11e5-a61f-

e9c95c06edca_story.html.

24. Much of the subsequent analysis of this case is based on the

authors’ observations of Khweis court proceedings, in which

details that are not found in the court documents were

revealed by federal prosecutors.

25. Weiner, Rachel. 2017. “What life inside the Islamic

State looks like for recruits.” Washington Post, June 6.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/

islamic-state-recruit-testifies-i-just-wanted-to-see-the-

other-side/2017/06/06/54853ae6-47b1-11e7-98cd-

af64b4fe2dfc_story.html.

26. “Trial Transcript.” 2017. USA v. Mohamad Jamal Khweis,

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia. Case 1:16-cr-00143. p. 741

27. Ibid., p. 678

28. Ibid., p. 798

29. Ibid., p. 908

30. Ibid., p. 622

31. Ibid., p. 579

32. Ibid., p. 909

33. Ibid., pp. 752-754

34. Ibid., p. 754.

35. The Google Mail account, mkhweis123, was created on

December 12th. Ibid., p. 952

36. Ibid., p. 537

37. Ibid., p. 537

38. Ibid., p. 537

39. Ibid., p. 692

40. Ibid., pp. 1012-1013

41. Among the physical evidence recovered by the FBI from

Khweis was three mobile phones (a Samsung Galaxy,

iPhone, and a Blu phone) and two sim cards. The phones all

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had the cameras covered by tape, presumably a measure tak-

en to prevent authorities from possibly accessing these and

surveilling his activities. The activity on Khweis’ phone that

investigators were able to uncover helped them to both map

out his route from Virginia to Syria and what his intentions

were once arriving there. Among his location searches

were a map of Gatwick Airport in London, along with

maps of Istanbul and Gaziantep in Turkey. He used Google

Maps to view the Gaziantep area and query which border

crossings were controlled by IS. These searches matched to

locations where Khweis’ phone had connected to wire-

less routers, with investigators identifying connections

at Gatwick Airport in the UK on the 17th of December

2015, in Istanbul on the 20th, in Gaziantep on the 24th,

and the border town of Elbaily on the 23rd, 24th and 25th.

He also made a number of revealing inquiries on Google,

searching names such as “Al amriki”, “Abu zak al Canada”,

“Al Canada”, “Al Canada in Arabic”, and “Al Kanadi.” Other

search terms included translations into Turkish of “how

do I get to Gaziantep”, “can you take a bus”, “can you take

a train”, “good morning” and “thank you.” “Government’s

Amended Trial Exhibit List, Exhibits 4-26, 36-42, 57-71.”

USA v. Mohamad Jamal Khweis.

42. The Apple ID 001Freedom007, registered to Khweis, was

used to create the account. Trial Transcript, USA v. Mohamad

Jamal Khweis, p. 1024.

43. Ibid., p. 702

44. Virtual private networks, or VPNs, allow users of public

internet networks to access private networks that otherwise

might be geographically restricted. Tor is a downloadable

browser which allows its users to browse the internet anony-

mously, masking their location and activity through relaying

connections via several nodes, rather than making a single,

traceable connection.

45. “Government’s Amended Trial Exhibit List, Exhibits 64 and

67.” USA v. Mohamad Jamal Khweis.

46. Ibid.

47. “Trial Transcript,” USA v. Mohamad Jamal Khweis, pp.

703-704.

48. Ibid., p. 704

49. The account he contacted was @islamispeacexxx. Ibid.,

975-981.

50. Ibid. p. 657

51. The National Investigation Agency of India, in a 2016

case, found that this account’s owner was connected to the

recruitment of an Indian national to join IS in Syria. “Charge

Sheet.” 2016

Honourable Special Court, NIA Patiala House Courts, New

Delhi, India. http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/

CasesPdfDoc/CS_RC-14_2015_NIA_DLI-1.pdf.

52. Before his death in a coalition airstrike in September

2015, Parson was a member of “the Legion,” a group of

English-speaking recruiters and attack planners who guided

supporters in Anglophone countries to travel to join IS and

commit attacks. He is connected to at least one attempt-

ed travel case in the U.S. Robles, Frances. 2017. “Trying

to Stanch Trinidad’s Flow of Young Recruits to ISIS.”

The New York Times, February 21. https://www.nytimes.

com/2017/02/21/world/americas/trying-to-stanch-

trinidads-flow-of-young-recruits-to-isis.html.

53. “Trial Transcript,” USA v. Mohamad Jamal Khweis, pp.

658-659

54. Ibid., p. 545

55. Ibid., pp. 990-999

56. Ibid., p. 990

57. Ibid., p. 997

58. Ibid., p. 992-994

59. Ibid., 999

60. Ibid., 1005-1007

61. Ibid., 1061-1062

62. Ibid., 1062

63. Callimachi, Rukmini. 2016. “How a Secretive Branch of

ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers.” The New York Times,

August 3. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/

middleeast/isis-german-recruit-interview.html.

64. Trial Transcript, USA v. Mohamad Jamal Khweis, pp.

1064-1065

65. Ibid, 734

66. Ibid., 736-738

67. Ibid., 737

68. Ibid., 1090-1092

69. Ibid., 565-566

70. Ibid., 566-567

71. Ibid., 1028

72. Ibid., 891-897

73. Ibid., 897-898

74. Ibid., 903-905

75. “American Sentenced to 20 Years for Joining ISIS.” 2017.

DOJ Press Release. October 27, 2017. https://www.justice.

gov/opa/pr/american-sentenced-20-years-joining-isis.

76. Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What

We Know and What We Do Not Know.”

77. Holman, “‘Gonna Get Myself Connected’: The Role of

Facilitation in Foreign Fighter Mobilizations.”

78. See, for instance, USA vs. Mohammed Hamza Khan; USA vs.

Keonna Thomas; USA vs. Jaelyn Delshaun Young and Mohammad

Oda Dakhlalla; USA vs. Haris Qamar; USA vs. Abdurasul

100 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

noTes

Hasanovich Juraboev and Akhror Saidakhmetov, USA vs. Munir

Abdulkader, etc.

79. Winter, “The Virtual Caliphate.”

Returning American Travelers

1. This report identifies 12 U.S. travelers by name. In 2015,

former U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper

testified that as many as 40 Americans returned from fight-

ing in jihadist groups in Syria. Reuters. 2015. “U.S. Spy Chief

Says 40 Americans Who Went to Syria Have Returned,”

March 2, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-

security-syria/u-s-spy-chief-says-40-americans-who-went-

to-syria-have-returned-idUSKBN0LY2EB20150302.

2. Barrett, Richard. 2017. “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign

Fighters and the Threat of Returnees.” The Soufan Group.

http://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/

Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-

Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017.pdf.

3. The 22 jihadist attacks in the U.S. from 2011 to 2017 are:

1. car-raMMing attack on U.s. Marines, Seattle, WA,

7/12/2011; 2. Boston Marathon BoMBing, Boston, MA,

4/15/2013; 3. aLi MUhaMMaD Brown MUrDers, Seattle, WA

and West Orange, NJ, 4/27/2017-6/25/2014; 4. okLahoMa

VaUghan FooDs BeheaDing, Moore, OK, 9/24/2014;

5. hatchet attack on new York PoLice oFFicers, New

York, NY, 10/23/2014; 6. John BaiLeY cLark Jr. shooting,

Morganton, NC 12/18/2014; 7. cUrtis cULweLL center

MUhaMMaD art exhiBit shooting, Garland, TX, 5/3/2015;

8. naVY reserVe shootings, Chattanooga, TN, 7/16/2015; 9.

UniVersitY oF caLiFornia, MerceD (UcM) staBBing, Merced,

CA, 11/4/2015; 10. san BernarDino shooting,

San Bernardino, CA, 12/2/2015; 11. shooting oF

PhiLaDeLPhia PoLice oFFicer, Philadelphia, PA, 1/7/2016;

12. restaUrant Machete attack, Columbus, OH,

2/11/2016; 13. orLanDo nightcLUB shooting, Orlando, FL,

6/12/2016; 14. roanoke DoUBLe staBBing, Roanoke, VA,

8/20/2016; 15. Minnesota MaLL staBBing, St Cloud, MN,

9/17/2016; 16. cheLsea anD seasiDe Park BoMBings, New

York, NY and Seaside Park, NJ, 9/17-9/19/2016; 17.

ohio state UniVersitY caMPUs staBBing, Columbus, OH,

11/28/2016; 18. Ft. LaUDerDaLe airPort shooting, Ft.

Lauderdale, FL, 1/6/2017; 19. DenVer transit oFFicer

shooting, Denver, CO, 1/31/2017; 20. FLint airPort

staBBing, Flint MI, 6/22/2017; 21. Lower Manhattan

trUck-raMMing attack, New York, NY, 10/31/2017;

22. Port aUthoritY BoMBing, New York, NY, 12/8/2017.

4. “TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.”

2013. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol. https://www.

europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/

eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report.

5. Hegghammer, “Should I Stay?” p. 12

6. Byman, Daniel, and Jeremy Shapiro. 2014. “Be Afraid, Be

A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western

Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.” Policy Paper 34.

Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/

uploads/2016/06/Be-Afraid-web.pdf.

7. AFP. 2017. “Islamic State: What Happened to All the Foreign

Fighters?” December 16. https://www.afp.com/en/news/23/

islamic-state-what-happened-all-foreign-fighters-doc-v76cq2.

8. Ibid.

9. Van Ginkel et. al., “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in

the European Union”

10. Jenkins, “When Jihadis Come Marching Home”

11. Comey, James. 2014. “Worldwide Threats to the

Homeland.” Statement by Director James B. Comey before

the House Homeland Security Committee. Federal Bureau

of Investigation. September 17. https://www.fbi.gov/news/

testimony/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland.

12. Rasmussen, Nicholas. 2017. “Opening Remarks- CNAS

Keynote Policy Address.” Center for a New American

Security, May 3. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/

documents/news_documents/CNASopeningremarks.pdf.

13. “New York Man Sentenced to 20 Years for Conspiring

to Provide Material Support to ISIL in Connection With

Planned New Year’s Eve Attack.” 2017. Department of

Justice Press Release. January 26. https://www.justice.gov/

opa/pr/new-york-man-sentenced-20-years-conspiring-

provide-material-support-isil-connection-planned.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Nesser, Petter, Anne Stenersen, and Emilie Oftedal. 2016.

“Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect.” Perspectives on

Terrorism 10 (6). http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/

index.php/pot/article/view/553.

17. “Terrorism in America after 9/11.” n.d. New America.

Accessed November 18, 2017. https://www.newamerica.

org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists.

18. Hegghammer, Thomas, and Petter Nesser. 2015. “Assessing the

Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking the West.” Perspectives

on Terrorism 9 (4). http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/

index.php/pot/article/view/440.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. One notable exception is the July 14, 2016 truck-ramming

attack in Nice, France, which killed 86 people. In this case,

the attacker, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, was not known

to have returned from Syria or Iraq. BBC News. 2016. “Attack

in Nice: What We Know,” August 19, 2016, sec. Europe.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801671.

23. Wright, Christopher J. 2016. “How Dangerous Are Domestic

Terror Plotters with Foreign Fighter Experience? The Case of

The Travelers: american JihadisTs in syria and iraq | 101

meleaGroU-hiTchens, hUGhes & cliFFord

Homegrown Jihadis in the US.” Perspectives on Terrorism 10 (1).

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/

view/487.

24. “Statement of Facts.” 2015. USA v. Abdirahman Sheik

Mohamud, United States District Court for the Southern

District of Ohio 2:15-cr-00095-JLG-EPD. https://www.

justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/977026/download.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. “Aafia Siddiqui Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court

to 86 Years for Attempting to Murder U.S. Nationals

in Afghanistan and Six Additional Crimes.” 2010. FBI.

September 23. https://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-

releases/2010/nyfo092310.htm.

34. “Statement of Facts.” USA v. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Gray, Kathy Lynn. 2015. “Columbus Man Indicted

on Terrorism Charges by Federal Grand Jury.” The

Columbus Dispatch. April 16. http://www.dispatch.com/

article/20150416/NEWS/304169763.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. “Columbus Man Sentenced for Providing Material

Support to Terrorists, Making False Statements to

Authorities.” 2018. DOJ Press Release. January 22, 2018.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/columbus-man-

sentenced-providing-material-support-terrorists-making-

false-statements.

45. Wood, “The American Climbing the Ranks of ISIS.”

46. Hughes and Clifford, “First He Became an American—Then

He Joined ISIS.”

47. Schmidt, Michael S., and Mark Mazzetti. 2014. “Suicide

Bomber From U.S. Came Home Before Attack.” The New

York Times, July 30. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/

us/suicide-bomber-from-us-came-home-before-attack.html.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Christian Science Monitor. 2014. “Sinh Vinh Ngo Nguyen

Sentenced to 13 Years for Trying to Aid Al Qaeda,” June

30. https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-

Wires/2014/0630/Sinh-Vinh-Ngo-Nguyen-sentenced-to-

13-years-for-trying-to-aid-al-Qaeda.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Mendick, Robert, and Robert Verkaik. 2016. “Only One in

Eight Jihadists Returning to UK Is Caught and Convicted.”

The Telegraph, May 21, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/2016/05/21/only-one-in-eight-jihadists-returning-to-

uk-is-caught-and-convic.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. “GW Extremism Tracker,” Program on Extremism.

57. “18 U.S. Code § 1001 - Statements or Entries Generally.” n.d.

LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed November 18,

2017. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1001.

58. Doyle, “Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18

U.S.C. §2339A and §2339B.”

59. Bjelopera, Jerome. 2015. “Terror Inmates: Countering

Violent Extremism in Prison and Beyond.” Statement

before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee

on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, U.S. House of

Representatives. http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/

HM05/20151028/104102/HHRG-114-HM05-Wstate-

BjeloperaJ-20151028.pdf.

60. Ibid.

61. Brandon, James. 2009. “The Danger of Prison Radicalization

in the West.” CTC Sentinel 2 (12). https://ctc.usma.edu/

posts/the-danger-of-prison-radicalization-in-the-west;

Basra, Rajan, Peter Neumann, and Claudia Brunner. 2016.

“Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and

the New Crime-Terror Nexus.” London, UK: International

Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. http://icsr.info/

wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-

Futures.pdf.

62. van Ginkel, Bibi. 2016. “Prosecuting Foreign Terrorist

Fighters: What Role for the Military?” International

Centre for Counter-terrorism- The Hague. https://www.

icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ICCT-VanGinkel-

Prosecuting-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-May2016-2.pdf.

Addressing the Threat of

American Jihadist Travelers

1. Jenkins, “When Jihadis Come Marching Home”; Byman

and Shapiro, “Be Afraid, Be A Little Afraid: The Threat

102 | The GeorGe WashinGTon UniversiTy ProGram on exTremism

noTes

of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria

and Iraq.”; Levitt, Matt. 2017. “America’s Radicalization

Problem: It’s Local.” The Washington Institute. November

1. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/

view/americas-radicalization-problem-its-local.

2. While the sample is limited, women returning travelers have

received lighter sentences than men. One women returnee

was sentenced to two years in prison, and one was never

charged, making the average sentence one year in prison.

For the six male returnees that have received sentences, the

average sentence is 9.2 years.

3. Kitfield, James. 2017. “Taking on ‘Foreign Fighters’: How

the West Tracks—and Targets—Jihadis Fleeing the Collapse

of ISIS.” Yahoo News, December 1. https://www.yahoo.com/

news/taking-foreign-fighters-west-tracks-targets-jihadis-

fleeing-collapse-isis-100045440.html.

4. “Prison Radicalization: The Environment, the Threat, and

the Response.” 2006. FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/news/

testimony/prison-radicalization-the-environment-the-

threat-and-the-response.

5. Buchanan, Larry. 2016. “Uncovering the Links Between the

Brussels and Paris Attackers.” The New York Times, March

23. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/23/

world/europe/how-the-brussels-and-paris-attackers-

could-be-connected.html.

6. “Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and

Their Families.” 2017. Radicalization Awareness Network.

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/

ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf.

7. Ibid.

8. Horgan, John, and Kurt Braddock. 2010. “Rehabilitating the

Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness

of De-Radicalization Programs.” Terrorism and Political

Violence 22 (2):267–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/

09546551003594748.

9. Authors’ interview with senior law enforcement official

involved in this program, November 2017.

10. Alkhouri, Laith, and Alex Kassirer. 2016. “Tech for

Jihad: Dissecting Jihadists Digital Toolbox.” Flashpoint.

https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/wp-content/uploads/

2016/08/TechForJihad.pdf.

11. Rosenstein, Rod. 2017. “Deputy Attorney General Rod J.

Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the Global Cyber Security

Summit.” presented at the Global Cyber Security Summit,

London, UK, October 13. https://www.justice.gov/opa/

speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-

remarks-global-cyber-security-summit.

12. Travis, Alan. 2017. “Amber Rudd: Viewers of Online

Terrorist Material Face 15 Years in Jail.” The Guardian,

October 2. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/

oct/03/amber-rudd-viewers-of-online-terrorist-material-

face-15-years-in-jail.

13. Elgot, Jessica. 2017. “May and Macron Plan Joint

Crackdown on Online Terror.” The Guardian, June 12.

http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/12/may-

macron-online-terror-radicalisation.

14. “Government’s Amended Trial Exhibit List, Exhibits 64 and

67.” USA v. Mohamad Jamal Khweis.

15. Eng, James. 2015. “FBI Director: Encrypted Messages

Stymied Probe of ‘Draw Muhammad’ Shooting.” NBC News.

December 9, 2015. https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/

security/fbi-director-encrypted-messages-stymied-

probe-garland-shooting-n477111.

16. Reuters. 2016. “France Says Fight against Messaging

Encryption Needs Worldwide Initiative,” August 11, 2016.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-internet-

encryption/france-says-fight-against-messaging-

encryption-needs-worldwide-initiative-idUSKCN10M1KB.

17. For instance, Ackerman, Spencer. 2015. “FBI Chief

Wants ‘Backdoor Access’ to Encrypted Communications

to Fight Isis.” The Guardian, July 8. http://www.theguardian.

com/technology/2015/jul/08/fbi-chief-backdoor-access-

encryption-isis; Haynes, Jonathan. 2017. “Backdoor

Access to WhatsApp? Rudd’s Call Suggests a Hazy Grasp

of Encryption.” The Guardian, March 27. http://www.

theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/27/amber-rudd-

call-backdoor-access-hazy-grasp-encryption.

18. Brantly, Aaron. 2017. “Banning Encryption to Stop

Terrorists: A Worse than Futile Exercise.” CTC Sentinel 10

(7). https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/banning-encryption-to-stop-

terrorists-a-worse-than-futile-exercise.

19. Ra, Markus. 2017. “Don’t Shoot the Messenger.” Telegraph.

March 27, 2017. http://telegra.ph/Dont-Shoot-the-Messenger.

Conclusion

1. Basra et. al., “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European

Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus.”

2. The figure in our sample stands at 28, but this is unlikely to be

the full number as it only reflects the cases about which there

are enough details to determine the identity of the traveler.

EXTREMISM.GWU.EDU | @GWUPOE

Hundreds of Americans have been

drawn to jihadist organizations

fighting in Syria and Iraq. Many

were arrested while attempting to

make the journey. The 64 individuals

identified in this study all reached

their destinations.

This study sheds light on the

motivations, methods, and threat

posed by these travelers.